The OCIA to the Response and Recovery FIOP describes the process and organizational constructs that will be utilized by Federal departments and agencies for responding to oil spills or chemical release threats or incidents. Other stakeholders such as SLTT government agencies; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector may also find the OCIA to be a useful document that supports and complements their planning efforts in responding to and recovering from nationally significant or large-scale chemical incidents.
The OCIA complements the Response and Recovery FIOP by providing additional federal guidance specific to oil/chemical incidents, including spills and releases (in the air, ground, and water/maritime domains), along with major chemical HAZMAT-related fires and explosions. In addition, the OCIA mirrors the FIOP by using a similar concept of operations for delivering response and recovery core capabilities during an incident while highlighting the unique attributes of oil/chemical incidents of various types, including acts of terrorism.
Under the Response and Recovery FIOP, incident operations are divided into phases as shown in Figure 1: Phase 1 (Pre-incident), Phase 2 (Response), and Phase 3 (Recovery).
Per the OCIA, operational activities corresponding to the operational phases for the response to and recovery from a chemical incident vary based upon the size, scope, and complexity of the incident, as well as the specific authorities used to manage the incident. As appropriate, operational phases may be adjusted, based on local conditions, to address the expected incident-specific environment and multi- jurisdictional resource needs. Additionally, the response to and recovery from a large-scale chemical incident typically will be characterized by multiple remediation and site re-occupation decisions and activities that may overlap or occur concurrently, so the concept of an absolute, strict step-by-step process or strict “linear” adherence to the operational phases presented above is not the intent. Rather, these phases above represent general groupings of activities that correspond to more generalized segments of the incident timeline. Chemical incident response and recovery must be conditioned by flexibility regarding the specifics of the incident at hand, with various operational phases overlapping to some degree.
Under Phase 1a (Normal Operations), FSLTT agencies, NGOs, and private-sector stakeholders assess risks, coordinate with each other, plan and train for chemical incidents, and maintain ongoing situational awareness. Phase 1b (Elevated Threat) &1c (Credible Threat) activities generally include, but are not limited to:
- Monitoring and assessing suspicious activities reports.
- Analyzing and modeling potential incident impacts to chemical infrastructure, analyzing the market impacts to the economy, and determining the effects of disruption to other critical infrastructure (CI) of a potential threat or incident.
- Conducting regular coordination calls among EPA, USCG, and other appropriate federal agencies and obtaining situational awareness and discussing threat reporting with chemical and other potentially affected industry representatives and SLTT agencies.
- Determining through the FBI if a potential threat is related to crime or terrorism and sharing that information with SLTT law enforcement and other relevant response-based teams (e.g., HAZMAT teams, etc.).
Phases 2a and 2b (Immediate Response and Deployment) involve multi-source incident notification/reporting, operational coordination between federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies, SLTT agencies, and private-sector entities and a host of other actions focused on saving lives, meeting basic human needs, protecting the environment, and supporting initial recovery activities. These phases also include taking action to make an initial characterization of the incident (including determining general extent of contamination), formulating initial protective actions recommendations for responders and the public based on existing FSLTT regulations, deploying specialized teams and assets, conducting initial impact assessments, providing medical and logistics augmentation, sharing incident- related information, etc.
Phase 2c (Sustained Response) normally covers a period of approximately 30 days that extends from the onset of the incident. Key activities conducted in this phase include, but are not limited to:
- Coordination among FSLTT governments, RPs, and other affected entities to identify potential cascading impacts and stabilize key community lifelines.
- Continued support to first responder and public needs including, but not limited to, ensuring personal safety and protection, containing damage to the environment, supporting mass care operations, and communicating critical information to the public including estimated time of remediation, addressing hazardous waste issues, etc.
- Coordination to ensure public protective measures conform to environmental modeling and established protective action recommendations.
Phase 3 (Long-term Recovery Operations) typically begin during the response phases (Phases 2a through 2c) and include preparations to support longer-term health and safety needs, assessment of long-term damage and mitigation options, infrastructure restoration, and longer-term environmental remediation. Each SLTT government defines its own goals for successful recovery based on its circumstances, challenges, vision, and priorities. Such goals generally include ensuring the return of displaced survivors, reestablishment of essential services, and the remediation of key environmental issues. Recovery activities may last for an extended period of months or years.
In most chemical incidents, the transition from response to recovery operations is not necessarily clear, and consequence management begins within response as decisions are made in real time. Such decisions also ultimately impact the recovery process. Hence, decision-makers should consider the longer-range consequences that decisions made in the earlier phases of the response may have on later phases. For example, protection levels that were selected to protect first-responders during Phases 2a and b of the response may not be sufficient for the longer-term exposures that could occur during resumed use/re-occupancy of a contaminated site.