Texas - DHS FEMA Grant Effectiveness Case Study

FEMA conducted this case study in order to:

• Understand how Texas improved capability gaps identified in previous disasters in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from Hurricane Harvey;
• Determine the role of FEMA grants in making the improvements that helped during Hurricane Harvey; and
• Identify best-practices Texas implemented to share with other states and jurisdictions.

Conversations with local stakeholders show that Texas was better prepared for and better able to respond to Hurricane Harvey than previous disasters because of how Texas state and local agencies invested in identified gaps using Federal, state, and local funds. FEMA will use the results from this and other case studies to enhance preparedness programs, develop tailored technical assistance, and better communicate the impacts of preparedness and mitigation grant programs to Federal stakeholders including Congress, state governments, local jurisdictions, and tribal governments.

Appendix A: Project Narratives‌

This appendix presents detailed descriptions of select investments—funded by Federal, state, and local funding sources—that Texas completed to increase hurricane-related preparedness capabilities. The appendix presents investments across three categories: Response Readiness, Communications, and Mitigation.

Response Readiness

RDFP works by offering specialized finance training courses, such as Disaster Accounting 101, to individual jurisdictions at no cost to the jurisdiction other than providing a venue. The course is divided into five flexible modules that can be taken over a period of time depending on jurisdictional needs and timelines. Format for the modules includes face-to-face instruction and outside work assignments.

Trainings let jurisdictions address a range of disaster-related financial topics, such as how to track time and labor, address overtime charges, and process travel costs. In addition to the pre-designed courses, TDEM also provides tailored classes or programs to address jurisdiction-specific needs on a case-by-case basis. By the end of the course, jurisdictions will have:

1. Reviewed the accounting system;
2. Identified gaps in their jurisdiction’s policies and procedures;
3. Established financial standard operating procedures (SOPs) for use in future disasters; and
4. Exercised their financial SOPs.

RDFP’s annual budget is $963,567 in state funds as of FY 2017 and the program supports 10 staff—nine stationed in Texas’ Public Safety Regions and one at TDEM headquarters. In addition to preparing jurisdictions for better disaster-related financial management, TDEM can deploy staff to EOCs during disasters. Jurisdictions that received training before Hurricane Harvey’s landfall reported being much more prepared to handle the financial challenges related to the storm than they had been in the past. In the wake of Hurricane Harvey, more jurisdictions have contacted TDEM and expressed interest in the RDFP as more jurisdictions have become aware of the benefits of the program.

Additionally, TDEM has identified additional areas where jurisdictions may benefit from additional training, such as debris contract monitoring. Pending additional funding, TDEM hopes to offer specific modules on these additional topics and organize COG-wide trainings through the RDFP.

TDEM officials struggled to keep track of citizens during Hurricane Katrina. Later, 73 people perished during a chaotic evacuation before Hurricane Rita even reached Texas. The tracking programs that TDEM had been using to assist evacuation and sheltering operations at the time were ineffective and not interoperable with other systems, resulting in disorganized operations that left individuals separated from their families.

In response to this gap in evacuation capability, TDEM invested $352,082 in FY 2010 SHSP funds, $570,771 in FY 2014-2015 EMPG funds, and $396,720 in FY 2017-FY2018 PA funds and State disaster funds to develop ETN to more accurately account for individuals and state assets involved in these operations. ETN accomplished this by consolidating six different existing tracking products into a more comprehensive, interoperable system. ETN can track entities including evacuated populations, state assets used in evacuation—including buses, vans, and planes— and active sheltering facilities. TDEM provides a wristband to individuals evacuated or sheltered by Texas state responders. Individuals receive this wristband during evacuation or when they arrive in person at any State-supported shelter. TDEM also uses this system to monitor the status of evacuation vehicles and current shelter populations in real-time. ETN lets TDEM track the last facility at which each individual checked in, allowing for easy and effective communication to these individuals when it is safe to return to their community.

ETN also has the capability to group individuals together, enabling TDEM to track each member of a family along with their pets or other personal items like luggage. TDEM in conjunction with local jurisdictions used ETN to evacuate and shelter over 31,000 people during Hurricane Harvey. All of those individuals tracked in ETN were accounted for and returned home. In one instance, two TDEM staff members assisted two Alzheimer’s patients in evacuating their home and sheltering in a State-supported shelter. When the two individuals accidentally separated from one another, TDEM used ETN to identify which shelter each had last checked into and used that information to reunite the individuals.

All State-led facilities and operations utilized ETN during Hurricane Harvey, but TDEM could not integrate shelters such as churches, nonprofit-led efforts, or pop-up shelters into ETN. TDEM expressed an interest to build the capability to incorporate these types of shelters into ETN. In total, TDEM effectively processed about half of the total number of individuals that required evacuation and/or sheltering because of Hurricane Harvey.

Full-Scale Evacuation Exercises [EMPG]

Each year, TDEM conducts a series of hurricane exercises to test Texas’ ability to manage large-scale evacuations. These exercise series, typically consisting of several workshops that culminate in a full-scale exercise, regularly engage over 1,000 Federal, state, local, private, and non-profit partners. In 2016, TDEM conducted the Rio Grande Valley Hurricane Exercise Series using $359,401 in FY 2015 EMPG funding. The series spanned five workshops from March through May 2016 and one full-scale exercise from June 2-9, 2016. This exercise series focused on determining Texas’ ability to evacuate citizens from isolated impacted regions with aircraft. Evacuees encompassed both members of the general population and populations with access and functional needs.

In the after-action report (AAR) for this exercise series, TDEM emphasized the strong collaboration and communication across participating jurisdictions as assets conducted air evacuations.

Additionally, TDEM also noted in the AAR that, while helpful, ETN posed some logistical issues and identified this as an area for improvement. During Hurricane Harvey, heavy flooding severely limited road access and hindered evacuation operations. As a result, TDEM resorted to using air evacuations to support populations from communities that became geographically isolated by rising flood waters. Ultimately, TDEM used Air National Guard air assets to evacuate approximately 2,500 people from the cities of Beaumont and Galveston. Similar to the strengths highlighted in the 2016 AAR, TDEM’s operations benefited greatly from the cooperation and coordination between outside mutual aid agencies. TDEM emphasized the importance of regional collaboration in this operation. The capabilities built and relationships strengthened through the 2016 exercise series directly benefited the air evacuation operation a year later during Hurricane Harvey.

Additionally, identified areas for improvement allowed TDEM to improve the ETN, contributing to TDEM’s ability to successfully use the network during Hurricane Harvey.

TDEM has invested in expanding law enforcement readiness for swift water rescue scenarios. In 2014, a Travis County deputy died after she accidentally drove into a flooded area to respond to a call and her vehicle was washed off the road. TDEM recognized that any officer could find themselves trapped in rising water, so Texas implemented a Swift Water Awareness Program with $499,647 in FY 2017 State funds and $661,000 in FY 2016 EMPG funds. Texas used State funds to hire a swift water manager to train staff on water awareness using TDEM’s independently designed course. Through the training, the swift water manager walks students through a two-hour course on the basics of swift water dynamics, and then students practice in the water to understand how to navigate swift water safely until rescue teams arrive. Upon completion of the course, TDEM provides students with an equipment bag including a rope bag, seatbelt cutter, life vest, and helmet.

TDEM also independently designed an advanced-level swift water rescue course to teach students how to conduct rescue operations in a qualified team. This course puts students in the water and requires them to conduct a simulated rescue. FY 2016 EMPG funding supported purchasing two zodiac swift water rescue boats ($30,000) and comprehensive team training packages for swift water, boat, and helicopter rescue; water survival; helicopter hoist rescue operations; specialized teams; and field responder safety.

During Hurricane Harvey, one district coordinator found himself driving through rapidly rising water. Thanks to his water rescue training, he was able to put on his life vest and move behind his vehicle. He credits the swift water training with saving his life. Today, every trooper trained through the DPS Academy must complete the water rescue awareness course to finish the academy. All Texas Rangers and SWAT team members must also complete this basic awareness course.

Each year, the Coastal Bend Council of Governments Emergency Management Association (CBEMA) hosts an annual Coastal Bend Hurricane Conference and Exercise in cooperation with multiple Federal, state, local, private, and non-profit partners. CBEMA identifies two primary objectives of the event: to share new best practices in hurricane preparation and response, and to communicate lessons learned from recent major events. Additionally, there is an exercise portion of the conference that allows participants to vet their plans in a collaborative environment. In FY 2018, CBEMA primarily used approximately $70,000 in local funds, attendance fees, and industry donations; around $25,000 in Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Multi-Jurisdiction Improvised Explosive Device Security Planning Program (MJIEDSP) funds; and $6,120 in FY 2018 SHSP funds to support the conference, supplemented by additional amounts of State and EMPG funding.

One of the most important outcomes of the conference is that EOC personnel can meet and interact with counterparts they might not otherwise meet in person. The atmosphere is learning-focused, and there is a close adherence to a no-fault environment. It provides an opportunity for all personnel involved in the operation of EOCs across the region to interact and network with outside Federal and state EOC operators, sharing experience and best practices. Such in-person contact is a critical component of building collaborative and effective cross-organization relationships.

Coastal Bend officials highlighted the long-standing collaboration that has resulted from this annual conference as an invaluable resource during the response to and recovery from Hurricane Harvey. By attending the conference in the past and having the ability to build connections, local emergency managers were better equipped to conceptualize, design, and execute complex multi-jurisdictional response and recovery operations during Hurricane Harvey.

Southeast Texas Community Response [SHSP, EMPG, HMGP, Local]

As Hurricane Harvey approached Texas, rainfall forecasts more than doubled for many communities. These unexpected rainfall totals and heavy flooding ultimately isolated many communities across Southeast Texas, leaving responders with only locally available resources to support response efforts. Before the storm, jurisdictions throughout this area had made extensive investments using Federal, state, and local funds that aided response and recovery missions, providing communities with local and regional resources like rescue boats, radios, and high-profile communications equipment. As demonstrated by the cities of Vidor and Port Arthur, communities that invested in local response capabilities before the storm were better equipped to independently address Hurricane Harvey’s impacts.

Heavy rainfalls of over 60 inches in the City of Vidor significantly handicapped response and recovery efforts, notably incapacitating their dispatch capabilities and making it difficult for officials to travel to command centers. Effectively addressing these impacts required extensive planning and communications

“Thanks to the Emergency Management Performance Grant our communities had updated plans, a designated Emergency Management Coordinator, and trained personnel to support a complex response operation when we became isolated by floodwaters during Hurricane Harvey.” – Captain Aleta Cappen, City of Vidor Police Department efforts.

To overcome this challenge, emergency management officials quickly established a fully-functioning dispatch center in their EOC using radios and transmitters they purchased using $1.47 million in FY 2015 EMPG funds. Additionally, Vidor invested $133,204 in FY 2009 HMGP funds to purchase additional backup generators and strengthen the structure of their city hall, where the city established its EOC and dispatch center during the storm. Impacts from the storm did not disrupt facility operations because of these investments. Vidor had also used these EMPG funds to hire an emergency management coordinator, expanding Vidor’s capability to develop and execute comprehensive disaster plans. Officials in Vidor consistently characterized these EMPG investments as critical to strengthening preparedness efforts in the city.

Collectively, these investments helped Vidor respond to Hurricane Harvey under circumstances where the city could not rely on external support.

The City of Port Arthur similarly used grant investments to effectively manage challenges during response operations. Port Arthur is one of the largest producers of chemicals in the country and houses the largest oil refinery in the United States. As such, emergency managers in the city prioritized hazardous materials (HazMat) emergency response capabilities by investing $58,419 in 2009 SHSP funds to purchase monitoring equipment and HazMat protection equipment, better equipping responders to address hazardous material leaks. During Hurricane Harvey, heavy flooding triggered fires across several oil refineries in the area. Port Arthur officials responded to these flood-triggered fires with the support of the monitoring equipment and HazMat resources. Port Arthur responders effectively contained the fires and prevented substantial environmental impacts from potential oil spills or explosions.

Additionally, Port Arthur used $68,062 in FY 2010 SHSP funds to purchase air boats for emergency operations. These SHSP-funded resources enabled responders to conduct rescue missions in otherwise inaccessible areas.

The Houston region’s systematic improvements in communications capabilities are well-highlighted in its response to the Arkema Chemical Plant, a high-profile incident during the flooding in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey. Located just to the east of Houston, in the town of Crosby, the Arkema Chemical Plant is a chemical processing facility that stores large quantities of volatile organic peroxides. These compounds require low- temperature refrigerated storage to keep them stable. If not kept stable, temperature-sensitive organic peroxides can rapidly decompose and combust. As Hurricane Harvey drenched the area with heavy rainfall and intense flooding, the rising water incapacitated the plant’s power, including all backup generators and critical refrigeration infrastructure.

As a safety precaution, plant personnel moved the most volatile of the compounds into nine separate diesel-fueled refrigerated trailers located on the higher ground inside the main facility. The trailers’ refrigeration systems, which housed approximately 350,000 pounds of material, began running low on fuel and eventually stopped working. Rising high water further compromised the trailers, resulting in limited release and combustion of the compounds with the potential for a catastrophic release. The potential for a cascading event warranted a complex multi-jurisdictional response and management effort to protect the lives, property, and environmental well-being of the surrounding communities.

Approximately 100 individuals from Federal, state, local, private, and academic partners assisted in incident operations. Specialty teams such as bomb squads, HazMat teams, and other special operation teams assisted in incident response. To coordinate operations, Unified Command relied on the joint Harris County-Houston radio network, funneled specifically through the Crosby tower site near the scene. This site, which was damaged by Hurricane Harvey and quickly repaired in the days preceding the chemical plant incident, was integral for communication during response operations. Network engineers and response officials stressed that without the capabilities that this communication network provided through the Crosby tower site, communication would have been nearly impossible for response operators.

Additionally, responders used a Harris County response boat funded by $48,750 in FY 2006 BZPP funds to remove the 11 ride-out personnel that remained inside the plant. Responders also used one Houston Police helicopter, which was purchased with local funds. Incident managers used this helicopter to monitor the trailers as response teams planned the response operation. The helicopter was equipped with grant-funded night vision and downlink software, funded with $575,000 in UASI funds, allowed for real- time monitoring of ground conditions.

Officials developed and implemented an incident response plan and pulled together the necessary teams and resources within four hours. Because of ground contamination and flammability concerns, responders could not use robots or drones for entry. Rather, response officials had to send responders wearing grant- funded HazMat suits into the plant to deploy initiation devices for a controlled combustion of the chemicals inside the six remaining trailers that had not already burned. Due to imminent danger, officials had to move quickly to stabilize the scene. Previous investments in preparedness, planning, teams, equipment, and training made this rapid process feasible. Without these vital investments, a quick response would not have been possible as local responders would have had to wait for outside resources to respond.

Just as the operation was to be executed, real-time video feeds from the helicopter revealed that chemicals in one trailer had begun to react, creating an unstable and life-threatening situation for the responders about to enter the site. Using the video capability, Unified Command decided to delay the operation until conditions were once again stabilized. This critical capability helped Unified Command conduct a rapid risk assessment, preventing the team from entering a deadly environment and potentially saving the lives of 16 responders.

Operations officials from this incident emphasized the parallels between this incident and terrorism- related incidents, both of which evolve and deteriorate rapidly, requiring continuous adaptation in high- risk hazardous conditions. Access to the special response teams and technology that Houston and Harris County had already invested in, trained, and exercised permitted the development of a plan and its execution within four hours. Aerial resources increased situational awareness and allowed decision makers on the ground to adapt quickly and efficiently in a dynamic threat environment, ultimately saving lives. Without the prevention and protection capabilities—funded by SHSP, and UASI, and local funds— the responders on this incident would not have been properly equipped, trained, or exercised to safely manage this incident.

UASI-funded resources at Arkema included: two HazMat teams, two bomb squads, a weather station, a Mobile Command Center, decontamination equipment, one law enforcement aviation team, two fire departments, and two FirstNet provider communication trailers. While grant funds paid for equipping, training, and exercising these specialized teams, local funds paid for the salaries and benefits of team members, reflecting an important relationship between local and Federal funds. Response operations degraded or destroyed some equipment, including HazMat suits and decontamination supplies, and $20,000 in remote detonator receivers, all of which Houston will need to replace.

Houston and Harris County have three Type I Bomb Squads and eight Type I HazMat teams, which train together quarterly. Officials highlighted this UASI-funded training as an integral part of establishing trust and strong working relationships between the personnel that carried out this operation. These strong working relationships and the robust capabilities within the Houston UASI allowed for another Houston Bomb Squad team to travel 90 miles away to simultaneously conduct a controlled explosion of Jersey barrier walls on Interstate-10, safely releasing rising water that was contributing to flooding in the City of Beaumont.

Port Security [PSGP]

The Port of Corpus Christi is one of the largest and busiest industrial shipping ports in the world. Over $22.7 billion in traded goods passed through the port in 2017. Officials estimated that a major disruption to the port—including a terrorist attack or catastrophic natural event—would cause wide-spread ripple effects on the entire US economy. Recognizing the port’s global importance and the growing need for the port’s security and resilience, Corpus Christi made extensive investments in new equipment and technology around the port site using both local and Federal funds. Corpus Christi received $615,000 in FY 2017 PSGP funding, much of which directly benefited Hurricane Harvey response and recovery.

During Harvey, incident managers activated PSGP-funded radars and cameras, funneled through the EOC, to monitor the port for damage or unauthorized entry. This real-time assessment allowed operators to begin planning recovery efforts by tracking damage in real-time, reducing the time necessary to re- open the busy port. Additionally, PSGP-funded boats enabled port staff to rescue personnel from a tug boat that capsized during an attempt to reposition a drill ship that was unmoored by the storm. These PSGP-funded boats also enabled staff to deploy to Port Aransas when all other access routes were blocked by the storm. Doing so allowed Port Aransas staff to deploy into the field and conduct life-saving search and rescue operations.

Response Apparatuses [OPSG, PSGP, Local]

Rockport built response capability by investing $165,442 in FY 2010 OPSG funds to purchase a Lenco BearCat armored vehicle in 2011. The BearCat, which is bulletproof and designed to transport a 10- member police tactical unit, serves as a regional asset that Rockport shares with surrounding communities. During Hurricane Harvey, Rockport used the vehicle to transport Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams and deliver critical food supplies to isolated communities during challenging wind and rain conditions in which other vehicles were unable to operate. Additionally, responders used the BearCat to rescue a family whose roof had collapsed during the storm.

Without the vehicle, it would have been nearly impossible to get this family to safety. Rockport also purchased two additional patrol cars in 2016 with $101,269 of FY 2014 and FY 2015 OPSG funding. Similarly, the City of Groves invested $904,500 in FY 2011 PSGP funds and $301,500 in local funds to purchase two industrial fire engines. During Hurricane Harvey, Port Arthur officials used these vehicles to conduct search and rescue missions in heavily flooded or otherwise inaccessible neighborhoods when the storm damaged their response apparatuses.

Houston Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Plans [SHSP, UASI, RCPGP, Local]

Before FEMA discontinued the grant program following FY 2011, the Greater Houston Region invested Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP) funding into improving its capabilities to respond to catastrophic disasters. Houston credits RCPGP with enabling partners in Southeast Texas to build a collaborative planning process and bringing in individuals with relevant experiences—such as SMEs and field operators—to reality-check plans during the drafting phase.

The RCPGP-funded plans are multi-jurisdictional, with some plans covering between 13 – 16 counties, while other plans cover as many as 30. In keeping with the whole community orientation of the plans, each plan involves an element of vertical integration, outlining roles and responsibilities of relevant Federal, state, and regional entities where appropriate.

Hurricane Harvey revealed some planning areas that could be improved, such as non-traditional shelter coordination, donation management, volunteer management, and housing. Plans had been predicated on regional support availability, and since Hurricane Harvey severely impacted Houston and surrounding counties, effective resource sharing across the region was not possible.

In the future, Houston also intends to clarify mutual aid resource management, particularly with outside law enforcement, in existing plans and procedures. To date, Houston has supported maintenance and updates to its plans with a small portion of its annual SHSP award. Further, some plans have been exercised and updated with UASI and local support.

Southeast Texas Alerting Network (STAN) [PSGP, Local]

During Hurricane Ike, officials throughout SETRPC relied on non-centralized methods to communicate critical messages and warnings to the public. SETRPC had no established electronic communication system to consistently deliver critical messages. In response, SETRPC used $911,140 in FY 2012 and FY 2014 PSGP funds to develop STAN.

STAN is a public-private partnership that enables emergency managers to send official alert messages to all citizens or to specific, targeted cohorts such as a particular group of emergency managers. STAN is an opt-in system where citizens register to receive public information updates via text message or phone call. In FY 2014, industry partners provided a 25 percent match to assist in developing the system. As the City of Beaumont is home to one of the largest oil refinery operations in the country, Exxon-Mobil partners with SETRPC to support STAN because of the large number of petroleum employees that might need emergency alert notices. Private industry partners, including Exxon-Mobil, can also use STAN to send messages to their employees and advise them of any specific workplace-related information and warnings.

STAN served two critical functions during Hurricane Harvey: dispelling social media misinformation and alerting residents mid-disaster as weather information changed. As the disaster unfolded, some social media posts provided incorrect information. For example, one post falsely stated that the City of Groves would soon cut off water service. Officials used STAN to send out official and accurate information to mitigate the spread of false information. During Hurricane Harvey, the National Weather Service frequently updated predictive models as storm severity became more certain and forecasted rainfall levels continued to rise rapidly, from initial forecasts of 12 – 24 inches to later forecasts of approximately 22 – 44 inches.

Eventually, predicted rainfall was so high that officials needed to order new evacuations, though there was no time to use normal evacuation notification venues. SETRPC officials activated STAN and successfully used the network to alert citizens of the new flood dangers. By successfully using this system to address a no-notice incident—the sudden and dramatic increase in forecasted rainfall totals—SETRPC demonstrated that STAN is an effective tool for use in other no-notice incidents, including acts of terrorism or other human-caused incidents.

“The floods from Harvey turned our cities into islands. The only way we were able to achieve operational coordination between the cities and counties was through our communications. Had it not been for the interoperable communications made possible by both portables and mobile data terminals purchased with DHS funding, we would not have been able to coordinate within the region at all.” – Chief Dale Jackson, City of Groves Fire Department

Before the implementation of the Regional Radio System, SETRPC had multiple non-interoperable communication pathways for emergency responders. One of the lessons from the 2005 response to Hurricane Rita was that communication needed to be clear and reliable. Additionally, SETRPC needed to make additional investments in equipment to increase interoperability and reduce coordination barriers. Between FY 2000 and FY 2003, SETRPC made an initial $6 million investment of local funds to begin working towards communication interoperability. From FY 2005 to FY 2018, SETRPC invested approximately $37 million in PSGP and SHSP funds and $1.8 million in other Federal funds to fully build the infrastructure for the regional radio system.

The regional radio system for SETRPC allowed for uninterrupted emergency communication throughout Hurricane Harvey. The unprecedented flooding for the region disrupted landline communications, 911, and public cell service. The flooding transformed towns into virtual islands, further limiting jurisdictions’ abilities to communicate and distribute resources. Moreover, flooding cut SETRPC jurisdictions off from the rest of the state as highways flooded. The regional radio system was the only form of unimpeded communication among jurisdictions during the storm and allowed for communication with state and Federal partners to continue.

Specifically, the city of Nederland used the radio system to successfully communicate among responders, enabling them to perform water rescues for the first time ever.

Several jurisdictions, including Nederland, Groves, and Vidor, indicated they would have suffered from inconsistent or nonexistent communication during the storm had the regional radio system not been in place.

SETRPC prioritized efforts to make the entire region P25 compliant, effectively making all radios completely interoperable with one another. As of August 2018, all jurisdictions within the SETRPC are P25 compliant.

After 9/11, first responders across the nation recognized a need to develop better interoperability among communication systems. In the Houston region, those systems were further tested by numerous natural and man-made disasters, prompting the region to identify widespread capability gaps in interoperable communications capabilities. These identified gaps have propelled robust efforts to improve the Houston Urban Area’s communications interoperability. Notably, the Houston-Harris County Joint Radio Facility project resulted in the two jurisdictions sharing facilities and resources in the operation and maintenance of a common regional radio communications system.

The city and county invest $6.8 million annually in local funds to staff the facility; additionally, $3.2 million in UASI funding is invested annually to maintain and enhance the systems. The radio shop houses network infrastructure for both jurisdictions’ radio systems. The networks serve all 13 counties of the Houston-Galveston Area, which includes the Houston UASI, and have the capability to share services with neighboring counties. Further, the networks are interoperable across local, state, and Federal agency networks.

Harris County also made substantial improvements to its Long Term Evolution (LTE) communications systems. Since FY 2010, Harris County has invested $27 million total—$16 million in PSGP and $11 million in local funds——to build a broadband communications system that primarily covers Harris County. During Hurricane Harvey, Harris County’s broadband system was used by multiple local, state, and Federal responding agencies across the affected areas to help reduce the amount of voice traffic generated on the public safety regional Land Mobile Radio System. It also increased operational efficiency by giving the responders the ability to send data-centric updates to the field. Harris County continues to implement lessons learned from unplanned disasters like Hurricane Harvey and planned events like Super Bowl LI. The region’s innovation has impacted national paradigm shifts towards increased incorporation of data into operational plans.

In addition, Montgomery County has invested $30.5 million total—$27 million in local FY 2009 – 2011 funds, $1.5 million in FY 2004 and FY 2007 UASI funds, and $2 million in FY 2010 AFG funds—to replace the county’s disparate, aging, and outdated radio systems with one interoperable 700/800 P25 system that ties into the Houston Harris County regional radio system. Because the system is tied into the region’s P25 LAN Mobile Radio system, county officials were able to communicate efficiently across county boundaries with other responding agencies to coordinate a region-wide response.

Before having the 800 MHz system, any teams operating outside of Montgomery County would have been operating without communications, and teams inside the county would have needed to carry multiple radios to communicate across response components. County officials stressed the importance of this new 800 MHz system during

Hurricane Harvey's response and recovery operations, noting that having all operating agencies on the same system significantly improved communication and efficiency of response compared to disaster operations just a year prior. Currently, the county is investing an additional $20 million of its own funding to upgrade equipment—including radios— and implement new security protocols.

These communications investments provided several benefits during the Hurricane Harvey response. Redundancies built into the networks enabled network engineers to manage three distinct damaged towers without causing any network disruptions or outages. Further, the joint Houston-Harris County facility provided and programmed approximately 300 radios to outside police agencies—such as the San Antonio Police Department— assisting in response efforts through mutual aid agreements with jurisdictions whose own equipment did not have the same interoperable capability. In total, these networks supported approximately 9,800 additional radios to sustain the increased network traffic from local jurisdictions and mutual aid partners both from within and outside of Texas. This increased capability improved the efficiency of disaster response efforts.

Local officials consistently noted the stark improvement in ease and efficiency of communication from past tropical event operations—including Tropical Storm Allison, Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Ike—to those during Hurricane Harvey.

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Upgrades [SHSP, UASI, EOC, CIAP, EMPG, Local]

After-action reviews of Hurricane Ike consistently demonstrated a need to better incorporate all necessary response partner agencies into critical decision-making processes. This identified capability gap served as the primary impetus behind re-construction and upgrades to Houston’s EOC. This project entailed a physical expansion and diversification of the EOC space and substantial investment into improving the technology EOC staff use during activations. Between FY 2015 and FY 2017, Houston used $618,615 in UASI funds and $250,000 in local funding to expand the existing EOC space. This renovation resulted in a 77 percent increase in staff capacity—from 44 to 78 staff—permitting the presence of additional Federal and private-sector partners in the EOC during critical phases of response and recovery operations. EOC staff consistently reported that this expansion was critical in enabling the better representation of and communication between all relevant partners.

Additionally, Houston invested $495,695 in FY 2015 – FY 2017 UASI funds to improve the facility’s technological capabilities. These upgrades included a new video feed integration and display systems that allowed operators to display and navigate between up to 32 distinct video feeds, increasing EOC situational awareness. The EOC has established reciprocity agreements with several private or municipal owners to share video feed during critical situations. In one instance, EOC staff used this remote monitoring capability to communicate to the incident commander of an incident involving an overturned plane with active explosives on board at a local airport.

Once alerted, the EOC and incident commander maintained oversight of the scene remotely via video feed, letting the aircraft burn through its fuel and self-extinguish without endangering the incident commander or other responders by approaching the scene.

Similarly, the Houston UASI has invested $717,100—$498,800 in FY 2011 and FY 2015 UASI funds and $218,300 in FY 2011 – FY 2018 local funds—to build a new Fort Bend County Alternate EOC, recognizing that the county’s primary EOC was aging and potentially prone to interruption during severe weather. The alternate facility, housed in the basement of a pre-existing county IT building, is designed to support a full-scale EOC activation if the primary EOC is rendered inoperable. The multi-room complex, containing a central operation center, a video-capable leadership conference room, and a large-scale plotter, has benefited partners across the entire Houston-Galveston Area Council region as the facility is also available to neighboring jurisdictions for use in both emergency and non-emergency functions.

Jurisdictions have used the facility to host exercises and trainings, including assessments of the Catastrophic Medical Operations Center (CMOC). During Hurricane Harvey, 26 county staff members operated phone lines in the facility to address a massive influx of calls from the public.

The City of Victoria also identified a critical need to upgrade the communications capabilities of their EOC in the aftermath of Hurricane Ike. During Hurricane Ike, the Victoria EOC had limited capability to communicate and conduct emergency response missions, prompting the city to increase the resilience of the facility and improve its communications capabilities. In FY 2011 and FY 2012, officials upgraded the Victoria EOC through critical infrastructure improvements using $1,926,178 in total funds: $167,955 of FY 2011 – FY 2012 SHSP funds; $1 million in FY 2011 – FY 2012 FEMA EOC grant funds; $500,923 in FY 2011 – FY 2012 Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP) Grant funds; $7,300 of FY 2011 – FY 2012 DOW Community Grant Funds; and $250,000 of FY 2011 – FY 2012 local funds. These upgrades included the installment of an FBI-certified communications room equipped with five television monitors, a secure radio system, and additional grant-funded radio systems that visiting emergency managers used to relay information back to their first responders during Hurricane Harvey.

The facility contains an emergency response room that seats approximately 50 staff members and is equipped with telephones and interoperable communication systems to coordinate response and recovery operations. During Hurricane Harvey, emergency response officials operated out of the facility for eight days uninterrupted.

Additionally, Victoria used $532,405 in FY 2007 – FY 2018 EMPG funds to hire three emergency management staff members to support the EOC. According to response officials, these extensive upgrades enabled the EOC to stay updated with the most current communication equipment, making the Victoria EOC a central piece of the jurisdiction’s emergency response system to Hurricane Harvey.

The City of Ingleside places a strong emphasis on ensuring that first responders have the necessary resources at their disposal to safely operate, including updated equipment and vehicles. In response, Ingleside spent $12,000 in local funds and $9,287 in FY 2009 SHSP funds to purchase a communications vehicle with two mobile repeaters for the fire department in 2010. The city then used $12,940 in FY 2011 SHSP funding to purchase radios for the vehicle in 2013. This vehicle’s systems are interoperable with all regional communications systems, and TV displays on the inside give staff increased situational awareness.

During Hurricane Harvey, the truck served as a hub for local responders. Emergency managers experiencing communication problems used the truck as a meeting area and borrowed radios from the truck before returning to the field. Ingleside also used the truck to maintain mobile repeater systems when the storm disabled communications systems, letting officials maintain response communications for four days. Ingleside also purchased communications equipment (two P25 800 MHz radios, one video camera, and a cross band repeater) in 2008 for its locally funded police vehicle using $40,400 in FY 2008 BZPP funds.

This vehicle provides officials with video capabilities to track on-going events; the capability to link multiple, disparate radio systems to streamline communication; and the capability to dispatch resources. Ingleside has also used this vehicle to respond to wildfires and bank robberies, as well as for several community events.

Mitigation

In response to evacuation and sheltering challenges during Hurricane Ike, TDEM increased state investment in community safe rooms aligning to FEMA and International Code Council (ICC) standards.12 TDEM implements state-specific requirements through the Texas Community Safe Room Program. FEMA provides funding for community-safe rooms through its HMGP and Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) programs. Local jurisdictions can apply to Texas for Federal and state funding to build a safe room and must provide a 25 percent match to federal funds. Since FY 2004, TDEM has invested $109.97 million in Federal, state, and local funds—including $108.03 million in HMGP funds and $1.94 million in FY 2011 PDM funds—to develop these community safe rooms.

Each safe room must adhere to FEMA’s established construction guidelines, which consider potential wind speeds, windborne debris impacts, flooding potential, fire protection, and means of egress.13 Typically, communities conduct a risk assessment to determine the best location to construct a safe room. Depending on local and state code, buildings that include 911 call stations, EOCs, fire stations, police stations, or K-12 school buildings with a capacity of 50 or more occupants and that are located in a 250 miles per hour tornado storm shelter design wind zone must construct a community safe room adhering to ICC design guidelines to withstand tornados.

Community safe rooms can be built into existing community facilities, such as a gym or cafeteria in a public school, or as stand-alone structures. Jurisdictions have full discretion on how they use the space when not activated for an emergency. Community safe rooms provide life safety protection from extreme wind events for citizens and typically house whoever is nearby and allowed to enter for tornados.

Community safe rooms can house first responders, specialized response and recovery teams such as US&R teams, and other incident-essential personnel during hurricanes that are not no-notice. Statewide, regional, or local preparedness investments often fund this personnel, reflecting a successful blend of not only preparedness and mitigation funds, but also of Federal, state, and locally funded efforts.

The community safe room in the City of Woodsboro served as a critical asset to Hurricane Harvey's response and recovery operations. In FY 2008, Woodsboro invested $2.18 million—$1,746,717 of HMGP funds and $436,679 of local funds—to construct their multi-use safe room.

Typically serving as a sports complex during day-to-day functions, Woodsboro’s safe room functioned as a base camp for response crews, a staging area for equipment, and an incident command post where emergency managers reported to receive operational assignments during Hurricane Harvey. State police, local fire and emergency medical services (EMS), and mutual aid EMS from as far away as Dallas/Fort Worth all established bases in the safe room. Response officials emphasized the importance of the Woodsboro facility, noting that Texas Task Force 1 would not have been able to operate in the region without the secure facility the safe room provided.

Additionally, officials estimated that had the safe room not served as a staging site, the response mission would have taken about a week longer and put at greater risk the lives and property of the surrounding communities. Other communities, such as the City of Victoria, also characterized their community safe rooms as critical to response operations.

Texas Medical Center (TMC) [SHSP, UASI, RCPGP, HMGP]

1. Improving communications capabilities;
2. Brick-and-mortar mitigation efforts including but not limited to: flood control, or utility and infrastructure protection; and
3. Improving coordination among system hospitals.

Most notably, the SouthEast Texas Regional Advisory Council (SETRAC) established a CMOC to address the medical coordination gap and ensure the resiliency of multi-jurisdictional healthcare infrastructure during catastrophic events such as Tropical Storm Allison and Hurricane Harvey. After Hurricane Katrina, the City of Houston welcomed over 250,000 displaced evacuees from Louisiana and surrounding affected areas. This influx of evacuees further highlighted a need first identified in the aftermath of Tropical Storm Allison for consistent cross-hospital communication and coordination. System hospitals consistently needed to manually coordinate patient transfers via phone call, and hospitals would often fight for the same EMS assets on a first-come-first-serve basis. The CMOC provides a centralized system that allows for efficient patient transfer and management of EMS resources.

CMOC, funded by $196,530 in FY 2015 UASI funds and $135,970 in FY 2017 SHSP funds, covers 187 hospitals, over 900 nursing homes, and about 250 EMS agencies throughout 25 counties in southeast Texas. Additionally, RCPGP funds were used to develop regional plans for the CMOC and to support exercises. In total, SETRAC’s CMOC ensures continuous medical care for over nine million people across 277 jurisdictions. Furthermore, capabilities built through the CMOC let TMC provide real-time updates to any active EOC in southeast Texas—including the State Operations Center—through a WebEOC medical dashboard.

SETRAC’s robust mitigation investments, in conjunction with preparedness efforts, enabled the center to function through Hurricane Harvey without a major disruption to patient care. Members of SETRAC’s CMOC have also traveled the country to share best practices with other jurisdictions, helping them create similar structures in their own communities.

TMC also engaged in several brick-and-mortar investments to increase the resilience of the facility by improving its ability to mitigate flooding. During Tropical Storm Allison, floodwater inundated the TMC Houston campus’ underground tunnel system. All but one facility—the Texas Children’s Hospital (TCH)—did not have submarine doors to prevent water inflow to the tunnel entrance. When TCH closed its doors, it forced water to flood other facilities through the other open tunnel entrances.

At the time, flood plans did not account for this outcome. Other facility basements flooded when the TCH doors closed because they did not have submarine doors, causing most of the TMC facilities to lose electrical power. Floodwaters damaged critical electrical equipment, including the backup generators, and rendered most of the complex without power.

To prevent this from happening again, TMC invested $6 million in FY 2001 HMGP funds to install automatic submarine doors and floodgates on all tunnel system entrances. TMC also engaged in mitigation action planning and developed agreements and protocols for closing doors. These doors now close automatically if floodwaters rise to 14 feet, preventing any ingress into the system’s basement.

In addition, TMC made several investments in utility protective measures, including elevated utilities, stormwater culverts, floodwalls around critical power infrastructure, installing disconnect switches to allow the removal of a flooded institution from the grid to prevent a system-wide failure, and redundant electricity options. As a result of these investments, TMC facilities operated with no major disruption to service during Hurricane Harvey.

University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) [HMGP, PA, State, Local]

UTMB, a member organization of TMC, is a vital resource to the medical community, providing over six million people with health care, medical education, and medical research. UTMB’s Galveston campus is home to one of only three Level 1 trauma centers in the Houston-Galveston region, a critical asset during large-scale incidents and petrochemical and oil rig accidents. The facility is one of few across the nation that has the capability to handle highly infectious diseases like Ebola through its Biosafety Level 4 Containment Facility.

During Hurricane Ike, UTMB Galveston sustained substantial damage due to the historic 13-foot storm surge, including catastrophic damage to the campus’ utility infrastructure and major disruptions to, and destruction of, vital medical research. As a result, the facility has planned, designed, and executed 712 mitigation-related investments since 2008 to ensure the facility’s uninterrupted ability to provide life-saving medical care.

Between FY 2008 – FY 2011, UTMB invested $1.14 billion across all mitigation projects with 42.5 percent coming from PA funds, 3.6 percent from HMGP funds, 6.0 percent from insurance funds, and 47.7 percent from a combination of state, local, and borrowed funds. FEMA’s mitigation grants covered costs to build a 16-foot flood wall. For reference, a 100-year flooding event is estimated at a 12-foot surge and a 500-year event at 18 feet. UTMB paid to raise the flood wall and elevate critical assets beyond the 500-year event, adding between 4 – 20 feet.

UTMB mitigation efforts also included a complete restructuring of the facility’s water piping system. During Hurricane Ike, floodwaters caused an underground steam pipe to burst, incapacitating the entire facility for nearly five months and the trauma center for 11 months. During this time, UTMB Galveston could not provide medical care, conduct critical research, or operate its education facilities. Rebuilding and elevating the piping system above 500-year flood levels has enabled UTMB to be better prepared and more resilient in future instances of mass flooding or storm surge.

In addition to the elevation of the water piping system, UTMB Galveston also embarked on several other elevation-related investments. Each investment sought to raise pre-existing critical infrastructure across the campus beyond the 500-year event to 20 feet and raised the standard elevation for any future infrastructure to 25 feet.

Examples of other elevation investments include the elevation of domestic water pumps, electrical equipment, and electrical switchgear, which are critical for transferring from normal power to emergency power.

During Hurricane Harvey, UTMB did not experience flooding as severe as Hurricane Ike flooding. As such, the storm did not fully stress UTMB’s various mitigation improvements, but UTMB still served as a key medical facility throughout Hurricane Harvey. UTMB provided critical care during the incident, taking on patients from other regional hospitals that had lost their capability to provide life-saving medical care.

For example, Harvey’s impacts forced the City of Beaumont to close its hospitals after they lost water. UTMB was the closest facility that could accept four neonatal intensive care unit infants that were evacuated from Beaumont, effectively saving the infants’ lives.

Appendix B: COG SHSP Funding Allocation Process‌

HSGD uses a formula based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence to strategically determine regional allocations of the 80% share of available SHSP funds. Modeled after the SHSP and UASI Risk Assessment used by FEMA to determine State and UASI risk profiles and allocations, HSGD’s formula includes factors such as population, critical infrastructure, and border miles. Summaries of the SHSP prioritization processes for the COGs FEMA visited throughout this case study are included below.

These processes, along with other supporting information such as the COG’s and/or the State’s THIRA/SPR, assist HSGD in determining which projects will be funded with the region’s allocation.

HSGD determines final funding approvals for all projects, though HSGD seeks to follow each COG’s prioritizations as closely as possible.

Houston-Galveston Area Council (H-GAC)

The Regional Homeland Security Coordinating Council (RHSCC) coordinates the prioritization and allocation process for SHSP funds in H-GAC. Each of the 13 counties within the region and the City of Houston submits a list of investments that they prioritize according to capability gaps identified in the regional THIRA/SPR, Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan - Implementation Plan, and other assessments. The RHSCC convenes and discusses the slate of investments utilizing a formalized scoring methodology based upon current priorities, risk, and other factors.

The score sheet is updated by the RHSCC annually. The RHSCC uses this discussion to make prioritization and requested allocation decisions, then submits a proposed list of investments to the H-GAC Board of Directors for final approval. Once approved, the list of selected investments is submitted to HSGD for approval.

Coastal Bend Council of Governments (CBCOG)

Each year, the CBCOG Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC) calls upon SMEs to identify capability gaps by reviewing the regional THIRA/SPR, surveys, and other reports. From this, the HSAC establishes top regional priorities. In 2018, these priorities covered planning, interoperable communications, and emergency operations centers. Applicants for grant funding self-assess their investment using a set of criteria that the HSAC establishes as a basis for evaluation and selection. Using investment proposals and self-assessments, an HSAC working group reviews proposals to determine if the investment addresses an HSAC-prioritized gap, can be completed in stages, and meets a local, regional, or state need, in addition to basic eligibility and funding availability considerations.

Once the working group finishes its review, HSAC forwards the recommended investments to CBCOG general membership for approval and submits final recommendations to the Texas HSAC. The Texas HSAC then submits the final slate of selected investments to HSGD for approval. 

Golden Crescent Regional Planning Commission (GCRPC)

GCRPC’s Regional Homeland Security Advisory Committee (RHSAC) manages the COG’s SHSP prioritization and allocation process. The RHSAC considers applications based on the previous year’s approved process and conducts its selection process exclusively at an open-forum RHSAC meeting, to which all applicants are invited to speak about their proposal. RHSAC uses an informal risk methodology that depends on previous disaster history and current priorities.

The RHSAC ranks and approves investments after the open-forum meeting, recommending top-priority investments for funding first, followed by lower-ranked investments until all allocated funds are depleted. The RHSAC then submits the final slate of selected investments to HSGD for approval.

Southeast Texas Regional Planning Commission (SETRPC)

SETRPC’s Emergency Management Planning Advisory Committee (EMPAC) leads a collaborative effort with all jurisdictions within the region to prioritize and allocate SHSP investments. The EMPAC solicits proposals from jurisdictions, focusing on investments that have region-wide benefits. Each proposal must incorporate a capability gap identified in the regional THIRA/SPR, the regional Critical Infrastructure, and Key Resources List, or the Texas Homeland Security Strategic Plan - Implementation Plan.

Once SETRPC receives all proposals, the EMPAC convenes all jurisdictions where investments are prioritized by unanimous consensus among all jurisdictions. SETRPC’s Executive Committee then submits the final slate of selected investments to HSGD for approval.

Report References

1. Hurricane Harvey AAR Final
   
2. FEMA Hurricane Season After Action Report 2017
   
3. Hurricane Costs
   
4. ‌Texas HSGD State Project Scoring Rubric
   
5. TDEM EMPG application budget narratives for FY 2016 and FY 2017
   
6. West Texas After the Blast
   
7. TDRF Executive Presentation PowerPoint
   
8. Regional Disaster Finance Program
   
9. State says Harvey's death toll has reached 88
   
10. Arkema Inc. Chemical Plant Fire
    
11. Arkema Inc. Chemical Plant Fire
    
12. Highlights of ICC 500-2014, ICC/NSSA Standard for the Design and Construction of Storm Shelters
    
13. http://www.dps.texas.gov/dem/Mitigation/commSaferoomFactSheet.pdf
    
14. Tropical Storm Allison Heavy Rains and Floods Texas and Louisiana - June 2001
    
15. RHPC, SETRAC and CMOC - KNW-126
    
16. 44 CFR 9.6, 9.7 and 9.11; Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program Digest September 2015, page 25.
    
17. 44 CFR 9.6, 9.7 and 9.11; Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program Digest September 2015, page 25.
    
18. 44 CFR 9.6, 9.7 and 9.11; Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program Digest September 2015, page 25.
    
19. CBCOG Methodology Description Document
    
20. CBCOG Scoring Document
    
21. CBCOG Methodology Description Document