4.2. Response Phases

4.2.1. PHASES 2A&B

• Notification: Notified appropriate agencies including local HAZMAT, police, fire, and possible property stakeholders. Notified the local FBI office for forensic sampling to identify the hazardous chemical and for criminal investigation activities. Collected all available data from local responders. The EOC was set up and coordinated an information stream to appropriate agencies. Tied in local, state, and national HAZMAT response assets. UC initiated. PIO was established.

• First Response: Several deaths occurred; local HAZMAT recovered bodies. Bodies kept in secure HAZMAT morgue. Local HAZMAT-capable hospitals were alerted for arrival of patients with blistering, respiratory distress, and other symptoms of HD exposure. Public decontamination facilities for exposed people set up by the local fire department and HAZMAT teams. Response workers settled on modified Level B (SCBA and hooded chemical resistant suit that provides protection against agents, with no skin exposed).

Evacuation was ordered for the inner harbor around explosion site, and limited areas of access were recommended for outlying areas on a case-by-case evaluation by the local health department.

Evacuation/shelter-in-place was enforced by state and local police. Federal (EPA and USCG) assets were deployed for air monitoring and the data were sent to the EOC to advise local Health Department on evacuation and shelter-in-place actions. Visible liquid/gas, presence of odors or dead animals, and any positive hit on handheld screening meters (Proengin’s AP4Ce), kits, or M8 paper were considered indicative of HD presence.

4.2.2. PHASE 2C

• Characterization: UC tasked the Planning Section Chief to develop an IAP, SAP, HASP, and AAMP. EPA and USCG, with state and local DEP assets, were deployed for sampling and monitoring to define HD plume. Samples were sent to National Reference Labs and the EPA Environmental Response Laboratory Network laboratories for analysis of HD and HD degradation products. Air monitoring and environmental sampling data were used with IMAAC modeling to delineate inhalation hazards, as well as to provide monitoring for response worker health and safety. IMAAC model data were sent to EOC/UC to advise the local Department of Health on continued evacuation/shelter-in-place actions. Soil, surface wipes, and water samples were taken to determine the extent of the hot area from HD explosion. Action levels for response worker for PPE levels were established.

• Remediation (Cleanup): UC tasked the Planning Section Chief to develop a RAP and waste disposal plan and to select a decontamination strategy for the HD cleanup. The site was divided into several separate decontamination units (DUs). Each DU was managed by a task force, which coordinated all sampling and analysis, decontamination, and health and safety issues for that specific DU. The sampling plan was modified as needed to include samples to verify decontamination, iteratively, during the decontamination process. EPA, CDC, the NRT, FEMA, state, property owners and other stakeholders were selected to participate in the Technical Working Group. Actions were taken to reduce source of HD release from surface water runoff into the nearby harbor. The decontamination of critical items, sensitive equipment, and other “special” items was considered in the overall plan. Disposal without decontamination was selected for certain media, such as polymeric handrails, which irreversibly absorb HD, making decontamination by many commercially available products ineffective. Disposal issues were handled by local and state DEP, obtaining the service of a local secure hazardous waste landfill.

• Clearance Phase: UC was tasked to develop the Clearance Sampling Plan using the clearance decision levels agreed upon by the Technical Working Group. Sampling and analysis continued to verify decontamination efficacy for each DU; each DU was cleared by the UC via the EU and the Technical Working Group. Air monitoring continued in each DU cleared, using exposure guidelines appropriate for clearance decision criteria, and appropriate site-specific, risk-based values.

• Phase 3: Restoration/Recovery: The UC (including public health professionals) via the EU and the Technical Working Group, cleared the last remaining DU, indicating that the HD site was cleared for resumed use/re-occupancy. All surface, soil, and air concentrations met the clearance decisions. Local and state DEPs continued ambient air monitoring to ensure levels remained below monitoring levels established by the Technical Working Group. PIO continued to be in place to address public concerns.

4.2.3. APPLICABLE EXPOSURE GUIDELINES FOR DECISION-MAKING

Although site-specific information would be developed for any contamination event, Figure 10 shows a comparison of available screening environmental guidelines for HD that could be used to inform the decision-making process for clearance. Detailed descriptions and references for these environmental guidelines can be found in Appendix A. Table B-6 shows an example response to an HD incident.

Graphic

Table B-6: Sulfur Mustard Example Response: Phases of Chemical Response

Phases 2a&b Day 1 (12-24 hours)

Phase	Health effects of concern	Activities and decisions	Criteria used for decision- making	Notes
Activities include: determine types of chemical, locations, hot area Controls to minimize further responder/public deaths/severe injury Risk communication efforts to inform public on progress of response	Immediate/near- term (acute) effects: Several deaths, eye and skin irritation (some blistering), upper respiratory distress, breathing difficulties, general concerns Hundreds reporting injuries at local hospitals	Response workers: PPE levels— Initially Level A, subsequent to agent identification, reduced to Level B General public: Evacuation of inner harbor area around explosion site Local shelter-in-place decision Shut off heat/AC/close windows Public (people) decontamination	Visible liquid/gas Odors Any “positive” detection with field identification tests/equipment (e.g., screening level field equipment and Military M8 paper) Reports of health effects	Decision-makers: Local emergency and environmental health departments

Phases 2b&c Days 2 and 3 (24-72 hours)

Phase	Health effects of concern	Activities and decisions	Criteria used for decision- making	Notes
Activities include: continued evaluation of air plume, identification of “sources” and field data to identify contaminated areas Technical Working Group established to determine sampling strategy and clearance goals Risk communication efforts to inform public on progress of response	Immediate/near- term (acute) effects: Continued reports of eye and skin irritation (some blistering), upper respiratory distress, breathing difficulties (effects of HD can be delayed for 2-48 hours)	Response workers: Air monitoring continued for hot area during operations to control/remove tanks Spikes indicated by field instrumentation required responders to evacuate—Level B and A (some inconsistency) General public: Initial shelter-in-place areas modified based on plume and sampling results Hospitals and critical infrastructures cleared	Air monitoring at periphery of hot area. Action levels identified for the protection of workers in PPE (e.g., > than AEGL 1 for 8 hr.) Wipe samples and laboratory- based analytical methods Air monitoring for protection of general public. Action levels developed based on extent of contamination, estimates of duration of exposure, etc. Relevant environmental guidelines may include 8-hour AEGLs for acute exposure durations, PALs or GLPs for longer term exposures	Decision-makers: Local emergency and environmental health departments together with federal agency support: primarily HHS, ATSDR and EPA for sampling

Phase 3 (Recovery/ Reentry) Days 4 to 30+

Phase	Health effects of concern	Activities and decisions	Criteria used for decision- making	Notes
Sampling teams using field tests/equipment followed by laboratory-based analysis Phased clearance Risk communication efforts to inform public on progress of response	Immediate/near- term (acute) effects: None Permanent/chro- nic injury/illness: None	Response workers: No PPE required End response work   General public: Resumed use/re-occupancy (unrestricted) of site/facilities.	Approach used: Air monitoring to corroborate soil, surface, and water clearance sampling to support findings/assumptions that decontamination is successful. Surface wiping—Sample results would be compared with site- specific clearance goals developed for populations of concern Soil and destructive concrete sampling—Laboratory analysis results compared with risk- based clearance goals for sulfur mustard Waste disposal for contaminated material	Decision-makers: Interagency through NRT- EPA, HHS, OSHA, supported by state/locals