Railroad Tunnel 25

Appeal Brief Appeal Letter Appeal Analysis

Appeal Brief

Disaster	FEMA-1008-DR
Applicant	Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority
Appeal Type	Second
PA ID#	037-91170
PW ID#	73902,73952,73966,77779,77353
Date Signed	1998-07-20T04:00:00

Citation: FEMA-1008-DR-CA; Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Cross Reference: Pre-disaster damage, earthquake related damages, emergency work versus restoration

Summary: Tunnel 25 is a 1.3-mile long, rail structure purchased by the Los Angeles County in 1991 for its commuter rail system. It was built in 1875 with a timber support structure; a concrete liner was installed in 1921. The tunnel floor is rock covered with ballast. In response to reported damages from the Northridge Earthquake, DSR 73902 for $1.5 million was approved as Category B in March 1994 to fund tunnel wall grouting (Phase 1) and to estimate costs for repairing the drainage system and trackbed (Phases 2 and 3). When the amount of grouting work exceeded expectations, grout liner was removed from the scope of work for DSR 73902, and DSR 73952 for $1.0 million was prepared in July 1994 for grouting (Phase 1A) and Phases 2 and 3. DSR 73966 later separated Phases 2 and 3 from DSR 73952. DSRs 73952 and 73966 were reduced by $2.5 million and $1.4 million, the respective pre-disaster budgets for tunnel and trackbed repairs, but were never approved. Upon a request for supplemental funding in 1995, FEMA reviewed the eligible project costs because it was apparent that there were considerable pre-disaster damages. FEMA suspended DSRs 73952 and 73966. The subgrantee completed work on Phases 1 and 1A, but not on Phases 2 and 3. In December 1996, DSRs 73952 and 73966 were voided, DSR 73902 was deobligated, and DSR 77353 was approved as Category E to fund eligible tunnel liner repairs ($1.8 million). Eligibility was based on incurred expenses of $4.9 million, minus ineligible mitigation work of $0.6 million, and $2.5 million in pre-disaster repair budget. The April 1997 first appeal stated that the drainage system and track were damaged during the earthquake, the use of Category E was incorrect, and the pre-disaster repair budget should not reduce eligibility funding. FEMA's responded that only the liner repair costs that exceed the pre-disaster damages are eligible and documentation did not support the existence of disaster related drainage and trackbed damage nor the existence of an immediate threat. The November 1997 second appeal made three points. First, an immediate threat existed because the use of the tunnel had increased after the disaster and there was the possibility of collapse from aftershocks. Second, FEMA deducted costs of "pre-disaster conditions" twice and that no pre-disaster budget amounts should be deducted. Third, the drainage system and trackbed sustained disaster-related damages.

Issues:

1. Were the repairs performed as emergency work?
2. Should FEMA deduct the pre-disaster budget estimates?
3. Were the drainage system and trackbed damages disaster related?

Findings:

1. No. Documentation does not support that an immediate threat existed as a result of the disaster.
2. Yes. The pre-disaster budgets for tunnel repairs are the best basis for establishing pre-disaster condition.
3. No. Documentation shows that the drainage system and trackbed were in as poor condition before the disaster as after.

Rationale: 1. 44 CFR 206.225(a)(3). 2. and 3. 44 CFR 206.223(a)(1)

Appeal Letter

Appeal Analysis

BACKGROUND
Tunnel 25 is a 1.3-mile long, single track rail structure that was purchased by the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 1991 for use in its commuter rail system, concurrently with freight use. The tunnel was built in 1875 with timbers for wall and roof support. A concrete liner was added to the tunnel walls and roof in 1921. The tunnel floor is natural rock covered with track support ballast rock. In response to reported damages from the Northridge Earthquake (January 17, 1994), an inspection team prepared Damage Survey Report (DSR) 73902 as Category B on February 10, 1994, ($1,520,000) to fund Phase 1 of a rehabilitation program.

The Phase 1 scope of work was for tunnel wall liner rehabilitation, including mobilization, site and geotechnical survey, exploratory drilling in the liner, liner tie-backs, and grouting and sealing. Phase 2 was to include drainage system rehabilitation and cleaning and resurfacing the existing tunnel liner. Phase 3 related to track and trackbed rehabilitation. DSR 73902 was approved on March 5, 1994, for the Phase 1 work ($1,520,000).

As work progressed on the tunnel lining, it became apparent that there was more grouting work than anticipated mostly because of void spaces between the liner and the rock. As a result, grout liner was removed from the scope of work for DSR 73902, and Supplemental DSR 73952 was prepared as Category B, on July 14, 1994, for the grouting work, referred to as Phase 1A, and Phases 2 and 3. DSR 73966 later separated Phases 2 and 3 as Category E work from DSR 73952. In preparation of DSRs 73952 and 73966, the subgrantee's pre-disaster budget amounts for tunnel lining and trackbed repairs were deducted from the subgrantee's contract costs. DSR 73952 was prepared in the amount of $1,040,217 and DSR 73966 was prepared in the amount of $2,050,383. However, DSRs 73952 and 73966 were never approved.

Subsequent to the subgrantee's request for supplemental funding in 1995, FEMA began a thorough review of the eligible project costs. FEMA was concerned that the original scope of work far exceeded repairs necessary due to the disaster, as questions arose regarding the facility's pre-disaster condition. Accordingly, FEMA suspended DSRs 73952 and 73966. At that time, the subgrantee had completed work on Phase 1 and 1A, but not on Phase 2 and 3. In December 1996, upon completion of the review, DSRs 73952 and 73966 were voided, DSR 77779 was approved to deobligate DSR 73902, and DSR 77353 was approved as Category E, to fund all eligible tunnel liner repairs and stabilization expenses ($1,802,986) based on the following:

Total expenses submitted by subgrantee for Tunnel 25		$4,953,255
(Less)	-Mitigation work	($372,500)
y	-Rail and ballast not used, but delivered to site	($237,089)
y	-Budgeted tunnel lining/stabilization costs	($2,540,680)
Total eligible expenses		$1,802,986

First Appeal
On June 4, 1997, the State of California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) transmitted the subgrantee's April 10, 1997, first appeal. The subgrantee stated that it did not concur with FEMA's deobligation of funds, and voiding of DSRs 73952 and 73966. Specifically, the subgrantee stated that the drainage system and track were damaged during the earthquake, the conversion of the category from B to E was not correct, and the reduction of funding based on the subgrantee's pre-disaster repair budget was inappropriate. OES concurred with the subgrantee's request.

The Federal Coordinating Officer's response dated September 9, 1997, provided considerable detail (a 10 page first appeal analysis) to uphold the previous FEMA decision. FEMA held that the liner did incur damages as a result of the disaster, however, pre-disaster damages existed to the liner. Therefore, the pre-disaster budgeted amount for repairs to the tunnel was deducted from the cost of the actual repairs. FEMA also maintained that documentation did not support a determination that the drainage and trackbed repairs were a result of damages from the disaster, but rather were due to pre-disaster conditions. On the issue of the category of work, FEMA took the position that the documentation did not support that an immediate threat existed, and, therefore, work was performed as permanent repairs, or Category E.

Second Appeal
With a January 16, 1998, letter, OES transmitted the subgrantee's November 20, 1997, second appeal. The subgrantee's appeal made three primary points. First, it maintained that repairs to the tunnel were performed as an emergency measure because the use of the tunnel had increased after the disaster and repairs were "performed to eliminate the immediate danger" of collapse from an aftershock or another earthquake. Second, the subgrantee disputed FEMA's claim that "pre-disaster conditions were budgeted for repair," stating that the pre-disaster budget was deducted twice by FEMA and that no pre-disaster budget amounts should be deducted. Third, it disputes FEMA's statement that the drainage system and trackbed was not damaged by the disaster.

DISCUSSION
Emergency Work versus Restorative Work
The subgrantee cites the increased regional dependence on the tunnel and increased passenger traffic after the disaster, low rail speeds, and concern for aftershocks and another earthquake as a basis for the eligibility of emergency work on the tunnel. However, no information was provided to establish an immediate threat and to support a revision to Category B, emergency work. Tunnel liner work did little to add to the structural integrity of the tunnel to "prevent a collapse" resulting from an aftershock or a future earthquake. Further, the work did not begin until well after aftershocks were likely to occur. The subgrantee states that the rail service speed was less than 10 miles per hour to prevent double-deck passenger cars from hitting the tunnel walls. The reduction in speed alone alleviated concerns about safety. However, the documentation submitted does not demonstrate the change in the use of double-deck cars after the disaster or the speed limit after the disaster. Documentation does support that the track was in disrepair prior to the disaster and that the disaster

did not necessarily worsen the condition of the track. With further regards to double-deck cars, an April 1994 memorandum by the subgrantee demonstrates that the subgrantee had difficulty in running double-deck cars through the tunnel. It states that "Southern Pacific has expressed an interest in increasing the vertical dimension in order to transport `double stacks' of intermodal containers."

In summary, no immediate threat was documented due to any changed condition resulting from the disaster and the eligible work is appropriately classified as Category E, permanent restoration.

Pre-disaster Condition and Disaster-Related Damages
The subgrantee disputes the eligibility reductions based on the pre-d p deducted twice from eligible work. The pre-disaster budgets are the best basis available to establish the pre-disaster condition of the tunnel. FEMA's funding of the tunnel liner repairs is based on a presumed contribution the disaster had in exacerbating the pre-disaster condition of the tunnel. In fact, the pre-disaster damages are well documented in comparison to the disaster related damages. Further, it is likely that the repairs performed after the disaster were performed with much more knowledge of extensive repairs needed to the tunnel liner than was known prior to the disaster. Specifically, large voids of up to two feet were discovered between the grout liner and the natural tunnel wall (rock). It is highly unlikely that these voids were created by the disaster. Rather, it is likely that they were in place following the grout lining of the tunnel in 1920-21. The only disaster identified damages appear to be increased chipping and cracking of concrete where the re-bar is close enough to the inside surface of the tunnel wall and the new horizontal seepage line at the construction joint between the footing and the wall of the tunnel liner. A May 1, 1995, memorandum from the subgrantee to FEMA confirms that the pre-disaster budget allocations used by FEMA are appropriate. The subgrantee stated that the pre-disaster budget was deducted twice in the preparation of DSRs 73966 and 77353. In the determination of eligible funding, as shown in the cost analysis in the background section of this analysis, the pre-disaster budget for tunnel lining was deducted once. Similarly, the pre-disaster budget was deducted only once in the preparation of DSR 77353. DSR 73966 was voided prior to approval of DSR 77353. Therefore, no duplicate deduction occurred.

FEMA believes that the tunnel drainage system and the trackbed did not incur disaster damages. The subgrantee bases its request for eligibility of repairs largely on an observation made in a November 1993 inspection report by Paul Eller: "A horizontal water seepage line of considerable length had developed at the construction joint between the footing and the wall. This seepage line was as not present before the earthquake." Several documents establish that prior to the disaster, the track drainage and track itself was in disrepair. Specifically, inspection documents establish that seepage into the tunnel occurred and that drainage from the tunnel was poor. The poor drainage contributed to decay of the trackbed and softening of the natural rock beneath the track, thus reducing track stability, as is documented by the subgrantee and by Shannon & Wilson in April 1994.

The disaster did not appear to cause an increase in seepage, as is documented in an April 25, 1994, letter from a geotechnical consultant to the construction contractor, which stated that "the tunnel appears to be drier than our notes from our 1989 visit indicate," and that the "existing seeps . are manifested as drips to barely coherent flows. No steady, strong flows were observed, nor were crown seeps observed that might indicate a high groundwater level above the tunnel." Review of these documents supports our conclusion that seepage into the tunnel and trackbed occurred long before the disaster and was not increased by the disaster.

CONCLUSION
We conclude from our review of all documentation that FEMA appropriately deducted the budgeted amount for pre-disaster damages to the tunnel. The subgrantee has not provided documentation to support either that an immediate threat existed or that the track and trackbed were damaged as a result of the disaster. Therefore, FEMA funding is appropriately limited to the repair of the tunnel lining made eligible in DSR 77353. Accordingly, the appeal is denied.