alert - warning

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3.2 Critical Infrastructure

Developing a baseline knowledge and record of regional critical infrastructure assets and characteristics will help create a pre-incident inventory of vulnerable critical infrastructure and key resources. Data and expertise from the following sources can be leveraged to support community preparedness when identifying local key infrastructure:

  • Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data (HIFLD), which provides infrastructure geospatial information
  • Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Protective Security Advisor (PSA) program, which provides critical infrastructure protection and vulnerability mitigation SMEs and can link the jurisdiction to CISA’s infrastructure protection resources and services

Once the critical infrastructure and key resources that are vulnerable to chemical incidents have been identified, temporary alternative infrastructure solutions (transportation, water, energy, communication) can be explored. These alternatives can be activated when primary systems or access/delivery routes are unavailable or overwhelmed. For example, plans can be made for the provision of an alternative water supply. Implementation of these plans would immediately reduce the public’s exposure to contaminated household water and could be continued until local authorities can provide a permanent remedy.

FEMA’s Community Lifelines construct may be helpful in organizing infrastructure threat and hazard identification and risk assessments. Lifelines describe the critical services within a community that must be stabilized or re-established to alleviate threats to life and property, and include water, energy, communications, and transportation. Community lifelines frame incident information to provide decision-makers with impact statements and summarize the root causes of disruptions to lifeline services. Utilizing the lifelines construct for preparedness and protection should work to maximize the effectiveness of key infrastructure restoration activities when an incident occurs.

Graphic
Figure 27: FEMA Community Lifelines
Figure 27: FEMA Community Lifelines

A pre-incident prioritization of critical infrastructure restoration should also be created based on the inventory of regional critical infrastructure assets and characteristics. Such prioritization is important since re-establishing critical infrastructure within the affected areas will support ongoing emergency response operations, life-sustainment, community functionality, and a transition to recovery. Pre-established plans can be generated based on existing plans for infrastructure prioritization, and can be tailored for specific chemical release incidents. These plans should include milestone requirements for restoration of high-priority services/assets given the benefits that result from the restoration of each critical service/ asset when it is made available again. The Community Lifelines construct should again be a useful tool in determining prioritization for the stabilization of fundamental services after an incident, with considerations for contingency response solutions as well as re-establishment of lifeline services.

The prioritization of the restoration of service of various elements of critical infrastructure should go beyond the level of “sector” (water, energy, communications, transportation) to also include the type of customer. In addressing the restoration of service, plans should also prioritize the re-entry (return) of essential personnel for critical infrastructure restoration purposes in situations in which widespread evacuations are needed due to a major chemical incident or a natural disaster with a wide area footprint. For example, hurricane-prone communities in Louisiana have codified plans for repopulation following a large-scale disaster that requires a mass evacuation. The re-entry plan of Jefferson Parish, LA, has tiers for which groups are allowed back: first, first responders; second, staff of primary critical infrastructure and major utility companies, and relevant government staff and contractors; third, assessment teams representing major companies and employers; fourth, economically vital and/or essential business owners and designated employees; and finally, the general public.

The impacts of a wide-area chemical scenario on regional critical infrastructure and function can be identified, understood, and accounted for pre-incident. For example, contamination of a port area will disrupt shipping and transportation functions. A pre-incident plan for assessing the nature and extent of critical supply chain disruptions as well as their potential impacts on manufacturing, agriculture, and energy facilities’ operations, including distribution of their products (e.g., electric power, fuels), should be developed. This activity should begin with identifying supply chains for critical resources and potential chemical release-based interruption points of those supply chains.

Good response planning must consider the issues, operational realities, and constraints facing the emergency response capabilities in each community. Based on its own circumstances, each community may reasonably adopt different response strategies based on the same technical analysis.