Risk Management Series
Primer
to Design Safe School Projects in Case of
Terrorist Attacks
December 2003

FEMA

FEMA 428 / December 2003

RISK MANAGEMENT SERIES

Primer to
Design Safe School
Projects in Case of
Terrorist Attacks
PROVIDING PROTECTION TO PEOPLE AND BUILDING

www.fema.gov

Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this
publication do not necessarily reflect the views of FEMA. Additionally, neither FEMA
or any of its employees makes any warrantee, expressed or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any
information, product, or process included in this publication. Users of information
from this publication assume all liability arising from such use

The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is one of the most
significant transformations in the Federal Government in decades, establishing a
department whose first priority is to protect the nation against terrorist attack.
Within the DHS, the Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) is
focused on ensuring that our nation is prepared for catastrophes, including both
natural disasters and terrorist assaults.
This Primer for Protection of Schools Against Terrorist Attacks provides guidance to
protect students, faculty, staff, and their school buildings from terrorist attacks. It also
provides guidance to the building science community of architects and engineers
working for local institutions on school projects.
This document is intended for use by schools who feel that they are at risk to terrorist
attacks. It provides necessary guidance to those who desire to increase the
performance of their school and related infrastructure. Not all schools are at risk of
terrorist attacks. The decision-makers in each school district should use current and
available threat information from the proper sources to make this determination.
The use of experts to apply the methodologies contained in this document is
encouraged.
This primer references several sources for additional information, including
publications completed by other government agencies. The reader is encouraged to
obtain additional guidance.
This document was prepared by the Building Sciences and Technology Branch of the
Mitigation Division, part of EP&R. DHS would like to thank the following agencies
for their contribution and input to this publication:
_ General Services Administration
_ Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center
_ Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) Criteria Office
_ USACE Protective Design Center
_ Department of Veterans Affairs
_ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health
_ Department of Justice, Office of Domestic Preparedness (DHS - Border and
Transportation Security)
_ United States Air Force - Civil Engineer Support Agenc

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT

BACKGROUND
The purpose of this primer is to provide the design community and school
administrators with the basic principles and techniques to make a school that is safe
from terrorist attacks and at the same time is functional, aesthetically pleasing, and
meets the needs of the students, staff, administration, and general public. Protecting
a school building and grounds from physical attack is a significant challenge
because the ability to design, construct, renovate, operate, and maintain the facility is
spread across numerous building users, infrastructure systems, and many building
design codes.
There is a strong interest in the United States (U.S.) in ensuring the safety of
students, faculty, and staff in our schools. Schools are integral parts of their com-
munities. On any given weekday, nearly 53 million young people aged 5 to 17 attend
more than 117,000 public and private schools where 6 million adults work as teachers
or staff (counting students, faculty, and staff, this constitutes more than one-fifth of
the U.S. population). Additionally, schools are resources for their communities.
Many schools are used as shelters, command centers, or meeting places in times of
crisis. Schools are also used widely for polling and voting functions. In some
communities, schools are places of health care delivery.
Schools may or may not be the targets of terrorism, but they are certain to be affected
by terrorism, whether directly or indirectly. On September 11, 2001, four elementary
schools and three high schools located within 6 blocks of the World Trade Center
were just beginning classes when the first plane hit the north tower. Thousands of
children were exposed to the dust clouds from the collapsing buildings. Even those
children not in the immediate vicinity experienced a great deal of anxiety. Children
in at least three states (New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) had parents working
in or around the World Trade Center that day. In the Washington, DC, area, schools
faced similar situations after the Pentagon was attacked.1
Many Americans feel that schools should be the safest place our children can be,
perhaps at times even safer than the homes in which they live. Security is not a
standalone capability; it is a critical design consideration that should be constantly
reviewed and scrutinized from the design phase through construction or reha-
bilitation and onto building use.
The focus of this primer will be on the threats posed by potential physical attacks on
a school by terrorists. Attacking schools and school children could be a highly
emotional and high profile event. At the time of publication of this primer, there
have been no direct terrorist threats against a school known to the public; however,
schools could be indirectly threatened by collateral damage from a terrorist attack
directed at nearby facilities. Protecting a school against terrorist attack is a
challenging task. A school may have considerable vulnerabilities, because of its well
defined periods of use, designated access points, storage of sensitive personal
information, minimal security forces, and numerous avenues of penetration and
escape for attackers.
This primer should be used in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings,
and FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks.
SCOPE
This primer presents an approach to protecting schools at risk from terrorist attacks.
The information presented is intended primarily for architects and engineers, or
school administrators with a technical background. This publication is designed to
meet the needs of all schools, including those with serious security concerns.
Because security concerns of individual schools vary greatly, some users with modest
security concerns may feel beleaguered by the amount of information and technical
approach presented. They should feel free to select the methods and measures that
best meet their individual situations while gaining a general appreciation of security
concerns and risk management.
Several design philosophies and techniques have been incorporated into this primer,
including the Department of Defense (DoD) Minimum Antiterrorism Standards, the
Army and Air Force Security Engineering Manual, the General Services Ad-
ministration (GSA) Public Building Standards, the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) Guidelines for Airborne Contaminants.
ORGANIZATION AND CONTENT OF THE PRIMER
This publication contains many how-to aspects based upon current information
contained in FEMA, Department of Commerce (DOC), DoD (including Army, Navy,
and Air Force), Department of Justice (DOJ), GSA, VA, CDC/NIOSH, and other
publications. It is intended to provide an understanding of the current
methodologies for assessing threat/hazard, vulnerability, and risk, and the design
considerations needed to improve protection of new and existing buildings and the
people occupying them. As needed, this primer should be supplemented with more
extensive technical resources, as well as the use of experts when necessary.
_ Chapter 1 presents a methodology for architects, engineers, and school
administrators to analyze the safety of students, teachers, and staff for
vulnerabilities to various terrorist threats. The methodology presented will assist
schools in performing risk management by helping them to identify the best and
most cost-effective terrorism mitigation measures for their unique security needs.
_ Chapters 2 and 3 discuss site and layout, and building design guidance and
safety plans, respectively, and mitigation measures or comprehensive architectural
and engineering design considerations to provide an acceptable level of
protection. Specifically, Chapter 2 discusses comprehensive architectural and
engineering design considerations for the school site, from the property line to
the school building. Chapter 3 presents design considerations for the building
envelope.
_ Chapter 4 is a brief discussion of explosive blast theory. Chapter 5 presents
chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) measures that can be taken to
mitigate school vulnerabilities and reduce associated risk for these terrorist tactics
or technological hazards.
_ Chapter 6 is a standalone description of the concept of safe rooms within
schools that will resist CBR and blast threats intended to provide school board
members and decision-makers with the basic components of a protective system.
_ Appendices A, B, and C contain acronyms, general definitions, and chemical
and biological agent characteristics, respectively. Appendix B is an extensive
glossary with terminology used in the report.
_ Appendices D and E present a comprehensive bibliography of publications
(including information for obtaining the publications), and the associations and
organizations capturing the building security guidance needed by the building
sciences community (including web sites), respectively.
_ Appendix F contains the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Principal Authors:
Michael Chipley, UTD, Inc.
Wesley Lyon, UTD, Inc.
Robert Smilowitz, Weidlinger Associates, Inc.
Pax Williams, Battelle Memorial Institute
Contributors:
Milagros Kennett, FEMA, Project Officer, Risk Management Series Publications
Eric Letvin, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc., Consultant Project Manager
Michael Kaminskas, UTD, Inc.
Christopher Arnold, Building Systems Development, Inc.
Shawn Fenn, FEMA
Randall Hoffman, UTD, Inc.
Damian Kolbay, UTD, Inc.
Eve Hinman, ATC/Hinman Consulting Engineers, Inc.
Robert Burns, UTD, Inc.
Curt Betts, U.S. Army Engineer District, Omaha
Connie Deshpande, Department of Education
Bill Modzeleski, Department of Education
Randy Haslam, Jordan, Utah, School District
Deb Daly, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc.
Wanda Rizer, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc.
Julie Liptak, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc.
Bob Pendley, Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc.

This primer was prepared under contract to FEMA. It will be revised periodically, and
comments and feedback to improve future editions are welcome. Please send
comments and feedback by e-mail to riskmanagementseriespubs@dhs.go v

TABLE OF CONTENT

FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTSi
CHAPTER 1 - ASSET VALUE, THREAT/HAZARD, VULNERABILITY, AND RISK1-
1
1.1 Asset Value Assessment 1-2
1.1.1 Identifying School Core Functions1-4
1.1.2 Identifying School Infrastructure1-4
1.1.3 Quantifying Asset Value1-5
1.2 Threat/Hazard Assessment1-7
1.2.1 Threat Identification1-9
1.2.2 Threat Definition1-13
1.2.3 Threat Assessment Products1-15
1.2.4 Design Basis Threat1-18
1.3 Vulnerability Assessment1-20
1.4 Risk Assessment1-23
1.5 The Risk Management Process1-28
CHAPTER 2 - SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 2-1
2.1 Land Use Considerations 2-2
2.2 Site Planning 2-4
2.2.1 Site Design2-4
2.2.2 Layout and Form2-4
2.2.3 Vehicular and Pedestrian Circulation2-9
2.2.4 Landscape and Urban Design2-10
2.3 Stand-off Distance2-14
2.4 Controlled Access Zones 2-16
2.5 Entry Control and Vehicular Access2-20
2.6 Signage2-21
2.7 Parking2-22
2.8 Loading Docks and Service Access2-24
2.9 Physical Security Lighting2-25
2.10 Site Utilities2-26
2.11 Summary of Site Mitigation Measures2-28
2.12 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)2-33
CHAPTER 3 - BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE AND SAFETY PLANS3-1
3.1 Architectural3-2
3.2 Building Structural and Non-structural Systems3-5
3.3 Building Envelope3-10
3.3.1 Building Exterior3-10
3.3.2 Exterior Wall Design3-10
3.3.3 Window Design3-12
3.3.4 Doors3-17
3.3.5 Roofs3-18
3.4 Mechanical Systems3-18
3.5 Electrical Systems3-24
3.6 Fire Protection Systems3-25
3.7 Communications Systems3-26
3.8 Physical Security Systems3-27
3.9 Summary of Building Envelope Mitigation Measures3-29
3.10 Recommendations Based on the Homeland Security Advisory System3-32
3.11 School Safety Emergency Management Plan3-33
3.12 Emergency Plans and Training3-36
CHAPTER 4 - EXPLOSIVE BLAST4-1
4.1 Blast Effects4-1
4.1.1 Building Damage4-3
4.1.2 Casualties and Injuries4-5
4.1.3 Levels of Protection4-5
4.2 Stand-off Distance and the Effects of Blast4-10
CHAPTER 5 - CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL MEASURES5-1
5.1 Evacuation5-2
5.2 Sheltering in Place5-3
5.3 Personal Protective Equipment5-6
5.4 Air Filtration and Pressurization5-8
5.5 Exhausting and Purging5-8
5.6 CBR Detection5-9
5.7 Indications of CBR Contamination5-11
CHAPTER 6 - SAFE ROOMS WITHIN SCHOOLS6-1
6.1 Types of CBR Hazards6-2
6.1.1 Toxic Industrial Chemicals6-2
6.1.2 Incapacitating and Tear-producing Agents6-3
6.1.3 Biological Agents6-3
6.1.4 Radiological Agents6-4
6.2 Most Likely Delivery Methods for CBR Agents6-4
6.2.1 Internal Release6-5
6.2.2 External Proximate Release6-5
6.2.3 Remote Release6-5
6.2.4 Remote Release with Forewarning6-6
6.3 Vulnerability to Remote CBR Release6-6
6.4 Vulnerability to Remote CBR Release with Forewarning6-10
6.5 Vulnerability to Internal CBR Release6-11
6.6 Vulnerability to External Proximate CBR Release6-11
6.7 Recommendations for CBR Protection 6-16
6.8 Safe Rooms in Response to the Domestic Explosive Threat6-16
6.9 Locating Safe Rooms to Mitigate Threats 6-20
6.10 Fragment Mitigating Upgrades 6-24
6.11 Structural Upgrades 6-30
APPENDIX A - ACRONYMS
APPENDIX B - GENERAL GLOSSARY
APPENDIX C - CBR AGENT CHARACTERISTICS
APPENDIX D - BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX E - ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
APPENDIX F - BUILDING VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

TABLES
Chapter 1
Table 1-1 Asset Value Scale1-6
Table 1-2 Nominal High School People and Asset Value Assessment 1-7
Table 1-3 Homeland Security Threat Conditions1-10
Table 1-4 Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards1-15
Table 1-5 Threat Rating Scale 1-16
Table 1-6 Nominal High School Threat Assessment1-17
Table 1-7 Vulnerability Rating Scale1-21
Table 1-8 Nominal High School Vulnerability Assessment1-22
Table 1-9 Risk Rating System1-24
Table 1-10 Risk Color Value System1-25
Table 1-11 Nominal School Risk Assessment Matrix1-26
Chapter 2
Table 2-1 Correlation of Mitigation Measures to Threats2-30
Chapter 3
Table 3-1 Glazing Protection Levels Based on Fragment Impact Locations3-13
Table 3-2 Correlation of GSA Glazing Performance Conditions and DoD Levels of
Protection for New Buildings3-14
Table 3-3 Safety/Security Recommendations3-32

Chapter 4
Table 4-1 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism (AT) Standards for New Buildings4-6
Table 4-2 Correlation of DoD Level of Protection to Incident Pressure4-6
Table 4-3 Damage Approximations4-13
Chapter 5
Table 5-1 Indicators of a Possible Chemical Incident5-13
Table 5-2 Indicators of a Possible Biological Incident5-15
Table 5-3 Indicators of a Possible Radiological Incident5-15
Chapter 6
Table 6-1 Pressures Exerted on a School Building Face by Wind6-13
FIGURES
Chapter 1
Figure 1-1 The assessment process model1-2
Figure 1-2 Typical building design and construction process1-19
Figure 1-3 Risk management choices1-19
Chapter 2
Figure 2-1 Non-redundant critical functions collocated near loading dock2-6
Figure 2-2 Clustering to enhance surveillance opportunities while minimizing views
into buildings2-7
Figure 2-3 Blocking of sight lines2-13
Figure 2-4 Improper building siting and view relationships2-13
Figure 2-5 Clear zone with unobstructed views2-14
Figure 2-6 Concept of stand-off distance2-15
Figure 2-7 Exclusive and non-exclusive zones2-17
Figure 2-8 Sample bollard applications2-18
Chapter 3
Figure 3-1 Re-entrant corners in a floor plan3-3
Figure 3-2 Glazed areas oriented perpendicularly away from streets3-4
Figure 3-3 Offset doors through the foyer3-5
Figure 3-4 Side view of a test structure illustrating performance conditions of Table
3-23-13
Figure 3-5 An unprotected window after a large explosion3-15
Figure 3-6 Sacrificial roof3-18
Figure 3-7 Example of protecting outdoor air intakes3-20
Figure 3-8 Another example of protecting air intakes3-21
Figure 3-9 Example of elevated air intake3-21
Figure 3-10 Example of enclosing an existing vulnerable air intake3-22
Figure 3-11 Considerations for the design of a new security system3-28
Figure 3-12 Physical security devices3-29
Chapter 4
Figure 4-1 Blast pressure effects on a structure4-4
Figure 4-2 Explosives environments - blast range to effects4-8
Figure 4-3 Blast analysis of a high school for a typical car bomb detonated in the
school's parking lot4-9
Figure 4-4 Blast analysis of a high school for a typical large truck bomb detonated in
the school's parking lot4-9
Figure 4-5 Relationship of cost to stand-off distance4-10
Figure 4-6 Incident overpressure measured in pounds per square inch, as a function
of stand-off distance and net explosive weight (pounds-TNT)4-13
Chapter 5
Figure 5-1 Example of chemical dispersion5-3
Figure 5-2 Universal-fit escape hood5-7
Figure 5-3 An IMS chemical detector designed for installation in HVAC systems5-10
Figure 5-4 Placards associated with chemical incidents5-14
Figure 5-5 Placards associated with biological incidents5-15
Figure 5-6 Placards associated with radiological incidents5-1

ASSET VALUE, THREAT/HAZARD, VULNERABILITY, AND RISK 1
his chapter presents methodologies for architects, engi-
neers, school administrators, and state and local officials
working in the building sciences field to identify the most
effective mitigation measures to achieve a desired level of
protection against terrorist attacks. These methodologies
will help designers define asset value and evaluate
vulnerability assessment information for the purpose of
integrating threat/hazard into a design basis. Architects
and engineers will be able to identify the best and most
cost-effective terrorism mitigation measures for each
building's unique security needs. Mitigation measures are
conceived by the design professional and are best
incorporated into the building architecture, building
systems, and operational parameters, with consideration
for life-cycle costs. The methodologies described in this
chapter can be used for new buildings during the design
process, as well as for existing buildings undergoing
renovation. A key tool in the assessment process is
provided for the designer in the last section of this
chapter, the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist.
In order to create a safe school environment, many factors
must be considered. Figure 1-1 depicts the assessment
process presented in this primer to help each school
identify the best and most cost-effective terrorism
mitigation measures for its own unique security needs.
Section 1.1 identifies the value of a school's assets (e.g.,
people, buildings, equipment, and processes) that need to
be protected, recognizing that students, faculty, and staff
will always be a school's most vital asset requiring
protection. Section 1.2 describes how to conduct a
threat/hazard assessment to identify and define the threats
and hazards that could cause harm to a school. Section 1.3
discusses how to perform a vulnerability assessment to
identify school weaknesses that might be exploited by a
terrorist or aggressor. Combining the results of the asset
value, threat, and vulnerability assessments in Sections 1.1
through 1.3, the next step in the assessment process is to
perform a risk assessment (Section 1.4) to determine to
what degree a school's assets are vulnerable
Figure 1-1 The assessment process model
to attack. The final step of the process is presented in
Section 1.5, where risk management decisions are
discussed to prioritize and decide on the best and most
cost-effective terrorism mitigation measures to implement
to achieve the desired level of protection.
A school assessment is best performed by engineering and
security professionals who are experts in risk management,
building design, blast effects, and chemical, biological, and
radiological (CBR) attacks, as well as the latest
antiterrorism (AT) security measures. If it is not feasible to
hire professionals, members of the design community
and/or school administrators can perform an assessment
using the methodology presented in this primer. Some
schools may choose to take a hybrid approach, hiring
specialists or consultants to help perform individual
portions of the assessment process.
1.1 ASSET VALUE ASSESSMENT
This section will describe how to perform an asset value
assessment (the first step of the assessment process), to
identify people and the asset value. To facilitate
identifying people and the value of a school's assets, it is
useful to conduct interviews of the people who are most
familiar with them. Inputs from school administrators,
teachers, nurses, custodial staff, cafeteria staff, and
students, as well as any others who can help identify the
most valuable assets should be sought. In order to
conduct productive interviews, a list of areas to be covered
should be generated and prioritized prior to the actual
interviews. Thorough planning and research to generate
relevant questions will aid the process and yield better
results.
An asset is a resource of value requiring protection.1 An asset can be tangible (e.g.,
students, faculty, staff, school buildings, facilities, equipment, activities, operations,
and information) or intangible (e.g., processes or a school's reputation). In order to
achieve the greatest risk reduction at the least cost, identifying and prioritizing a
school's critical assets is a vital first step in the process to identify the best mitigation
measures to improve its level of protection prior to a terrorist attack. Recognizing that
people are a school's most critical asset, the process described below will help identify
and prioritize school infrastructure where people are most at risk and require
protection.
Identifying a school's critical assets is accomplished in a two-step process:
Step 1: Define and understand the school's core functions and processes
Step 2: Identify school infrastructure
. _ Critical components/assets
. _ Critical information systems and data
. _ Life safety systems and safe haven areas
. _ Security systems

1 Appendix B is a glossary of assessment and security terminology. Appendix C contains chemical and biological agent characteristics.
1.1.1 Identifying School Core Functions
The initial step of an asset value assessment is the determination of core functions and
processes necessary for the school to continue to operate or provide services after an
attack. The reason for identifying core functions/processes is to focus the design team
and school administrators on what a school does, how it does it, and how various
threats can affect the school. This provides more discussion and results in a better
understanding of asset value. Factors that should be considered include:
. _ What are the school's primary services or outputs?
. _ What critical activities take place at the school?
. _ Who are the school's occupants or visitors?
. _ What inputs from external organizations are required for a school's
success?

1.1.2 Identifying School Infrastructure
After the core functions and processes are identified, an evaluation of school
infrastructure is the next step. To help identify and value rank infrastructure, the
following should be considered, keeping in mind that the most vital asset for every
school is its people:
. _ Identify how many people may be injured or killed during a terrorist
attack that directly affects the infrastructure.
. _ Identify what happens to school functions, services, or student
satisfaction if a specific asset is lost or degraded. (Can primary services continue?)
. _ Determine the impact on other organizational assets if the component
is lost or can not function.
. _ Determine if critical or sensitive information is stored or handled at the
school.
. _ Determine if backups exist for the school's assets.
. _ Determine the availability of replacements.

. _ Determine the potential for injuries or deaths from any catastrophic
event at the school's assets.
. _ Identify any critical faculty, staff, or administration whose loss would
degrade, or seriously complicate the safety of students, faculty, and staff during an
emergency. [Consider first responders or the personnel responsible for shelter
operations at a school that is a designated shelter for natural hazards.]
. _ Determine if the school's assets can be replaced and identify
replacement costs if the school building is lost.
. _ Identify the locations of key equipment.
. _ Determine the locations of personnel work areas and systems within a
school.
. _ Identify the locations of any personnel operating "outside" a school's
controlled areas.
._ Determine, in detail, the physical locations of critical support architectures:
. � Communications and information technology (IT - the flow of critical
information)
. � Utilities (e.g., facility power, water, air conditioning, etc.)
. � Lines of communication that provide access to external resources and
provide movement of students and faculty (e.g., road, rail, air transportation)
. _ Determine the location, availability, and readiness condition of
emergency response assets, and the state of training of school staff in their use.

1.1.3 Quantifying Asset Value
After a list of a school's assets or resources of value requiring protection have been
identified, they should be assigned a value. Asset value is the degree of debilitating
impact that would be caused by the incapacity or destruction of the school's assets.
There are many scales that can be used, each with advantages and disadvantages.
Because some people are used to working with linguistic scales, although many
engineers and designers prefer numerical systems, this publication will use a
combination of a seven-level linguistic scale and a ten-point numerical scale as shown
in Table 1-1. Obviously, the key asset for every school is its people (e.g., students,
faculty, and staff). They will always be assigned the highest asset value as in the
example below.
Table 1-1: Asset Value Scale

Asset Value

Very High

10
High

8-9
Medium High

7
Medium

5-6
Medium Low

4
Low

2-3
Very Low

Very High - Loss or damage of the school's assets would have exceptionally grave
consequences, such as extensive loss of life, widespread severe injuries, or total loss
of primary services and core functions and processes.
High - Loss or damage of the school's assets would have grave consequences, such as
loss of life, severe injuries, loss of primary services, or major loss of core functions and
processes for an extended period of time.
Medium High - Loss or damage of the school's assets would have serious
consequences, such as serious injuries, or impairment of core functions and processes
for an extended period of time.
Medium - Loss or damage of the school's assets would have moderate to serious
consequences, such as injuries, or impairment of core functions and processes.
Medium Low - Loss or damage of the school's assets would have moderate
consequences, such as minor injuries, or minor impairment of core functions and
processes.
Low - Loss or damage of the school's assets would have minor consequences or
impact, such as a slight impact on core functions and processes for a short period of
time.
Very Low - Loss or damage of the school's assets would have negligible consequences
or impact.
Asset Value Example. A nominal list of assets for a typical high school with assigned
value is presented in Table 1-2. Please note that this is a nominal example; each school
should tailor its list to its own unique situation. In Section 1.4, the results of the asset
value assessment will be combined with the results of a threat assessment (Section 1.2)
and a vulnerability assessment (Section 1. 3) to determine total risk.

1.2 THREAT/HAZARD ASSESSMENT
After identifying asset value, the next step in the assessment process is to conduct a
threat/hazard assessment wherein the threats or hazards are identified, defined, and
quantified. Within the Department of Defense (DoD), intelligence community, and
law enforcement, the term "threat" is typically used to describe the design criteria for
terrorism or manmade disasters. Within the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and other civil agencies, the term "hazard" is used in several different
contexts. "Natural hazard" typically refers to a natural event such as an earthquake, a
flood, or a wind disaster. "Manmade hazards" are "technological hazards" and
"terrorism." These are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that they originate
from human activity. Furthermore, "technological hazards" are generally assumed to
be accidental, and their consequences are considered unintended. For the sake of
simplicity, this primer will use the terms "threat" and "hazard" when referring to
terrorism and manmade disasters, respectively.
Table 1-2: Nominal High School Asset Value Assessment

For terrorism, the threat is from aggressors (those people with intent to do harm) that
are known to exist, have the capability for hostile actions, and have expressed
intentions for using hostile actions. They may seek publicity for their cause or political
gain through their actions to injure or kill people, and destroy or damage facilities,
property, equipment, or resources.
Aggressor tools can be forced entry tools, vehicles, or surveillance (visual/audio).
Their weapons can be incendiary devices; small arms (rifles and handguns); stand-off
military-style weapons (rocket propelled grenades or mortars); explosive devices; and
CBR agents. Their tactics run the gamut: moving vehicle bombs; stationary vehicle
bombs; exterior attacks (thrown objects like rocks, Molotov cocktails, hand grenades,
or hand-placed bombs); stand-off weapons attacks (small arms, military or improvised
direct and indirect fire weapons); covert entries (gaining entry by false credentials or
circumventing security with or without weapons); mail bombs (delivered to individuals
or institutions); airborne contamination (CBR agents used to contaminate the air,
water, or food supply to a school); and waterborne contamination (CBR agents
injected into the water supply of a school facility).
A threat assessment is a continual process of compiling and examining all available
information concerning potential threats and manmade hazards. It can be broken
down into two processes (1) defining threats and (2) identifying threat event profiles
and tactics.
1.2.1 Threat Identification
The beginning point for security design is to define threats (hazards) and tactics that
may be employed. From a physical attack viewpoint, schools maybe susceptible to
attack by a number of different threats and tactics especially in areas of high risk.
Schools are typically site constrained, have well defined traffic control and entry
points, and operate on standard schedules. Designers and school administrators need
to evaluate attack objectives, threat event profiles, and the effects or impact of the
attack on the school and its occupants. It should also be noted that weapons and
tactics change faster than the construction of schools. Table 1-3 provides a broad
spectrum of manmade threats/hazards to consider and can be used as a tool in the
threat assessment process. An extensive list of potential chemical and biological agents
that can be used in terrorist attacks is provided in Appendix C. Blast range effects are
indicated throughout Chapter 4.
Table 1-3: Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards*

Table 1-3: Event Profiles for Terrorism and Technological Hazards* (continued)

*ADAPTED FROM: FEMA 386-7, INTEGRATING HUMAN-CAUSED HAZARDS INTO MITIGATION PLANNING, SEPTEMBER 2002.

1.2.2 Threat Definition
A threat (hazard) is any indication, circumstance, or event with
the potential to cause loss of, or damage to an asset. It is impor-
tant to understand who are the people with the intent to cause
harm; or who, by process, materials, or proximity, can cause in-
direct harm to a school building. With the goal of reducing the
potential risk of a school building, the design team and school
administration should seek threat assessment information from
local law enforcement, the local office of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), State Health Departments, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and the Homeland Security Offices
(HSOs) at the state level. In many areas of the country, there are
threat coordinating committees that facilitate the sharing of
information. Local fire departments and hazardous materials
(HazMat) units will frequently understand the threat of
technological hazards due to hazardous materials on school
grounds as well as those in surrounding industries that could
cause a collateral threat to schools. In many jurisdictions, the
HazMat unit is part of the fire department.
After information on potential aggressors is gathered, it should be analyzed. A
common method to evaluate terrorist threats uses five factors: existence, capability,
history, intention, and targeting.
Existence addresses the questions: Who is hostile to our school building or
community of concern? Are they present or thought to be present? Are they able to
enter the country or are they readily identifiable in a local community upon arrival?
Capability addresses the questions: What weapons have been used in carrying out past
attacks? Do the aggressors need to bring them into the area or are they available
locally?
History addresses the questions: What has the potential threat element done in the
past and how many times? When was the most recent incident and where, and against
what target? What tactics did they use? Are they supported by another group or
individuals? How did they acquire their demonstrated capability?
Intention addresses the questions: What does the potential threat element or
aggressor hope to achieve? How do we know this (e.g., published in books or news
accounts, speeches, letters to the editor, informant)?
Targeting addresses the questions: Do we know if an aggressor (we may not know
which specific one) is performing surveillance on our school, nearby facilities, or
facilities that have much in common with our school? Is this information current and
credible, and indicative of preparations for terrorist operations (manmade hazards)?
The threat/hazard analysis for a school can range from a general threat/hazard
scenario shared by all members of a community to a very detailed examination of
specific groups, individuals, and tactics that must be repelled or defended against by
means of school design. The Homeland Security Advisory System has five threat levels
that provide a general indication of risk of terrorist attack. In Table 1-4, the five factors
commonly used to evaluate terrorist threats have been layered onto the Homeland
Security Advisory levels. It illustrates threat levels and provides a representation of the
likelihood of a terrorist attack. If the anticipated threat or projected character/use of
the facility warrant, a detailed threat analysis should be developed in coordination
with local law enforcement, intelligence, and civil authorities in order to more
quantitatively determine the vulnerability or risk. All schools should identify actions to
be taken for each threat level. A table with specific recommendations for schools
based on the Homeland Security Threat Advisory Level is presented in Chapter 3
(Table 3-3).
Table 1-4: Homeland Security Threat Conditions
_ Factor must be present _ Factor may or may not be present
Please note the DHS does not use these threat analysis factors to determine threat level.
SOURCE: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY.

1.2.3 Threat Assessment Products
A threat assessment is a continual process of compiling and examining all
available information concerning potential threats and manmade
hazards. The product of a threat assessment is a list of threats and hazards
with a threat rating assigned. The threat rating is a subjective judgment
based on existence, capability, history, intention, and targeting. Often,
information is sketchy and analysts must rely more on thejudgment of
experts, statistical probability, and occasionally assumptions to help
quantify and qualify the threat (all assumptions should be documented).
The same combination of linguistic scale and numerical scale used in the
asset value assessment (Table 1-1) can be used for the threat assessment
as presented in Table 1-5. Assessing terrorist threats is much more diffi-
cult than assessing the risk from natural hazards such as earthquakes,
floods, and winds. Historical data form the basis of threat and locality
indicates vulnerability to a great extent in regard to natural hazards. For
terrorist threats, the likelihood of occurrence is less defined and the
associated vulnerabilities have many considerations that impact making
good risk management decisions.
Table 1-5: Threat Rating Scale

Threat Rating

Very High

10
High

8-9
Medium High

7
Medium

5-6
Medium Low

4
Low

2-3
Very Low

Very High - Known aggressors or hazards, highly capable of causing loss of, or damage
to the school exist. One or more vulnerabilities are present. The aggressors are known
or highly suspected of having intent to exploit the school's assets and are known or
highly suspected of performing surveillance on a facility.
High - Known aggressors or hazards, capable of causing loss of, or damage to the
school exist. One or more vulnerabilities are present and the aggressors are known
or reasonably suspected of having intent to exploit the school's assets.
Medium High - Known aggressors or hazards, capable of causing loss of, or damage to
the school exist. One or more vulnerabilities are present and the aggressor is
suspected of having intent to exploit the school's assets.
Medium - Known aggressors or hazards that may be capable of causing loss of, or
damage to the school exist. One or more vulnerabilities may be present; however, the
aggressors are not believed to have intent to exploit the school's assets.
Medium Low - Known aggressors or hazards that may be capable of causing loss of or
damage to the school exist. Aggressors have no intent to exploit the school's assets.
Low - Few or no aggressors or hazards exist. Their capability of causing damage to
the school's assets is doubtful.
Very Low - No aggressors or hazards exist.
Threat Assessment Example. A nominal list of threats/hazards with assigned threat
rating is presented in Table 1-6. Please note that this is a nominal example; each
school should tailor its list to its own unique situation.
Table 1-6: Nominal High School Threat Assessment
Stationary vehicle bomb
Low
2
Attack with small arms
Medium Low
4
Hydrogen sulfide "stink bomb"
Medium
5
Forced entry at night to damage school
property
Medium High
7
Electronic attack to destroy or alter school
academic records
Medium High
7

1.2.4 Design Basis Threat
Traditionally, the building regulatory system has addressed natural disaster
mitigation (hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake, windstorm, and snow storm)
through prescriptive building codes supported by well-established and accepted
reference standards, regulations, inspection, and assessment techniques. Some man-
made risks (e.g., HazMat storage) and specific societal goals (energy conservation
and life safety) have also been similarly addressed. However, the building regulation
system has not yet fully addressed most manmade hazards or terrorist threats.
Soon after September 11, 2001, the New York City Building Department initiated an
effort to analyze the building code in relation to terrorist threats. The task force
issued a report recommending code changes based on the attack on the World
Trade Center. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has a committee on
premises security and security system installation standards. These advancements
may some day result in the building regulatory system developing prescriptive
building codes to mitigate security threats.
In the absence of such regulations, identifying design basis threats (e.g., threat tactics,
weapons, tools, or explosives against which a building must be protected) should be
considered as part of a school's threat assessment to facilitate the work of designers
during new construction or rehabilitation of an existing school building. The DoD,
General Services Administration (GSA), and Department of State (DOS) all have
established processes to identify design basis threats for their facilities.
The typical building design and construction process is sequential, progressing from
identifying building use and design goals through actual construction. This process is
illustrated in Figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2 Typical building design and construction process
In every school design and renovation project, there are ultimately three choices of
how to address the risk posed by terrorism:
1. 1. Do nothing and accept the risk
2. 2. Perform a risk assessment and manage the risk by installing reasonable
mitigation measures to achieve a desired level of protection
3. 3. Harden the building against all threats to achieve the least amount of
risk

Figure 1-3 is a graphical representation of the three choices. Since September 11,
2001, terrorism has become a dominant concern. Life, safety, and security issues
should be a design goal from the beginning for all schools.
Figure 1-3 Risk management choices

1.3 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
A vulnerability assessment evaluates vulnerability, or any weaknesses that can be
exploited by an aggressor, of critical assets across a broad range of identified threats
and provides a basis for determining mitigation measures for protection of people and
critical assets.
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist provided in Appendix F is based on
the checklist developed by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and compiles
many best practices based upon technologies and scientific research to consider
during the design of a new building or an assessment of an existing school building.
It allows a consistent security evaluation of designs at various levels. The checklist can
be used as a screening tool for an initial vulnerability assessment or be used by
subject matter experts for a comprehensive vulnerability assessment of existing
school buildings.
The assessment of any vulnerability of a school building should be done within the
context of the defined threats and the value of the school's assets. That is, each
element of the school building should be analyzed for vulnerabilities to each threat
and a vulnerability rating should be assigned. The same combination of linguistic scale
and numerical scale used in the asset value and threat assessments (Tables 1-1 and 1-
5) can also be used for the vulnerability assessment as presented in Table 1-7. It should
be noted that a vulnerability assessment may change the value rating of assets due to
the identification of critical nodes or some other factor that makes the school's assets
more valuable.
Table 1-7: Vulnerability Rating Scale

Vulnerability Rating

Very High

10
High

8-9
Medium High

7
Medium

5-6
Medium Low

4
Low

2-3
Very Low

Very High - One or more major weaknesses have been identified
that make the school's assets extremely susceptible to an aggressor
or hazard.

High- One or more significant weaknesses have been identified that

make the school's assets highly susceptible to an aggressor or hazard.
Medium High - An important weakness has been identified that
makes the school's assets very susceptible to an aggressor or hazard.

Medium - A weakness has been identified that makes the school's

assets fairly susceptible to an aggressor or hazard.
Medium Low - A weakness has been identified that makes the
school's assets somewhat susceptible to an aggressor or hazard.

Low - A minor weakness has been identified that slightly increases
the susceptibility of the school's assets to an aggressor or hazard.
Very Low - No weaknesses exist.

Vulnerability Assessment Example. To create the vulnerability
assessment of a school, a site vulnerability assessment should be
performed using the checklist in Appendix F. The results of the
vulnerability assessment are then analyzed in conjunction with the
results of the asset value and threat assessments developed earlier.
Each asset/threat pair is then assigned a vulnerability rating as
shown in Table 1-8 and forms the basis for identifying measures
to mitigate threat vulnerability and improve protection of the
building and its occupants. Please note that this is a nominal example; each school
should tailor its list to its own unique situation.

Table 1-8: Nominal High School Vulnerability Assessment

VH = Very High; H = High; MH = Medium High; M = Medium; ML = Medium Low; L = Low; VL
= Very Low

1.4 RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk is the potential for a loss of or damage to an asset. It is measured based upon the
value of the asset in relation to the threats and vulnerabilities associated with it. Risk
is based on the likelihood or probability of the hazard occurring and the conse-
quences of the occurrence. A risk assessment analyzes the threat (probability of
occurrence), and asset value and vulnerabilities (consequences of the occurrence) to
ascertain the level of risk for each asset against each applicable threat/hazard. Thus,
a very high likelihood of occurrence with very small consequences may require
simple, low cost mitigation measures, but a very low likelihood of occurence with very
grave consequences may require more costly and complex mitigation measures. The
risk assessment provides engineers, architects, and school administrators with a
relative risk profile that defines which assets are at the greatest risk against specific
threats. Chapters 2 and 3 explore mitigation measures to reduce the vulnerability
and risk for valuable assets with a high risk.
There are numerous methodologies and techniques for conducting a risk assessment.
One approach is to assemble the results of the asset value assessment, threat
assessment, and vulnerability assessment, and determine a numeric value of risk for
each asset and threat/hazard pair in accordance with the following formula:
Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating
The completed matrix provides a quantitative value for risk that can be converted into
a linguistic value as shown in Table 1-9. The following rating system can be used for
assessing the risk of schools.
Table 1-9: Risk Rating System

Very High - The potential for loss or damage of the school's assets is so great as to
expect exceptionally grave consequences, such as extensive loss of life, widespread
severe injuries, or total loss of primary services, and core functions and processes.
High - The potential for loss or damage of the school's assets is so great as to expect
grave consequences, such as loss of life, severe injuries, loss of primary services, or
major loss of core functions and processes for an extended period of time.
Medium High - The potential for loss or damage of the school's assets is such as to
expect serious consequences (e.g., as serious injuries, or impairment of core
functions and processes for an extended period of time).
Medium - The potential for loss or damage of the school's assets is such as to expect
serious consequences (e.g., injuries, or impairment of core functions and processes).
Medium Low - The potential for loss or damage of the school's assets is such as to
expect only moderate consequences (e.g., minor injuries, or minor impairment of
core functions and processes).
Low - The potential for loss or damage of the school's assets is such as to expect only
minor consequences or impact (e.g., a slight impact on core functions and processes
for a short period of time).
Very Low - The potential for loss or damage of the school's assets is so low that there
would only be negligible consequences or impact.
Because of the large amount of information in a risk assessment matrix, it is useful to
assign a color code (red, yellow, or green) based on the total numeric value of risk
determined based on the scale in Table 1-10.
Table 1-10: Risk Color Value System
As a minimum, mitigation measures to reduce risk and create an acceptable level of
protection should be considered for those critical assets determined to be at highest
risk.
Risk Assessment Example. A nominal risk assessment is presented in Table 1-11 based
on the asset value, threat, and vulnerability assessment examples presented earlier. As
mentioned previously, each school should tailor its list to its own unique situation.
Table 1-11: Nominal High School Risk Assessment Matrix

Table 1-11: Nominal High School Risk Assessment Matrix (continued)

1.5 THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Risk management is the process of selecting and implementing mitigation measures
to achieve an acceptable level of risk at an acceptable cost. Because it is cost-
prohibitive to protect against the entire range of possible threats, it is important to
develop a realistic prioritization of mitigation measures. When considering mitigation
measures, the following factors should be considered:
. _ Results of the risk assessment, including asset value and asset
vulnerabilities
. _ Costs of the mitigation measures

. _ The value of risk reduction to the school
. _ Frequency with which the benefits of the mitigation measures will be
realized
. _ The deterrence or preventive value of the mitigation measures
. _ The expected lifespan of the mitigation measures and the time value of
money

To evaluate prospective mitigation measures, the design team should first calculate
new values of risk based on how the installation or use of mitigation measures would
change vulnerability and/or asset values. Some mitigation measures will affect mul-
tiple asset/threat risk values. After the amount of risk reduction each mitigation
measure will produce has been calculated, the cost of each mitigation measure
should be estimated using resources such as R.S. Means Construction Cost Data. The
final step is to perform a benefit/cost analysis to determine which mitigation
measures will produce the greatest reduction of risk at an acceptable cost.
When dealing with manmade hazards and terrorism, it is much more difficult to
predict how often an event will occur and the deterrent value of mitigation measures.
Although there are historical data to help predict how often natural hazards such as
floods or tornadoes occur in various regions, the probability or frequency of manmade
hazards/threats is not known. Therefore, subjective approaches for frequency must be
combined with quantitative estimates of cost-effectiveness.
Additionally, the deterrent or preventive value of a mitigation measure is also difficult
to quantify. Deterrence, in the case of terrorism, may also have a secondary impact in
that, once a school is "hardened," a terrorist may turn to a less protected building,
changing the likelihood of an attack for both targets. For example, the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City became the target of an aggressor when he was
deterred from attacking his primary target, the FBI building, because it was too
difficult to get the attack vehicle close to the target. He was able to park immediately
adjacent to the Murrah Federal Building and successfully target the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
All these factors should be considered when calculating the value of mitigation
measures, and weighing their value against their cost. Ideally, sufficient resources
would be available to achieve a desired level of protection against design basis threats
through mitigation measures. This is not always the case, so it is also important that
every school identify or designate an appropriate authority that is authorized to accept
risk on behalf of the school. Sometimes when decisions are left up to committees or
personnel at an inappropriate level, poor choices or decisions can be made.
It is also essential to maintain analytic integrity and objectivity during the assessment
process in order to achieve an honest and unbiased risk assessment. Legitimate
differences of professional opinion may occur; therefore, it is also important that the
process be transparent and repeatable. For example, there could be an honest
disagreement about the threat rating assigned to an "electronic attack to destroy
school records." An open and repeatable methodology facilitates healthy debate to
help the risk acceptance authority, who is ultimately responsible, make informed
decisions.
In sum, the risk management process is a benefit/cost analysis to decide and prioritize
which mitigation measures to implement to achieve the desired level of protection
with available resources. This is accomplished by repeating risk assessment
calculations adjusting for how mitigation measures change a school's asset values and
vulnerabilities. As pointed out earlier, mitigation measures may also change how an
aggressor views a school, thus changing the threat assessment as well.

SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE

his chapter discusses comprehensive architectural and engineering design
considerations (mitigation measures) for the school site, from the property line to the
school building, including: land use, site planning, stand-off distance, controlled
access zones, entry control and vehicular access, signage, parking, loading docks and
service access, physical security lighting, and site utilities. The intent of this guidance is
to provide concepts for integrating mitigation strategies to the design basis threats as
identified during the risk assessment. Integrating security requirements into a larger,
more comprehensive approach necessitates achieving a balance among many
objectives such as reducing risk; facilitating proper school building function; aesthetics
and matching architecture; creating a school environment conducive to learning; and
hardening of physical structures beyond required building codes and standards for
added security.
The design community must work closely with school districts and school
administrators to ensure that the optimal balance of all these considerations is
achieved; thus, coordination within the design team is critical. Many school asset
protection objectives can be achieved during the early stages of the design process
when mitigation measures are the least costly and most easily implemented. Planners,
architects, and landscape designers play an important role in identifying and
implementing crucial asset protection measures while considering land use; site
selection; the orientation of buildings on the site; and the integration of vehicle
access, control points, physical barriers, landscaping, parking, and protection of
utilities to mitigate threats.
It is important to remember that the nature of any threat is always changing. Although
indications of potential future threats may be scarce during the design stage,
consideration should be given to accommodating enhanced protection measures in
response to future threats that may emerge. School protection objectives must be
balanced with other design objectives, such as the efficient use of land and resources,
and must also take into account existing physical, programmatic, and fiscal constraints.
2.1 LAND USE CONSIDERATIONS
Land use is a broad planning process that encompasses zoning ordinances, subdivision
regulations, and master planning. Regulating land use development has been a
common practice in the United States for many years, with numerous regulations and
other tools in use by state and local governments to influence the configuration of
urban sites. Comprehensive planning can encourage certain types of development,
incentives, allocation of resources, and capital improvement programs oriented to
improve the security of areas vulnerable to manmade disasters. In most cases, sound
site planning will increase the land area needed for individual school buildings and
maximize the protection measures to be adopted. Other potential terrorist targets in
the surrounding area should also be considered. Students and teachers might be
killed or injured by collateral damage from a terrorist attack directed at another
nearby facility. When designing a school, the designer should consider external and
internal land use design concerns, including the characteristics of the surrounding
area (e.g., construction type, occupancies, and the nature and intensity of adjacent
activities), as well as the implications of these characteristics for the protection of the
students, faculty, and staff on the school site under consideration. The amount of land
available on the site for stand-off and the inherent ability of the school site to
accommodate the implementation of natural and manmade antiterrorism and
security design features could help the designers to determine if other measures such
as hardening the school building should also be considered.
It is important to recognize that conflicts sometimes arise between security-oriented
site design and conventional site design. For example, open circulation and common
spaces (which are desirable for conventional design) may be detrimental to certain
aspects of security.
When designing new school buildings or evaluating existing schools, the designer
should evaluate key protection measures to ensure they are appropriate, desirable,
and cost-effective in terms of mitigating the risk of potential terrorist attacks. Security
measures must be evaluated carefully to understand which measures are truly
beneficial and which are not practical.
When making decisions about site antiterrorism and security, designers should
consider the following:
. _ Adjacent land use and zoning plans for potential development that
would impact security within the school (assess by using land use maps and
Geographic Information Systems [GISs])
. _ Building footprint(s) relative to total land available
. _ Building location(s) or, if undeveloped, suitable building location(s)
relative to the site perimeter and adjacent land uses; distance between the perimeter
fence and improved areas off site
. _ Access via foot, road, rail, water, and air; suitability to support a secure
perimeter
. _ Current and planned infrastructure and its vulnerabilities, including
easements, tunnels, pipes, and rights-of-way
. _ Infrastructure nodes that constitute single-point vulnerabilities
. _ Adjacent land uses and occupancies that could enable or facilitate
attacks or that are potential targets themselves and thus present collateral damage or
cascading failure hazards
. _ Proximity to fire and police stations, hospitals, shelters, and other
critical facilities that could be of use in an attack
. _ Presence of natural physical barriers such as water features, dense
vegetation, and terrain that could provide access control and/or shielding, or
suitability of the site for the incorporation of such features
. _ Topographic and climatic characteristics that could affect the
performance of chemical agents and other weapons

_ Observability from outside site boundaries; ability of vegetation in proximity to
building or site to screen covert activity

2.2 SITE PLANNING
The single most important goal in planning a site to resist terrorism and security
threats is the protection of life, property, and operations. Decision-making in support
of this purpose should be based first and foremost on a comprehensive assessment of
the manmade threats and hazards so that planning and design countermeasures are
appropriate and effective in the reduction of vulnerability and risk as described in
Chapter 1. It is important to recognize that a given countermeasure can mitigate one
or more vulnerabilities, but may be detrimental to other important design goals. This
section will highlight several aspects of site design and will present some of the unique
characteristics arising from their application to antiterrorism and security.
2.2.1 Site Design
Because the economics of development dictate the construction of schools, security
concerns should be evaluated carefully. Conflicts sometimes arise between security
site design and conventional site design. For example, open circulation and common
spaces, which are desirable for conventional school design, are often undesirable for
security design. To maximize safety, security, and sustainability, designers should
implement a holistic approach to site design that integrates form and function to
achieve a balance among the various design elements and objectives. Even if resources
are limited, significant value can be added to a project by integrating security
considerations into the more traditional design tasks in such a way that they
complement, rather than compete with, the other elements.

2.2.2 Layout and Form
The overall layout of a school site (e.g., the placement and form of its buildings,
infrastructures, and amenities) is the starting point for development. Choices made
during this stage of the design process will steer decision-making for the other
elements of the site. A number of aspects of site layout and building type present
security considerations and are discussed below.
_ Clustered versus dispersed functions. There is a strong correlation between
building functions and building layout and forms. Typically, the former dictates
the other two. Depending on the site characteristics, the occupancy requirements,
and other factors, school buildings may cluster key functions in one particular
area or have these functions designed in a more dispersed manner. Both patterns
have compelling strengths and weaknesses in terms of security.
Concentrating key functions in one place may create a target-rich environment
and increase the risk of collateral impacts. Additionally, it increases the potential
for the establishment of more single-point vulnerabilities, such as indicated in
Figure 2-1. This figure shows several key functions grouped in a particular area of
the building (i.e., the mechanical rooms, stairs, telephone switch room, and
loading docks). If these areas become a target, the school may be closed for a
substantial period of time, even if the attack is not severe and the rest of the
school remains unharmed. However, grouping high-risk activities, concentrations
of personnel, and critical functions into a cluster can help maximize stand-off
from the perimeter and create a "defensible space." This also helps to reduce the
number of access and surveillance points, and minimize the size of the perimeter
needed to protect the school areas.
In contrast, the dispersal of key functions reduces the risk
that an attack on any one part of the site will impact the other
parts. However, this could also have an isolating effect and
reduce the effectiveness of on-site surveillance, increase the
complexity of security systems and emergency response, and
create a less defensible space.
To the extent that site, economic, and other factors allow, the designer should
consolidate school designs that are functionally
Figure 2-1 Non-redundant critical functions collocated near loading dock
compatible and have similar threat levels. For example,
visitor areas and receiving/loading areas constitute a
school's innermost line of defense, because they are
the first places where people and materials enter the
school building. Logically, they should be physically
separated from other key functions such as the main
operational areas or where people concentrate.
. _ School building orientation. The orientation of a school building can
have significant impact on its performance, not only in terms of energy efficiency, but
also the ability to protect occupants (see Figure 2-2). A school building's orientation
relative to its surroundings defines its relationship to that area. In aesthetic terms, a
school building can open up to the area or turn its back; it can be inviting to those
outside, or it can "hunker down" defensively. The physical positioning of a building
relative to its surroundings may seem more subtle, but can be a greater determinant of
this intangible quality than exterior aesthetics. Nevertheless, the proximity of a
vulnerable
. _ Open space. The incorporation of open space into school site design
presents a number of benefits. First and foremost is the ability to easily monitor an
area and detect intruders, vehicles, and weapons. Closely related to this benefit is the
stand-off value of open space; as discussed in Chapter 4, blast energy decreases as the
inverse of the cube of the distance from the seat of the explosion, so every additional
increment of distance provides increasingly more protection. In addition, pervious
open space allows stormwater to percolate back into the ground, reducing the need
for culverts, drainage pipes, manholes, and other covert site access and weapon
concealment opportunities. Also, if the open space is impassible for vehicles (as in the
case of a wetland or densely vegetated area), it can provide not only environmental
and aesthetic amenities, but prevent vehicle intrusion as well.
. _ Infrastructure and lifelines. Providing power, gas, water, wastewater,
and communications services is one of the most basic requirements of any school
development. At the site scale, all critical lifelines should have at least one layer of
redundancy, or backup. By eliminating single-point vulnerabilities, designers will
reduce the chance that service will be interrupted if an attack damages or destroys a
lifeline either outside the school perimeter or on site. It is important to note that
collocating a backup lifeline with its primary lifeline does not eliminate single-point
vulnerability; only physical separation can substantially increase the likelihood of
continuity of service.

Additionally, all controls, interconnections, exposed lines, and other vulnerable
elements of school infrastructure systems should be protected from access and
exploitation by surveillance and/or physical countermeasures. Service entrances
and other secondary access points should be monitored and access-controlled;
special attention should also be paid to any locations where multiple systems or
primary and backup systems come together, such as control rooms and
mechanical spaces. Again, these facilities should be designed for maximum
observability, including the use of opportunity reduction and target hardening
strategies where appropriate, and should be equipped with adequate lighting and
emergency communications capabilities wherever possible. For additional
information, see Sections 2.9 and 2.10.

2.2.3 Vehicular and Pedestrian Circulation
The movement of people and materials into, through, and out of a school facility is
determined by the design of its access, circulation, and parking systems. Such systems
should be designed to maximize efficiency while minimizing conflicts between vehicle
and pedestrian modes. Designers should begin with an understanding of the school's
transportation requirements based on an analysis of how the school will be used. This
includes studying the number and types of access points that are required, bus
requirements, the parking volume needed, where users need to go to and from, and
the modes of transportation they will use. Several aspects of transportation planning
can impact security and are discussed below.
_ Roadway network design. Streets are generally designed to minimize travel time
and maximize safety, with the end result typically being a straight path between two
or more endpoints. Although a straight line may be the most efficient course,
designers should use caution when orienting streets relative to school buildings
requiring high protection. Designers should design a roadway system to minimize
vehicle velocity, thus using the roadway itself as a protective measure. This is
accomplished through the use of several strategies.
First, straight-line or perpendicular approaches to school buildings should not be
used in a school at high risk, because these give vehicles the opportunity to gather
the speed necessary to ram through protective barriers and crash into or
penetrate buildings. Instead, approaches should be parallel to the fa�ade, with
berms, high curbs, appropriate trees, or other measures used to prevent vehicles
from departing the roadway. A related technique for reducing vehicle speeds is
the construction of serpentine (curving) roadways with tight-radius corners.
Existing streets can be retrofitted with barriers, bollards, swing gates, or other
measures to force vehicles to travel in a serpentine path. Again, high curbs and
other measures should be installed to keep vehicles from departing the roadway in
an effort to avoid these countermeasures.
Less radical than these techniques are traffic calming strategies, which seek to use
design measures to cue drivers as to the acceptable speed for an area. These
include raised crosswalks, speed humps and speed tables, pavement treatments,
bulbouts, and traffic circles. In addition to creating a more pedestrian-friendly
environment, which increases "eyes on the street" surveillance, designing
roadways to physically limit speeds can have the added benefits of increasing
safety and, subsequently, lowering liability. Designers should be aware, however,
that many of these techniques can have detrimental effects for emergency
response, including slowing response time, interfering with en route emergency
medical treatment, and increasing the difficulty of maneuvering fire apparatus.
They also may present problems for snow removal, and their outer ends should
remain flat so that bicycles can proceed unimpeded.
_ Parking. Surface lots can be designed and placed to keep vehicles away from
school buildings, but they can consume large amounts of land and, if constructed
of impervious materials, can contribute greatly to stormwater runoff. They can also
be hazardous for pedestrians if dedicated pedestrian pathways are not provided.
For additional information, see Section 2.7.

2.2.4 Landscape and Urban Design
Designing to meet user needs while maintaining stewardship of the natural and built
environments becomes increasingly more challenging when security requirements
are factored in. Design principles at the school site should include an emphasis on
selection of low-impact development techniques and environmental stewardship;
compatibility of context and relationship with adjacent uses, forms, and styles;
establishment of scale and identity through aesthetic design; connectivity among
buildings, uses, activities, and transportation modes; resource conservation; cultural
responsiveness; and the creation of appealing public spaces. These objectives are
generally achieved through the work of two closely related disciplines, landscape
design and urban design. For the purposes of this document, these two disciplines
are virtually overlapping and will, therefore, be addressed together.
_ Landscape design. Many landscape features can be used in school design to
enhance security. Landscape design features should be used to create the level of
protection without turning the school into a fortress. Elements such as landforms,
water features, and vegetation are among the building blocks of attractive and
welcoming spaces, and they can also be powerful tools for enhancing security.
These features can be used not only to define or designate a space, but also to
deter or prevent hostile surveillance or unauthorized access. Vegetative groupings
and landforms can even provide some level of blast shielding. Stands of trees,
earthen berms, and similar countermeasures generally cannot replace setbacks,
but they can offer supplementary protection. However, landscaping can also have
detrimental impacts for safety and security, and designers should consider the
unique requirements of the school project to ensure that the landscape design
elements they choose will be appropriate and effective.
With careful selection, placement, and maintenance, landscape elements can
provide visual screening that protects school gathering areas and other activities
from surveillance without creating concealment for covert activity. However,
dense vegetation in close proximity to a school building can screen illicit activity
and should be avoided. Additionally, thick ground cover such as English ivy or
vegetation over 4 inches tall such as monkey grass can be used to conceal bombs
and other weapons; in setback clear zones, vegetation should be selected and
maintained with eliminating concealment opportunities in mind. Similarly,
measures to screen visually detractive components such as transformers, trash
compactors, and condensing units should be designed to minimize concealment
opportunities for people and weapons.
_ Urban design. Numerous urban design elements present opportunities to provide
school security. The scale of the streetscape should be appropriate to its primary
users, and it can be manipulated to increase the comfort level of desired users
while creating a less inviting atmosphere for users with malicious intent. However,
even at the pedestrian scale, certain operational requirements must be
accommodated. For example, although efficient pedestrian and vehicle circulation
systems are important for school functions and operations, they are also critical for
emergency response, evacuation, and egress, and must be able to accommodate
vehicles up to the largest fire apparatus in the community. Furthermore, despite an
emphasis on downsizing the scale of the streetscape, it is critical to maintain the
maximum stand-off distance possible between vehicles and structures.
At the school perimeter, walls and fences used for space
definition may be hardened to resist the impact of a weapon-
laden truck; however, planters, bollards, or decorative
boulders could accomplish the same objective in a much more
aesthetically pleasing manner. Such an approach also creates
permeability, which would allow pedestrians and cyclists to
more easily move through the space.
Landscape and urban design inherently define the "lines of
sight" in a space. These techniques seek to deny aggressors a
"line of sight" to a potential target, either from on or off site. This
increases the protection of sensitive information and operations
by using stand-off weapons (see Figures 2-3 and 2-4). In addition
to the use of various types of screening options, anti-surveillance
measures (e.g., using building orientation, landscaping,
screening, and landforms) to block sight lines can also be used.
Depending on the circumstances, landforms can be either beneficial or detrimental
to anti-surveillance. Elevated sites may enhance surveillance of the surrounding area
from inside the facility, but may also allow observation of on-site areas by adversaries.
School buildings should not be sited immediately adjacent
Figure 2-5 Clear zone with unobstructed views

2.3 STAND-OFF DISTANCE
The most cost-effective solution for mitigating explosive effects on school
buildings is to keep explosives as far away from them as possible. The
distance between an asset and a threat is referred to as the stand-off
distance as shown in Figure 2-6. There is no ideal stand-off distance; it is
determined by the type of threat, the type of construction, and desired
level of protection. The easiest and least costly opportunity for achieving
appropriate levels of protection against terrorist threats is to incorporate
sufficient stand-off distance into school designs. Maximizing stand-off
distance also ensures that there is opportunity in the future to upgrade
school buildings to meet increased threats or to accommodate higher
levels of protection. Stand-off distance must be coupled with appropriate
building hardening as discussed in Chapter 3, to provide the necessary
level of protection to the school.
Figure 2-6 Concept of stand-off distance
For schools located in high-risk areas, additional considerations follow:
. _ The first mode of site protection is to create "keep out zones" that can
ensure a minimum guaranteed distance between an explosion (i.e., from a vehicle)
and the school structure.
. _ The perimeter line is the outermost line that can be protected by the
security measures incorporated during the school design process. It is recommended
that the perimeter line be located as far as is practical from the building exterior.
Many vulnerable school buildings are located in urban areas where only the exterior
wall of the building stands between the outside world and the building occupants. In
this case, the options are obviously limited. Often, the perimeter line can be pushed
out to the edge of the sidewalk by means of bollards, planters, and other obstacles. To
push this line even further outward, restricting or eliminating parking along the curb
often can be arranged with local authorities. In some extreme cases, elimination of
loading zones and the closure of streets are an option.

. _ "Keep out zones" can be achieved with perimeter barriers that cannot
be compromised by vehicular ramming. A continuous line of security should be
installed along the perimeter of the site to protect it from unscreened vehicles and to
keep all vehicles as far away from the school as possible.
. _ The following critical building components should be located away
from main entrances, vehicle circulation, parking, and maintenance areas. If this is
not possible, harden as appropriate:

� Emergency generator, including fuel systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and water
supply
. � Normal fuel storage
. � Telephone distribution and main switchgear
. � Fire pumps
. � Building control centers
. � Uninterrupted power supply (UPS) systems controlling critical functions
. � Main refrigeration systems if critical to building operation
. � Elevator machinery and controls
. � Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities
. � Critical distribution feeders for emergency power

2.4 CONTROLLED ACCESS ZONES
For a school at high risk, one method to attain the appropriate protection is with the
creation of a controlled access zone. These zones define minimum distances between
a school building and potential threats through the installation of barriers (such as
bollards, planters, fountains, walls, and fences). The barriers are designed to withstand
assaults by terrorist vehicles; however, their placement must be designed to allow for
access by fire and rescue vehicles in the event of an emergency. Selection of barriers is
based on operational considerations related to vehicle access and parking. Good
design principles for high-risk schools endorse the complete surround of a school
building with a stand-off zone that has perimeters set at distances that consider threat
levels, desired level of protection, building construction, and land availability. Entry
into the controlled area should only be through an entry control point.
When designing schools at high risk, controlled access zones may be exclusive or non-
exclusive, as shown in Figure 2-7. An exclusive zone is the area surrounding a school
building within the exclusive control of the building. Anyone entering an exclusive
zone must have a purpose related to the building. A non-exclusive zone is either a
public right-of-way or a particular area related to the main school building.
The following are some security considerations applicable to controlled access zones
and enforcement:
. _ Design and select barriers based on threat capabilities.
. _ If the limited availability of land precludes the creation of an exclusive
zone, the use of screening surrounding the school building is an alternative.
. _ Design and locate security devices to establish consistent rhythm
patterns within the site. Incorporate subtle and aesthetically pleasing security
measures to reach the desired level of protection.
. _ Locate security measures so that they do not impede the free access to
school public entrances or internal pedestrian flow. Miscellaneous decorative
elements (e.g., flag poles, fountains, pools, gardens, and similar features) may be
located within access ways to slow movement or restrict access.
. _ Use a combination of barriers. Some barriers are fixed and obvious
(fences and gates), while others are passive (sidewalks far away from buildings, curbs
with grassy areas, etc.). See Figure 2-8.

Figure 2-8 Sample bollard applications
. _ Consider using landscape materials to create barriers that are soft and
natural rather than manmade where physical barriers are required.
. _ Use vehicles as temporary physical barriers by placing them in front of
buildings or across access roads.
._ Maintain as much stand-off distance as possible between potential vehicular
bombs and the school building.
. � Provide traffic obstacles near entry control points to slow down traffic.
. � Consider vehicle barriers at building entries and drives.
. � Offset vehicle entrances from the direction of a vehicle's approach to force a
reduction in speed.
. � Position gates and perimeter boundary fences outside the blast vulnerability
envelope, when possible.
. � Provide a vehicle crash resistance system in the form of a low wall or earth
berm, if the threat level warrants it.
. _ Design entry control points (if provided) to screen the building from
vehicles entering it.
._ Provide passive vehicle barriers to keep stationary vehicle bombs at a distance
from the school building.
. � Use high curbs, low berms, shallow ditches, trees, shrubs, and other physical
separations to keep stationary bombs at a distance.
. � Do not allow vehicles to park next to perimeter walls of the secured area.
Consider using bollards or other devices to keep vehicles away.
. _ Provide adequate lighting to aid in threat detection in controlled
access zones.
. _ Use CCTV to control entry points, the site perimeter, and exclusive and
non-exclusive zones.

2.5 ENTRY CONTROL AND VEHICULAR ACCESS
In the case of a school, the objective of the design professional is to save lives by
mitigating building damages and reducing the chances of a catastrophic collapse of
the building at least until it is fully evacuated. Although there are many forms of
attacks against a school, from the standpoint of school structural design, the vehicle
bomb governs design because historically it has been used on multiple occasions by
terrorists. Where a school perimeter barrier is required for security, it will be necessary
to provide points of access through the perimeter for school users (i.e., students,
faculty, staff, visitors, and service providers). An entry control point or guard building
serves as the designated point of entry for site access. It provides a point for
implementation of desired/required levels of screening and access control. The
objective of the entry control point is to prevent unauthorized access to school
grounds while maximizing the rate of authorized access by foot or vehicle. These
measures will not be required for all schools; they may only be appropriate for schools
considered at high risk. Designs should be flexible to allow implementation of
increased security controls when schools are placed in high alert and easing of
controls at lower threat levels. For a school considered to be at high risk, the following
should be considered in the design of entry control points:
. _ Design entry roads to schools so that they do not provide direct or
straight-line vehicular access to the main building. Route major corridors away from
key school areas and functions.
. _ Design access points at an angle to oncoming streets so that is difficult
for a vehicle to gain enough speed to break through them.
. _ Minimize the number of access roads and entrances into a school.
. _ Provide a drop-off/pick-up lane for buses only.

. _ Minimize the number of driveways or parking lots that students will
have to walk across to get to the school building.
. _ Designate an entry to the school for commercial, service, and delivery
vehicles, preferably away from key school areas and functions, whenever possible.
. _ Design the entry control point and guard building so that the
authorization of approaching vehicles and occupants can be adequately assessed, and
the safety of both gate guards and approaching vehicles can be maintained when a
school is placed at high alert).
. _ Design (if they are required) traffic calming strategies and barriers
(road alignment, retractable bollards, swing gates, or speed bumps) to control vehicle
speed and slow incoming vehicles before they reach the gate so that entry control
personnel have adequate time to respond to unauthorized activities.
. _ Provide inspection areas that are not visible to the public. Place
appropriate landscape plantings to accomplish screening.
. _ Provide pull-over lanes at site entry gates to check suspect vehicles.
Also, provide a visitor/site personnel inspection area to inspect vehicles prior to
allowing access to the school site.
. _ Consider providing a walkway and turnstile for pedestrians and a
dedicated bicycle lane.

2.6 SIGNAGE
Signs are an important element of school security. They are meant to keep intruders
out of restricted areas. Confusion over site circulation, parking, and entrance locations
can contribute to a loss of site security. Signs should be provided off site and at school
entrances; there should be on-site directional, parking, and cautionary signs for
students, faculty, staff, visitors, service vehicles, and pedestrians. Unless required, signs
should not identify sensitive areas. A comprehensive signage plan should include the
following:
. _ Prepare entry control procedures signs that explain current entry
procedures for drivers and pedestrians.
. _ Prepare traffic regulatory and directional signs that control traffic flow
and direct vehicles to specific appropriate points.
. _ Consider using street addresses or building numbers instead of
detailed descriptive information inside the school grounds.
. _ Minimize the number of signs identifying high-risk areas; however, a
significant number of warning signs should be erected to ensure that possible
intruders are aware of entry into restricted areas.
. _ Minimize signs identifying critical utility complexes (e.g., power
stations and significant gas, water, and sewer). Post easily understandable signs to
minimize accidental entry by unauthorized visitors into critical areas.
. _ In areas where English is one of two or more languages commonly
spoken, warning signs must contain the other language(s) in addition to English. The
signs should be posted at intervals of no more than 100 feet and should not be
mounted on fences equipped with intrusion-detection equipment.
. _ Locate variable message signs, which give information on
site/organization special events and visitors, far inside site perimeters.

2.7 PARKING
Parking restrictions can help to keep potential threats away from a school building.
In urban settings, however, curbside or underground parking is often necessary and
sometimes difficult to control. Mitigating the risks associated with parking requires
creative design measures, including parking restrictions, perimeter buffer zones,
barriers, structural hardening, and other architectural and engineering solutions.
The following considerations may help designers to implement parking measures for
schools that may be at high risk:
. _ Locate vehicle parking areas away from school buildings to minimize
blast effects from potential vehicle bombs.
. _ Provide separate parking areas for students, faculty, staff, and visitors
who may be going in and out during the school day. (This allows the main student
parking lot to be closed off during the school day.)
. _ If possible, locate visitor or general public parking near, but not on, the
site itself.
. _ Locate general parking in areas that provide the fewest security risks to
school personnel.
. _ Consider one-way circulation within a school parking lot to facilitate
monitoring for potential aggressors.
. _ Locate parking within view of occupied school buildings while
maintaining stand-off.
. _ Prohibit parking within the stand-off zone.
. _ Request appropriate permits to restrict parking in the curb lane for
school vehicles or key employee parking only where distance from the building to the
nearest curb provides insufficient setback, and compensating design measures do not
sufficiently protect the building from the assessed threat. If necessary, use structural
features to prevent parking.
. _ Provide appropriate setback from parking on adjacent properties, if
possible. Structural hardening may be required if the setback is insufficient. In new
designs, it may be possible to adjust the location of the school building on the site to
provide adequate setback from adjacent properties.
. _ When establishing parking areas, provide emergency communications
systems (e.g., intercom, telephones, etc.) at readily identified, well-lighted, CCTV
monitored locations to permit direct contact with security personnel.

. _ Provide parking lots with CCTV cameras connected to the security
system and adequate lighting capable of displaying and videotaping lot activity.
. _ If possible, prohibit parking beneath or within a school building.
. _ If parking beneath a building is unavoidable, limit access to the parking
areas and ensure they are secure, well-lighted, and free of places of concealment.
._ Apply the following restrictions If parking within a school building is required:
. � Public parking with identification (ID) check
. � School vehicles and school employees and students only
. � Selected school employees only, or those requiring security

2.8 LOADING DOCKS AND SERVICE ACCESS
Loading docks and service access areas are commonly required for a school building
and are typically desired to be kept as invisible as possible. For this reason, special
attention should be devoted to these service areas in order to avoid intruders. Design
criteria for school loading docks and service access include the following:
. _ Separate by at least 50 feet, loading docks and shipping and receiving
areas in any direction from utility rooms, utility mains, and service entrances,
including electrical, telephone/ data, fire detection/alarm systems, fire suppression
water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.
. _ Locate loading docks so that vehicles will not be allowed under the
building. If this is not possible, the service area should be hardened for blast. Loading
dock design should limit damage to adjacent areas and vent explosive forces to the
exterior of the building.
. _ If loading zones or drive-through areas are necessary, monitor them
and restrict height to keep out large vehicles.

. _ Avoid having driveways within or under school buildings.
. _ Provide adequate design to prevent extreme damage to loading docks.
The floor of the loading dock does not need to be designed for blast resistance if the
area below is not occupied and or does not contain critical utilities. In certain cases,
significant structural damage to the walls and ceiling of the loading dock may be
acceptable; however, the areas adjacent to the loading dock should not experience
severe structural damage or collapse.
. _ Provide signage to clearly mark separate entrances for deliveries.

2.9 PHYSICAL SECURITY LIGHTING
Security lighting can be provided for overall school ground/ building illumination
and the perimeter to allow security personnel to maintain visual-assessment during
darkness. It may provide both a real and psychological deterrent for continuous or
periodic observation. Lighting is relatively inexpensive to maintain and may reduce
the need for security personnel while enhancing personal protection by reducing
opportunities for concealment and surprise by potential attackers.
Provide sufficient lighting at entry control points to ensure adequate lighting for the
area. Where practical, place lighting elements as high as possible to give a broader,
more natural light distribution. This requires fewer poles (less hazardous to drivers)
and is more aesthetically pleasing than standard lighting.
The type of site lighting system used depends on the school's overall security
requirements. Four types of lighting are used for security lighting systems:
_ Continuous lighting is the most common security lighting system. It consists of a
series of fixed lights arranged to flood a given area continuously during darkness
with overlapping cones of light.
. _ Standby lighting has a layout similar to continuous lighting; however,
the lights are not continuously lit, but are either automatically or manually turned on
when suspicious activity is detected or suspected by the security personnel or alarm
systems.
. _ Movable lighting consists of manually operated, movable searchlights
that may be lit during hours of darkness or only as needed. The system normally is
used to supplement continuous or standby lighting.
. _ Emergency lighting is a backup power system of lighting that may
duplicate any or all of the above systems. Its use is limited to times of power failure or
other emergencies that render the normal system inoperative. It depends on an
alternative power source such as installed or portable generators or batteries. Consider
emergency/backup power for security lighting as determined to be appropriate.

2.10 SITE UTILITIES
Utility systems can suffer significant damage when subjected to the shock of an
explosion. Some of these utilities may be critical for safely evacuating people from
the school building. Their destruction could cause damage that is disproportionate
to other building damage resulting from an explosion. To minimize the possibility
of such hazards, apply the following measures:
. _ Where possible, provide underground, concealed, and protected
utilities.
. _ Provide redundant utility systems (particularly electrical services) to
support school security, life safety, and rescue functions.
. _ Consider quick connects for portable utility backup systems if
redundant sources are not available.
. _ Prepare vulnerability assessments for all utility services to the school,
including all utility lines, storm sewers, gas transmission lines, electricity transmission
lines, and other utilities that may cross the site perimeter.

. _ Protect drinking water supplies from waterborne contaminants by
securing access points, such as manholes. If warranted, maintain routine water testing
to help detect waterborne contaminants.
. _ Minimize signs identifying critical utilities. Provide fencing to prevent
unauthorized access and use landscape planting to conceal aboveground systems.
. _ Locate petroleum, oil, and lubricants storage tanks and operations
buildings downslope from all other occupied school buildings. Locate fuel storage
tanks at least 100 feet from buildings.
. _ Consider providing utility systems with redundant or loop service,
particularly in the case of electrical systems. Where more than one source or service is
not currently available, provisions should be made for future connections. In the
interim, consider "quick connects" at the building for portable backup systems.
. _ Decentralize a school's communications resources, when possible; the
use of multiple communication networks will strengthen the communications system's
ability to withstand the effects of a terrorist attack.
. _ Place trash receptacles as far away from the building as possible; trash
receptacles should not be placed within 30 feet of a building.
. _ Provide a school-wide public address system that extends from the
interior to the exterior of buildings.
. _ Conceal and harden incoming utility systems within schools to provide
blast protection, including burial or proper encasement wherever possible.
. _ Locate utility systems at least 50 feet from loading docks, front
entrances, and parking areas.
. _ Route critical or fragile utilities so that they are not on exterior walls or
on walls shared with mailrooms.

. _ Ensure that the redundant utilities are not collocated or do not run in
the same chases. This minimizes the possibility that both sets of utilities will be
adversely affected by a single event.
. _ Ensure backup systems are located away from the systems components
for which they provide backup.
. _ Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 31 pounds (14
kilograms) or more to minimize the likelihood that they will fall and injure school
occupants. Design all equipment mountings to resist forces of 0.5 times the equipment
weight in any direction and 1.5 times the equipment weight in the downward
direction. This standard does not preclude the need to design equipment mountings
for forces required by other criteria such as seismic standards.
. _ Ensure that access to crawl spaces, utility tunnels, and other means of
under school building access is controlled to limit opportunities for aggressors placing
explosives underneath buildings.
. _ Screen, seal, or secure all utility penetrations of the site's perimeter to
prevent their use as access points for unauthorized entry into the school site. If access
is required for maintenance of utilities, secure all penetrations with screening, grating,
latticework, or other similar devices.

2.11 SUMMARY OF SITE MITIGATION MEASURES
A general spectrum of site mitigation measures ranging from the least protection, cost,
and effort going to the greatest protection, cost, and effort for a school site is
presented below. Detailed discussions of individual measures can be found earlier in
the chapter. This is a nominal ranking of mitigation measures. In practice, the
effectiveness and cost of individual mitigation measures may be different for specific
applications. Table 2-1 can be used by designers and school administrators to correlate
the mitigation measures described in this chapter to specific terrorist threats and
tactics.
. � Place trash receptacles as far away from the school building as possible.
. � Remove any dense vegetation that may screen covert activity.
. � Use thorn-bearing plant materials to create natural barriers.
. � Identify all critical resources in the school area (fire and police stations, hospitals, etc.) for
design consideration.
. � Identify all potentially hazardous facilities in the area (nuclear plants, chemical labs, etc.).
. � Use temporary passive barriers to eliminate straight-line vehicular access to areas of limited
access.
. � Use vehicles as temporary physical barriers during elevated threat conditions.
. � Make proper use of signs for traffic control, building entry control, etc. Minimize signs
identifying high-risk areas.
. � Identify, secure, and control access to all utility services to the school.
. � Limit and control access to all school crawl spaces, utility tunnels, and other means of under
building access to prevent the planting of explosives.
. � Utilize GIS to assess adjacent land use.
. � Provide open space inside the fence along the school perimeter.
. � Locate fuel storage tanks at least 100 feet from all occupied school buildings.
. � Block sight lines through building orientation, landscaping, screening, and landforms.
. � Use temporary and procedural measures to restrict parking and increase stand-off.
. � Locate and consolidate high-risk land uses in the interior of the school site.
. � Select and design barriers based on threat levels.
. � Maintain as much stand-off distance as possible from potential vehicle bombs.
. � Separate backup utility systems.
. � Conduct periodic water testing to detect waterborne contaminants.
. � Enclose the perimeter of the school. Create a single controlled entrance for vehicles (entry
control point).
. � Establish law enforcement or security force presence for schools facing high threats.
. � Install quick connects for portable utility backup systems.
. � Install security lighting in areas where needed.
. � Install CCTV cameras in areas where needed.
. � Mount all equipment to resist forces in any direction.
. � Include security and protection measures in the calculation of school land area requirements.
. � Redesign and construct parking to provide adequate stand-off for vehicle bombs.
. � Position buildings to permit occupants and security personnel to monitor the site.
. � Do not site the school building adjacent to potential threats or hazards.
. � Locate critical school building components away from the main entrance, vehicle circulation,
parking, or maintenance area. Harden as appropriate.
. � Provide a site-wide public address system and emergency call boxes at readily identified
locations.
. � Prohibit parking beneath or within a school building.
. � Redesign and construct access points at an angle to oncoming streets.
. � Designate entry points for commercial and delivery vehicles away from high-risk areas.
. � In urban areas, push the perimeter out to the edge of the sidewalk by means of bollards,
planters, and other obstacles. For even better stand-off, push the line even farther outward by restricting or
eliminating parking along the curb, eliminating loading zones, or through street closings.
. � Provide intrusion detection sensors for all utility services to the school.
. � Provide backup utility systems to support school security, life safety, and rescue functions.
. � Conceal and/or harden incoming utility systems.
. � Install active vehicle crash barriers.

Table 2-1 Correlation of Mitigation Measures to Threats*

Table 2-1: Correlation of Mitigation Measures to Threats* (continued)

CONTROLLED ACCESS ZONES

Exclusive zone/Non-exclusive zone
_
_

Clear zone
_
_

Fencing and physical barriers
_
_
_
_
_
_

Active barriers
_
_
_
_
_
_

Passive barriers
_
_
_

ENTRY CONTROL AND VEHICULAR
ACCESS

Minimize access roads
_
_

_
_

Control points
_
_
_
_
_
_

Active monitoring
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
Provide enhanced protection at school entrances
_
_
_
_
_
_

Include pull-over lanes at checkpoints to inspect
vehicles
_
_
_
_
_
_

Avoid straightline vehicular access to high-risk
areas
_
_

Avoid straightline entry approach roads
_
_

Locate vehicle parking areas far from high-risk
areas
_
_

Provide separate service and delivery access
_
_

Route major corridors away from high-risk areas
_
_

_
_

Locate high-risk resources remote from primary
roads
_
_

_
_

Minimize directional identification signs
_
_
_
_
_
_

Limit vehicular access to high-risk areas
_
_
_
_
_
_

SIGNAGE
Minimize signage
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_

Table 2-1: Correlation of Mitigation Measures to Threats* (continued)

* ADAPTED FROM U.S. AIR FORCE INSTALLATION FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE.

2.12 CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL
DESIGN (CPTED)
CPTED is a crime reduction technique that has several key elements applicable to the
analysis of building function and site design against physical attack. It is used by
architects, city planners, landscape and interior designers, and law enforcement with
the objective of creating a climate of safety in a community by designing a physical
environment that positively influences human behavior. Although CPTED principles
are not incorporated into the assessment process presented in this primer, it is useful
to briefly discuss CPTED because it is often entwined with terrorism protection
measures.
CPTED concepts have been successfully applied in a wide variety of applications,
including streets, parks, museums, government buildings, houses, and commercial
complexes. The approach is particularly applicable to schools, where outdated
facilities are common. Most schools in the United States were built 30 to 60 or more
years ago. Security issues were almost nonexistent at the time, and technology was
dramatically different. As a result, building designs are not always compatible with
today's more secu-rity-conscious environment.
According to CPTED principles, depending upon purely conventional physical
security measures (e.g., security guards and metal detectors) to correct objectionable
student behavior may have its limitations. Although employing physical security
measures will no doubt increase the level of physical security, in some cases physical
security measures employed as stand-alone measures may lead to a more negative
environment, thereby enhancing violence. In short, employing stand-alone physical
security measures may fail to address the underlying behavioral patterns that adversely
affect the school environment. CPTED analysis focuses on creating changes to the
physical and social environment that will reinforce positive behavior.
CPTED builds on three strategies:
. _ Territoriality (using buildings, fences, pavement, sign, and landscaping
to express ownership)
. _ Natural surveillance (placing physical features, activities, and people to
maximize visibility)
. _ Access control (the judicial placement of entrances, exits, fencing,
landscaping, and lighting)

A CPTED analysis of a school evaluates crime rates, office-referral data, and school
cohesiveness and stability, as well as core design shortcomings of the physical
environment (e.g., blind hallways, uncontrolled entries, or abandoned areas that
attract problem behavior). The application of CPTED principles starts with a threat
and vulnerability analysis to determine the potential for attack and what needs to be
protected. Protecting a school from physical attack by criminal behavior or terrorist
activity, in many cases, only reflects a change in the level and types of threats. The
CPTED process asks questions about territoriality, natural surveillance, and access
control that can:
. _ Increase the effort to commit crime or terrorism
. _ Increase the risks associated with crime or terrorism
. _ Reduce the rewards associated with crime or terrorism
. _ Remove the excuses as to why people do not comply with the rules and
behave inappropriately

The CPTED process provides direction to solve the challenges of crime and terrorism
with organizational (people), mechanical (technology and hardware), and natural
design (architecture and circulation flow) methods.
CPTED concepts can be integrated into expansion or reconstruction plans for existing
buildings as well as new buildings. Applying CPTED concepts from the beginning
usually has minimal impact on costs, and the result is a safer school. Each school,
district, and community should institute measures appropriate for their own
circumstances because there is no a single solution that will fit all schools.
Many CPTED crime prevention techniques for a school complement conventional
terrorism and physical attack prevention measures. For example, as part of the
CPTED strategy of improving territoriality, schools are encouraged to direct all
visitors through one entrance that offers contact with a receptionist who can
determine the purpose of the visit and the destination, and provide sign-in/sign-out
and an ID tag prior to building access. These CPTED measures are similar to and
complement physical security entry control point stations.
However, in some cases, CPTED techniques can conflict with basic physical security
principles. The CPTED strategy of natural surveillance calls for locating student
parking in areas that allow ease of monitoring. A design that locates student parking
close to the principal's office also reduces vehicle stand-off and could create a
vulnerability of the school structure to a vehicle bomb. In cases where CPTED
techniques conflict with security principles, designers and school administrators
should seek innovative solutions tailored to their unique situation.

BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE AND SAFETY PLANS
his chapter addresses explosive blast and CBR concerns
from terrorist attacks, highlighting mitigation measures,
including architectural, structural, and building envelope
systems, and school safety plans. After the site design
considerations to enhance protection presented in
Chapter 2 have been taken into account, additional
building design measures, such as hardening and CBR
mitigation measures, must be considered to protect school
occupants. Historically, the majority of fatalities that occur
in terrorist attacks directed against buildings are due to
building collapse. This was true for the Oklahoma City
bombing in 1995 when 87 percent of the building
occupants who were killed were in the collapsed portion
of the Murrah Federal Building.
When considering mitigation measures for explosive blast
threats, the primary strategy is to keep explosive devices as
far away from the school building as possible (maximize
stand-off distance). This is usually the easiest and least
costly way to achieve a desired level of protection. In cases
where sufficient stand-off distance is not available to
protect against progressive collapse of a school building
(i.e., schools located in urban settings), hardening of the
building's structural systems may be required. Designers
should try to minimize hazardous flying debris during an
explosive event because a high number of injuries can
result from flying glass fragments and debris from walls,
ceilings, and non-structural features. Another
consideration is to balance the hardening of the building
envelope so that the columns, walls, windows, and glazing
have approximately equal response for damage and
injury/casualty for the design basis threat weapon at the
available stand-off distance. Window design is the element
that is usually the most diverse in conventional
construction. Good blast engineering is a multi-disciplinary
effort that requires the concerted efforts of the architect,
structural engineer, mechanical engineer, and the other
design team members in order to achieve a balanced
building envelope.
When considering mitigation measures for CBR hazards, heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning (HVAC) systems are of particular concern. A school building can
provide protection against CBR agents released outdoors if the flow of fresh air is
filtered or interrupted; however, HVAC systems can also become an entry point and
distribution system for hazardous contaminants. If installed, HVAC air filtration and
air-cleaning systems can reduce the effects of a CBR agent by removing the
contaminants from the air within a building. There are a variety of ways to protect
school building occupants from airborne hazards. These protective measures can be
as simple as defining a protective action plan or as complex as strict design measures
practical only for new construction. Specific HVAC design measures will be discussed
in this chapter. In addition, Chapter 5 contains a discussion of CBR protective actions.
School building design should be optimized to facilitate emergency evacuation,
rescue, and recovery efforts through effective placement, structural design, and
redundancy of emergency exits and critical mechanical/electrical systems. Through
effective structural design, the overall damage levels may be reduced to make it easier
for people to get out safely and allow emergency responders to enter safely. The
designer must also balance measures to protect people with the requirements of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG), Uniform Federal
Accessibility Standards (UFAS), National Fire Protection Codes (NFPC), and all
applicable local building codes. Additional information is available in FEMA 426,
Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, and FEMA 427,
Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks.
3.1 ARCHITECTURAL
Several architectural considerations can be implemented to mitigate the effects of a
terrorist bombing on a school facility. These considerations often cost nothing or
very little if implemented early in the design process.
The shape of the school building can contribute to the overall damage to the
structure. For example, "U" or "L" shaped buildings tend to trap shock waves, which
may exacerbate the effect of explosive blasts. For this reason, it is recommended that
re-entrant corners be avoided (see Figure 3-1). In general, convex rather than concave
shapes are preferred when designing the exterior of a school building. Other
considerations follow:
. _ Orient school buildings horizontally rather than vertically to reduce
the building's profile and exposure.
. _ Elevate the ground floors of school buildings above grade to prevent
vehicles from being driven into the facility.
. _ Avoid eaves and overhangs, because they can be points of high local
pressure and suction during blasts. When these elements are used, they should be
designed to withstand blast effects.
. _ Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack, such as
loading docks, lobbies, and parking areas.
. _ Orient glazing perpendicular to the primary facade to reduce exposure
to blast and projectiles (see Figure 3-2).
. _ Avoid having exposed structural elements (e.g., columns) on
the exterior of the school.

Figure 3-1 Re-entrant corners in a floor plan
SOURCE: U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTALLATION FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE
Figure 3-2 Glazed areas oriented perpendicularly away from streets
. _ Connect interior non-load bearing walls to the structure with flexible
connections.
. _ Place areas of high visitor activity away from key assets.
. _ Eliminate hiding places within the school building.
. _ Locate assets in areas where they are visible to more than one person.
. _ Use interior barriers to differentiate levels of security within a school
building.
. _ Stagger doors located across from one another in interior hallways to
limit the effects of a blast through the school structure (see Figure 3-3).
. _ Provide foyers with reinforced concrete walls, and offset interior and
exterior doors from each other in the foyer.
. _ Locate stairwells required for emergency as remotely as possible from
areas where blast events might occur.

. _ Wherever possible, do not discharge stairs into lobbies, parking, or
loading areas.
. _ Separate unsecured areas of the main school building as much as
possible. For example, a separate lobby pavilion or loading dock area outside of the
main footprint of the building provides enhanced protection against damages and
potential building collapse in the event of an explosion. This can also be done by
creating internal "hard lines" or buffer zones, using

SOURCE: U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTALLATION FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE
secondary stairwells, elevator
shafts, corridors, and storage areas Figure 3-3 Offset doors through the foyer
between public and secured areas.

_ Place parking areas outside the main footprint of the
school building to reduce the vulnerability to
catastrophic collapse.

3.2 BUILDING STRUCTURAL AND
NONSTRUCTURAL SYSTEMS
For schools that require high security measures, explosive
blast threats may govern building design. A structural
engineer should determine the school design features
needed to achieve the desired level of protection against
the design blast threat, considering both the collapse of
the school building as well as incipient injuries and
fatalities of students, faculty, and staff.
Progressive collapse is a situation where local failure of a
primary structural component leads to the collapse of
adjoining members which, in turn, leads to additional
collapse. Hence the total damage is disproportionate to
the original cause. Progressive collapse is a chain reaction
of structural failures that follows from damage to a
relatively small portion of a structure.
All new school buildings should be designed with the intent of reducing the potential
for progressive collapse as a result of an abnormal loading event, regardless of the
required level of protection. The following structural characteristics (from GSA
Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidelines for New Federal Office Buildings and Major
Modernization Projects, November 2000) should be considered in the initial phases of
structural design. Incorporation of these features will provide a much more robust
structure and decrease the potential for progressive collapse.
. _ Redundancy. The use of redundant lateral and vertical force resisting
systems is highly encouraged when considering progressive collapse. Redundancy
tends to promote a more robust structure and helps to ensure that alternate load paths
are available in the case of a structural element(s) failure. Additionally, redundancy
provides multiple locations for yielding to occur, which increases the probability that
damage will be constrained.
. _ The use of ductile (flexible) structural elements and detailing.

It is critical that both the primary and secondary structural elements be capable of
deforming well beyond the elastic limit without experiencing structural collapse.
Hence, the use of ductile construction materials (i.e., steel, cast-in-place
reinforced concrete, etc.) for both the structural elements and connection
detailing is encouraged. The capability of achieving a ductile response is
imperative when considering an extreme redistribution of loading such as that
encountered in a structural element(s) failure.
. _ Capacity for resisting load reversals. Both the primary and secondary
structural elements should be designed to resist load reversals in the case of a
structural element(s) failure.
. _ Capacity for resisting shear failure. Primary structural elements
maintain sufficient strength and ductility under an abnormal loading event to
preclude a shear failure. If the shear capacity is reached before flexural capacity, a
sudden,

non-ductile failure of the element could potentially lead to a
progressive collapse of the structure.
Both the GSA and DoD take a threat-independent approach to progressive collapse.
The goal of a threat-independent approach is not to prevent collapse from a specific
design threat, but to control and stop the continuing spread of damage after
localized damage or localized collapse has occurred.
The GSA and DoD require that the structural response of a building be analyzed in a
test that removes a key structural element (e.g., vertical load carrying column, section
of bearing wall, beam, etc.) to simulate local damage from an explosion. If effective
alternative load paths are available for redistributing the loads, originally supported by
the removed structural element, the building has a low potential for progressive
collapse.
For higher levels of protection from blast, cast-in-place reinforced concrete is
normally the construction type of choice. Other types of construction such as properly
designed and detailed steel structures are also allowed. Several material and
construction types, although not disallowed by these criteria, may be undesirable and
uneconomical for protection from blast.
The following guidelines are commonly used to mitigate the effects of blast on
structures and to mitigate the potential for progressive collapse. See sidebar for details
and more guidance.
_ Use multiple barrier materials and construction techniques to mitigate the effects
of blast on a structure at less expense than a single material or technique.
. _ Incorporate internal damping into the structural system to absorb blast
impact.
. _ Use symmetric reinforcement to increase the ultimate load capacity of
the structure.
. _ Incorporate design redundancy and alternative load paths to help
mitigate blasts and reduce the chance of progressive collapse. The Murrah Federal
Building's structural system did not have any redundancy for the slab and beam
systems.
. _ Strengthen the structural system to help resist the effects of a blast.
. _ Incorporate inelastic or post elastic design to allow the structure to
absorb the energy of the explosion through plastic deformation.
. _ Recognize that components might act in directions for which they were
not designed. This is due to the engulfment of structural members by blast, the
negative phase, the upward loading of elements, and dynamic rebound of members.
Making steel reinforcement (positive and negative faces) symmetric in all floor slabs,
roof slabs, walls, beams, and girders will address this issue. Symmetric reinforcement
also increases the ultimate load capacity of the members.
. _ Ensure that lap splices fully develop the capacity of the reinforcement.
. _ Stagger lap splices and other discontinuities.
. _ Control deflections around certain members, such as windows, to
prevent premature failure. Additional reinforcement is generally required.
. _ Use wire mesh in plaster to reduce the incidence of flying fragments.
. _ Avoid the use of masonry when blast is a threat. Masonry walls break up
readily and become secondary fragments during blasts.

. _ Use ductile connections for steel construction and develop as much
moment connection as practical. Connections for cladding and exterior walls to steel
frames should develop the capacity of the wall system under blast loads.
. _ Avoid single-point failures that can cascade, producing widespread
catastrophic collapse. A prime example is the use of transfer beams and girders that, if
lost, may cause progressive collapse and are, therefore, highly discouraged.
. _ Incorporate redundancy and alternative load paths into design to
mitigate blast loads. One method of accomplishing this is to use two-way
reinforcement schemes where possible.
. _ Minimize column spacing so that reasonably sized members can be
designed to resist the design loads and increase the redundancy of the system. A
practical upper level for column spacing is 30 feet for the levels of blast loads
described herein.
. _ Minimize floor to floor heights. Unless there is an overriding
architectural requirement, a practical limit is generally less than or equal to 16 feet.
. _ Use architectural or structural features that deny contact with exposed
primary vertical load members in school lobbies. A minimum stand-off of at least 6
inches from these members is required.
. _ Minimize the use of venetian blinds and false ceilings, and locating
equipment such as light fixtures, partitions, ductwork, and air conditioners above
ceilings wherever possible. These items may become flying debris in the event of an
explosion. Placing heavy equipment such as air conditioners near the floor rather than
the ceiling is one idea for limiting this hazard; using exposed ductwork as an
architectural device is another possibility.

3.3 BUILDING ENVELOPE
3.3.1 Building Exterior
The exterior envelope of the school building is the most vulnerable to an exterior
explosive threat because it is the part of the building closest to the weapon. It also is
a critical line of defense for protecting the occupants of the school building.
The design philosophy to be used here is that simpler is better. Generally simple
geometries, with minimal ornamentation (which may become flying debris during an
explosion) are recommended. If ornamentation is used, it is recommended that it
consists of a lightweight material such as timber or plastic, which is less likely to
become a projectile in the event of an explosion than, for example, brick, stone, or
metal.

3.3.2 Exterior Wall Design
The exterior walls provide the first line of defense to prevent air-blast pressures and
hazardous debris from entering the school building. At a minimum, the objective of
design is to ensure that these members fail in a flexible mode rather than in a brittle
mode such as shear. The walls also need to be able to resist the loads transmitted by
the windows and doors. Beyond ensuring a flexible failure mode, the exterior wall may
be designed to resist the actual or reduced pressure levels of the defined threat.
Special reinforcing and anchors should be provided around blast-resistant window and
door frames.
Poured-in-place reinforced concrete will provide the highest level of protection, but
solutions like pre-cast concrete, reinforced concrete masonry unit (CMU) block, and
metal studs may also be used to achieve lower levels of protection.
For pre-cast panels, consider a minimum thickness of 5 inches with two-way
reinforcing bars placed at spacing not greater than the thickness of the panel.
Connections into the structure should provide as a straight a line of load transmittal as
practical, using as few connecting pieces as possible.
For CMU block walls, use 8-inch block walls, fully grouted with vertical centered
reinforcing bars placed in each cell and horizontal reinforcement at each layer.
Connections into the structure should be able to resist the ultimate lateral capacity of
the wall. A preferred system is to have a continuous exterior CMU wall that laterally
bears against the floor system. For increased protection, consider using 12-inch blocks
with two layers of reinforcement.
For metal stud systems, use metal studs back to back and mechanically attached, to
minimize lateral torsion effects. To catch exterior cladding fragments, attach a wire
mesh to the exterior side of the metal stud system. The supports of the wall are to be
designed to resist the ultimate lateral capacity load of the system.
When designing schools in areas perceived as high risk, engineers and architects
should consider the following recommendations:
. _ Substitute strengthened building walls and systems when stand-off
distances cannot be accommodated.
. _ Use ductile materials capable of very large plastic deformations without
complete failure.
. _ Design exterior walls to resist the actual pressures and impulses acting
on the exterior wall surfaces from the threats defined for the school building.
. _ Design exterior walls to withstand the dynamic reactions from the
windows.
. _ Design exterior shear walls to resist the actual blast loads predicted
from the threats specified. Consider shear walls that are essential to the lateral and
vertical load bearing system, and that also function as exterior walls, to be primary
structures.
. _ Consider reinforced concrete wall systems in lieu of masonry or curtain
walls to minimize flying debris in a blast.

. _ Reinforced wall panels can protect columns and assist in preventing
progressive collapse, because the wall will assist in carrying the load of a damaged
column.
. _ Give special consideration to construction types that reduce the
potential for collapse where exterior walls are not designed for the full design loads.
. _ Consider use of sacrificial exterior wall panels to absorb blast.

3.3.3 Window Design
Window systems (e.g., glazing, frames, anchorage to supporting walls, etc.) on the
exterior fa�ade of a school building should be designed to mitigate the hazardous
effects of flying glass during an explosion event. In an effort to protect school
occupants, designers should integrate the features of the glass, connection of the glass
to the frame (bite), and anchoring of the frame to the building structure to achieve a
"balanced design." This means all the components should have compatible capacities
and theoretically would all fail at the same pressure-pulse levels. In this way, the
damage sequence and extent of damage are controlled. Table 3-1 presents six GSA
glazing protection levels based on how far glass fragments would enter a space and
potentially injure its occupants. Figure 3-4 depicts how far glass fragments could enter
a structure for each GSA performance condition.
Table 3-1: Glazing Protection Levels Based on Fragment Impact Locations1
* In conditions 2, 3a, 3b, 4 and 5, glazing fragments may be thrown to the outside of the protected
space toward the detonation location.

Figure 3-4 Side view of a test structure illustrating performance conditions of Table 3-2

1 From GSA PBS-PQ100.1, Facilities Standards for the Public Building Service, June 14, 1996 BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE
AND SAFETY PLANS 3-13

The divide between performance conditions 3a and 3b can be equated to the
"threshold of injury." The divide between performance conditions 4 and 5 can be
equated to the "threshold of lethality." The GSA glazing performance conditions
shown above correlate with the DoD levels of protection presented in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2: Correlation of GSA Glazing Performance Conditions and DoD Levels of
Protection for New Buildings
FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings,
contains a detailed description of window system design considerations. Although not
all windows in a school can be designed to resist the full forces from very large
explosive blast events, hardened window systems can provide significant protection for
students, faculty, and staff. Preferred systems include: thermally tempered glass with a
security film installed on the interior surface and attached to the frame; laminated
thermally tempered glass; laminated heat strengthened, or laminated annealed glass;
and blast curtains. Glazing systems that do not provide any protection include:
untreated monolithic annealed or heat-strengthened glass and wire glass. Figure 3-5
depicts an unprotected window after a large explosion.
Figure 3-5 An unprotected window after a large explosion
General Guidelines for Windows and Glazing. General guidelines for windows and
glazing include the following:
. _ Do not place windows adjacent to doors because, if the windows are
broken, the door can be unlocked.
. _ In schools requiring high security, minimize the number and size of
windows in a fa�ade. If possible, limit the amount of glazed area in building facades to
15 percent. The amount of blast entering a space is directly proportional to the
amount of opening on the facade.
. _ Consider using burglary- and ballistic-resistant glazing in high-risk
school areas.
. _ Consider using laminated glass in place of conventional glass.
. _ Consider window safety laminate (such as mylar) or another fragment
retention film (FRF) over glazing (properly installed) to reduce fragmentation.

. _ Consider placing guards, such as grills, screens, or meshwork, across
window openings to protect against covert entry. Affix protective window guards firmly
to the structure. Fire egress considerations must be judged against window guards.
. _ Position the operable section of a sliding window on the inside of the
fixed section and secure it with a broomstick, metal rod, or similar device placed at
the bottom of the track.
. _ Provide horizontal windows 6 feet above the finished floor to limit
entry.
. _ Consider using steel window frames securely fastened or cement
grouted to the surrounding structure.
. _ Minimize interior glazing in high-risk areas (e.g., lobbies, loading
docks).

Mullion and Wall Design. The frame members connecting adjoining windows are
referred to as mullions. These members may be designed using a static approach
when the breaking strength of the window glass is applied to the mullion, or a dynamic
load may be applied using the peak pressure and impulse values. Although the static
approach may seem easier, it often yields a design that is not practical, because the
mullion can become very deep and heavy, driving up the weight and cost of the
window system. In addition, it may not be consistent with the overall architectural
objectives of the project. A dynamic approach is likely to provide a section that meets
the design constraints of the project. To accomplish this, a single-degree-of-freedom
solution is often used. The governing equation of motion may be solved using
numerical methods. There are also charts available for linearly decaying loads that
circumvent the need to solve differential equations. These charts only require that the
fundamental period of the mullion (including the tributary area of the window glass),
the ultimate resistance force of the mullion, the peak pressure, and the equivalent
linear decay time are known.
Peak lateral response of the mullion is to be limited to a 2-degree support rotation.
Also, the displacement ductility is to be limited to a 4degree support rotation. As with
frames, it is good engineering practice to limit the number of interlocking parts used
for the mullion.

3.3.4 Doors
Door assemblies include the door, its frame, and anchorage to the building. As part of
a balanced school design approach, exterior doors in high-risk buildings should be
designed to withstand the maximum dynamic pressure and duration of the load from
the design threat explosive blast. Other general door considerations for these types of
buildings are as follows:
. _ Provide hollow steel doors or steel-clad doors with steel frames. Ensure
the strength of the latch and frame anchor equals that of the door and frame.
. _ Consider blast-resistant doors for schools considered to be at high risk.
. _ Permit normal entry/egress through a limited number of doors, if
possible, while accommodating emergency egress.
. _ Ensure that exterior doors into inhabited areas open outward. In
addition to facilitating egress, by doing so, the doors will seat into the door frames in
response to an explosive blast, increasing the likelihood that the doors will not enter
the school building as hazardous debris.
. _ Replace externally mounted locks and hasps with internally locking
devices because the weakest part of most door assemblies is the latching component.
. _ Locate hinges on interior or use exterior security hinges to reduce
their vulnerability.
. _ Install emergency exit doors so that they facilitate only exiting
movement.
. _ Consider using solid doors or walls as a backup for glass doors in foyers.
. _ Strengthen and harden the upright surfaces of a door jamb into which
the door fits.

3.3.5 Roof System Design
Control access to school roofs to minimize the possibility of aggressors placing
explosives or CBR agents there or otherwise threatening school occupants or critical
infrastructure. Designers should consider the following:
. _ For new school buildings, eliminate all external roof access by
providing access from internal stairways or ladders, such as in mechanical rooms.
. _ For existing school buildings, eliminate external access, where possible,
or make roof access ladders removable, retractable, or lockable.
. _ Provide pitched roofs to allow deflection of explosives.
. _ Make school roof access hatches secure from intruders.
. _ Consider designing buildings with a sacrificial sloping roof that is above
a protected ceiling (see Figure 3-6).

Figure 3-6 Sacrificial roof

3.4 MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
Mechanical systems design standards address limiting damage to critical infrastructure
and protecting school building occupants against CBR threats. The primary goal of a
mechanical system after a terrorist attack should be to continue to operate key life
safety systems for school occupants. School designers should be aware that during an
interior bombing event, smoke removal and control are of paramount importance.
They should consider the fact that, if window glazing is hardened, a blast may not blow
out windows, and smoke may be trapped in the school building. In the event of a blast,
the available smoke removal system may be essential to smoke removal, particularly in
large, open spaces. This equipment should be located away from high-risk areas such
as loading docks and garages. The system controls and power wiring to the equipment
should be protected. The system should be connected to emergency power to provide
smoke removal. Smoke removal equipment should be provided with standalone local
control panels that can continue to individually function in the event the control
wiring is severed from the main control system.
Designers should consider locating components in less vulnerable areas, limiting
access to mechanical systems, and providing a reasonable amount of redundancy.
Specific considerations include the following:
. _ Avoid mounting plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the
inside of exterior school walls. When this is unavoidable, mount fixtures on a separate
wall at least 6 inches from the exterior wall face.
. _ Avoid placing plumbing on the top of the roof deck of the school
building.
. _ Avoid suspending plumbing fixtures and piping from the ceiling.
. _ Reduce the number of utility openings, manholes, tunnels, air
conditioning ducts, filters, and access panels into the school structure.
. _ Protect school building operational control areas and utility feeds to
lessen the negative effects of a blast.
. _ Design operational redundancies to survive all kinds of attacks.
. _ Use lockable systems for school utility openings and manholes where
appropriate. Infrequently used utility covers/manholes

can be tack-welded as an inexpensive alternative to locking
tamper-resistant covers.
Key HVAC System Considerations. The following HVAC design measures should be
considered to mitigate the risk of CBR threats against school buildings. A more
detailed discussion of HVAC design considerations is contained in FEMA 426 Reference
Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings and FEMA 427 Primer for
Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks. HVAC protective actions are
discussed in Chapter 5.
_ Place intakes at the highest practical level on the school building. For protection
against malicious acts, the intakes should also be covered by screens so that objects
cannot be tossed into the intakes or into air wells from the ground (see Figures 3-7,
3-8, and 3-9). Such screens should be sloped to allow thrown objects to roll or slide
off the screen, away from the intake. Many existing school buildings have air
intakes that are located at or below ground level. For those that have wall-mounted
or below-grade intakes close to the building, the intakes can be elevated by
constructing a plenum or external shaft over the intake (see Figure 3-10).
Figure 3-7 Example of protecting outdoor air intakes
SOURCE: CDC/NIOSH, PUBLICATION NO. 2002-139, GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTING BUILDING ENVIRONMENTS FROM
AIRBORNE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL ATTACKS, MAY 2002.
Fig u r e 3-8 A n o t h e r e x a m ple o f p r o t e c t i n g a i r i n t a k e s
S O U R C E : C D C / NIO S H , P U B LIC ATIO N N O . 2 0 0 2-1 3 9 , GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTING BUILDING
ENVIRONMENTS FROM AIRBORNE
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL ATTACKS, M AY 2 0 0 2 .

Figure 3-9
Example of elevated air intake

S O U R C E : C D C / NIO S H , P U B LIC ATIO N N O . 2 0 0 2-1 3 9 ,
GUIDANCE FOR PROTECTING BUILDING ENVIRONMENTS
FROM AIRBORNE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, OR
RADIOLOGICAL ATTACKS, M AY 2 0 0 2 .

Figure 3-10 Example of enclosing an existing vulnerable air Ground-level Outdoor Air Intake intake
SOURCE: CDC/NIOSH, PUBLICATION NO. 2002-139, GUIDANCE FOR
PROTECTING BUILDING ENVIRONMENTS FROM AIRBORNE CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, OR RADIOLOGICAL ATTACKS, MAY 2002.
Raised-level Outdoor Air Intake
_ Provide protection for existing school buildings with air intakes below grade, at
ground level, or wall-mounted outside secure areas, with physical security measures
(e.g., placing fencing, surveillance cameras, and motion detectors around the
intakes to facilitate monitoring by security personnel). These measures can help
prevent malicious acts, but are less effective than elevating the intakes, because
ground level releases under certain conditions can enter the intakes from points
outside the area fenced or under surveillance.
. _ Maintain physical security on mechanical rooms to prevent the direct
introduction of hazardous materials into the system of ducts that distributes air to the
school building. This includes locking and controlling the access to all mechanical
rooms containing HVAC equipment.
. _ Restrict access to school building operation systems by outside
personnel. To deter tampering by outside maintenance personnel, a school staff
member should escort these individuals throughout their service visit and should
visually inspect their work before final acceptance of the service. Alternatively, schools
can ensure the reliability of pre-screened service personnel from a trusted contractor.
. _ Restrict access to school building data. Information on building
operations (including mechanical, electrical, vertical transport, fire and life safety,
security system plans and schematics, and emergency operations procedures) should
be controlled.
. _ Isolate school lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks, and storage areas.
Lobbies, mailrooms (includes various mail processing areas), loading docks, and other
entry and storage areas should be physically isolated from the rest of the building.
These are areas where bulk quantities of CBR agents are likely to enter a school
building.
. _ Consider "shelter-in-place" rooms or areas in schools, where people can
stay in the event of an outdoor release. The goal is to create areas where outdoor air
infiltration is very low. Usually such rooms will be in the inner part of the school in an
area with no exterior windows if possible. The rooms should have doors that are fairly
effective at preventing airflow and should contain staging supplies such as duct tape
and plastic to help further seal the areas from the hallways. Typically, restrooms are a
bad choice, because they have exhaust ducts that lead directly to the outside. Opening
and closing a conventional hinged door can pump large amounts of air into the room;
if practical, replace the door with a code

compliant sliding door to reduce this effect. Additionally, it may be possible to
provide purified air to the safe area through modifications to the HVAC
system. For more information, see Chapters 5 and 6.
_ Ducted returns offer limited access points to introduce a CBR agent. The return
vents can be placed in conspicuous locations throughout a school, reducing the
risk of an agent being secretly introduced into the return system. Non-ducted
return air systems commonly use hallways or spaces above suspended ceilings as a
return-air path or plenum. CBR agents introduced at any location above the
suspended ceiling in a ceiling plenum return system will probably migrate back to
the HVAC unit and be redistributed to occupied areas. Schools should be designed
to minimize mixing between air-handling zones, which can be partially
accomplished by limiting shared returns.

3.5 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS
The major security functions of the electrical system are to maintain power to
essential school services, especially those required for life safety and evacuation.
When designing a school building, architects and engineers should consider
providing lighting and surveillance to deter criminal activities, and provide
emergency communications. They should also consider the following
recommendations:
. _ Emergency and normal electric panels, conduits, and switchgear
should be installed separately, at different locations, and as far apart as possible.
Electric distribution should also run at separate locations.
. _ Emergency generators should be located away from loading docks,
entrances, and parking. More secure locations include the roof, protected grade level,
and protected interior areas.
. _ Main fuel storage for generators should be located away from loading
docks, entrances, and parking. Access should be restricted and protected (e.g., locks
on caps and seals).

. _ Fuel tanks should be mounted near the generator, given the same
protection as the generator, and sized to store an appropriate amount of fuel. A
battery and/or UPS could be a viable alternative for a smaller school.
. _ Conduits and lines should be installed outside to allow a trailer-
mounted generator to connect to the school's electrical system. If tertiary power is
required, other methods include generators and feeders from alternative substations.
. _ Emergency power should be provided for emergency lighting in school
restrooms, egress routes, and any meeting room without windows.
. _ School building access points should be illuminated to aid in threat
detection.
. _ Self-contained battery lighting should be provided in stairwells and for
exit signs.
. _ Suspending electrical conduits from the ceiling should be avoided.
. _ Adequate lighting of perimeters and parking areas should be provided
to aid in visual surveillance and to support the use of CCTV.

3.6 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS
The fire protection system inside the school building should maintain life safety
protection after an incident and allow for safe evacuation of the building when
appropriate. Although fire protection systems are designed to perform well during
fires, they are not traditionally designed to survive bomb blasts. Fire protection system
considerations include the following:
_ A school's fire protection water system should be protected from single-point failure
in case of a blast event. The incoming line should be encased, buried, or located 50
feet away from high-risk areas. The interior mains should be looped and
sectionalized.
. _ To increase the reliability of the fire protection system, a dual pump
arrangement should be considered, with one electric pump and one diesel pump. The
pumps should be located away from each other.
. _ All school security locking arrangements on doors used for egress must
comply with requirements of NFPA 101, Life Safety Code.

3.7 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
Designers should consider the following:
. _ Redundant communications. The school should have a second
telephone service to maintain communications in case of an incident. A base radio
communications system with antenna should be installed in the stairwell, and portable
sets distributed on floors. This is the preferred alternative.
. _ Radio telemetry. Distributed antennas could be located throughout the
school facility if required for emergency communications through wireless
transmission of data.
. _ Alarm and information systems. Alarm and information systems should
not be collected and mounted in a single conduit, or even collocated. Circuits to
various parts of the school building should be installed in at least two directions
and/or risers. Low voltage signal and control copper conductors should not share
conduits with high voltage power conductors. Fiber-optic conductors are generally
preferred over copper.
. _ Empty conduits. Empty conduits and power outlets can be provided for
possible future installation of security control equipment.
. _ Mass notification. All inhabited school buildings should have a timely
means to notify occupants of threats and instruct them what to do in response to those
threats. School buildings should have a capability to provide real-time notification of
building occupants and people in the immediate vicinity of the building during
emergency situations. The information

relayed should be specific enough to determine the
appropriate response actions.

3.8 PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEMS
Physical security is defined as that part of security concerned with physical measures
designed to safeguard people and to prevent unauthorized access to equipment,
certain areas of the school building, and key documents. These days, all security
operations face new and complex physical security challenges across the full spectrum
of operations.
Although security technologies are not the answer to all school security problems, if
applied appropriately, they can enhance security, free up administrators for more
appropriate work, and sometimes can save money. At a non-educational building, a
typical approach to physical security is:
For example, if someone is breaking into a school facility, it is necessary to have a
means of detection so that information can be provided to appropriate authorities.
Next, the intruder must be delayed as long as possible so that the response force may
arrive. Finally, someone, such as the police, must respond to the incident to catch the
intruder. For a school, the National Institute for Justice2 has recommended expanding
this model as shown below:
2 National Institute of Justice Research Report NCJ 178265, The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, September
1999.
This educational approach emphasizes deterrence by instituting measures both before
and after an event to convince perpetrators not to do whatever they are considering.
Although, the efficacy of deterrence for high-risk terrorist tactics is questionable,
schools have a broad spectrum of threats to consider with any physical security system.
Schools are also unique in that they generally have the authority and opportunity to
establish consequences for incidents that involve students and occur on school
grounds. Figure 3-11 depicts some considerations for the design of a school security
system and Figure 3-12 shows examples of physical security devices.
For schools requiring greater security, some general measures are contained in the
National Institute of Justice Research Report NCJ 178265, The Appropriate and Effective
Use of Security Technologies in
U.S. Schools, September 1999.
Figure 3-11 Considerations for the design of a new security system
SOURCE: NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT NCJ 178265, THE APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE USE OF
SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES IN U.S. SCHOOLS, SEPTEMBER 1999.
Figure 3-12 Physical security devices
Obviously, when considering any physical security measure for a school, it is important
to balance its use with the risk of creating a "bunker" or "prison" atmosphere that is
not conducive to learning. The measures recommended in this chapter should be
applied judiciously and in concert with the threat assessment depicted in Chapter 1,
and also with any risk perceived by school administrators.

3.9 SUMMARY OF BUILDING ENVELOPE MITIGATION
MEASURES
A general spectrum of building envelope mitigation measures ranging from the least
protection, cost, and effort going to the greatest protection, cost, and effort is
provided below. Detailed discussions of individual measures can be found earlier in
this chapter. Please note this is a nominal ranking of mitigation measures. In practice,
the effectiveness and cost of individual mitigation measures may deviate from this
example based on specific applications.
Ensure that all school exterior doors into inhabited areas open outward. Ensure emergency exit doors
only facilitate exiting.
Secure school roof access hatches from the interior. Prevent public access to building roofs.
Restrict access to school building operation systems.
Conduct periodic training of school HVAC maintenance and operation staff.

Evaluate HVAC control options.
Install empty conduits for future school security control equipment during initial construction or major
renovation.

Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of exterior walls.
Minimize interior glazing near high-risk a reas.
Establish school emergency plans, policies, and procedures.
Establish written plans for school evacuation and sheltering in place.
Illuminate school access points.
Restrict access to school building information.
Secure HVAC intakes and mechanical rooms.
Limit the number of doors used for normal entry/egress.
Lock all utility access openings.
Provide emergency power for emergency lighting in school restrooms, egress routes, and any meeting

room without windows.
Install an internal public address system.
Stagger interior doors and offset interior and exterior doors.
Eliminate hiding places.
Install a second and separate telephone service.
Install radio telemetry distributed antennas throughout the facility.
Use a badge identification system for school access.
Install a CCTV surveillance system in areas where needed.
Install an electronic security alarm system in areas where needed.
Install rapid response and isolation features into school HVAC systems.
Use interior barriers to differentiate levels of security.
Avoid eaves and overhangs or harden to withstand blast effects.
Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack.
Install call buttons at key public contact areas.
Install emergency and normal electric equipment at different locations.
Avoid exposed structural elements.

. � Reinforce foyer walls.
. � Use architectural features to deny contact with exposed primary vertical load members.
. � Isolate school lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks, and storage areas.
. � Locate stairwells remotely. Do not discharge stairs into lobbies, parking, or loading areas.
. � Elevate school HVAC fresh-air intakes.
. � Create "shelter-in-place" rooms or areas.
. � Separate HVAC zones. Eliminate leaks and increase school building air tightness.
. � Install blast-resistant doors or steel doors with steel frames.
. � Physically separate unsecured areas from the main school building.
. � Install HVAC exhausting and purging systems.
. � Connect interior non-load bearing walls to structure with non-rigid connections.
. � Use structural design techniques to resist progressive collapse of school buildings.
. � Treat exterior shear walls as primary structures.
. � Orient glazing perpendicular to the primary fa�ade facing uncontrolled vehicle approaches.
. � Use reinforced concrete wall systems in lieu of masonry or curtain walls.
. � Ensure active fire system is protected from single-point failure in case of a blast event.
. � Establish school's ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade.
. � Avoid re-entrant corners on the school building exterior.
. � Issue CBR personal protective equipment.
. � Design exterior walls to resist blast.
. � Design school facilities with a sacrificial sloping roof above a protected ceiling.
. � Upgrade glazing -laminated glass, safety laminates, FRF, etc.
. � Install a 24-hour on-site monitoring center.
. � Install HVAC filtering and pressurization.
. � Install HVAC CBR real-time monitoring detectors.

3.10 RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON
THE HOMELAND SECURITY
ADVISORY SYSTEM
Table 3-3 presents recommendations for safety/security
measures linked to the DHS Threat Advisory Level.
Chapter 6 of the U.S. Department of Education (DOE)
Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and
Communities contains similar recommendations.
Table 3-3: Safety/Security Recommendations
Table 3-3: Safety/Security Recommendations (continued)

Orange -High
Red -Severe
. _ Complete recommended actions at lower level
. _ Consider canceling outside activities
. _ Prepare to handle inquiries from anxious parents and media
._ Review and implement increased security measures
. � Limit parking near school buildings
. � Restrict visitor access
. _ Discuss children's fears concerning possible terrorist attacks
. _ Review sporting event and extracurricular activity decisions
. _ Place school and district crisis response teams on standby alert status
. _ Complete recommended actions at lower level
. _ Follow local and/or Federal Government instructions
. _ Coordinate with local and state officials to consider school openings and
closings
. _ Listen to radio/TV for current information/instructions
._ Review and implement increased security measures
. � Further limiting parking to increase stand-off
. � Posting/increasing security staff
. _ Activate command and support centers if appropriate
. _ Continue staff, parent, and community communications
. _ Coordinate parent-child reunification process, if necessary
. _ Ensure mental health counselors are available for students, faculty, and staff

3.11 SCHOOL SAFETY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
PLAN
The DHS has designated the DOE as the lead agency for security related to schools.
The DOE has published a guide, Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for
Schools and Communities, May 2003, that is intended to give schools, districts, and
communities the critical concepts and components of good crisis planning, stimulate
thinking about crisis preparedness process, and provide examples of promising
practices. Additional information is also available from the National Advisory
Committee on Children and Terrorism (NACCT).
The DOE recommends each school crisis plan address four major areas:
mitigation/prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
._ Mitigation/Prevention:
. � Conduct an assessment of each school building. Identify those factors that
put the building, students, faculty, and staff at greater risk, such as proximity to rail
tracks that regularly transport hazardous materials or facilities that produce highly
toxic material or propane gas tanks, and develop a plan for reducing the risk. This can
include plans to evacuate students away from these areas in times of crisis and to
reposition propane tanks or other hazardous materials away from school buildings.
. � Work with businesses and factories in close proximity to the school to ensure
that the school's crisis plan is coordinated with their crisis plans.
. � Ensure that a process is in place for controlling access and egress to the
school. Require all persons who do not have authority to be in the school to sign in.
. � Review traffic patterns, and where possible, keep cars, buses, and trucks away
from school buildings.
. � Review landscaping, and ensure that buildings are not obscured by
overgrowth of bushes or shrubs where contraband can be placed or persons can hide.
._ Preparedness:
. � Have site plans for each school building readily available and ensure they are
shared with first responders and agencies responsible for emergency preparedness.
. � Ensure there are multiple evacuation routes and rallying points. First or
second evacuation site options may be blocked or unavailable at the time of the crisis.
. � Practice responding to crisis on a regular basis.

. � Ensure a process is established for communicating during a crisis.
. � Inspect equipment to ensure it operates during crisis situations.
. � Have a plan for discharging students. Remember that, during a crisis, many
parents and guardians may not be able to get to the school to pick up their child.
Make sure every student has a secondary contact person and contact information
readily available.
. � Have a plan for communicating information to parents and for quelling
rumors. Cultivate relationships with the media ahead of time, and identify a Public
Information Officer (PIO) to communicate with the media and the community
during a crisis.
. � Work with law enforcement officials and emergency preparedness agencies
on a strategy for sharing key parts of the school crisis plans.

._ Response:
. � Identify the type of crisis that is occurring and determine the appropriate
response.
. � Develop a command structure for responding to a crisis. The roles and
responsibilities for educators, law enforcement and fire officials, and other first
responders in responding to different types of crisis need to be developed,
coordinated, reviewed, and approved.
. � Maintain communications among all relevant staff.
._ Recovery:
. � Return to the business of teaching and learning as soon as possible.
. � Identify and approve a team of credentialed mental health workers to
provide mental health services to faculty and students after a crisis. Understand that
recovery takes place over time and that the services of this team may be needed over
an extended time period.

. � Ensure that the team is adequately trained.
. � The plan needs to include notification of parents on actions that the school
intends to take to help students recover from the crisis.

3.12 EMERGENCY PLANS AND TRAINING
Every school should have a school safety emergency management plan developed in
partnership with public safety agencies, including law enforcement, fire, public
health, mental health and local emergency preparedness agencies. The plan should
address fire, and natural and manmade disasters. A school's plan should be tailored
to address the unique circumstances and needs of the individual school, and should
be coordinated and integrated with community plans and the plans of local
emergency preparedness agencies.
These plans should also consider CBR attack scenarios and the associated procedures
for communicating instructions to building occupants, identifying suitable shelter-in-
place areas (if they exist), identifying appropriate use and selection of personal protec-
tive equipment (i.e., clothing, gloves, respirators) and directing emergency
evacuations. Individuals developing emergency plans and procedures should
recognize that there are fundamental differences between chemical, biological, and
radiological agents. In general, chemical agents will show a rapid onset of symptoms,
while the response to biological and radiological agents will be delayed. Issues such as
designated areas and procedures for chemical storage, HVAC control or shutdown,
and communications with school occupants and emergency responders, should all be
addressed. The plans should be as comprehensive as possible, but, as described
earlier, protected by limited and controlled access. When appropriately developed,
these plans, policies, and procedures can have a major impact upon school occupant
survivability in the event of a CBR release.
Staff training, particularly for those with specific responsibilities during an event, is
essential and should cover both internal and external events. Holding regularly
scheduled practice drills, similar to the common fire drill, allows for plan testing, as
well as student and key staff rehearsal of the plan, and increases the likelihood for
success in an actual event. School officials should ensure that training is provided to
staff that operate and maintain the school's HVAC system. This training should
include the procedures to be followed in the event of a suspected CBR agent release.
Development of current, accurate HVAC diagrams and HVAC system labeling
protocols should be addressed. These documents can be of great value in the event of
a CBR release.
EXPLOSIVE BLAST

his chapter discusses blast effects, potential school damage, injuries, levels of
protection, stand-off distance, and predicting blast effects. Specific blast design
concerns and
mitigation measures are discussed in Chapters 2 and
3. Explosive events have historically been a favorite tactic of terrorists for a variety of
reasons and this is likely to continue into the future. The DoD, GSA, and DOS have
considerable experience with blast effects and blast mitigation. However, many
architects and building designers do not have such experience. For additional
information on explosive blast, see FEMA 426,
Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, and FEMA 427,
Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist Attacks. See sidebar for im-
portant reference material on explosive blast.
4.1 BLAST EFFECTS
An explosion is an extremely rapid release of energy in the form of light, heat, sound,
and a shock wave. A shock wave consists of highly compressed air traveling radially
outward from the source at supersonic velocities. As the shock wave expands, pressures
decrease rapidly (with the cube of the distance) and, when it meets a surface that is in
line-of-sight of the explosion, it is reflected and amplified by a factor of up to thirteen.
Pressures also decay rap-idly over time (i.e., exponentially) and have a very brief span
of existence, measured typically in thousandths of a second, or milliseconds.
Diffraction effects, caused by corners of a building, may act to confine the air-blast,
prolonging its duration. Late in the explosive event, the shock wave becomes negative,
creating suction. Behind the shock wave, where a vacuum has been created, air rushes
in, creating a powerful wind or drag pressure on all surfaces of the building. This wind
picks up and carries flying debris in the vicinity of the detonation. In an external
explosion, a portion of the energy is also imparted to the ground, creating a crater and
generating a ground shock wave analogous to a high-intensity, short-duration
earthquake.
In the context of other hazards (e.g., earthquakes, winds, or floods), an explosive
attack has the following distinguishing features:
. _ The intensity of the pressures acting on a targeted building can be
several orders of magnitude greater than these other hazards. It is not uncommon for
the peak pressure to be in excess of 100 pounds per square inch (psi) on a building in
an urban setting for a vehicle weapon parked along the curb. At these pressure levels,
major damages and failure are expected.
. _ Explosive pressures decay extremely rapidly with distance from the
source. Therefore, the damages on the side of the building facing the explosion may
be significantly more severe than on the opposite side. As a consequence, direct air-
blast damages tend to cause more localized damage.
. _ The duration of the event is very short, measured in thousandths of a
second, or milliseconds. This differs from earthquakes and wind gusts, which are
measured in seconds, or sustained wind or flood situations, which may be measured in
hours. Because of this, the mass of the structure has a strong mitigating effect on the
response because it takes time to mobilize the mass of the structure. By the time the
mass is mobilized, the loading is gone, thus mitigating the response. This is the
opposite of earthquakes, whose imparted forces are roughly in the same timeframe as
the response of the building mass, causing a resonance effect that can worsen the
damage.

4.1.1 Building Damage
The extent and severity of damage and injuries in an explosive event cannot be
predicted with perfect certainty. Past events show that the unique specifics of the
failure sequence for a building significantly affect the level of damage. Despite these
uncertainties, it is possible to give some general indications of the overall level of
damage and injuries to be expected in an explosive event, based on the size of the
explosion, distance from the event, and assumptions about the construction of the
building.
Damage due to the air-blast shock wave may be divided into direct air-blast effects and
progressive collapse. Direct air-blast effects are damage caused by the high-intensity
pressures of the air-blast close in to the explosion and may induce the localized failure
of exterior walls, windows, floor systems, columns, and girders. Progressive collapse is
discussed in Section 3.2.
The air-blast shock wave is the primary damage mechanism in an explosion. The
pressures it exerts on building surfaces may be several orders of magnitude greater
than the loads for which the building is designed. The shock wave also acts in
directions that the building may not have been designed for, such as upward on the
floor system. In terms of sequence of response, the air-blast first impinges on the
weakest point in the vicinity of the device closest to the explosion, typically the
exterior envelope of the building. The explosion pushes on the exterior walls at the
lower stories and may cause wall failure and window breakage. As the shock wave
continues to expand, it enters the structure, pushing both upward and downward on
the floors (see Figure 4-1).
Floor failure is common in large-scale vehicle-delivered explosive attacks, because
floor slabs typically have a large surface area for the pressure to act on and a
comparably small thickness. In terms of the timing of events, the building is engulfed
by the shockwave and direct air-blast damage occurs within tens to hundreds of mil-
liseconds from the time of detonation. If progressive collapse is initiated, it typically
occurs within seconds.
Figure 4-1 Blast pressure effects on a structure
Glass is often the weakest part of a building, breaking at low pressures compared to
other components such as the floors, walls, or columns. Past incidents have shown that
glass breakage may extend for miles in large external explosions. High-velocity glass
fragments have been shown to be a major contributor to injuries in such incidents. For
incidents within downtown city areas, falling glass poses a major hazard to passersby on
the sidewalks below and prolongs post-incident rescue and cleanup efforts by leaving
tons of glass debris on the street. Specific glazing design considerations are discussed
in Chapter 3.
4.1.2 Casualties and Injuries
Blast can cause significant casualties. During the bombing of the Murrah Federal
Building, 168 people were killed. Severity and type of injury patterns incurred in
explosive events may be related to the level of structural damage. The high pressure of
the air-blast that enters through broken windows can cause eardrum damage and lung
collapse. As the air-blast damages the building components in its path, missiles are
generated that cause impact injuries. Airborne glass fragments typically cause
penetration or laceration-type injuries. Larger fragments may cause non-pen-etrating,
or blunt trauma, injuries. Finally, the air-blast pressures can cause occupants to be
bodily thrown against objects or to fall. Lacerations due to high-velocity flying glass
fragments have been responsible for a significant portion of the injuries received in
explosion incidents. In the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, for instance, 40 percent of the survivors in the building cited glass as contributing
to their injuries. Within nearby buildings, laceration estimates ranged from 25 percent
to 30 percent.
4.1.3 Levels of Protection
The amount of explosive and the resulting blast dictate the level of protection
required to prevent a building from collapsing or minimize injuries and deaths.
Table 4-1 shows how the DoD correlates levels of protection with potential damage
and expected injuries. The GSA and the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) also
use the level of protection concept. However, wherein DoD has five levels, they have
established four levels of protection. The GSA and ISC levels of protection can be
found in GSA PBS-P100, Facilities Standards for the Public Buildings Service, November
2000, Section 8.6.
Table 4-1: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism (AT) Standards for New Buildings

SOURCE: THE DoD UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA (UFC), DoDMINIMUMANTITERRORISMSTANDARDSFORBUILDINGS, UFC
4-010-01, 31 JULY 2002
The levels of protection above can roughly be correlated
for conventional construction without any blast hardening
to the following incident pressures as shown in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2: Correlation of DoD Level of Protection to Incident
Pressure
Figure 4-2 shows an example of a range-to-effect chart that indicates the distance or
stand-off to which a given size bomb will produce a given effect (see Section 4.2). This
type of chart can be used to display the blast response of a building component or
window at different levels of protection. It can also be used to consolidate all building
response information to assess needed actions if the threat weapon-yield changes. For
example, an amount of explosives are stolen and indications are that they may be used
against a specific building. A building-specific range-to-effect chart will allow quick
determination of the needed stand-off for the amount of explosives in question, once
the explosive weight is converted to trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalence. Given an ex
nated in the school's parking lot, respectively. A computer-based GIS was used to
analyze the school's vehicular access and circulation pattern to determine a
reasonable detonation point for a vehicle bomb. Structural blast analysis was then
performed using nominal explosive weights and a nominal school structure. The
results are shown in Figures 4-3 and 4-4. The red ring indicates the area in which
structural damage is predicted. The orange and yellow rings indicate predictions for
lethal injuries and severe injuries from glass, respectively. Please note that nominal
inputs were used in this analysis and they are not a predictive examination.
Figure 4-2 Explosives environments -blast range to effects

Figure 4-3 Blast analysis of a high school for a typical car bomb detonated in the school's parking lot

Figure 4-4 Blast analysis of a high school for a typical large truck bomb detonated in the school's
parking lot
In the case of a stationary vehicle bomb, knowing the size of the bomb (TNT
equivalent in weight), its distance from the structure, how the structure is put together,
and the materials used for walls, framing, and glazing allows the designer to
determine the level of damage that will occur and the level of protection achieved.
Whether an existing building or a new construction, the designer can then select
mitigation measures as presented in this chapter and Chapters 2 and 3 to achieve the
level of protection desired.
4.2 STAND-OFF DISTANCE AND THE EFFECTS OF BLAST
Energy from a blast decreases rapidly over distance. In general, the cost to provide
asset protection will decrease as the distance between an asset and a threat increases,
as shown in Figure 4-5. However, increasing stand-off also requires more land and
more perimeter to secure with barriers, resulting in an increased cost not reflected in
Figure 4-5. As stand-off increases, blast loads generated by an explosion decrease and
the amount of hardening necessary to provide the required level of protection
decreases.
Figure 4-5 Relationship of cost to stand-off distance
SOURCE: U.S. AIR FORCE, INSTALLATION FORCE PROTECTION GUIDE
The critical location of the weapon is a function of the site, the building layout, and
the security measures in place. For vehicle bombs, the critical locations are
considered to be at the closest point that a vehicle can approach on each side,
assuming that all security measures are in place. Typically this is a vehicle parked
along the curb directly outside the building, or at the entry control point where
inspection takes place. For internal weapons, location is dictated by the areas of the
building that are publicly accessible (e.g., lobbies, corridors, auditoriums, cafeterias,
or gymnasiums). Range or stand-off is measured from the center of gravity of the
charge located in the vehicle or other container to the building component under
consideration.
Defining appropriate stand-off distance for a given building component to resist
explosive blast effects is difficult. Often in urban settings, it is either not possible or
practical to obtain appropriate stand-off distance. Adding to the difficulty is the fact
that defining appropriate stand-off distance requires a prediction of the explosive
weight of the weapon. In the case of terrorism, this is tenuous at best.
The DoD prescribes minimum stand-off distances based on the required level of
protection. Where minimum stand-off distances are met, conventional construction
techniques can be used with some modifications. In cases where the minimum stand-
off cannot be achieved, the building must be hardened to achieve the required level
of protection (see the DoD UFC - DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings,
UFC 4-010-01, 31 July 2002).
The first step in predicting blast effects on a building is to predict blast loads on the
structure. Because blast pressure pulse varies based on stand-off distance, angle of
incidence, and reflected pressure over the exterior of the building, the blast load
predictions can be very complex. Consultants may use sophisticated methods such as
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) computer programs to predict blast loads.
These complex programs require special equipment and training to run.
In most cases, especially for design purposes, more simplified methods may be used by
blast consultants to predict blast loads. Tables of pre-determined values (see GSA
Security Reference Manual: Part 3-Blast Design & Assessment Guidelines, July 31, 2001) or
computer programs may be used such as: 1
. _ ATBLAST (GSA)
. _ CONWEP (U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center)

Figure 4-6 provides a quick method for predicting the expected overpressure
(expressed in pounds per square inch or psi) on a building for a specific explosive
weight and stand-off distance. Enter the x-axis with the estimated explosive weight a
terrorist might use and the y-axis with a known stand-off distance from a building. By
correlating the resultant effects of overpressure with other data, the degree of
damage that the various components of a building might receive can be estimated.
The vehicle icons in Figure 4-6 indicate the relative size of the vehicles that might be
used to transport various quantities of explosives.
The analysis of structures subjected to the effects of an explosion is very complex and
requires an understanding of structural engineering, dynamics, strengths of materials,
and specialized training in explosive effects. Such analysis should be performed by
engineers who can conduct a complex analysis that is both time-dependent and
accounts for non-linear behavior. In the absence of such an analysis of a specific
structure, it is possible to provide rough approximations of building damages to be
expected in an explosive event. Table 4-3 provides basic estimates of incident
pressures at which different types of damage generally occur to buildings based on the
incident pressures determined in Figure 4-6.
1For security reasons, the distribution of these computer programs is limited.
Figure 4-6 Incident overpressure measured in pounds per square inch, as a function of stand-off
distance and net explosive weight (pounds-TNT)
Table 4-3: Damage Approximations
SOURCES: EXPLOSIVESHOCKSINAIR, KINNEY & GRAHM, 1985;
FACILITYDAMAGEANDPERSONNELINJURYFROMEXPLOSIVEBLAST, MONTGOMERY & WARD, 1993; AND
THEEFFECTSOFNUCLEARWEAPONS, 3RD EDITION, GLASSTONE & DOLAN, 1977.
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL MEASURES
his chapter is based on guidance from the Centers for
Disease Control and Protection (CDC)/National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the
DoD and presents protective measures and actions to
safeguard the occupants of a school building from CBR
threats. Evacuation, sheltering in place, personal
protective equipment, air filtration and pressurization,
and exhausting and purging will be discussed, as well as
CBR detection.1 Additionally, CBR design mitigation
measures are discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, and
Appendix C contains information on chemical and
biological agent characteristics. FEMA 426 Reference
Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings
contains detailed information on CBR threats.
Although the likelihood of a direct attack against a school
is very low, recent terrorist events have increased interest
in the vulnerability of all types of buildings to CBR threats.
Of particular concern are building HVAC systems, because
they can become an entry point and distribution system
for airborne hazardous contaminants. Even without special
protective systems, buildings can provide protection in
varying degrees against airborne hazards that originate
outdoors. Conversely, the hazards produced by a release
inside a building can be much more severe than a similar
release outdoors. Because buildings allow only a limited
exchange of air between indoors and outdoors, not only
can
1 This chapter includes a number of protective measures that are included for informational purposes only. It is not the intention of FEMA to endorse
any particular product or protective measure.
After the presence of an airborne hazard is detected, there are five possible protective
actions for a building and its occupants. In increasing order of complexity and cost,
these actions are:
1. 1. Evacuation
2. 2. Sheltering in Place
3. 3. Personal Protective Equipment
4. 4. Filtering and Pressurization
5. 5. Exhausting and Purging

These actions are implemented, singly or in combination, when a hazard is present
or known to be imminent. To ensure these actions will be effective, a school safety
emergency plan specific to each school, as well as training and familiarization for
occupants, is required (see Sections 3.11 and 3.12). Exhausting and purging is listed
last because it is usually the final action after any airborne hazard incident.
5.1 EVACUATION
Evacuation is the most common protective action taken when an airborne hazard,
such as smoke or an unusual odor, is perceived in a building. In most cases, existing
plans for fire evacuation apply. Orderly evacuation is the simplest and most reliable
action for an internal airborne hazard, but may not be the best action in all situations,
especially in the case of an external CBR release or plume, particularly one that is
widespread. If the area covered by the plume is too large to rapidly and safely exit,
sheltering in place should be considered. If a CBR agent has infiltrated the building
and evacuation is deemed not to be safe, the use of protective hoods may be
appropriate. Two considerations in non-fire evacuation are: 1) to determine if the
source of the airborne hazard is internal or external to the building; and 2) to
determine if evacuation may lead to other risks. Also, evacuation and assembly of
occupants should be on the upwind side of the building and at least 100 feet away,
because any airborne hazard escaping the structure will be carried downwind.
5.2 SHELTERING IN PLACE
Typically, buildings offer little protection to occupants from airborne hazards outside
the structure because outdoor air must be continuously introduced to provide a
comfortable, healthy indoor environment. However, a school can provide substantial
protection against agents released outdoors if the flow of fresh air is filtered/cleaned,
or temporarily interrupted or reduced. Interrupting the flow of fresh air is the
principle applied in the protective action known as sheltering in place. Additional
information can be found in Section 3.4 and Chapter 6 of this primer.
The need for schools to consider sheltering in place is demonstrated in Figure 5-1,
which depicts the results of modeling a chemical dispersion from a rail line assuming
local prevailing winds. Note that the chemical plume travels directly over a nominal
elementary school.
Figure 5-1 Example of chemical dispersion
The advantage of sheltering in place is that it can be implemented rapidly. The
disadvantage is that its protection is variable and diminishes with the duration of the
hazard. Sheltering requires that two distinct actions be taken without delay to
maximize the passive protection a school building provides:
. _ First, reduce the indoor-outdoor air exchange rate before the
hazardous plume arrives. This is achieved by closing all windows and doors, and
turning off all fans, air conditioners, and combustion heaters.
. _ Second, increase the indoor-outdoor air exchange rate as soon as the
hazardous plume has passed. This is achieved by opening all windows and doors, and
turning on all fans to ventilate the building.

The level of protection that can be attained by sheltering in place is substantial, but it
is less than can be provided by high-effi-ciency filtration of the fresh air introduced
into the building. The amount of protection varies with:
. _ The building's air exchange rate. The tighter the school building (i.e.,
the lower the air exchange rate), the greater the protection it provides. In most cases,
air conditioners and combustion heaters cannot be operated while sheltering in place
because operating them increases the indoor-outdoor exchange of air.
. _ The duration of exposure. Protection varies with time, diminishing as
the time of exposure increases. Sheltering in place is, therefore, suitable only for
exposures of short duration, roughly 2 hours or less, depending on conditions.
. _ Purging or period of occupancy. How long students, faculty, and staff
remain in the building after the hazardous plume has passed also affects the level of
protection. Because the school building slowly purges contaminants that have entered
it, at some point during plume passage, the concentration

inside exceeds the concentration outside. Maximum protection is attained by
increasing the air exchange rate after plume passage or by exiting into clean air.
_ Natural filtering. Some filtering occurs when the agent is deposited in the school
shell or upon interior surfaces as air passes into and out of the building. The tighter
the school building, the greater the effect of this natural filtering.
In a home, taking the actions required for sheltering (i.e., closing windows and
doors, and turning off all air conditioners, fans, and combustion heaters) is relatively
simple. Doing so in a school may require more time and planning. All air handling
units must be turned off and any dampers for outside air must be closed. Procedures
for a protective action plan, therefore, should include:
. _ Identifying all air handling units, fans, and the switches needed to
deactivate them.
. _ Identifying cracks, seams, joints, and pores in the building shell to be
temporarily sealed to further reduce outside air infiltration. Keeping emergency
supplies, such as duct tape and polyethylene sheeting, on hand.
. _ Identifying procedures for purging after an internal release (i.e.,
opening windows and doors, turning on smoke fans, air handlers, and fans that were
turned off) to exhaust and purge the building.
._ Identifying school safe rooms (i.e., interior rooms having a lower air exchange
rate - see Chapter 6) that may provide a higher level of passive protection. It may be
desirable to go to a predetermined sheltering room (or rooms) and:
. � Shut and lock all windows and doors
. � Seal any windows and vents with plastic sheeting and duct tape

. � Seal the door(s) with duct tape around the top, bottom, and sides
. � Firmly pack dampened towels along the bottom of each door
. � Turn on a TV or radio that can be heard within the shelter and listen for
further instructions
. � When the "all clear" is announced, open windows and doors

Although sheltering is for protection against an external release, it is possible, but
more complex, to shelter in place on one or more floors of a multi-story school
building after an internal release has occurred on a single floor. Important
considerations for use of sheltering in place are that stairwells must be isolated by
closed fire doors, elevators must not be used, and clear evacuation routes must remain
open if evacuation is required. Escape hoods may be needed if the only evacuation
routes are through contaminated areas.
One final consideration for sheltering in place is that students, faculty, and staff
cannot be forced to participate. During an event, some building emergency plans call
for making a concise information announcement, and then giving occupants 3 to 5
minutes to proceed to the sheltering area or evacuate the building before it is sealed.
It is important to develop a plan in cooperation with likely participants and awareness
training programs that include discussions of sheltering in place and events (CBR
attacks, hazardous material releases, or natural disasters) that might make sheltering
preferable to evacuation. Training programs and information announcements during
an event should be tailored to help students, faculty, and staff to make informed
decisions.
5.3 PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
A wide range of individual protection equipment is available, including respirators,
protective hoods, protective suits, CBR detectors, and decontamination equipment.
Of particular note, new models of universal-fit escape hoods have been developed for
short-duration "escape-only" wear to protect against chemical agents, aerosols
(including biological agents), and some toxic industrial chemicals. These hoods are
compact enough to be stored in desks or to be carried on the belt. They should be
stored in their sealed pouches and opened only when needed. Most of these hoods
form protective seals at the neck and do not require special fitting techniques or
multiple sizes to fit a large portion of the population. Training is required to use the
hoods properly. Depending on hood design, the wearer must bite on and breathe
through a mouth bit or use straps to tighten a nose cup around the nose and mouth
(see Figure 5-2). Escape hoods should be considered, but may not be an effective or
efficient proposed solution for use in schools, under current threats.
There are no government standards for hoods intended for protection against the
malicious use of chemical or biological agents. In selecting an escape hood, a
purchaser should, therefore, require information on laboratory verification testing.
Figure 5-2 Universal-fit escape hood Plans should be made for training, fitting, storing, and
maintaining records relative to storage life, and there should be procedures for
instructing building occupants about when to put on the hoods. Wearing a hood can
cause physiological strain and may cause panic or stress that could lead to respiratory
problems in some people. Finally, it should be recognized that no single selection of
personal protective equipment is effective against every possible threat. Selection must
be tied to specific threat/hazard characteristics.
SOURCE: MSA INTERNATIONAL
5.4 AIR FILTRATION AND PRESSURIZATION
Among the various protective measures for school buildings, high-efficiency air
filtration/cleaning provides the highest level of protection against an outdoor release
of hazardous materials. It can also provide continuous protection, unlike other
approaches for which protective measures are initiated upon detecting an airborne
hazard. Chapter 6 and FEMA 426 Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks
Against Buildings discuss air filtration in detail.
Two basic methods of applying air filtration to buildings are external filtration and
internal filtration. External filtration involves drawing air from outside, filtering
and/or cleaning it, and discharging the air inside the building or protected zone.
This provides a higher level of protection, but involves substantially higher costs.
Internal filtration involves drawing air from inside the building, filtering and/or
cleaning it, and discharging the air back inside the building.
The relative levels of protection of the two methods can be illustrated in terms of
protection factor, and the ratio of external dose and internal dose (concentration
integrated over time). External filtration systems with high-efficiency filters can yield
protection factors greater than 100,000. For internal filtration, the protection factors
are likely to be less and are highly variable. The protection of internal filtration varies
with a number of factors, including those listed in Section 5.2, the efficiency of the
filter, flow rate of the filter unit, and size of the room or building in which the filter
unit operates.
5.5 EXHAUSTING AND PURGING
Turning on building ventilation fans and smoke-purge fans is a protective action for
purging airborne hazards from the building and reducing the hazard to which school
occupants are exposed, but it is mainly useful when the source of the hazard is
indoors.
Purging must be carefully applied with regard to the location of the source and the
time of the release. It must be clear that the source of the hazard is inside the school
building and, if not, purging should not be attempted. If the hazardous material has
been identified before release or immediately upon release, purging should not be
employed, because it may spread the hazardous material throughout the school
building or HVAC zone. In this case, all air handling units should be turned off to
isolate the hazard while evacuating or temporarily sheltering in place.
Additionally, the ventilation system and smoke purge fans can be used to purge the
building following an external release after the hazard outdoors has dissipated, and it
has been confirmed that the agent is no longer present near the school building.
5.6 CBR DETECTION
Most strategies for protecting students, faculty, staff, and visitors from airborne hazards
will require a means of detection (i.e., determining that a hazard exists). Although
effective and inexpensive devices are widely available to detect, for example, smoke
and carbon monoxide, there are no detectors that can rapidly alert occupants to a
broad range of chemical and biological hazards.
Chemical detection technology has improved vastly since Operation Desert Storm,
where many military detection systems experienced high false alarm rates, but
biological detection technology has not matured as fast. Biological signatures are not
as distinctive as chemical signatures and can take 30 minutes or more to detect.
Biological detection systems are expensive and generally require trained specialists to
operate. Current chemical detectors work in approximately 10 seconds; furthermore,
wide varieties of efficient radiological detectors have been developed for the nuclear
industry and are commercially available.
Chemical Detectors. Driven largely by a desire to protect workers from toxic vapors in
industrial environments, considerable information is known on the toxicity of
chemical warfare agents, which often have dual uses in industry. A variety of detection
tech-nologies exist, ranging from inexpensive manual point detection devices (e.g.,
paper strips and calorimetric tubes) utilizing basic chemical reactions to trigger color
changes, to sophisticated detection systems utilizing advanced technologies.
Chemical agents do not possess universal properties that
permit detection by any single method. Therefore, most
chemical detectors are designed to detect specific agents
or a group of related agents. Most broad range detection
systems actually combine several different sensors utilizing
different technologies and can be very expensive and
complex. Nevertheless, today there are numerous
commercially available chemical detectors. The most
capable detectors utilize ion mobility spectrometry (IMS),
surface acoustic wave (SAW), or gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometer (GC/MS) technologies to detect chemical
agents and toxic industrial materials (TIMs).
Today, there are commercially available IMS detection systems that will detect most
chemical agents and many TIMs (see Figure 5-3). They are suitable for integration
into a building ventilation system, can interface with HVAC control systems, have
reasonable maintenance requirements (every 3 months), low false alarm rates, and
can be programmed to detect specific chemical agents. An IMS chemical detector designed for Biological
Detectors. The current state of
installation in HVAC systems biological detection technology is very dif-

SOURCE: SMITHS DETECTION
ferent from that of chemical agent
detection technology. In general, most biological detection
systems are currently in the research and early
development stages. There are some commercially
available devices that have limited utility (responding only
to a small number of agents) and are generally high cost
items. Because commercially available biological warfare
(BW) detection systems and/or components exhibit
limited utility in detecting and identifying BW agents and
are also costly, it is strongly recommended that purchasers
be very careful when considering any device that claims to
detect BW agents.
5.7 INDICATIONS OF CBR CONTAMINATION
Most hazardous chemicals have warning properties that provide a practical means for
detecting a hazard and initiating protective actions. Such warning properties make
chemicals perceptible; for example, vapors or gases can be perceived by the human
senses (i.e., smell, sight, taste, or irritation of the eyes, skin, or respiratory tract)
before serious effects occur. The distinction between perceptible and imperceptible
agents is not an exact one. The concentrations at which a person can detect an odor
vary from person to person, and these thresholds also vary relative to the
concentration that can produce immediate, injurious effects.
Most of the industrial chemicals and chemical-warfare agents are readily detectable by
smell. Soldiers in World Wars I and II were taught to identify, by smell, such agents as
mustard, phosgene, and chlorine, and this detection method proved effective for
determining when to put on and take off a gas mask. An exception is the chemical-
warfare agent Sarin, which is odorless and colorless in its pure form and, therefore,
imperceptible. Among the most common toxic industrial chemicals, carbon
monoxide is one of the few that is imperceptible. Because it is odorless and colorless,
it causes many deaths in buildings each year (see Section 6.2.1).
Biological agents are also imperceptible and there are no detection devices that can
determine their presence in the air in real time. Current methods for detecting
bacterial spores, such as anthrax, require a trained operator and expensive
equipment. It is not currently possible to base protective responses to biological
agents on detection.
Researchers are working on a prototype device to automatically and continuously
monitor the air for the presence of bacterial spores. The device would continuously
sample the air and use microwaves to trigger a chemical reaction, the intensity of
which would correspond to the concentration of bacterial spores in the sample. If an
increase in spore concentration is detected, an alarm similar to a smoke detector
would sound and a technician would respond and use traditional sampling and
analysis to confirm the presence of anthrax spores. Researchers hope the device
response time will be fast enough to help prevent widespread contamination.
In the absence of a warning property, people can be alerted to some airborne hazards
by observing symptoms or effects in others. This provides a practical means for
initiating emergency plans, because the susceptibility to hazardous materials varies
from person to person. The concentrations of airborne materials may also vary
substantially within a given building or room, producing a hazard that may be greater
to some occupants than to others.
Other warning signs of a hazard may involve seeing and hearing something out of the
ordinary, such as the hiss of a rapid release from a pressurized cylinder. Awareness of
warning properties, signs, and symptoms in other people is the basis of an emergency
plan (see Sections 3.11 and 3.12). Such a plan should apply four possible protective
actions: evacuating, sheltering in place, using protective masks, and exhausting and
purging, as already discussed in this chapter.
For protection against imperceptible agents, the only practical protective measures
are those that are continuously in place, such as filtering all air brought into the
building on a continuous basis and using automatic, real-time sensors that are
capable of detecting the imperceptible agents.
CBR materials, as well as industrial agents, may travel in the air as a gas or on
surfaces we physically contact. Dispersion (e.g., colored residue, dead foliage,
pungent odor, and dead animals, birds, fish, or insects; see Table 5-1 and Figure
5-4).
In the case of a biological incident, the onset of symptoms takes days to weeks and,
typically, there will be no characteristic indicators (see Table 5-2 and Figure 5-5).
Because of the delayed onset of symptoms in a biological incident, the area affected
may be greater due to the migration of infected individuals.
In the case of a radiological incident, the onset of symptoms also takes days to weeks
to occur and typically there will be no characteristic indicators (see Table 5-3 and
Figure 5-6). Radiological materials are not recognizable by the senses because they
are colorless and odorless.
Specialized equipment is required to determine the size of the affected area and if the
level of radioactivity presents an immediate or long-term health hazard. Because of
the delayed onset of symptoms in a radiological incident, the affected area may be
greater due to the migration of contaminated individuals.
Table 5-1: Indicators of a Possible Chemical Incident
Dead animals, birds, fish
Not just an occasional roadkill, but numerous animals (wild and
domestic, small and large), birds, and fish in the same area.
Lack of insect life
If normal insect activity (ground, air, and/or water) is missing, check
the ground/water surface/ shore line for dead insects. If near water,
check for dead fish/aquatic birds.
Physical symptoms
Numerous individuals experiencing unexplained water-like blisters,
wheals (like bee stings), pinpointed pupils, choking, respiratory
ailments and/or rashes.
Mass casualties
Numerous individuals exhibiting unexplained serious health problems
ranging from nausea to disorientation to difficulty in breathing to
convulsions to death.
Definite pattern of
casualties
Casualties distributed in a pattern that may be associated with possible
agent dissemination methods.
Illness associated with
confined geographic area
Lower attack rates for people working indoors than those working
outdoors, and vice versa.

Table 5-2: Indicators of a Possible Biological Incident

Unusual numbers of sick
or dying people or animals
Any number of symptoms may occur. As a first responder, strong
consideration should be given to calling local hospitals to see if
additional causalities with similar symptoms have been observed.
Casualties may occur hours to days or weeks after an incident has
occurred. The time required before symptoms are observed is dependent
on the biological agent used and the dose received. Additional
symptoms likely to occur include unexplained gastrointestinal illnesses
and upper respiratory problems similar to flu/colds.
Unscheduled and unusual
spray being disseminated
Especially if outdoors during periods of darkness.
Abandoned spray devices
Devices will have no distinct odors.

Figure 5-5 Placards associated with biological incidents
Table 5-3 Indicators of a Possible Radiological Incident
Unusual numbers of sick
or dying people or animals
As a first responder, strong consideration should be given to calling
local hospitals to see if additional casualties with similar symptoms
have been observed. Casualties may occur hours to days or weeks after
an incident has occurred. The time required before symptoms are
observed is dependent on the radioactive material used and the dose
received. Additional symptoms likely to occur include skin reddening
and, in severe cases, vomiting.
Unusual metal debris
Unexplained bomb/munitionslike material.
Radiation symbols
Containers may display a radiation symbol.
Heat emitting material
Material that seems to emit heat without any sign of an external
heating source.
Glowing material/particles
If the material is strongly radioactive, it may emit a radioluminescence.

Figure 5-6 Placards associated with radiological incidents

SAFE ROOMS WITHIN SCHOOLS

his chapter is a work in progress and will be superceded by a future FEMA
publication (FEMA 442) that will have expanded guidance on the subject of safe
rooms. It is intended as a standalone description of the concept of safe rooms within
schools that will resist CBR and blast threats and to provide school board members
and decision-makers with the basic components of a protective system.
It is important to note that the probability of either a CBR or terrorist explosive event
occurring in the United States is small. This is evidenced by the relatively few domestic
buildings that have been targeted by intentional CBR or explosive events compared to
the vast number of buildings that might be considered vulnerable. To date, two
incidents of biological terrorism have been recorded and acknowledged to have had
significant impacts on coincident populations in the United States: the 2001 anthrax
mailings and the 1984 contamination of restaurants with Salmonella bacteria. If a
localized CBR event were to occur, the potential for contamination to spread and
cause collateral illnesses and fatalities up to 4 or more kilometers (approximately 21�2
miles) from the target site would be likely. Unpredictable meteorological conditions
would play a key role in the spread of such CBR contamination. Similarly, if an
explosive event were to occur, there would be a significant potential for injuries
resulting from debris impact and structural collapse. Therefore, in consideration of
the proximity of some schools with respect to higher profile potential targets in the
United States, school board members and administrators may determine that their
select facilities require the design and construction of safe rooms. Because there are
so many different types of school buildings, with so many different types of
construction and materials, it is not possible to relate all the following issues to specific
building types; nevertheless, an attempt was made to relate the relevant threats and
the general principles of protective design to the development of safe rooms within
schools.
This chapter discusses:
. _ The different types of hazards
. _ The general means by which these hazards might be addressed
. _ The protective methods that may be effective
. _ The level of effectiveness that may be achieved
. _ The information from which decision-makers can estimate the
cost for providing different levels of protection

6.1 TYPES OF CBR HAZARDS
Chemical contaminants of concern are the chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and
toxic industrial chemicals (TICs). Key attributes of CWAs and TICs are their toxicity,
volatility, and availability. The most toxic CWAs are the nerve agent liquids, which
include VX with high toxicity and low volatility, and Sarin with high toxicity and
moderate volatility. The measured volatility of a chemical represents the ease with
which the quantity of liquid chemical leaves the liquid state and becomes a gas in
equilibrium with its volumetric surroundings. So, an occupant of a room where Sarin
liquid is naturally evaporating is at much greater
risk than the same individual being in the same room with the same or (to a degree
greater) quantity of a naturally evaporating VX agent (see Appendix C). The lethality
of VX exceeds the lethality of Sarin by dose, but Sarin is much more volatile than VX.
6.1.1 Toxic Industrial Chemicals
Though of lower toxicity than nerve agents, TICs are widely available, and some can
be easily obtained or produced without sophisticated equipment. Among the
hundreds of TICs produced worldwide are several that have been used as CWAs (e.g.,
arsine, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, hydrogen sulfide, acrolein, and
cyanogen chloride). Those that have been used in warfare are considered second-rate
CWAs because their toxicity and vapor pressure make them less effective than other
agents for open-air battlefield use.
6.1.2 Incapacitating and Tear-producing Agents
Although incapacitating and tear-producing agents are considered non-lethal, indoor
releases can, under certain conditions, produce lethal concentrations. In addition to
the tear-producing agents, there are commercially available agents containing
oleoresin capsicum (OC), the natural oil of chili peppers. The malicious or accidental
release of pepper spray has caused many disruptive incidents in recent years. In
contact with the eyes, nose, or mouth, OC causes immediate
pain and inflammation. Inhaled, its aerosol causes choking and gasping for breath.
Of low vapor pressure, OC is easily filtered.
6.1.3 Biological Agents
Biological agents include bacteria, viruses, and rickettsia. Toxins, which are poisons of
biological origin and not living organisms, are sometimes grouped with biological
agents and sometimes with chemical agents. Although there are hundreds of
microorganisms that could be used as biological agents, the likely number is much
smaller when the agents' effectiveness, reliability, availability, ease of manufacture, and
stability in storage and dissemination are considered. When disseminated as aerosols,
biological agents are most effective in the size range of 1 to 5 microns, because they
can remain suspended for long periods. Smaller particles are less likely to survive as
aerosols, and larger particles settle rapidly, making them less likely to enter the lungs.
The settling time in still air for an anthrax spore (1 micron by 0.7 micron in size) is
approximately 1�2 foot per hour. Particles of this size are readily filtered from an air
stream with high-ef-ficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. Toxins, which may be in
crystalline or liquid form, are also filterable with HEPA when disseminated as aerosols.
6.1.4 Radiological Agents
Radiological agents are radioactive materials. Explosive release is the most likely
means of disseminating such agents in a terrorist attack (e.g., a "dirty bomb" consisting
of radioactive material packaged with a conventional explosive). The likely radioactive
ingredients are those used for industrial and medical purposes (e.g., isotopes of
cesium, cobalt, and iridium). They are commonly found in hospitals and labs, often
with few safeguards. Given the availability of nuclear reactors for research or energy
production by universities, research facilities, or private industries, the threat
associated with radiological materials is significant. Radiological contaminants are very
persistent, in that their decay rate is extremely slow. Unlike chemical or biological
agents, decontamination involves only removal, not neutralization. Radiological
aerosols present a health hazard if ingested or inhaled, but are easily filtered from an
air stream with HEPA filters.
6.2 MOST LIKELY DELIVERY METHODS FOR CBR AGENTS
For purpose of vulnerability assessments, delivery methods are divided into four types
of releases: internal, external proximate, remote, and remote with forewarning.
6.2.1 Internal Release
This involves transporting a container of agent into a building and releasing the
contents manually, automatically, or remotely. Such a device may rely simply upon
natural evaporation (as in the Tokyo subway Sarin attack), with the rate of evaporation
proportional to the surface area that develops as liquid agent spills from its container.
Aerosolization may occur with movement of an open package or letter containing a
biological agent. A sprayer powered by batteries or compressed air can produce an
effective dose of an agent quite rapidly. An agent can be released in any area served by
return ducts/plenums or in a mechanical room, with dissemination through an air-
handling unit. Biological agents can also be placed into certain types of humidifier
systems.
6.2.2 External Proximate Release
This involves introducing an agent or a dissemination device from outside the
building directly through a penetration in the building shell, such as a fresh-air
intake. Vulnerability to this type of release is highest when air intakes are at
accessible, unsecured locations at ground level. Agents can also be delivered through
other penetrations, but potential effectiveness is less in the absence of a driving force
(a fan) to introduce and distribute air within the building. A documented example of
an attack through a ground-level penetration is the release of a toxic industrial gas
from a pressurized cylinder through a dryer vent. External proximate release also
includes forcing open or breaking windows and doors to introduce agents from
pressurized cylinders or tossing a grenade or container of an agent into the building.
6.2.3 Remote Release
If directed at a specific facility, this type of attack involves a plume, puff, or line source
generated so that the wind carries the agent to the target building; the facility may be
the target or collaterally in the direction of the attack. The most efficient type of
remote attack is a directed-plume attack with a ground-level source placed upwind of a
building's fresh-air intakes or open windows. A ground-level, directed-plume attack
was conducted with the nerve agent Sarin from a distance of 60 yards in Matsumoto,
Japan, in 1994, killing 7 and injuring 264 in a zone 500 yards deep and 100 yards wide.
A remote attack can also involve an aerial release. Release from an aircraft is much less
likely to affect a specific, targeted building, however, because the vertical rate of
transport, governed by settling time and atmospheric stability, is extremely difficult to
judge.
6.2.4 Remote Release with Forewarning
This type of attack differs from other remote releases because protective actions other
than those for no-warning attacks can be applied. This type involves warning in the
form of an explosion or an event such as an accidental or intentional release of an
agent from a chemical transport or storage tank. Scenarios involving forewarning
include sabotage of toxic industrial storage tanks/ trucks, transport accidents, fires, or
the impending release of a chemical agent from a point upwind of the building.
Quantities of agent that could be released from a single 3,000-gallon tanker truck are
approximately 34,000 pounds for phosgene, 35,000 pounds for chlorine, and 17,000
pounds for hydrogen cyanide.
6.3 VULNERABILITY TO REMOTE CBR RELEASE
In the absence of a secure perimeter around the building (see Section 2.4) and a real-
time detection system, vulnerability to a remote release is determined by: 1) the
efficiency of the school building's filtration system in removing aerosols and gases, 2)
the unfiltered component of air exchange, and 3) the configuration of the school
building and elevation of air intakes. These vulnerabilities can be characterized as
follows.
_ Efficiency of gas filtration. Generally, if adsorbers are found in buildings, they
are for the purpose of improving indoor air quality by removing both outdoor and
indoor air pollutants, particularly corrosive gases such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
dioxide, and ozone, and are used where appropriate for protecting against the
deleterious effects of these gases. Although not intended for protecting people
from toxic chemical agents, these gas adsorbers do reduce the vulnerability to an
attack with certain chemical agents.
With a 1-inch bed thickness of coarse (4x6 mesh) sorbent
granules and a short residence time of these indoor air
quality filters, the efficiency is about 99 percent initially,
and it diminishes with time in service, typically to about 25
percent in a year. There is also an initial bypass of roughly 1
percent through the bed and additional bypasses among filter
modules' holding frames. The bypasses may increase with
time in service, dropping the net efficiency below the initial
level. This compares with an efficiency of greater than 99.999
percent for gas adsorbers designed for protection of people in
military applications. Removal efficiency for these indoor air
quality adsorbers is relatively low and uncertain for some of
the threat agents (the capacity for arsine is low, for example).
Thus, the efficiency and capacity are highly variable.
Manufacturers provide surveillance testing to determine when
to change filters and recommend that they be changed when
reactive capacity has dropped to 25 percent of the initial
value. The typical service life for single stage, 1-inch beds is
approximately 1 year.

_ Particulate filtration. Significant particulate filtration can be accomplished by
using a 35-percent pre-filter and a 95percent filter in series. The efficiency of this
filter train is in the range of 95 to 99 percent for 1-micron particles in the new
condition, and this efficiency increases as the filters load.
_ Unfiltered air exchange. Typical of schools, a substantial portion of the air
exchanged between indoors and outdoors may not pass through the filters of any
air-handling units. When this occurs, the level of protection the building structure
provides is, therefore, governed not by the efficiency of the filters but rather by
that portion of makeup air bypassing the filters. There are several paths by which
air exchange is driven by fans, buoyancy, and/or wind pressures. They include
operable windows; doorways with flows driven by buoyancy, particularly in summer
and winter when indoor-outdoor temperature differentials are highest; and
unintentional openings in the building shell. When internal resistance is minimal,
less dense (buoyant) warm air rises and flows out of a school building near its top
in winter, drawing in cool air at the lower levels. Conversely, in summer, cool air
falls and flows out of the building's base. The buoyancy effect tends to be less
pronounced in spring and fall because of smaller indoor and outdoor temperature
differences. With the standard draw-through configuration of the air-handling
units, leakage paths at the access doors and panels are subject to inward pressure;
these leakage paths increase as the gaskets age. Typically, access doors also fail to
seal well with filter frames, allowing bypass that increases with age.
_ Typical protection factors achievable. In terms of protection factor, protection
against aerosols (biological/radiological agents and others such as tear gas)
provided by the best (standard) filtration systems available in air-handling units is
substantial, but relatively low (in the range of approximately 5 to 50). Protection
factor is a ratio of dose (concentration integrated over time) of an agent outside
divided by the resulting dose of agent inside a building). This level of protection is
comparable to that achievable with sheltering in place or an active detection-
based system that responds by de-energizing fans and closing dampers. The
higher value in this range is estimated by taking the inverse of the penetration
factor for 1-micron particles through the filters, including an initial bypass of
approximately 1 percent. The lower value in the protection-factor range is
estimated for both particulate and gas filters by using 20 percent as an estimate of
the unfiltered air exchange; the inverse of the penetration factor (0.2) is 5.
With an indoor air quality filter unit having a gas adsorber, the protection factor for
gases can be as high as 50, but only when filters are new and only with gas adsorbers.
The protection drops to a low value as the filter efficiency decreases with time in
service. This may be less than 2 if the efficiency drops below 50 percent after 1 year in
service. The protection factor against gases is also reduced by the portion of outside
air (which could be at least 80 percent) that does not flow through gas adsorbers. With
a penetration of 80 percent, the protection factor for gases for the whole building is
less than 2.
6.4 VULNERABILITY TO REMOTE CBR RELEASE WITH
FOREWARNING
This type of attack involves release of agent by explosion or rapid release from a
tanker truck, rail car, or fixed storage tank. The potential for this type of attack is
higher when the facility is near rail lines, public roads with truck traffic, or storage
tanks of toxic chemicals. This type of attack may also involve an explosive release of a
radiological agent (i.e., a "dirty bomb" attack at a distance from the building great
enough to allow for protective actions to be taken before wind carries the agent to the
building).
The criterion for this aspect of vulnerability is the ability to rapidly assume a
sheltering-in-place posture (see Section 5.2). The main requirements are
plans/procedures for sheltering, controls to rapidly turn off all fans, and a
communications or public address system to facilitate closing of doors and keeping
them closed while an outdoor hazard is present or imminent. Protection factors vary,
diminishing with time of exposure; however, scenarios of explosive release under most
conditions would present a relatively short exposure to the school building.
6.5 VULNERABILITY TO INTERNAL CBR RELEASE
This is a remote possibility owing to the nature and likelihood of other vandalism and
that actual targeting of a school has no historical precedence. Nevertheless, internal
releases involve covert entry or covert introduction of agents in containers.
Vulnerability to internal release is, therefore, determined principally by physical
security measures in place. Containers of agents may be hand-car-ried or delivered in
mail, supplies, or equipment. Other factors affecting this vulnerability are internal
(recirculation) filtration and how well entry zones where any screening takes place are
isolated architecturally and mechanically.
The basis for preventing covert introduction of agents is access control and entry
screening. Use of the X-ray machine for hand-carried items facilitates the detection
of containers large enough to hold hazardous quantities of chemical agents; however,
it requires specific operating procedures for doing so, and it may not be effective in
detecting containers of hazardous quantities of biological agents. Obviously, such
procedures are not recommended for schools without provocation (i.e., an actual
threat) because of cost.
6.6 VULNERABILITY TO EXTERNAL PROXIMATE CBR
RELEASE
Vulnerability to external proximate release is determined mainly by the accessibility
of outside air intakes to covert introduction of agent or agent-dissemination device.
Unless air intakes are relocated at a higher elevation, this vulnerability would remain
high.
The three strategies for protecting a school building from airborne hazards
originating outdoors are air filtration, controlling air exchange, and exclusion by
physical security. Options presented in this chapter focus on air filtration; however,
enhanced filtration techniques discussed earlier would be applied most
economically in schools to a selected safe room, such as a school gymnasium or
auditorium. Without a secure exclusion zone around the school building, physical
security measures are limited to those described above for external proximate
release and internal release.
Controlling air exchange is most commonly employed with human detection and
warning (i.e., sheltering in place). It can also be applied with automatic, real-time
detection equipment, but with very limited effectiveness. Few agents among the full
spectrum of threat agents can be detected with accuracy in real time. Protection
factors vary with response time and, even with instantaneous response, protection
factors are no greater than the maximum protection factors achievable with sheltering
in place. As the response time increases, protection factors diminish. With current
technology, response times are longest for biological agent detection. The response
time for presumptive identification by a detector such as the Joint Biological Point
Detection System is approximately 30 minutes and far exceeds the response time
needed for effective use of sheltering in place. A biological detection system would
not, therefore, prevent the contamination of a particular building.
_ Criteria for protective performance. All of the following discussion represents
extreme measures applied to high-risk, high-security assets or, in general, to lesser
degrees, safe rooms, and perhaps to would-be safe rooms for schools. There is no
standard requirement for protection factors. U.S. military systems are designed to
achieve protection factors greater than 10,000. The criterion applied to military
masks and collective protection
shelters is 6,667, which is based upon specific levels for chemical agents on the
battlefield and for threshold effects of the chemical agents on soldiers. There is no
criterion for biological or radiological agents based upon concentrations and doses
likely to be developed in an attack on a school building; however, it would be 10,000 or
greater.
The selection of a CBR safe room in a school building requires an assessment of
factors contributing to infiltration (or wind penetration from the outside). To prevent
infiltration through the protected envelope requires an internal pressure of
approximately 50 Pascals [0.2 inch, water gauge (iwg)]. This pressure does not prevent
infiltration driven by buoyancy and wind pressures under all possible conditions, but it
does so under wind conditions most conducive to a (stand-off) plume attack (see
Table 6-1). The level of safe room pressurization should exceed 95-99 percent of the
meteorological conditions for the given school location. Note that wind does not exert
a uniform pressure on a building face; the pressure varies by location on the building
face and the angle of incidence. A 20 mile-per-hour (mph) wind velocity is not un-
common in the United States and, thus, a safe room pressurized to 50 Pascals would
prevent infiltration from time averaged 20 mph winds.
Table 6-1: Pressures Exerted on a School Building Face by Wind
*Time Averaged and Normal (90%) Incidence to School Building Face
There are several options for improving protection factors with filtration; they involve
both the type/configuration of the filter system and the extent of the protective
envelope.
_ Options for type of filter system. Four options for a dedicated type of filtration
system for a safe room include:
. � Improving mixed-air particulate filtration of air-handling units. Particulate
filters may be upgraded to 95-percent filters, providing the potential for substantial
improvement in protection against biological agent aerosols. The limit of protection
factor against 1-micron particles, however, is approximately 100 with pressurization of
the protective envelope and reduction of bypass at the filter frames. Reduction of
bypass requires sealing and gasketing existing retainers, slide-in tracks, and access
doors, and adding gaskets between filter frames in slide-in tracks. Pressurization can
be achieved by rebalancing the air-handling units and controlling the flows through
open doorways and windows. Among the options for improvement are to upgrade the
filters to HEPA with leak-tight holding frames; with pressurization, this would increase
the potential protection factor to about 10,000 for biological agents, but not for
chemical agents. This option requires special holding fixtures for the filters and may
require replacement of supply fans to accommodate higher pressure drop.
. � Improving mixed-air gas filtration of the air-handling units. An option to
increase protection factors of a school building for chemical agents is to install gas
adsorbers in air-handling units. This would involve adding the indoor air quality (IAQ)
type adsorbers to existing air-handling units, at a cost of $0.50 per cfm. With a 1-year
service life, the filter replacement costs would be $0.25 per cfm. Additional energy
related operating costs would be incurred due to the pressure drop of the adsorbers
(0.75 iwg). This option does not provide high efficiency against all chemical agents.
. � Installing makeup-air units with HEGA and HEPA filters. A makeup air unit
for both gases and aerosols includes the following components in series: pre-filter, fan,
HEPA filter, HEGA filter, and heating and cooling coils. The makeup-air unit provides
filtered outside air to pressurize the protective

envelope. It eliminates recirculation and the internally induced infiltration
associated with applying a single fan for both makeup air and recirculated air. The
most cost-effective HEGA filter units currently available for protection from
chemical agents employ the military-standard 200-cfm radial-flow filters per MIL-
PRF-51527A, "Filter Set, Gas-particulate, 200 cfm," Type II. These contain ASZM-
TEDA carbon of 12x30 mesh size in 2-inch-deep beds, which removes all chemical
warfare agents and a substantial number of toxic industrial chemicals. These provide
removal efficiency greater than 99.999 percent throughout their service life
(estimated at 3 years). HEPA filters are standard components with HEGA systems.
These military adsorbers cost approximately $4.50 per cfm, and their expected
service life is 3 years, although service life varies with the air quality of the region and
the moisture to which the filters are exposed over time. Maintenance costs run
approximately $2 per year per cfm. Maintenance also includes changing HEPA
filters annually and pre-filters every 90 days. With total pressure drop of 6 iwg across
the adsorber and HEPA filter, energy costs for the high-efficiency filtration run
approximately $0.50 per cfm per year.
� Installing makeup-air units with HEPA only. Use of only HEPA in a makeup-air unit
would provide a high level of protection from biological agents, radiological agents,
solid aerosols such as tear gas, and liquid aerosols of low vapor pressure. High-level
protection against biological aerosols is particularly beneficial because there is no
capability for real-time detection of biological agents (all strategies that require
biological detection are mitigation strategies involving decontamination and
medical treatment). Use of HEPA only in a makeup-air unit would substantially
reduce hardware costs, maintenance costs, and electrical costs of ventilation as well
as the space requirements for the units. Protection at a lower level would still be
provided by filtration of recirculated air with gas adsorbers in air-handling units.
6.7 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CBR PROTECTION
The following actions are recommended for CBR protection:
. _ To provide a substantial level of protection against an external
release of CBR agents, apply any one of the filtration options summarized above to a
renovated school gymnasium or auditorium safe room.
. _ To protect against a remote attack with a chemical or
radiological agent, plans, procedures, and training for sheltering in place should be
developed. To support this protective measure, a rapid notification system (public
address system) and controls for rapid deactivation of fans and closing of dampers
should be defined. A guide for developing protective action plans is available in the
Army Corps of Engineers draft Technical Instruction TI 853-01 Protecting Buildings and
Their Occupants from Airborne Hazards, dated October 2001.
. _ To reduce vulnerability to internal release, implement security
procedures specific to entry screening for containers of unknown liquids or gases
being carried into the secure area. Provide training to employees on awareness of the
CBR threat and the protective action plan.

6.8 SAFE ROOMS IN RESPONSE TO THE DOMESTIC
EXPLOSIVE THREAT
The concept of safe rooms has been around for quite some time. Bomb shelters were
used in the United Kingdom (U.K.) during World War II to protect the civilian
populations against aerial attack and fall-out shelters were established in cities in the
United States during the Cold War to protect against the lingering effects of a feared
nuclear attack. More recently, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) requires apartment
protected spaces (APSs) or floor protected spaces (FPSs) to be constructed in every
new building or to be added to existing buildings according to engineering specifica-
tions. In buildings in which no shelters exist, interior rooms may be converted to
shelters by following IDF instructions. In all cases, the shelters must be accessible
within 2 minutes of a warning siren. The protected spaces are intended to serve as a
refuge when an attack is suspected, either through early warning or remote detection;
however, the protected space is much less effective when the event takes place without
warning. Two minutes and eleven seconds elapsed between the time the Ryder truck
stopped in front of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the detonation
of its explosives, but no one was alerted to the danger until the explosion occurred.1 At
Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, U.S. Air Force Security Police observers on
the roof of the building overlooking the perimeter identified the attack in progress
and alerted many occupants to the threat; however, evacuation was incomplete and
500 people were wounded and 19 people were killed by the explosion.2
The effectiveness of the safe room in protecting occupants from the effects of an
explosive detonation is, therefore. highly dependent on early detection and warning.
Unless the attacker notifies authorities of a bomb threat, as often occurred in the
terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, the safe room can best be used after an
explosion occurs in anticipation of a second attack. The 1998 bombing of the U.S.
Embassy in Kenya was preceded by a small explosion that drew curious embassy
employees to the windows; such a tactic, if repeated in the United States, would justify
the relocation of school occupants to a safe room until school officials are able to
determined that it is safe to disperse the students. To these limited objectives, the
establishment of a safe room in schools may serve a useful purpose. Given the nature
of the explosive threat, however, it may be more effective to provide debris mitigating
protective measures for all exterior fa�ade elements.
It is important to understand the nature of the domestic explosive threat in order to
effectively plan for the protection of different
1 The structural features of the building, including the transfer girders that spanned over the main entrances, along with the relatively short distance
from the curb to the face of the building, were the most significant contributing factors to the collapse.
2 Although the precast structure was subjected to overwhelming blast loads, which blew the front fa�ade into the occupied spaces, the building
was designed to the U.K. regulations, which have provisions for structural robustness that require precast components to be tied together.
types of facilities and particularly for the establishment of safe rooms in schools.
Although the patterns of past events may not predict the future, they give valuable
insight to the protection against a very low probability, but potentially high
consequence event. As previously discussed, despite a wide range of terrorist events,
such as CBR contamination, an explosion remains the most insidious threat, requiring
the least sophisticated materials and expertise. The principal components of an
explosive device can be obtained at a variety of retail outlets, without arousing
suspicion. Every year, over 1,000 intentional explosive detonations are reported by the
FBI Bomb Data Center. In 1998, the last year for which the compiled data were
published, there were 1,225 actual incidents of unauthorized explosions in the United
States.3 The majority of these explosives were targeted against residential properties
and vehicles; however, 76 explosive events were detonated at educational facilities,
causing a total of $28,500 in property damage.4 In addition to these actual events, 63
incidents involving hoax devices were investigated. By contrast, only one explosive
device was detonated at a Federal Government facility, causing $1.5 million in
property damage, and eight were
detonated at local/state government facilities, causing $316,000 in property damage.
Over 70 percent of the people involved in bombing incidents were "young offenders"
and less than 1�2 percent were members of terrorist groups. Vandalism was the
motivation in 40 percent of the intentional and accidental bombing incidents. Al-
though two out of three attacks were perpetrated between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m., the
incidents against educational facilities were more uniformly distributed throughout
the day. Although each successive major domestic terrorist event exceeded the
intensity of
3 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, General Information Bulletin 98-1.
4 The Bomb Data Center information does not indicate whether any of these events were preceded by a warning nor does it indicate the average weight
of explosives used.
the predecessor, this is not particularly relevant to the threats to which a school
structure might be subjected; if an explosive were to be detonated in or around a
school building, it would most likely be a small improvised device assembled by a
youth and vandalism is most likely to be the motive.
The size of the explosive that might be considered for a protective design is limited by
the maximum weight that might be transported either by hand or by vehicle (for
additional information, see Section 4.2). Despite the large weight of explosives that
might be transported by vehicle, there have been relatively few large-scale explosive
events within the United States. The 1995 explosion that collapsed portions of the
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City contained 4,800 pounds of ammonium
nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) and the 1993 explosion within the parking garage be-
neath the World Trade Center complex contained 1,200 pounds of urea nitrate. As
implied by the FBI statistics, the majority of the domestic events contain significantly
smaller weights of low energy explosives. The explosive that was used in the 1996 pipe
bomb attack at the Olympics in Atlanta consisted of smokeless powder and was
preceded by a warning that was called in 23 minutes before the detonation.
Nevertheless, the protective design of structures focuses on the effects of high energy
explosives and relates the different mixtures to an equivalent weight of trinitrotoluene
(TNT).
As discussed in Chapter 4, the distance of the protected structure from the point of
explosive detonation is commonly referred to as the stand-off distance. As the front of
the shock-wave propagates away from the source of the detonation at supersonic
speed, it expands into increasingly larger volumes of air, the peak incident pressure at
the shock front decreases, and the duration of the pressure pulse increases. The shock
front first impinges on the leading surfaces of a structure located within its path and
then engulfs the entire structure. Both the intensity of peak pressure and the impulse,
which considers the effect of both pressure intensity and pulse duration, affect the
hazard potential of the blast loading. Other issues, such as the geometry of the waves
impacting the protected structure and the reflectivity of the surroundings, will either
amplify or reduce the intensity of the blast loading.
6.9 LOCATING SAFE ROOMS TO MITIGATE THREATS
The building's fa�ade is its first real defense against the effects of a bomb and typically
the weakest component that would be subjected to blast pressures. Although the
response of specific glazed components5 is a function of the dimensions, make-up, and
construction techniques, the conventionally glazed portions of the fa�ade would
shatter and inflict severe wounds when subjected to a 50-pound explosive detonation
at a stand-off distance on the order of 200 feet. If the glazed elements are upgraded
with a fragment retention film (FRF), the same fa�ade element may be able to
withstand a 50-pound explosive detonation at a stand-off distance on the order of 70
feet. Unreinforced masonry block walls are similarly vulnerable to collapse when
subjected to a 50-pound threat at a stand-off distance of 50 feet; however, if these same
walls are upgraded with a debris catching system, they may be able to sustain this same
intensity explosive detonation at a stand-off distance on the order of 20 feet. If the
weight of explosives were increased from 50 pounds to 500 pounds, the required
stand-off distances to prevent severe wounds increases to 500 feet for conventional
window glazing, 200 feet for window glazing treated with a FRF, 250 feet for
unreinforced masonry block walls, and 60 feet for masonry walls upgraded with a
debris catching system. Based on these dimensions, it is apparent that substantial
standoff distances are required for the unprotected structure and these distances may
be significantly reduced through the use of debris mitigating retrofit systems.
Furthermore, because blast loads diminish with distance and geometry of wave
propagation relative to the loaded surface of the building, the larger threats at larger
stand-off distances are likely to damage a larger percentage of fa�ade elements than
the more localized effects of smaller threats at shorter stand-off distances. Safe rooms
that may be located within the school should, therefore, be located in windowless
spaces or spaces in which the window glazing was upgraded with a FRF.
5 Glazing refers to the glass make-up, either single pane or insulated double pane, that is used in a window system.
Although small weights of explosives are not likely to produce significant blast loads
on the roof, low-rise structures may be vulnerable to blast loadings resulting from large
weights of explosives at large stand-off distances that may sweep over the top of the
building. The blast pressures that may be applied to these roofs are likely to far exceed
the conventional design loads and, unless the roof is a concrete deck or concrete slab
structure, it may be expected to fail. There is little that can be done to increase the
roof's resistance to blast loading that doesn't require extensive renovation of the
building structure. Therefore, safe rooms should be located at lower floors, away from
the roof debris that may rain down in response to blast loading.
The building's lateral load resisting system, the structural frame or shear walls that
resist wind and seismic loads, will be required to receive the blast loads that are
applied to the exterior fa�ade and transfer them to the building's foundation. This
load path is typically through the floor slabs that act as diaphragms and interconnect
the different lateral resisting elements. The lateral load resisting system for a school
building depends, to a great extent, on the type of construction and region. In many
cases, low-rise buildings do not receive substantial wind and seismic forces and,
therefore, do not require substantial lateral load resisting systems. Because blast loads
diminish with distance, a package sized explosive threat is likely to locally overwhelm
the fa�ade, thereby limiting the force that may be transferred to the lateral load re-
sisting system. However, the intensity of the blast loads that may be applied to the
building could exceed the design limits for most conventional school construction. As
a result, the building is likely to be subjected to large inelastic deformations that may
produce severe cracks to the structural and nonstructural partitions. There is little that
can be done to upgrade the existing school structure to make it more flexible in
response to a blast loading that doesn't require extensive renovation of the building.
Safe rooms should, therefore, be located close to the interior shear walls or reinforced
masonry walls in order to provide maximum structural support in response to these
uncharacteristically large lateral loads.
In addition to the hazard of impact by fa�ade debris propelled into the building or
roof damage that may rain down, the occupants may also be vulnerable to much
heavier debris resulting from structural damage. Progressive collapse occurs when an
initiating localized failure causes adjoining members to be overloaded and fail,
resulting in an extent of damage that is disproportionate to the originating region of
localized failure. The initiating localized failure may result from a sufficiently sized
parcel bomb that is in contact with a critical structural element or from a vehicle sized
bomb that is located at a short distance from the structure. However, a large explosive
device at a large stand-off distance is not likely to selectively cause a single structural
member to fail; any damage that results from this scenario is more likely to be
widespread and the ensuing collapse cannot be considered progressive. Although
progressive collapse is not typically an issue for buildings three stories or shorter,
transfer girders or precast construction may produce structural systems that are not
tolerant of localized damage conditions. The columns that support transfer girders
and the transfer girders themselves may be critical to the stability of a large area of
floor space. Similarly, precast construction that relies on individual structural panels
may not be sufficiently tied together to resist the localized damage or large structural
deformations that may result from an explosive detonation. As a result, safe rooms
should not be located on a structure that is either supported by or underneath a
structure that is supported by transfer girders unless the building is evaluated by a
licensed professional engineer. The connection details for multi-story precast
structures should also be evaluated before the building is used to house a safe room.
Nonstructural building components (e.g., piping, ducts, lighting units, and conduits)
that are located within safe rooms must be
sufficiently tied back to a competent structure to prevent failure of the services and
the hazard of falling debris. To mitigate the effects of in-structure shock that may
result from the infilling of blast pressures through damaged windows, the
nonstructural systems should be located below the raised floors or tied to the ceiling
slabs with seismic restraints.
6.10 FRAGMENT MITIGATING UPGRADES
The conversion of existing construction to provide blast-resis-tant protection requires
upgrades to the most fragile or brittle elements enclosing the safe room. Failure of the
glazed portion of the fa�ade represents the greatest hazard to the occupants.
Therefore, the exterior glazed elements of the school fa�ade and, in particular, the
glazed elements of the designated safe rooms, should be protected with a FRF, also
commonly known as anti-shatter film (ASF), "shatter-resistant window film" (SRWF),
or "security film." These materials consist of a laminate that will improve post-damage
performance of existing windows. Applied to the interior face of glass, ASF holds the
fragments of broken glass together in one sheet, thus reducing the projectile hazard
of flying glass fragments. See FEMA 426 Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist
Attacks Against Buildings for more information.
Most ASFs are made from polyester-based materials and coated with adhesives. They
are available as clear, with minimal effects to the optical characteristics of the glass,
and tinted, which provide a variety of aesthetic and optical enhancements and can
increase the effectiveness of existing heating/cooling systems. Most films are designed
with solar inhibitors to screen out ultraviolet (UV) rays and are available treated with
an abrasion resistant coating that can prolong the life of tempered glass.6 However,
over time, the UV absorption damages the film and degrades its effectiveness.
According to published reports, testing has shown that a 7-mil thick film, or specially
manufactured 4-mil thick film, is the minimum thickness that is required to provide
hazard mitigation from blast. Therefore, a 4-mil thick ASF should be utilized only if it
has demonstrated, through explosive testing, that it is capable of providing the desired
hazard level response.
The application of security film must, at a minimum, cover the clear area of the
window. The clear area is defined as the portion of the glass unobstructed by the
frame. This minimum applica
6 Abrasions on the faces of tempered glass reduce the glass strength.
tion, termed daylight installation, is commonly used for retrofitting windows. By this
method, the film is applied to the exposed glass without any means of attachment or
capture within the frame. Application of the film to the edge of the glass panel,
thereby extending the film to cover the glass within the bite, is called an edge to edge
installation and is often used in dry glazing installations. Other methods of retrofit
application may improve the film performance, thereby reducing the hazard;
however, these are typically more expensive to install, especially in a retrofit situation.
Although a film may be effective in keeping glass fragments together, it may not be
particularly effective in retaining the glass in the frame. ASF is most effective when it is
used with a blast tested anchorage system. Such a system prevents the failed glass from
exiting the frame.
The wet glazed installation, a system where the film is positively attached to the frame,
offers more protection than the daylight installation. This system of attaching the film
to the frame reduces glass fragmentation entering the building. The wet glazing
system utilizes a high strength liquid sealant, such as silicone, to attach the glazing
system to the frame. This method is more costly than the daylight installation.
Securing the film to the frame with a mechanically connected anchorage system
further reduces the likelihood of the glazing system exiting the frame. Mechanical
attachment includes anchoring methods that employ screws and/or batten strips that
anchor the film to the frame along two or four sides. The mechanical attachment
method can be less aesthetically pleasing when compared to wet glazing because
additional framework is necessary and is more expensive than the wet glazed
installation.
Window framing systems and their anchorage must be capable of transferring the
blast loads to the surrounding walls. Unless the frames and anchorages are competent,
the effectiveness of the attached films will be limited. Similarly, the walls must be able
to withstand the blast loads that are directly applied to them and accept the blast loads
that are transferred by the windows. The strength of these walls may limit the
effectiveness of the glazing upgrades.
If a major rehabilitation of the fa�ade is required to improve the mechanical
characteristics of the building envelope, a laminated glazing replacement is
recommended. Laminated glass consists of two or more pieces of glass permanently
bonded together by a tough plastic interlayer made of polyvinyl butyral (PVB) resin.
After being sealed together, the glass "sandwich" behaves as a single unit. Annealed,
heat strengthened, tempered glass, or polycarbonate glazing can be mixed and
matched between layers of laminated glass in order to design the most effective lite
for a given application. When fractured, fragments of laminated glass tend to adhere
to the PVB interlayer, rather than falling free and potentially causing injury.
Laminated glass can be expected to last as long as ordinary glass provided it is not
broken or damaged in any way. It is very important that laminated glass is correctly
installed in order to ensure long life. Regardless of the degree of protection required
from the window, laminated glass needs to be installed with adequate sealant to
prevent water from coming in contact with the edges of the glass. A structural sealant
will adhere the glazing to the frame and allow the PVB interlayer to develop its full
membrane capacity. Similar to attached film upgrades, the window frames and
anchorages must be capable of transferring the blast loads to the surrounding walls.
Blast curtains are made from a variety of materials, including a warp knit fabric or a
polyethylene fiber. The fiber can be woven into a panel as thin as 0.029 inch that
weighs less than 1.5 ounces per square foot. This fact dispels the myth that blast
curtains are heavy sheets of lead that completely obstruct a window opening and
eliminate all natural light from the interior of a protected building. The blast curtains
are affixed to the interior frame of a window opening and essentially catch the glass
fragments produced by a blast wave. The debris is then deposited on the floor at the
base of the window. Therefore, the use of these curtains does not eliminate the
possibility of glass fragments penetrating the interior of the occupied space, but
instead limits the travel distance of the airborne debris. Overall, the hazard level to
occupants is significantly reduced by the implementation of the blast curtains.
However, a person sitting directly adjacent to a window outfitted with a blast curtain
may still be injured by shards of glass in the event of an explosion.
The main components of any blast curtain system are the curtain itself, the
attachment mechanism by which the curtain is affixed to the window frame, and
either a trough or other retaining mechanism at the base of the window to hold the
excess curtain material. The blast curtain with curtain rod attachment and sill trough
differ largely from one manufacturer to the next. The curtain fabric, material
properties, method of attachment, and manner in which they operate all vary, thereby
providing many options within the overall classification of blast curtains. This fact
makes blast curtains applicable in many situations.
Blast curtains differ from standard curtains in that they do not open and close in the
typical manner. Although blast curtains are intended to remain in a closed position at
all times, they may be pulled away from the window to allow for cleaning, blind or
shade operation, or occupant egress in the case of fire. However, the curtains can be
rendered ineffective if installed such that easy access would provide opportunity for
occupants to defeat their operation. The color and openness factor of the fabric
contributes to the amount of light that is transmitted through the curtains and the see-
through visibility of the curtains. Although the color and weave of these curtains may
be varied to suit the aesthetics of the interior d�cor, the appearance of the windows is
altered by the presence of the curtains.
The curtains may either be anchored at the top and bottom of the window frame or
anchored at the top only and outfitted with a weighted hem. The curtain needs to be
extra long with the surplus either wound around a dynamic tension retainer or
stored in a reservoir housing. When an explosion occurs, the curtain feeds out of the
receptacle to absorb the force of the flying glass fragments. The effectiveness of the
blast curtains relies on their use and no protection is provided when these curtains
are pulled away from the glazing.
Rigid catch bar systems have been designed and tested as a means of increasing the
effectiveness of laminated window upgrades. Laminated glazing is designed to hold
the glass shards together as the window is damaged; however, unless the window
frames and attachments are upgraded as well to withstand the capacity of the glazing,
this retrofit will not prevent the entire sheet from flying free of the window frames.
The rigid catch bars intercept the laminated glass and disrupt their flight; however,
they are limited in their effectiveness, tending to break the dislodged fa�ade materials
into smaller projectiles.
Rigid catch bar systems collect huge forces upon impact and require substantial
anchorage into a very substantial structure to prevent failure. If either the
attachments or the supporting structure are incapable of restraining the forces, the
catch system will be dislodged and become part of the debris. Alternatively, the de-
bris may be sliced by the rigid impact and the effectiveness of the catch bar will be
severely reduced.
Flexible catch bars can be designed to absorb a significant amount of the energy upon
impact, thereby keeping the debris intact and impeding their flight. These systems
may be designed to effectively repel the debris and inhibit their flight into the
occupied spaces. These systems may be designed to repel the debris from the failed
glazing as well as the walls in which the windows are mounted. The design of the
debris restraint system must be strong enough to withstand the momentum
transferred upon impact and the connections must be capable of transferring the
forces to the supporting slabs and spandrel beams. However, under no circumstances
can the design of the restraint system add significant amounts of mass to the structure
that may be dislodged and present an even greater risk to the occupants of the
building.
Cables are extensively used to absorb significant amounts of energy upon impact and
their flexibility makes them easily adaptable to many situations. The diameter of the
cable, the spacing of the strands, and the means of attachment are all critical in
designing an effective catch system. These catch cable concepts have been used by
protective design window manufacturers as restraints for laminated lites. The use of
cable systems has long been recognized as an effective means of stopping massive
objects moving at high velocity. To confirm the adequacy of the cable catch system to
restrain the debris resulting from an explosive event, an analytical simulation or a
physical test is required.
High performance energy absorbing cable catcher systems retain glass and frame
fragments and limit the force transmitted to the supporting structure. These
commercially available retrofit products consist of a series of 1�4-inch diameter
stainless steel cables connected with a shock-absorbing device to an aluminum box
section, which is attached to the jambs, the underside of the header, and the topside
of the sill. The energy absorbing characteristics allow the catch systems to be
attached to relatively weakly constructed walls without the need for additional costly
structural reinforcement. To reduce the possibility of slicing the laminated glass, the
cable may either be sheathed in a tube or an aluminum strip may be affixed to the
glass directly behind the cable.
Unreinforced CMU walls provide limited protection against air-blast due to
explosions. When subjected to overload from air-blast, brittle unreinforced CMU walls
will fail and the debris will be propelled into the interior of the structure, possibly
causing severe injury or death to the occupants. This wall type has been prohibited for
new construction where protection against explosive threats is required. Existing
unreinforced CMU walls may be retrofitted with a sprayed-on polymer coating to
improve their air-blast resistance. This innovative retrofit technique takes advantage of
the toughness and resiliency of modern polymer materials to effectively deform and
dissipate the blast energy while containing the shattered wall fragments. Although the
sprayed walls may shatter in a blast event, the elastomer material remains intact and
contains the debris.
The blast mitigation retrofit for unreinforced CMU walls consists of an interior and
optional exterior layer of polyurea applied to exterior walls and ceilings. The polyurea
provides a ductile and resilient membrane that catches and retains secondary
fragmentation from the existing concrete block as it breaks apart in response to an air-
blast wave. These fragments, if allowed to enter the occupied space, are capable of
producing serious injury and death to occupants of the structure.
In lieu of the elastomer, an aramid (Geotextile) debris catching system may be
attached to the structure by means of plates bolted through the floor and ceiling
slabs. Similar to the elastomer retrofit, the aramid layer does not strengthen the wall;
instead, it restrains the debris that would otherwise be hurled into the occupied
spaces.
6.11 STRUCTURAL UPGRADES
It may not be possible for existing construction to be retrofitted to limit the extent of
collapse to one floor on either side of the failed column. If the members are
retrofitted to develop catenary behavior, the adjoining bays must be upgraded to
resist the large lateral forces associated with this mode of response. This may require
more extensive retrofit than is either feasible or desirable. In such a situation, it may
be desirable to isolate the collapsed region rather than risk propagating the collapse
to adjoining bays. The retrofit of existing structures to protect against a potential
progressive collapse resulting from the detonation of a terrorist explosive threat may,
therefore, best be achieved through the localized hardening of vulnerable columns.
These columns need only be upgraded to a level of resistance that balances the
capacities of all adjacent structural elements. At greater blast intensities, the resulting
damage would be extensive and termed global collapse rather than progressive
collapse. Attempts to upgrade the structure to conform to the alternate path
approach will be invasive and potentially counterproductive. Care must be taken not
to weaken a structure in the attempt to make it more robust.
Conventionally designed columns may be vulnerable to the effects of explosives,
particularly when placed in contact with their surface. Stand-off elements, in the form
of partitions and enclosures, may be designed to guarantee a minimum stand-off
distance; however, this alone may not be sufficient. Additional resistance may be
provided to reinforced concrete structures by means of a steel jacket or a carbon fiber
wrap that effectively confines the concrete core, thereby increasing the confined
strength and shear capacity of the column, and holds the rubble together to permit it
to continue carrying the axial loads. The capacity of steel flanged columns may be
increased with a reinforced concrete encasement that adds mass to the steel section
and protects the relatively thin flange sections. The details for these retrofits must be
designed to resist the specific weight of explosives and stand-off distance.
The floor slabs are typically designed to resist downward gravity loading and have
limited capacity to resist uplift pressures or the upward deformations experienced
during a load reversal. Therefore, floor slabs that may be subjected to significant uplift
pressures, such that they overcome the gravity loads and subject the slabs to reversals
in curvature, require additional reinforcement. If the slab does not contain this
tension reinforcement, it must be supplemented with a lightweight carbon fiber
application that may be bonded to the surface at the critical locations. Carbon fiber
reinforcing mats bonded to the top surface of slabs would strengthen the floors for
upward loading and reduce the likelihood of slab collapse from blast infill uplift
pressures as well as internal explosions in mailrooms or other susceptible regions. This
lightweight high tensile strength material will supplement the limited capacity of the
concrete to resist these unnatural loading conditions. An alternative approach may be
to notch grooves in the top of concrete slabs and epoxy carbon fiber rods into grooves;
although this approach may offer a greater capacity, it is much more invasive and has
not been evaluated with explosive testing.
ACRONYMS A

ADAAG Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines
AED automated external defibrillator ANFO
ammonium nitrate and fuel oil APS apartment
protected space ASF anti-shatter film ASZM-TEDA
copper-silver-zinc-molybdenum-
triethylenediamine AT antiterrorism ATF Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
B

BPL bound with pitch-low BW biological warfare
CBR chemical, biological, or radiological CCTV closed circuit television CDC Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics cfm cubic
feet per minute CMU concrete masonry unit
CPR
cardiopulmonary resuscitation
CPTED
Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design
CWA
chemical warfare agent
D

DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DOC
Department of Commerce
DoD
Department of Defense
DOE
Department of Education
DOJ
Department of Justice
DOS
Department of State
E

EP&R
Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and

Response (DHS)
F

FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPS
floor protected space
FRF
fragment retention film

GC/MS gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer
GIS Geographic Information System
GSA General Services Administration
H
HazMat hazardous materials HEGA high-efficiency gas adsorber HEPA high-efficiency
particulate air HSO Homeland Security Office HVAC heating, ventilation, and air
conditioning
IAQ indoor air quality ID identification IDF Israeli Defense Fund
IMS ion mobility spectrometry ISC Interagency Security Committee IT information
technology iwg inch water gauge
M
mph miles per hour
N

NACCT
National Advisory Committee on Children
and

Terrorism
NAVFAC
Naval Facilities Command
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
NFPC
National Fire Protection Code
NIOSH
National Institute for Occupational Safety
and

Health
O

OC
oleoresin capsicum
P

PIO
Public Information Officer
psi
pounds per square inch
pvb
polyvinyl butyral
S

SAW
surface acoustic wave
SRWF
shatter-resistant window film

TEDA triethylenediamine TIC toxic industrial chemical TIM toxic industrial material
TNT trinitrotoluene
U

UFAS Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards UFC Unified Facilities Criteria
U.K. United Kingdom UPS uninterrupted power supply
U.S. United States USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers UV ultraviolet
V
VA Department of Veterans Affairs
GENERAL GLOSSARY B

This appendix contains some terms that do not actually appear in this manual.
They have been included to present a comprehensive list that pertains to this
series of publications.
A

Access control. Any combination of barriers, gates, electronic security equipment,
and/or guards that can deny entry to unauthorized personnel or vehicles.
Access control point. A station at an entrance to a building or a portion of a building
where identification is checked and people and hand-carried items are searched.
Access controls. Procedures and controls that limit or detect access to minimum
essential infrastructure resource elements (e.g., people, technology, applications,
data, and/or facilities), thereby protecting these resources against loss of integrity,
confidentiality, accountability, and/or availability.
Accountability. The explicit assignment of responsibilities for oversight of areas of
control to executives, managers, staff, owners, providers, and users of minimum
essential infrastructure resource elements.
Active vehicle barrier. An impediment placed at an access control point that may be
manually or automatically deployed in response to detection of a threat.
Aerosol. Fine liquid or solid particles suspended in a gas (e.g., fog or smoke).
Aggressor. Any person seeking to compromise a function or structure.
Airborne contamination. Chemical or biological agents introduced into and fouling
the source of supply of breathing or conditioning air.
Antiterrorism (AT). Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of
individuals, forces, and property to terrorist acts.
Area lighting. Lighting that illuminates a large exterior area.
Assessment. The evaluation and interpretation of measurements and other
information to provide a basis for decision-making.
Asset. A resource of value requiring protection. An asset can be tangible (e.g.,
people, buildings, facilities, equipment, activities, operations, and information) or
intangible (e.g., processes or a company's information and reputation).
Asset protection. Security program designed to protect personnel, facilities, and
equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and
integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security,
and personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence,
and other security programs.
Asset value. The degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the
incapacity or destruction of an asset.
Attack. A hostile action resulting in the destruction, injury, or death to the civilian
population, or damage or destruction to public and private property.
B

Balanced magnetic switch. A door position switch utilizing a reed switch held in a
balanced or center position by interacting magnetic fields when not in alarm
condition.
Ballistics attack. An attack in which small arms (e.g., pistols, submachine guns,
shotguns, and rifles) are fired from a distance and rely on the flight of the projectile
to damage the target.
Barbed tape or concertina. A coiled tape or coil of wires with wire barbs or blades
deployed as an obstacle to human trespass or entry into an area.
Barbed wire. A double strand of wire with four-point barbs equally spaced along the
wire deployed as an obstacle to human trespass or entry into an area.
Barcode. A black bar printed on white paper or tape that can be easily read with an
optical scanner.
Biological agents. Living organisms or the materials derived from them that cause
disease in or harm to humans, animals, or plants or cause deterioration of material.
Biological agents may be used as liquid droplets, aerosols, or dry powders.
Blast curtains. Heavy curtains made of blast-resistant materials that could protect
the occupants of a room from flying debris.
Blast-resistant glazing. Window opening glazing that is resistant to blast effects because
of the interrelated function of the frame and glazing material properties frequently
dependent upon tempered glass, polycarbonate, or laminated glazing.
Blast vulnerability envelope. The geographical area in which an explosive device will
cause damage to assets.
Bollard. A vehicle barrier consisting of a cylinder, usually made of steel and
sometimes filled with concrete, placed on end in the ground and spaced about 3 feet
apart to prevent vehicles from passing, but allowing entrance of pedestrians and
bicycles.
Building hardening. Enhanced construction that reduces vulnerability to
external blast and ballistic attacks.
Building separation. The distance between closest points on the exterior walls of
adjacent buildings or structures.
Cable barrier. Cable or wire rope anchored to and suspended off the ground or
attached to chain-link fence to act as a barrier to moving vehicles.
Chemical agent. A chemical substance that is intended to kill, seriously injure, or
incapacitate people through physiological effects. Generally separated by severity of
effect (e.g., lethal, blister, and incapacitating).
Clear zone. An area that is clear of visual obstructions and landscape materials that
could conceal a threat or perpetrator.
Closed circuit television (CCTV). An electronic system of cameras, control
equipment, recorders, and related apparatus used for surveillance or alarm
assessment.
Collateral damage. Injury or damage to assets that are not the primary target of an
attack.
Combating terrorism. The full range of federal programs and activities applied
against terrorism, domestically and abroad, regardless of the source or motive.
Community. A political entity that has the authority to adopt and enforce laws and
ordinances for the area under its jurisdiction. In most cases, the community is an
incorporated town, city, township, village, or unincorporated area of a county;
however, each state defines its own political subdivisions and forms of government.
Components and cladding. Elements of the building envelope that do not qualify as
part of the main wind-force resisting system.
Confidentiality. The protection of sensitive information against unauthorized
disclosure and sensitive facilities from physical, technical, or electronic penetration
or exploitation.
Consequence Management. Measures to protect public health and safety, restore
essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments,
businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. State and
local governments exercise the primary authority to respond to the consequences
of terrorism.
Contamination. The undesirable deposition of a chemical, biological, or
radiological material on the surface of structures, areas, objects, or people.
Control center. A centrally located room or facility staffed by personnel charged with
the oversight of specific situations and/ or equipment.
Controlled area. An area into which access is controlled or limited. It is that
portion of a restricted area usually near or surrounding a limited or exclusion
area. Correlates with exclusion zone.
Controlled lighting. Illumination of specific areas or sections.
Controlled perimeter. A physical boundary at which vehicle and personnel access is
controlled at the perimeter of a site. Access control at a controlled perimeter should
demonstrate the capability to search individuals and vehicles.
Conventional construction. Building construction that is not specifically designed
to resist weapons, explosives, or chemical, biological, and radiological effects.
Conventional construction is designed only to resist common loadings and
environmental effects such as wind, seismic, and snow loads.
Coordinate. To advance systematically an exchange of information among
principals who have or may have a need to know certain information in order to
carry out their roles in a response.
Counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect
against: espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted
for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons; or international
terrorist activities, excluding personnel, physical, document, and communications
security programs.
Counterterrorism (CT). Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond
to terrorism.
Covert entry. Attempts to enter a facility by using false credentials or stealth.
Crash bar. A mechanical egress device located on the interior side of a door that
unlocks the door when pressure is applied in the direction of egress.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). A crime prevention
strategy based on evidence that the design and form of the built environment can
influence human behavior. CPTED usually involves the use of three principles:
natural surveillance (by placing physical features, activities, and people to maximize
visibility); natural access control (through the judicial placement of entrances, exits,
fencing, landscaping, and lighting); and territorial reinforcement (using buildings,
fences, pavement, signs, and landscaping to express ownership).
Crisis Management (CM). The measures taken to identify, acquire, and plan the
use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of
terrorism.
Critical assets. Those assets essential to the minimum operations of the organization,
and to ensure the health and safety of the general public.
Critical infrastructure. Primary infrastructure systems (e.g., utilities,
telecommunications, transportation, etc.) whose incapacity would have a debilitating
impact on the school's ability to function.
D

Damage assessment. The process used to appraise or determine the number of injuries
and deaths, damage to public and private property, and the status of key facilities and
services (e.g., schools, hospitals and other health care facilities, fire and police stations,
communications networks, water and sanitation systems, utilities, and transportation
networks) resulting from a manmade or natural disaster.
Data gathering panel. A local processing unit that retrieves, processes, stores,
and/or acts on information in the field.
Debris-catching system. Blast wallpaper, fragmentation blankets, or any similar
system applied to the inside of a building's exterior walls. Debris-catching systems
are often made of Kevlar or geotextile material and are designed to collect wall
material debris in the event of an external explosion and to shield occupants from
injuries.
Decontamination. The reduction or removal of a chemical, biological, or
radiological material from the surface of a structure, area, object, or person.
Defense layer. Building design or exterior perimeter barriers intended to delay
attempted forced entry.
Defensive measures. Protective measures that delay or prevent attack on an asset or
that shield the asset from weapons, explosives, and CBR effects. Defensive measures
include site work and building design.
Design Basis Threat (DBT). The threat (e.g., tactics and associated weapons, tools, or
explosives) against which assets within a building must be protected and upon which
the security engineering design of the school is based.
Design constraint. Anything that restricts the design options for a protective system or
that creates additional problems for which the design must compensate.
Design opportunity. Anything that enhances protection, reduces requirements for
protective measures, or solves a design problem.
Design team. A group of individuals from various engineering and architectural
disciplines responsible for the protective system design.
Disaster. An occurrence of a natural catastrophe, technological accident, or human-
caused event that has resulted in severe property damage, deaths, and/or multiple
injuries.
Domestic terrorism. The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a
group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto
Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or
coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance
of political or social objectives.
Dose rate (radiation). A general term indicating the quantity (total or accumulated)
of ionizing radiation or energy absorbed by a person or animal, per unit of time.
Dosimeter. An instrument for measuring and registering total accumulated
exposure to ionizing radiation.
Duress alarm devices. Also known as panic buttons, these devices are designated
specifically to initiate a panic alarm.
E

Effective stand-off distance. A stand-off distance at which the required level of
protection can be shown to be achieved through analysis or can be achieved through
building hardening or other mitigating construction or retrofit.
Electronic Entry Control Systems (EECS). Electronic devices that automatically verify
authorization for a person to enter or exit a controlled area.
Electronic Security System (ESS). An integrated system that encompasses interior and
exterior sensors, closed circuit television systems for assessment of alarm conditions,
Electronic Entry Control Systems, data transmission media, and alarm reporting
systems for monitoring, control, and display of various alarm and system information.
Emergency. Any natural or human-caused situation that results in or may result in
substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss of
property.
Emergency Environmental Health Services. Services required to correct or improve
damaging environmental health effects on humans, including inspection for food
contamination, inspection for water contamination, and vector control; providing for
sewage and solid waste inspection and disposal; cleanup and disposal of hazardous
materials; and sanitation inspection for emergency shelter facilities.
Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Services including personnel, facilities, and
equipment required to ensure proper medical care for the sick and injured from the
time of injury to the time of final disposition, including medical disposition within a
hospital, temporary medical facility, or special care facility; release from the site; or
declared dead. Further, Emergency Medical Services specifically include those
services immediately required to ensure proper medical care and specialized
treatment for patients in a hospital and coordination of related hospital services.
Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The protected site from which state and local
civil government officials coordinate, monitor, and direct emergency response
activities during an emergency.
Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). A document that describes how people and
property will be protected in disaster and disaster threat situations; details who is
responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment,
facilities, supplies, and other resources available for use in the disaster; and outlines
how all actions will be coordinated.
Emergency Public Information (EPI). Information that is disseminated primarily in
anticipation of an emergency or at the actual time of an emergency and, in addition
to providing information, frequently directs actions, instructs, and transmits direct
orders.
Entry control point. A continuously or intermittently manned station at which entry to
sensitive or restricted areas is controlled.
Equipment closet. A room where field control equipment such as data gathering
panels and power supplies are typically located.
Evacuation. Organized, phased, and supervised dispersal of people from
dangerous or potentially dangerous areas.
Evacuation, mandatory or directed. This is a warning to persons within the
designated area that an imminent threat to life and property exists and individuals
MUST evacuate in accordance with the instructions of local officials.
Evacuation, spontaneous. Residents or citizens in the threatened areas observe an
emergency event or receive unofficial word of an actual or perceived threat and,
without receiving instructions to do so, elect to evacuate the area. Their movement,
means, and direction of travel are unorganized and unsupervised.
Evacuation, voluntary. This is a warning to persons within a designated area that a
threat to life and property exists or is likely to exist in the immediate future.
Individuals issued this type of warning or order are NOT required to evacuate;
however, it would be to their advantage to do so.
Evacuees. All persons removed or moving from areas threatened or struck by a
disaster.
Exclusion area. A restricted area containing a security interest. Uncontrolled
movement permits direct access to the item. See controlled area and limited area.
Exclusion zone. An area around an asset that has controlled entry with highly
restrictive access. See controlled area.
F

Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The person appointed by the FEMA
Director to coordinate federal assistance in a Presidentially declared emergency
or major disaster.
Federal Response Plan (FRP). The FRP establishes a process and structure for the
systematic, coordinated, and effective delivery of federal assistance to address the
consequences of any major disaster or emergency.
Fence protection. An intrusion detection technology that detects a person crossing a
fence by various methods such as climbing, crawling, cutting, etc.
Fence sensor. An exterior intrusion detection sensor that detects aggressors as they
attempt to climb over, cut through, or otherwise disturb a fence.
Field of view. The visible area in a video picture.
First responder. Local police, fire, and emergency medical personnel who first arrive
on the scene of an incident and take action to save lives, protect property, and meet
basic human needs.
Forced entry. Entry to a denied area achieved through force to create an opening in
fence, walls, doors, etc., or to overpower guards.
Fragment retention film (FRF). A thin, optically clear film applied to glass to minimize
the spread of glass fragments when the glass is shattered.
Frangible construction. Building components that are designed to fail to vent blast
pressures from an enclosure in a controlled manner and direction.
G

Glare security lighting. Illumination projected from a secure perimeter into the
surrounding area, making it possible to see potential intruders at a considerable
distance while making it difficult to observe activities within the secure perimeter.
Glazing. A material installed in a sash, ventilator, or panes (e.g., glass, plastic, etc.,
including material such as thin granite installed in a curtain wall).
Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR). The person empowered by the
Governor to execute, on behalf of the State, all necessary documents for disaster
assistance.
H
Hazard. A source of potential danger or adverse condition.
Hazard mitigation. Any action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to
human life and property from hazards. The term is sometimes used in a stricter
sense to mean cost-effective measures to reduce the potential for damage to a
facility or facilities from a disaster event.
Hazardous material (HazMat). Any substance or material that, when involved in an
accident and released in sufficient quantities, poses a risk to people's health, safety,
and/or property. These substances and materials include explosives, radioactive
materials, flammable liquids or solids, combustible liquids or solids, poisons,
oxidizers, toxins, and corrosive materials.
High-hazard areas. Geographic locations that, for planning purposes, have been
determined through historical experience and vulnerability analysis to be likely to
experience the effects of a specific hazard (e.g., hurricane, earthquake, hazardous
materials accident, etc.), resulting in vast property damage and loss of life.
High-risk target. Any material resource or facility that, because of mission sensitivity,
ease of access, isolation, and symbolic value, may be an especially attractive or
accessible terrorist target.
Human-caused hazard. Human-caused hazards are technological hazards and
terrorism. They are distinct from natural hazards primarily in that they originate from
human activity. Within the military services, the term threat is typically used for
human-caused hazard. See definitions of technological hazards and terrorism for
further information.
I

International terrorism. Violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any
state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population,
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts
occur outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the
means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce
or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The combination of components, including
sensors, control units, transmission lines, and monitor units, integrated to operate in
a specified manner.
J

Jersey barrier. A protective concrete barrier initially and still used as a highway divider
that now also functions as an expedient method for traffic speed control at entrance
gates and to keep vehicles away from buildings.
Laminated glass. A flat lite of uniform thickness consisting of two monolithic glass
plies bonded together with an interlayer material as defined in Specification
C1172. Many different interlayer materials are used in laminated glass.
Landscaping. The use of plantings (shrubs and trees), with or without landforms
and/or large boulders, to act as a perimeter barrier against defined threats.
Layers of protection. A traditional approach in security engineering using concentric
circles extending out from an area to be protected as demarcation points for different
security strategies.
Level of protection (LOP). The degree to which an asset is protected against
injury or damage from an attack.
Liaison. An agency official sent to another agency to facilitate interagency
communications and coordination.
Limited area. A restricted area within close proximity of a security interest.
Uncontrolled movement may permit access to the item. Escorts and other internal
restrictions may prevent access to the item. See controlled area and exclusion area.
Line of sight (LOS). Direct observation between two points with the naked eye or
hand-held optics.
Line-of-sight sensor. A pair of devices used as an intrusion detection sensor that
monitor any movement through the field between the sensors.
Local government. Any county, city, village, town, district, or political subdivision of
any state, and Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or Alaska Native village or
organization, including any rural community or unincorporated town or village or any
other public entity.
M

Mail-bomb delivery. Bombs or incendiary devices delivered to the target in letters or
packages.
Minimum measures. Protective measures that can be applied to all buildings
regardless of the identified threat. These measures offer defense or detection
opportunities for minimal cost, facilitate future upgrades, and may deter acts of
aggression.
Mitigation. Those actions taken to reduce the exposure to and impact of an attack
or disaster.
Motion detector. An intrusion detection sensor that changes state based on movement
in the sensor's field of view.
Moving vehicle bomb. An explosive-laden car or truck driven into or near a building
and detonated.
Mutual Aid Agreement. A pre-arranged agreement developed between two or more
entities to render assistance to the parties of the agreement.
N

Natural hazard. Naturally-occurring events such as floods, earthquakes, tornadoes,
tsunami, coastal storms, landslides, and wildfires that strike populated areas. A
natural event is a hazard when it has the potential to harm people or property (FEMA
386- 2 Understanding Your Risks). The risks of natural hazards may be increased or
decreased as a result of human activity; however, they are not inherently human-
induced.
Natural protective barriers. Natural protective barriers are mountains and
deserts, cliffs and ditches, water obstacles, or other terrain features that are
difficult to traverse.
Non-exclusive zone. An area around an asset that has controlled entry, but shared or
less restrictive access than an exclusive zone.
Non-persistent agent. An agent that, upon release, loses its ability to cause
casualties after 10 to 15 minutes. It has a high evaporation rate, is lighter than air,
and will disperse rapidly. It is considered to be a short-term hazard; however, in
small, unventilated areas, the agent will be more persistent.
Nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Also called Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD). Weapons that are characterized by their capability to produce mass
casualties.
P

Passive vehicle barrier. A vehicle barrier that is permanently deployed and does
not require response to be effective.
Perimeter barrier. A fence, wall, vehicle barrier, landform, or line of vegetation
applied along an exterior perimeter used to obscure vision, hinder personnel access,
or hinder or prevent vehicle access.
Persistent agent. An agent that, upon release, retains its casualty producing effects for
an extended period of time, usually anywhere from 30 minutes to several days. A
persistent agent usually has a low evaporation rate and its vapor is heavier thanair;
therefore, its vapor cloud tends to hug the ground. It is considered to be a long-term
hazard. Although inhalation hazards are still a concern, extreme caution should be
taken to avoid skin contact as well.
Physical security. The part of security concerned with measures/ concepts designed
to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations,
materiel, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage,
damage, and theft.
Planter barrier. A passive vehicle barrier, usually constructed of concrete and filled
with dirt (and flowers for aesthetics). Planters, along with bollards, are the usual street
furniture used to keep vehicles away from existing buildings. Overall size and the
depth of installation below grade determine the vehicle stopping capability of the
individual planter.
Plume. Airborne material spreading from a particular source; the dispersal of
particles, gases, vapors, and aerosols into the atmosphere.
Polycarbonate glazing. A plastic glazing material with enhanced resistance to
ballistics or blast effects.
Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA). A mechanism used to determine the impact
and magnitude of damage and the resulting unmet needs of individuals, businesses,
the public sector, and the community as a whole. Information collected is used by the
state as a basis for the Governor's request for a Presidential declaration, and by FEMA
to document the recommendation made to the President in response to the
Governor's request. PDAs are made by at least one state and one federal
representative. A local government representative familiar with the extent and
location of damage in the community often participates; other state and federal
agencies and voluntary relief organizations also may be asked to participate, as
needed.
Preparedness. Establishing the plans, training, exercises, and resources necessary
to enhance mitigation of and achieve readiness for response to, and recovery
from all hazards, disasters, and emergencies, including WMD incidents.
Primary asset. An asset that is the ultimate target for compromise by an aggressor.
Primary gathering building. Inhabited buildings routinely occupied by 50 or more
personnel. This designation applies to the entire portion of a building that meets the
population density requirements for an inhabited building.
Probability of detection (POD). A measure of an intrusion detection sensor's
performance in detecting an intruder within its detection zone.
Probability of intercept. The probability that an act of aggression will be detected and
that a response force will intercept the aggressor before the asset can be
compromised.
Progressive collapse. A chain reaction failure of building members to an extent
disproportionate to the original localized damage. Such damage may result in upper
floors of a building collapsing onto lower floors.
Protective barriers. Define the physical limits of a site, activity, or area by restricting,
channeling, or impeding access and forming a continuous obstacle around the object.
Protective measures. Elements of a protective system that protect an asset against a
threat. Protective measures are divided into defensive and detection measures.
Protective system. An integration of all of the protective measures required to protect
an asset against the range of threats applicable to the asset.
R

Radiation. High-energy particles or gamma rays that are emitted by an atom as the
substance undergoes radioactive decay. Particles can be either charged alpha or beta
particles or neutral neutron or gamma rays.
Radiation sickness. The symptoms characterizing the sickness known as radiation
injury, resulting from excessive exposure of the whole body to ionizing radiation.
Radiological monitoring. The process of locating and measuring radiation by means
of survey instruments that can detect and measure (as exposure rates) ionizing
radiation.
Recovery. The long-term activities beyond the initial crisis period and emergency
response phase of disaster operations that focus on returning all systems in the
community to a normal status or to reconstitute these systems to a new condition that
is less vulnerable.
Response. Executing the plan and resources identified to perform those duties and
services to preserve and protect life and property as well as provide services to the
surviving population.
Restricted area. Any area with access controls that is subject to these special
restrictions or controls for security reasons. See controlled area, limited area,
exclusion area, and exclusion zone.
Risk. The potential for loss of, or damage to, an asset. It is measured based upon
the value of the asset in relation to the threats and vulnerabilities associated with
it.
Rotating drum or rotating plate vehicle barrier. An active vehicle barrier used at
vehicle entrances to controlled areas based on a drum or plate rotating into the path
of the vehicle when signaled.
S

Sacrificial roof or wall. Roofs or walls that can be lost in a blast without damage to
the primary asset.
Safe haven. Secure areas within the interior of the facility. A safe haven should be
designed such that it requires more time to penetrate by aggressors than it takes for
the response force to reach the protected area to rescue the occupants. It may be a
haven from a physical attack or an air-isolated haven from CBR contamination.
Secondary asset. An asset that supports a primary asset and whose compromise would
indirectly affect the operation of the primary asset.
Secondary hazard. A threat whose potential would be realized as the result of a
triggering event that of itself would constitute an emergency (e.g., dam failure
might be a secondary hazard associated with earthquakes).
Situational crime prevention. A crime prevention strategy based on reducing the
opportunities for crime by increasing the effort required to commit a crime,
increasing the risks associated with committing the crime, and reducing the target
appeal or vulnerability (whether property or person). This opportunity reduction is
achieved by management and use policies such as procedures and training, as well as
physical approaches such as alteration of the built environment.
Specific threat. Known or postulated aggressor activity focused on targeting a
particular asset.
Stand-off distance. A distance maintained between a building or portion thereof
and the potential location for an explosive detonation or other threat.
Stand-off weapons. Weapons such as anti-tank weapons and mortars that are
launched from a distance at a target.
State Coordinating Officer (SCO). The person appointed by the Governor to
coordinate state, commonwealth, or territorial response and recovery activities with
FRP-related activities of the Federal Government, in cooperation with the FCO.
State Liaison. A FEMA official assigned to a particular state, who handles initial
coordination with the state in the early stages of an emergency.
Stationary vehicle bomb. An explosive-laden car or truck stopped or parked near a
building.
Structural protective barriers. Manmade devices (e.g., fences, walls, floors, roofs,
grills, bars, roadblocks, signs, or other construction) used to restrict, channel, or
impede access.
Superstructure. The supporting elements of a building above the foundation.
Supplies-bomb delivery. Bombs or incendiary devices concealed and delivered to
supply or material handling points such as loading docks.
T

Tactics. The specific methods of achieving the aggressor's goals to injure
personnel, destroy assets, or steal materiel or information.
Tangle-foot wire. Barbed wire or tape suspended on short metal or wooden pickets
outside a perimeter fence to create an obstacle to approach.
Taut wire sensor. An intrusion detection sensor utilizing a column of uniformly spaced
horizontal wires, securely anchored at each end and stretched taut. Each wire is
attached to a sensor to indicate movement of the wire.
Technological hazards. Incidents that can arise from human activities such as
manufacture, transportation, storage, and use of hazardous materials. For the sake
of simplicity, it is assumed that technological emergencies are accidental and that
their consequences are unintended.
Terrorism. The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof,
in furtherance of political or social objectives.
Thermally tempered glass (TTG). Glass that is heat-treated to have a higher tensile
strength and resistance to blast pressures, although with a greater susceptibility to
airborne debris.
Threat. Any indication, circumstance, or event with the potential to cause loss of, or
damage to an asset.
Threat analysis. A continual process of compiling and examining all available
information concerning potential threats and human-caused hazards. A common
method to evaluate terrorist groups is to review the factors of existence, capability,
intentions, history, and targeting.
TNT equivalent weight. The weight of TNT (trinitrotoluene) that has an equivalent
energetic output to that of a different weight of another explosive compound.
Tornado. A local atmospheric storm, generally of short duration, formed by winds
rotating at very high speeds, usually in a counter-clockwise direction. The vortex, up to
several hundred yards wide, is visible to the observer as a whirlpool-like column of
winds rotating about a hollow cavity or funnel. Winds may reach 300 miles per hour or
higher.
Toxic-free area. An area within a facility in which the air supply is free of toxic
chemical or biological agents.
Toxicity. A measure of the harmful effects produced by a given amount of a toxin
on a living organism.
Triple-standard concertina (TSC) wire. This type of fence uses three rolls of stacked
concertina. One roll will be stacked on top of two other rolls that run parallel to each
other while resting on the ground, forming a pyramid.
U

Unobstructed space. Space around an inhabited building without obstruction large
enough to conceal explosive devices 150 mm (6 inches) or greater in height.
V

Video motion detection. Motion detection technology that looks for changes in the
pixels of a video image.
Visual surveillance. The aggressor uses ocular and photographic devices (such as
binoculars and cameras with telephoto lenses) to monitor facility or installation
operations or to see assets.
Volumetric motion sensor. An interior intrusion detection sensor that is designed to
sense aggressor motion within a protected space.
Vulnerability. Any weakness in an asset or mitigation measure than can be exploited
by an aggressor (potential threat element), adversary, or competitor. It refers to the
organization's susceptibility to injury.
W

Warning. The alerting of emergency response personnel and the public to the
threat of extraordinary danger and the related effects that specific hazards may
cause.
Watch. Indication in a defined area that conditions are favorable for the specified type
of severe weather (e.g., flash flood watch, severe thunderstorm watch, tornado watch,
tropical storm watch).
Waterborne contamination. Chemical, biological, or radiological agent introduced
into and fouling a water supply.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Any device, material, or substance used in a
manner, in a quantity or type, or under circumstances showing an intent to cause
death or serious injury to persons, or significant damage to property. An explosive,
incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant charge of more
than 4 ounces, or a missile having an explosive incendiary charge of more than 0.25
ounce, or mine or device similar to the above; poison gas; weapon involving a disease
organism; or weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level
dangerous to human life.
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT CHARACTERISICS

SELECTED BIOLOGICAL AGENT CHARACTERISICS

This appendix contains some CBR terms that do not actually appear in this manual.
They have been included to present a comprehensive list that pertains to this series of
publications.
CHEMICAL TERMS
A
Acetylcholinesterase. An enzyme that hydrolyzes the neurotransmitter
acetylcholine. The action of this enzyme is inhibited by nerve agents.
Aerosol. Fine liquid or solid particles suspended in a gas (e.g., fog or smoke).
Atropine. A compound used as an antidote for nerve agents.
C
Casualty (toxic) agents. Produce incapacitation, serious injury, or death, and can be
used to incapacitate or kill victims. They are the blister, blood, choking, and nerve
agents.
Blister agents. Substances that cause blistering of the skin. Exposure is through
liquid or vapor contact with any exposed tissue (eyes, skin, lungs). Examples
are distilled mustard (HD), nitrogen mustard (HN), lewisite (L),
mustard/lewisite (HL), and phenodichloroarsine (PD).
Blood agents. Substances that injure a person by interfering with cell
respiration (the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide between blood and
tissues). Examples are arsine (SA), cyanogens chloride (CK), hydrogen
chloride (HCl), and hydrogen cyanide (AC).
Choking/lung/pulmonary agents. Substances that cause physical injury to
the lungs. Exposure is through inhalation. In extreme cases, membranes
swell and
BIBLIOGRAPHY D

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and Protection,
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Security Task Force, Washington, DC
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Building Security Through Design: A Primer for Architects, Design Professionals, and their
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American Institute of Chemical Engineers
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American Medical Association
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American Society of Civil Engineers
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http://atfp.nfesc.navy.mil/pdf/ASHRAE%20CBR%20Guidance.pdf
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Building Owners and Managers Association International
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Telephone: 1-800-480-2520, Fax: 301-362-5335
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November 1988, Washington, DC (not available on Internet) Contact FEMA
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August 2001
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Balancing Security and Openness: A Thematic Summary of a Symposium on Security and the
Design of Public Buildings, November 30, 1999
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Split Speed Bump, 1998, Kathy Mulder, Washington, DC, TE International
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Lawrence Berkeley National Lab
Protecting Buildings From a Biological or Chemical Attack: actions to take before or during a
release. LBNL/PUB-51959, January 10, 2003
http://securebuildings.lbl.gov/images/bldgadvice.pdf
National Academy of Sciences
Combating Terrorism: Prioritizing Vulnerabilities and Developing Mitigation Strategies,
Project Identification Number: NAEP-R-02-01-A, National Academy of Engineering
on-going project - results to be published.
http://www4.nationalacademies.org/webcr.nsf/ProjectScopeDisplay/ NAEP-R-02-01-
A?OpenDocument
National Capital Planning Commission
Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital, October 2001
http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/security/DesigningSec.pdf
The National Capital Planning Urban Design and Security Plan, October 2002
http://www.ncpc.gov/publications/udsp/Final%20UDSP.pdf
National Institute of Building Sciences
Whole Building Design Guide: Provide Security for Building Occupants and Assets
http://www.wbdg.org/design/index.php?cn=2.7.4&cx=0
National Research Council
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Mitigation, 2001, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, ISBN 0-309-08286-2
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National Symposium of Comprehensive Force Protection, October 2001, Charleston,
SC, Lindbergh & Associates. For a list of participants, access
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Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card with Explanation of Use
http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/prods_pubs/newBTSCPress.htm
The House National Security Committee
Statement of Chairman Floyd D. Spence on the Report of the Bombing of Khobar
Towers, August 1996, Washington, DC
http://www.house.gov/hasc/Publications/104thCongress/ Reports/saudi.pdf
U.S. Air Force
ESL-TR-87-57, Protective Construction Design Manual, November 1989; Contact
Airbase Technologies Division (AFRL/MLQ) at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL, via e-
mail to techinfo@afrl.af.mil. [Superceded by Army Technical Manual TM 5-855-1
(Air Force
Pamphlet AFPAM 32-1147(I), Navy Manual NAVFAC P-1080, DSWA Manual
DAHSCWEMAN-97), December 1997]
Expedient Hardening Methods for Structures Subjected to the Effect of Nonnuclear
Munitions, October 1990, Wright Laboratory Report (not available on Internet)
Installation Entry Control Facilities Design Guide, October 2002, Air Force Center for
Environmental Excellence
http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/dc/dcd/gate/index.html
Installation Force Protection Guide, 1997, Air Force Center for Environmental
Excellence
http://www.afcee.brooks.af.mil/dc/dcd/arch/force.pdf
Vehicle Bomb Mitigation Guide, July 1, 1999, Force Protection Battlelab [For Official Use
Only] Contact the USAF Force Protection Battlelab, Lackland Air Force Base, TX,
Telephone: (210)671-0058
U.S. Army
Field Manuals (FM)
FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, January 8, 2001, Washington, DC
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-19.30/fm3-19.30.pdf
or
http://www.wood.army.mil/mpdoctrine/PDF_Files/FM_3-19.30.pdf
FM 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, July 13, 1992
http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/5-114/toc.htm
Technical Instruction 853-01 (Draft), Protecting Buildings and Their Occupants from
Airborne Hazards, October 2001
http://buildingprotection.sbccom.army.mil/basic/airborne_hazards
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Engineer Technical Letters (ETL)
ETL 1110-3-494, Airblast Protection Retrofit for Unreinforced Concrete Masonry Walls, July
14, 1999 [Restricted Access]
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs
ETL 1110-3-495, Estimating Damage to Structures from Terrorist Bombs Field Operations
Guide, July 14, 1999 [Restricted Access]
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs
ETL 1110-3-498, Design of Collective Protection Shelters to Resist Chemical, Biological, and
Radiological (CBR) Agents, February 24, 1999
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs
ETL 1110-3-501, Window Retrofit Using Fragment Retention Film with Catcher Bar System,
July 14, 1999 [Restricted Access]
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-tech-ltrs
Protective Design - Mandatory Center of Expertise - Technical Reports
PDC-TR-91-6, Blast Analysis Manual, Part 1-Level of Protection Assessment Guide, July 1991
[For Official Use Only] Contact U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center,
ATTN: CENWO-ED-ST, 215 N. 17th Street, Omaha, NE 68102-4978, Telephone:
(402)221-4918
Technical Manuals (TM)
TM 5-853-1, Security Engineering Project Development, May 12, 1994, also Air Force
Manual 32-1071, Volume 1 [For Official Use Only]
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/armytm
TM 5-853-2, Security Engineering Concept Design, May 12, 1994, also Air Force Manual
32-1071, Volume 2 [For Official Use Only]
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/armytm
TM 5-853-3, Security Engineering Final Design, May 12, 1994, also Air Force Manual 32-
1071, Volume 3 [For Official Use Only]
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/armytm
TM 5-853-4, Security Engineering Electronic Security Systems, May 12, 1994
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/armytm
TM 5-855-4, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning of Hardened
Installations, November 28, 1986
http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/armytm/tm5-855-4/ toc.htm
TM 5-1300, Structures to Resist Accidental Explosions, November 19, 1990, (also Navy
NAVFAC (Naval Facilities) P-397, Air Force Regulation 88-2); Contact David Hyde,
U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center, 3909 Halls Ferry Road,
Vicksburg, MS 39180 or via e-mail to hyded@ex1.wes.army.mil
U.S. Department of Commerce
Administrative Orders (DAO)
DAO 206-5, Occasional Use of Public Areas in Public Buildings, December 9, 1986
http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/daos/206-5.htm
DAO 207-1, Security Programs, June 24, 1991, Amended September 6, 1991
http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/daos/207-1.htm
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1, October 1998
http://www.ciao.gov/resource/vulassessframework.pdf
Practices For Securing Critical Information Assets, January 2000
http://www.ciao.gov/resource/Practices_For_Securing_Critical_
Information_Assets.pdf
U.S. Department of Defense
DoD Security Engineering Manual [Expected to have a major portion for public
distribution once published as Unified Facilities Criteria and a smaller portion For
Official Use Only similar to the UFC for AT Standards for Buildings listed below. This
publication will replace Army Technical Manual 5-853 (Air Force Joint Manual 32-
1071), Volumes 1, 2, and 3 and Navy Military Handbook 1013/1A] DoD O-2000.12-H,
Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence:
Mandatory Standards and Implementing Guidance, with Changes 1 and 2, February 1993,
Change 1
-May 21, 1993, Change 2-October 3, 1997 [For Official Use Only]
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pub1.html
Force Protection Equipment Demonstration IV, 6-8 May 2003
http://www.fped4.org
Interim Antiterrorism/Force Protection Construction Standards, December 16, 1999 [For
Official Use Only] Contact U.S. Army Engineer
District, ATTN: CENWO-ED-ST, 215 North 17th Street, Omaha, NE 68102-4978,
Telephone: (402)221-4918.
Interim Antiterrorism/Force Protection Construction Standards
-Progressive Collapse Guidance, April 4, 2000 (not available on Internet) Contact U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center, ATTN: CENWO-ED-ST, 215 N.
17th Street, Omaha, NE 68102-4978, Telephone: (402)221-4918
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC)
UFC 3-340-01, Design and Analysis of Hardened Structures to Conventional Weapons Effects,
June 30, 2002 [For Official Use Only] [Formerly Army TM 5-855-1]
http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/techinfo/ufc/UFC3-340-01 WEB.PDF
UFC 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, July 31, 2002
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ccbdoc.php?category=ufc&docid=10 6&ref=1
Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS)
UFGS-02821A, Fencing, February 2002
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/02821A.pdf
UFGS-02840A, Active Vehicle Barriers, February 2002
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/02840A.pdf
UFGS-02841N, Traffic Barriers, August 2001
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/02841N.pdf
UFGS-08390A, Blast Resistant Doors, April 2001
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/08390.pdf
UFGS-08581, Blast Resistant Tempered Glass Windows, August 2001
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/08581.pdf
UFGS-08840A, Plastic Glazing, July 1995
https://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/08840A.pdf
UFGS-08850, Fragment Retention Film for Glass, July 1992
https://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/08850.pdf
UFGS-11020, Security Vault Door, August 2002
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/11020.pdf
UFGS-11025, Forced Entry Resistant Components, August 2001
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/11025.pdf
UFGS-11035, Bullet-Resistant Components, April 2000
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/11035.pdf
UFGS-13095A, Electromagnetic (EM) Shielding, July 2001
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/13095A.pdf
UFGS-13420A, Self-Acting Blast Valves, November 1997
http://www.ccb.org/ufgs/pdf/13420A.pdf
U.S. Department of Education
Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities, May
2003
http://www.ed.gov/emergencyplan
U.S. Department of Energy
DOE/TIC 11268, A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment Loadings on Structures,
February 1992, Albuquerque, NM, Southwest Research Institute [not available on
Internet]
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/nat_strat_hls.p
df
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,
February 2003
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/National_Cyberspace_ Strategy.pdf
President's Homeland Security Advisory Council-Statewide Template Initiative, March
2003
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Statewide_Template_ Initiative.pdf
State and Local Actions for Homeland Security, July 2002
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/stateandlocal/State_and_
Local_Actions_for_Homeland_Security.pdf
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
The Avoidance of Progressive Collapse, Regulatory approaches to the problem, PB-248 781,
October 1975, Division of Energy, Building Technology and Standards, Office of
Policy Development and Research, Washington, DC 20410 (not available on Internet)
Creating Defensible Space, April 1996, Oscar Newman, Washington, DC
http://www.huduser.org
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Terrorism in the United States, 1999, Washington, DC Counterterrorism
Division
http://www.fbi.gov/publications.htm
Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, Assessment and Strategy
Development Tool Kit, NCJ181200, May 15, 2000, [For Official Use Only]
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/assessment.txt
National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools: A Guide for Schools
and Law Enforcement Agencies, September 1999, with U.S. Department of Education,
Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program; and U.S. Department of Energy, Sandia
National Laboratories
http://www.ncjrs.org/school/home.html
NIJ Guide 100-00, Guide for the Selection of Chemical Agent and Toxic Industrial Material
Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders, June 2000
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/184449.pdf
NIJ Guide 101-00, An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for
Emergency First Responders, December 2001
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/190747.pdf
NIJ Guide 102-00, Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First
Responders, Volumes I-IV, November 2002
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/191518.pdf
NIJ Guide 602-00, Guide to the Technologies of Concealed Weapon and Contraband Imaging
and Detection, February 2001
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/184432.pdf
NIJ Standard 0108.01, Blast Resistant Protective Materials, September 1985 [Subscription
Required]
http://www.ccb.org
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Community Policing, August
1996, Dan Fleissner and Fred Heinzelmann, Washington, DC
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/crimepre.pdf
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Parking Facilities, April 1996, Mary S.
Smith, Washington, DC
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedpkg.pdf
"Designing Out" Gang Homicides and Street Assaults, November 1998, James Lasley,
Washington, DC
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/173398.pdf
The Expanding Role of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Premises Liability,
April 1996, Corey L. Gordon and William Brill, Washington, DC
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/cptedlia.pdf
Physical Environment and Crime, January 1996, Ralph B. Taylor and Adele V. Harrell,
Washington, DC
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/physenv.pdf
Visibility and Vigilance: Metro's Situational Approach to Preventing Subway Crime, November
1997, Nancy G. La Vigne, Washington, DC
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/166372.pdf
U.S. Marshals Service Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities, June 28, 1995
[Restricted Access]
http://www.oca.gsa.gov
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security
Architectural Engineering Design Guidelines (5 Volumes), March 1998 [For Official Use
Only] (not available on Internet)
Certification Standard SD-STD-01.01, Revision G (Amended), Forced Entry and
Ballistic Resistance of Structural Systems, Amended April 30, 1993 [Subscription
Required]
http://www.ccb.org
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, April 2002, Washington, DC
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/pdf/
Physical Security Standards Handbook, January 7, 1998 [For Official Use Only] (not available
on Internet)
Structural Engineering Guidelines for New Embassy Office Buildings, August 1995 [For
Official Use Only] (not available on Internet)
The Report of the Accountability Review Board on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam on August 7, 1998, January 1999, Washington, DC
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/accountability_ report.html
U.S. Department of the Treasury/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard And Evacuation Distance Tables, 1999, request in writing,
address information available at
http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/fire-explo_pub/i54001.htm
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Physical Security Assessment of Veterans Affairs Facilities, Recommendations of the
National Institute of Building Sciences Task Group to the Department of Veterans
Affairs, 6 September 2002
http://www.va.gov/facmgt/standard/etc/vaphysicalsecurityreport.pdf
U.S. Fire Administration (USFA of FEMA)
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Process Job Aid, May 1, 2002
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/dhtml/fire-service/cipc-jobaid.cfm
U.S. Navy
Design Manuals (DM) NAVFAC (Naval Facilities Command)
NAVFAC DM 2.08, Blast Resistant Structures, December 1986
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ccbdoc.php?category=nav&docid=4 6&ref=1
NAVFAC DM 13.02, Commercial Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), September 1986
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ccbdoc.php?category=nav&docid=4 7&ref=1
Interim Technical Guidance (ITG) 03-03, Entry Control Facilities, 20 February 2003
http://www.lantdiv.navfac.navy.mil/servlet page?pageid=8609,8611 &_dad=
lantdiv&_schema=LANTDIV&11435_ACTIVE_1777132.p_ subid=
60007&11435_ACTIVE_1777132.p_sub_siteid=51 &11435_ ACTIVE_1777132.p_edit=0
Military Handbooks (MIL-HDBK)
MIL-HDBK-1002/1, Structural Engineering General Requirements, November 30, 1987
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ccbdoc.php?category=nav&docid=4 8&ref=1
MIL-HDBK-1004/4, Electrical Utilization Systems, October 13, 1987
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ccbdoc.php?category=nav&docid=4 9&ref=1
MIL-HDBK-1012/3, Telecommunications Premises Distribution Planning, Design,
and Estimating, May 31, 1996
http://www.wbdg.org/ccbref/ccbdoc.php?category=nav&docid=5 0&ref=1
MIL-HDBK-1013/1A, Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Fixed Land-Based
Facilities, December 15, 1993. For copies, contact Defense Printing Service, Building
40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, Telephone: (215)697-2179,
Fax: (215)697-1462 or available on the National Institute of Building Sciences'
Construction Criteria Base
MIL-HDBK-1013/10, Design Guidelines for Security Fencing, Gates, Barriers, and
Guard Facilities, May 14, 1993. For copies, contact Defense Printing Service,
Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, Telephone:
(215)697-2179, Fax: (215) 697-1462 or available on the National Institute of Building
Sciences' Construction Criteria Base MIL-HDBK-1013/12, Evaluation of Security
Glazing for Ballistic, Bomb, and Forced Entry Tactics, March 10, 1997. For copies,
contact Defense Printing Service, Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia,
PA 19111-5094, Telephone: (215)697-2179, Fax: (215) 697-1462 or available on the
National Institute of Building Sciences' Construction Criteria Base
MIL-HDBK-1013/14, Selection and Application of Vehicle Barriers, February 1, 1999. For
copies, contact Defense Printing Service, Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue,
Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, Telephone: (215)697-2179, Fax: (215)697-1462 or
available on the National Institute of Building Sciences' Construction Criteria Base
TechData Sheets - Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC)
TDS-2062-SHR, Estimating Damage to Structures from Terrorist Bombs, September 1998 [For
Official Use Only] Requests for publication can be made to Naval Facilities Engineering
Service Center, Security Engineering Division (ESC66), 1100 23rd Ave, Port Hueneme,
CA 93043-4370, Telephone (805)982-1582 (Primary), (805)982-4817 (Alternate); Fax:
(805)982-1253
TDS-2063-SHR, Blast Shielding Walls, September 1998 [For Official Use Only] Requests
for publication can be made to Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center, Security
Engineering Division (ESC66), 1100 23rd Ave., Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370,
Telephone: (805)982-1582 (Primary), (805)982-4817 (Alternate); Fax: (805)982-1253
TDS-2079-SHR, Planning and Design Considerations for Incorporating Blast Mitigation
in Mailrooms, May 2000. For copies, contact Defense Printing Service, Building 40, 700
Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19111-5094, Telephone: (215)697-2179, Fax: (215)
697-1462 TDS-2090-SHR, Design Parameters for a Controlled Entry Point. For copies,
contact Defense Printing Service, Building 40, 700 Robbins Avenue, Philadelphia, PA
19111-5094, Telephone: (215)697-2179, Fax: (215)697-1462
User Guides - Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC)
UG-2030-SHR, Security Glazing Applications, May 1998, distributed June 25, 1998. [For
Official Use Only] Requests for publication can be made to Naval Facilities Engineering
Service Center, Security Engineering Division (ESC66), 1100 23rd Ave., Port
Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Telephone: (805)982-1582 (Primary), (805) 982-4817
(Alternate); Fax: (805)982-1253
UG-2031-SHR, Protection Against Terrorist Vehicle Bombs, May 1998, distributed June
25, 1998. [For Official Use Only] Requests for publication can be made to Naval
Facilities Engineering Service Center, Security Engineering Division (ESC66),
1100 23rd Ave, Port Hueneme, CA 93043-4370, Telephone: (805)982-15.82
(Primary), (805) 982-4817 (Alternate); Fax: (805)982-1253
Other Books, Magazines, Magazine Articles, and Newspaper Articles
Archibald, Rae W., et al., 2002, Security and Safety in Los Angeles High-Rise Buildings after
9/11. RAND, Santa Monica, CA, ISBN: 0-8330-3184-8
http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB381
Atlas, Randall I., June 1998, Designing for Crime and Terrorism, Security and Technology
Design, Security Technology and Design Magazine Reprint Services, Jim Benesh,
Telephone: (800)547-7377 x324, Fax: (920)568-2244, e-mail:
jim.benesh@cygnuspub.com
Bartlett, Sarah and Petrarca, John, The Schools of Ground Zero: Early Lessons
Learned in Children's Environmental Health, American Public Health Association,
September 2002, ISBN: 0875530281 Broder, James F., December 15, 1999, Risk
Analysis and the Security Survey, 2nd Edition, Butterworth-Heinemann, Stoneham,
MA, ISBN: 0750670894
Craighead, Geoff, December 2002, High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety, 2nd Edition,
Academic Press, ISBN: 0750674555
Crowe, Timothy D., 2000, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Applications
Of Architectural Design And Space Management Concepts (2nd Edition), Stoneham, MA,
Butterworth-Heinemann, ISBN: 075067198X
Fehr, Stephen C., July 1996, Parking Under Siege in D.C.: U.S. Anti-Terrorism Plan
Threatens 360 Spaces, TheWashington Post, July 13, 1996
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/archives/advanced.htm
Fenelly, Lawrence J, June 1997, Effective Physical Security, 2nd Edition, Stoneham, MA,
Butterworth-Heinemann, ISBN: 0-75-069873-X
Garcia, Mary Lynn, February 23, 2001, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection
Systems, Stoneham, MA, Butterworth-Heinemann, ISBN: 0750673672
Gonchar, Joann, March 2002, Building for a Secure Future: Government
Facilities under way incorporate already tough standards, Engineering News-
Record, March 25, 2002
http://www.construction.com/NewsCenter/Headlines/ENR/ 20020325e.asp
Greene, R.W., October 2002, Confronting Catastrophe: A GIS Handbook,
ESRI Press, ISBN: 1589480406 Hart, Sara, March 2002, In the aftermath of
September 11, the urban landscape appears vulnerable and random:
Architects and consultants focus on risk assessment and security through
design, Architectural Record, March 2002
http://archrecord.construction.com/CONTEDUC/ARTICLES/ 03_02_1.asp
Kowalski, Wladyslaw Jan, P.E., Ph.D., September 26, 2002, Immune Building Systems
Technology, McGraw-Hill Professional, ISBN: 0-07-140246-2
Nadel, Barbara A, March 1998, Designing for Security, Architectural Record, March
1998
http://www.archrecord.com/CONTEDUC/ARTICLES/3_98_1.asp
Owen, David D. and R.S. Means Engineering Staff, Building Security: Strategies and Costs,
Construction Publishers & Consultants, ISBN: 0-87629-698-3, 2003
Pearson, Robert, September 1997, Security through Environmental Design, Security and
Technology Design, Security Technology and Design Magazine Reprint Services, Jim
Benesh, Telephone: (800) 547-7377 x324; Fax: (920) 568-2244; e-mail:
jim.benesh@cygnuspub.com
Rochon, Donald M., June 1998, Architectural Design for Security, Security and Technology
Design, Security Technology and Design Magazine Reprint Services, Jim Benesh,
Telephone: (800)547-7377 x324; Fax: (920)568-2244; e-mail:
jim.benesh@cygnuspub.com
Security Magazine [on-line magazine]
http://www.securitymagazine.com
Security Solutions Online: Access Control and Security Systems [on-line
magazine] http://securitysolutions.com/
Security Technology and Design [on-line and print magazine]
http://www.st-and-d.com
Sidell, Frederick R., et al, 1998, Jane's Chem-Bio Handbook, Jane's
Information Group, Alexandria, VA, ISBN 0-7106 2568-5

http://www.janes.com/company/catalog/chem_bio_hand.shtml
Smith, Keith, November 2000, Environmental Hazards: Assessing Risk and Reducing
Disaster, Routledge, New York, NY, ISBN 0415224632
http://www.routledge-
ny.com/books.cfm?isbn=0415224632
ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS E

._ American Lifelines Alliance
.http://www.americanlifelinesalliance.org
._ Applied Technology Council
.http://www.atcouncil.org
._ Battelle Memorial Institute, National Security Program
.http://www.battelle.org/natsecurity/default.stm
._ Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
.http://www.csis.org
._ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
.http://www.cdc.gov/niosh
._ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
.http://www.cia.gov
._ Council on Tall Buildings and Urban Habitat (CTBUH)
.http://www.ctbuh.org
._ Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
.http://www.faa.gov
._ Healthy Buildings International, Inc.
.http://www.healthybuildings.com
._ Institute of Transportation Engineers
.http://www.ite.org
._ Interagency Security Committee (ISC) led by the U.S. General Services
Administration [Restricted Access]
.http://www.oca.gsa.gov
._ International CPTED [Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design]
Association (ICA)
.http://new.cpted.net/home.amt
. _ Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)

http://securebuildings.lbl.gov
_ National Academy of Sciences
http://www4.nationalacademies.org/nas/nashome.nsf
� Federal Facilities Council (FFC) Standing Committee on Physical Security and
Hazard Mitigation
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ffc/Physical_
Security_ Hazard_Mitigation.html
� National Research Council
http://www.nationalacademies.org/nrc
._ National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA)
.http://www.ndia.org
._ Public Entity Risk Institute
.http://www.riskinstitute.org
._ Security Design Coalition
.http://www.designingforsecurity.org
._ Security Industry Association (SIA)
.http://www.siaonline.org/
._ Technical Support Working Group (Departments of Defense and State)
.http://www.tswg.gov
._ U.S. Air Force Electronic System Center (ESC), Hanscom Air Force Base
.http://eschq.hanscom.af.mil/
._ U.S. Army Soldiers and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM): Basic
Information on Building Protection
.http://buildingprotection.sbccom.army.mil
. _ U.S. Department of Justice

http://www.usdoj.gov
� Federal Bureau of Investigation: Terrorism in the United States reports
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terroris.htm
. � National Institute of Justice (NIJ)

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij
� Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp
. � U.S. Marshals Service (USMS)

http://www.usdoj.gov/marshals
The Infrastructure Security Partnership (TISP)
http://www.tisp.org
Founding Organizations
_ American Council of Engineering Companies (ACEC)
http://www.acec.org
. _ American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)

http://www.asce.org
.� Architectural Engineering Institute (AEI) of ASCE
.http://www.asce.org/instfound/aei.cfm
.� Civil Engineering Research Foundation (CERF) of ASCE
.http://www.cerf.org
. � Structural Engineering Institute (SEI) of ASCE

http://www.seinstitute.org
._ Associated General Contractors of America
.http://www.agc.org
._ Construction Industry Institute
.http://construction-institute.org
. _ Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

http://www.fema.gov
.� Building Performance Assessment Team
.http://www.fema.gov/mit/bpat
.� Human Caused Hazards
.http://www.fema.gov/hazards
. � Mitigation Planning

http://www.fema.gov/fima/planning.shtm
. _ Federal Facilities Council - See National Academy of Sciences
_ National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Building and
Fire Research Laboratory
http://www.bfrl.nist.gov
. _ Naval Facilities Engineering Command

http://www.navfac.navy.mil
� Naval Facilities Engineering Service Center (NFESC), Security
Engineering Center of Expertise ESC66
http://atfp.nfesc.navy.mil
._ Society of American Military Engineers (SAME)
.http://www.same.org
._ The American Institute of Architects (AIA), Security Resource Center
.http://www.aia.org/security
._ U.S.Army Corps of Engineers http://www.usace.army.mil
.� Blast Mitigation Action Group, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Center of
Expertise for Protective Design
.http://bmag.nwo.usace.army.mil
.� U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Electronic Security Center
.http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/esc
. � U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center

http://pdc.nwo.usace.army.mil
Selected Member Organizations
._ Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute, Inc.
.http://www.ari.org
._ Air Conditioning Contractors of America
.http://www.acca.org
. _ Airport Consultants Council

http://www.acconline.org
._ Alliance for Fire & Smoke Containment & Control
.http://www.afscconline.org
._ American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials
(AASHTO)
.http://www.transportation.org
._ American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety
.http://www.aiche.org/ccps
._ American Planning Association
.http://www.planning.org
._ American Portland Cement Alliance
.http://www.portcement.org/apca
._ American Public Works Association
.http://www.apwa.net
._ American Railway Engineering & Maintenance of Way Association
.http://www.arema.org
._ American Society for Industrial Security International (ASIS)
.http://www.asisonline.org
._ American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers
(ASHRAE)
.http://www.ashrae.org
._ American Society of Interior Designers
.http://www.asid.org
._ American Society of Landscape Architects (ASLA)
.http://www.asla.org
._ American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
.http://www.asme.org
._ American Underground Construction Association (AUA)
.http://www.auca.org or http://www.auaonline.org
. _ American Water Resources Association (AWRA)

http://www.awra.org
._ Associated Locksmiths of America
.http://www.aloa.org
._ Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies
.http://www.amwa.net
._ Association of State Dam Safety Officials
.http://www.damsafety.org
._ Building Futures Council
.http://www.thebfc.com
._ Building Owners and Managers Association International (BOMA),
Emergency Resource Center
.http://www.boma.org/emergency
._ California Department of Health Services, Division of Drinking Water &
Environmental Management
.http://www.dhs.cahwnet.gov/ps/ddwem
._ Construction Industry Roundtable
.http://www.cirt.org
._ Construction Innovation Forum
.http://www.cif.org
._ Construction Specifications Institute
.http://www.csinet.org
._ Construction Users Roundtable
.http://www.curt.org
._ Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
.http://www.dtra.mil
._ Design-Build Institute of America
.http://www.dbia.org
._ Drexel (University) Intelligent Infrastructure & Transportation Safety Institute
.http://www.di3.drexel.edu
. _ Federal Highway Administration

http://www.fhwa.dot.gov
_ Florida Department of Transportation, Emergency Management Office
http://www11.myflorida.com/safety/Emp/emp.htm
or Florida Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management
http://www.floridadisaster.org/bpr/EMTOOLS/Severe/ terrorism.htm
or
http://www.dca.state.fl.us/bpr/EMTOOLS/CIP/critical_
infrastructure_protecti.htm
_ George Washington University, Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk
Management
http://www.cee.seas.gwu.edu
or
http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~icdm
._ Homeland Protection Institute, Ltd.
.http://www.hpi-tech.org
._ Inland Rivers Ports and Terminals
.http://www.irpt.net
._ Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. -USA
.http://www.ieeeusa.org or http://www.ieee.org/portal/ index.jsp
._ International Association of Foundation Drilling
.http://www.adsc-iafd.com
. _ International Code Council (ICC)

http://www.intlcode.org
Consolidates services, products, and operations of BOCA (Building Officials and
Code Administrators), ICBO (International Conference of Building Officials)
and SBCCI Southern Building Code Congress International) into one member
service organization - the International Code Council (ICC) in January 2003.
_ International Facility Management Association (IFMA)
http://www.ifma.org
._ Market Development Alliance of the FRP Composites Industry
.http://www.mdacomposites.org
._ Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering Research
.http://mceer.buffalo.edu
._ National Aeronautics and Space Administration
.http://www.nasa.gov
. _ National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC)

http://www.ncpc.gov
� Security and Urban Design
http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/security.html
._ National Center for Manufacturing Sciences
.http://www.ncms.org
._ National Concrete Masonry Association
.http://www.ncma.org
._ National Conference of States on Building Codes and Standards
.http://www.ncsbcs.org
._ National Council of Structural Engineers Associations (NCSEA)
.http://www.ncsea.com or http://dwp.bigplanet.com/
engineers/homepage

._ National Crime Prevention Institute
.http://www.louisville.edu/a-s/ja/ncpi/courses.htm
._ National Fire Protection Association
.http://www.nfpa.org
._ National Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS)
.http://www.nibs.org and http://www.wbdg.org
._ National Park Service, Denver Service Center
.http://www.nps.gov/dsc
. _ National Precast Concrete Association

http://www.precast.org
._ National Wilderness Training Center, Inc.
.http://www.wildernesstraining.net
._ New York City Office of Emergency Preparedness
.http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem
._ Ohio State University
.http://www.osu.edu/homelandsecurity
._ Pentagon Renovation Program
.http://renovation.pentagon.mil
._ Portland Cement Association (PCA)
.http://www.portcement.org
._ Primary Glass Manufacturers Council
.http://www.primaryglass.org
._ Protective Glazing Council
.http://www.protectiveglazing.org
._ Protective Technology Center at Penn State University
.http://www.ptc.psu.edu
._ SAVE International
.http://www.value-eng.org
._ Society of Fire Protection Engineers
.http://www.sfpe.org
._ Southern Building Code Congress, International
.http://www.sbcci.org
._ Sustainable Buildings Industry Council
.http://www.sbicouncil.org
._ Transit Standards Consortium
.http://www.tsconsortium.org
._ Transportation Research Board/Marine Board
.http://www.trb.org
. _ Transportation Security Administration -Maritime and Land

http://www.tsa.dot.gov
._ University of Missouri, Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering,
National Center for Explosion Resistant Design
.http://www.engineering.missouri.edu/explosion.htm
._ U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency
.http://www.afcesa.af.mil
._ U.S. Coast Guard
.http://www.uscg.mil
. _ U.S. Department of Energy

http://www.energy.gov
.� Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
.http://www.sandia.gov
.� Architectural Surety Program
.http://www.sandia.gov/archsur
. � Critical Infrastructure Protection Initiative

http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN02-11-00/steam_ story.html
._ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
.http://www.hhs.gov
._ U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
.http://www.va.gov/facmgt
._ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Chemical Emergency
Preparedness and Prevention Office (CEPPO)- Counter-terrorism
.http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/cntr-ter.html
. _ U.S. General Services Administration (GSA)

http://www.gsa.gov
� Office of Federal Protective Service (FPS) of GSA
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/content/orgs_content.jsp?cont
entOID=117945&contentType=1005&P=1&S=1
. � Office of Public Building Service (PBS) of GSA

http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/content/orgs_content.jsp?cont
entOID=22883&contentType=1005&PPzz=1&S=1
� Office of the Chief Architect of GSA
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/content/orgs_content.jsp?cont
entOID=22899&contentType=1005
and
http://www.oca.gsa.gov
._ U.S. Green Building Council
.http://www.usgbc.org
._ U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters
.http://www.usmc.mil
._ U.S. Society on Dams
.http://www.ussdams.org
._ Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
.http://www.ce.vt.edu
. _ Water and Wastewater Equipment Manufacturers Association

http://www.wwema.org
The Partnership for Critical Infrastructure (PCIS)
http://www.pcis.org
Note: Involved mainly with information systems and not building real property.
Government
._ Department of Commerce Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO)
.http://www.ciao.gov
._ Department of Energy (DOE)
.http://www.energy.gov
._ Department of Homeland Security
.http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland
. _ National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC)

http://www.nipc.gov
Private Sector
._ Anser Institute for Homeland Security (ANSER)
.http://www.homelandsecurity.org
._ CERT(r) Coordination Center (CERT/CC)
.http://www.cert.org
._ Electronic Warfare Associates (EWA)
.http://www.ewa.com
._ Information Technology Association of America (ITAA)
.http://www.itaa.org
._ National Cyber Security Alliance (Alliance)
.http://www.staysafeonline.info
._ North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC)
.http://www.nerc.com
._ SANS Institute (SANS -SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security)
.http://www.sans.org
._ The Financial Services Roundtable Technology Group (BITS)
.http://www.bitsinfo.org
._ The Institute for Internal Auditors (IIA)
.http://www.theiia.org
. _ The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Center for Corporate
Citizenship (CCC)

http://www.uschamber.com/ccc
Selected States and Local Organizations
._ Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies
.http://www.amwa.net
._ International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM)
.http://www.iaem.com
. _ National Association of State CIOs (NASCIO)

http://www.nascio.org
._ National Emergency Managers Association (NEMA)
.http://www.nemaweb.org
._ National Governor's Association (NGA)
.http://www.csg.org
._ The Council of State Governments (CSG)
.http://www.csg.org
. _ The National League of Cities (NLC)

http://www.nlc.org
BUILDING VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST F
he Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist is based on
the checklist developed by the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) and compiles many best practices based on
technologies and scientific research to consider during the
design of a new school building or renovation of an
existing building. It allows a consistent security evaluation
of designs at various levels. The checklist can be used as a
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability
assessment or be used by subject matter experts for a
comprehensive vulnerability assessment of existing
buildings. In addition to examining design issues that
affect vulnerability, the checklist includes questions that
determine if critical systems continue to function in order
to enhance deterrence, detection, denial, and damage
limitation, and to ensure that emergency systems function
during a threat or hazard situation.
The checklist is organized into the 13 sections listed below. To conduct a vulnerability
assessment of a school building or preliminary design, each section of the checklist
should be assigned to an engineer, architect, or subject matter expert who is
knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Each
assessor should consider the questions and guidance provided to help identify
vulnerabilities and document results in the observations column. If assessing an
existing building, vulnerabilities can also be documented with photographs, if
possible. The results of the 13 assessments should be integrated into a master
vulnerability assessment and provide a basis for determining vulnerability ratings
during the assessment process.
1. 1. Site
2. 2. Architectural
3. 3. Structural Systems
4. 4. Building Envelope
5. 5. Utility Systems
6. 6. Mechanical Systems (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and CBR)
7. 7. Plumbing and Gas Systems
8. 8. Electrical Systems
9. 9. Fire Alarm Systems
10. 10. Communications and Information Technology (IT) Systems
11. 11. Equipment Operations and Maintenance
12. 12. Security Systems
13. 13. Security Master Plan

Building Vulnerablilty Assessment Checklist

Sectio
n
Vulnerability
Question
Guidanc
e
Observation
s

1 Sit

What major structures surround the facility (site or building(s))?
What critical infrastructure, government, military, or recreation facilities are in the local area
that impact transportation, utilities, and collateral damage (attack at this facility impacting the
other major structures or attack on the major structures impacting this facility)?
What are the adjacent land uses immediately outside the perimeter of this facility (site or
building(s))?
Do future development plans change these land uses outside the facility (site or building (s))
perimeter?
Although this question bridges threat and vulnerability, the threat is the manmade hazard that can
occur (likelihood and impact) and the vulnerability is the proximity of the hazard to the building(s)
being assessed. Thus, a chemical plant release may be a threat/hazard, but vulnerability changes if
the plant is 1 mile upwind for the prevailing winds versus 10 miles away and downwind. Similarly, a
terrorist attack upon an adjacent building may impact the building(s) being assessed. The Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City was not the only building to have severe damage caused by the
explosion of the Ryder rental truck bomb

Critical infrastructure to consider includes:
Telecommunications infrastructure
Facilities for broadcast TV, cable TV; cellular networks; newspaper offices, production, and distribution; radio
stations; satellite base stations; telephone trunking and switching stations, including critical cable routes and major
rights-of-way
Electric power systems
Power plants, especially nuclear facilities; transmission and distribution system components; fuel distribution,
delivery, and storage
Gas and oil facilities
Hazardous material facilities, oil/gas pipelines, and storage facilitie

Banking and finance institutions
Financial institutions (banks, credit unions) and the business district; note schedule business/financial
district may follow; armored car services
Transportation networks
Airports: carriers, flight paths, and airport layout; location of air traffic control towers, runways, passenger
terminals, and parking areas
Bus Stations
Pipelines: oil; gas
Trains/Subways: rails and lines, railheads/rail yards, interchanges, tunnels, and cargo/passenger terminals;
note hazardous material transported
Traffic: interstate highways/roads/tunnels/bridges carrying large volumes; points of congestion; note time
of day and day of week
Trucking: hazardous materials cargo loading/unloading facilities; truck terminals, weigh stations, and rest
areas
Waterways: dams; levees; berths and ports for cruise ships, ferries, roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and
container ships; international (foreign) flagged vessels (and cargo)
Water supply systems
Pipelines and process/treatment facilities, dams for water collection; wastewater treatment
Government services
Federal/state/local government offices - post offices, law enforcement stations, fire/rescue, town/city hall,
local mayor's/governor's residences, judicial offices and courts, military installations (include type-Active,
Reserves, National Guard)
Emergency services
Backup facilities, communications centers, Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), fire/Emergency Medical
Service (EMS) facilities, Emergency Medical Center (EMCs), law enforcement facilities
The following are not critical infrastructure, but have potential collateral damage to
consider:
Agricultural facilities: chemical distribution, storage, and application sites; crop spraying services; farms and
ranches; food processing, storage, and distribution facilities
Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities: apartment buildings; business/corporate
centers; chemical plants (especially those with Section 302 Extremely Hazardous Substances); factories; fuel
production, distribution, and storage facilities; hotels and convention centers; industrial plants; raw material
production, distribution, and storage facilities; research facilities and laboratories; shipping, warehousing,
transfer, and logistical centers
Events and attractions: festivals and celebrations; open-air markets; parades; rallies, demonstrations,
and marches; religious services; scenic tours; theme parks
Health care system components: family planning clinics; health department offices; hospitals;
radiological material and medical waste transportation, storage, and disposal; research facilities and
laboratories, walk-in clinics
Political or symbolically significant sites: embassies, consulates, landmarks, monuments,
political party and special interest groups offices, religious sites
Public/private institutions: academic institutions, cultural centers, libraries, museums, research
facilities and laboratories, schools
Recreation facilities: auditoriums, casinos, concert halls and pavilions, parks, restaurants and clubs
(frequented by potential target populations), sports arenas, stadiums, theaters, malls, and special interest
group facilities; note congestion dates and times for shopping centers
References: FEMA 386-7, FEMA SLG 101, DOJ NCJ181200

1.2
Does the terrain place the building in a depression or low area?

Depressions or low areas can trap heavy vapors, inhibit natural decontamination by prevailing winds, and
reduce the effectiveness of in-place sheltering.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guid

1.3

In dense, urban areas, does curb lane parking allow uncontrolled vehicles to park
unacceptably close to a building in public rights-of-way

Where distance from the building to the nearest curb provides insufficient setback, restrict parking in the curb
lane. For typical city streets, this may require negotiating to close the curb lane. Setback is common
terminology for the distance between a building and its associated roadway or parking. It is analogous to stand-
off between a vehicle bomb and the building. The benefit per foot of increased stand-off between a potential
vehicle bomb and a building is very high when close to a building and decreases rapidly as the distance
increases. Note that the July 1, 1994, Americans with Disabilities Act Standards for Accessible Design states
that required handicapped parking shall be located on the shortest accessible route of travel from adjacent
parking to an accessible entrance.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.4

Is a perimeter fence or other types of barrier controls in place?
The intent is to channel pedestrian traffic onto a site with multiple buildings through known access control
points. For a single building, the intent is to have a single visitor entrance.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.5

What are the site access points to the site or building?

The goal is to have at least two access points - one for passenger vehicles and one for delivery trucks due to the
different procedures needed for each. Having two access points also helps if one of the access points becomes
unusable, then traffic can be routed through the other access point.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

1.6

Is vehicle traffic separated from pedestrian traffic on the site?
Pedestrian access should not be endangered by car traffic. Pedestrian access, especially from public
transportation, should not cross vehicle traffic if possible.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

1.7
Is there vehicle and pedestrian access control at the perimeter of the site

Vehicle and pedestrian access control and inspection should occur as far from facilities as possible (preferably
at the site perimeter) with the ability to regulate the flow of people and vehicles one at a time.
Control on-site parking with identification checks, security personnel, and access control systems.
Reference: FEMA 386-7
1.8
Is there space for inspection at the curb line or outside the protected perimeter?
What is the minimum distance from the inspection location to the building

Design features for the vehicular inspection point include: vehicle arrest devices that prevent vehicles from
leaving the vehicular inspection area and prevent tailgating.
If screening space cannot be provided, consider other design features such as: hardening and alternative location
for vehicle search/inspection.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.9
Is there any potential access to the site or building through utility paths or water runoff

Eliminate potential site access through utility tunnels, corridors, manholes, stormwater runoff culverts, etc.
Ensure covers to these access points are secured.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

1.10
What are the existing types of vehicle anti-ram devices for the site or building?
Are these devices at the property boundary or at the building

Passive barriers include bollards, walls, hardened fences (steel cable interlaced), trenches, ponds/basins,
concrete planters, street furniture, plantings, trees, sculptures, and fountains. Active barriers include pop-up
bollards, swing arm gates, and rotating plates and drums, etc.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.11
What is the anti-ram buffer zone stand-off distance from the building to unscreened vehicles or
parking

If the recommended distance for the postulated threat is not available, consider reducing the stand-off required
through structural hardening or manufacturing additional stand-off through barriers and parking restrictions.
Also, consider relocation of vulnerable functions within the building, or to a more hazard-resistant building.
More stand-off should be used for unscreened vehicles than for screened vehicles that have been searched.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.12
Are perimeter barriers capable of stopping vehicles?
Will the vehicle barriers at the perimeter and building maintain access for emergency
responders, including large fire apparatus

Anti-ram protection may be provided by adequately designed: bollards, street furniture, sculpture, landscaping,
walls, and fences. The anti-ram protection must be able to stop the threat vehicle size (weight) at the speed
attainable by that vehicle at impact. If the anti-ram protection cannot absorb the desired kinetic energy,
consider adding speed controls (serpentines or speed bumps) to limit the speed at impact. If the resultant speed
is still too great, the anti-ram protection should be improved.
References: Military Handbook 1013/14 and GSA PBS P-100

1.13
Does site circulation prevent high-speed approaches by vehicles

The intent is to use site circulation to minimize vehicle speeds and eliminate direct approaches to structures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.14
Are there offsetting vehicle entrances from the direction of a vehicle's approach to force a
reduction of speed

Single or double 90-degree turns effectively reduce vehicle approach speed.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.1

Is there a minimum setback distance between the building and parked vehicles

Adjacent public parking should be directed to more distant or better-protected areas, segregated from employee
parking and away from the building. Some publications use the term setback in lieu of the term stand-off.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.1

Does adjacent surface parking on site maintain a minimum stand-off distance

The specific stand-off distance needed is based upon the design basis threat bomb size and the building
construction. For initial screening, consider using 25 meters (82 feet) as a minimum, with more distance needed
for unreinforced masonry or wooden walls.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.1

Do standalone, aboveground parking garages provide adequate visibility across as well as into
and out of the parking garage

Pedestrian paths should be planned to concentrate activity to the extent possible.
Limiting vehicular entry/exits to a minimum number of locations is beneficial.
Stair tower and elevator lobby design should be as open as code permits. Stair and/or elevator waiting areas
should be as open to the exterior and/or the parking areas as possible and well lighted. Impact-resistant,
laminated glass for stair towers and elevators is a way to provide visual openness.
Potential hiding places below stairs should be closed off; nooks and crannies should be avoided, and dead-end
parking areas should be eliminated.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.1

Are garage or service area entrances for employee-permitted vehicles protected by suitable
anti-ram devices?
Coordinate this protection with other anti-ram devices, such as on the perimeter or property
boundary to avoid duplication of arresting capability

Control internal building parking, underground parking garages, and access to service areas and loading docks
in this manner with proper access control, or eliminate the parking altogether.
The anti-ram device must be capable of arresting a vehicle of the designated threat size at the speed attainable at
the location.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.1

Do site landscaping and street furniture provide hiding places

Minimize concealment opportunities by keeping landscape plantings (hedges, shrubbery, and large plants with
heavy ground cover) and street furniture (bus shelters, benches, trash receptacles, mailboxes, newspaper
vending machines) away from the building to permit observation of intruders and prevent hiding of packages.
If mail or express boxes are used, the size of the openings should be restricted to prohibit the insertion of
packages.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.2

Is the site lighting adequate from a security perspective in roadway access and parking areas

Security protection can be successfully addressed through adequate lighting. The type and design of lighting,
including illumination levels, is critical. Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA)
guidelines can be used. The site lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV system.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
1.2

Are line-of-sight perspectives from outside the secured boundary to the building and on the
property along pedestrian and vehicle routes integrated with landscaping and green space

The goal is to prevent the observation of critical assets by persons outside the secure boundary of the site. For
individual buildings in an urban environment, this could mean appropriate window treatments or no windows
for portions of the building.
Once on the site, the concern is to ensure observation by a general workforce aware of any pedestrians or
vehicles outside normal circulation routes or attempting to approach the building unobserved.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide
1.22
Do signs provide control of vehicles and people

The signage should be simple and have the necessary level of clarity. However, signs that identify sensitive
areas should generally not be provided.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

1.23
Are all existing fire hydrants on the site accessible

Just as vehicle access points to the site must be able to transit emergency vehicles, so too must the emergency
vehicles have access to the buildings and, in the case of fire trucks, the fire hydrants. Thus, security
considerations must accommodate emergency response requirements.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2 Architectural

2.1

Does the site and architectural design incorporate strategies from a Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) perspective

The focus of CPTED is on creating defensible space by employing:
1. Natural access controls:
- Design streets, sidewalks, and building entrances to clearly indicate public routes and direct people away from
private/restricted areas
- Discourage access to private areas with structural elements and limit access (no cut-through streets)
- Loading zones should be separate from public parking
2. Natural surveillance:
- Design that maximizes visibility of people, parking areas, and building entrances; doors and windows that
look out on to streets and parking areas
- Shrubbery under 2 feet in height for visibility
- Lower branches of existing trees kept at least 10 feet off the ground
- Pedestrian-friendly sidewalks and streets to control pedestrian and vehicle circulation
- Adequate nighttime lighting, especially at exterior doorways
3. Territorial reinforcement:
- Design that defines property lines
- Design that distinguishes private/restricted spaces from public spaces using separation, landscape plantings;
pavement designs (pathway and roadway placement); gateway treatments at lobbies, corridors, and door
placement; walls, barriers, signage, lighting, and "CPTED" fences
- "Traffic-calming" devices for vehicle speed control
4. Target hardening:
- Prohibit entry or access: window locks, deadbolts for doors, interior door hinges
- Access control (building and employee/visitor parking) and intrusion detection systems
5. Closed circuit television cameras:
- Prevent crime and influence positive behavior, while enhancing the intended uses of space. In other words,
design that eliminates or reduces criminal behavior and at the same time encourages people to "keep an eye
out" for each other.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

Is it a mixed-tenant building

Separate high-risk tenants from low-risk tenants and from publicly accessible areas. Mixed uses may be
accommodated through such means as separating entryways, controlling access, and hardening shared
partitions, as well as through special security operational countermeasures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Are pedestrian paths planned to concentrate activity to aid in detectio

Site planning and landscape design can provide natural surveillance by concentrating pedestrian activity,
limiting entrances/exits, and eliminating concealment opportunities. Also, prevent pedestrian access to
parking areas other than via established entrances.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.

Are there trash receptacles and mailboxes in close proximity to the building that can be used
to hide explosive devices

The size of the trash receptacles and mailbox openings should be restricted to prohibit insertion of packages.
Street furniture, such as newspaper vending machines, should be kept sufficient distance (10 meters or 33 feet)
from the building, or brought inside to a secure area.
References: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD UCF 4-010-01

Do entrances avoid significant queuing

If queuing will occur within the building footprint, the area should be enclosed in blast-resistant construction. If
queuing is expected outside the building, a rain cover should be provided. For manpower and equipment
requirements, collocate or combine staff and visitor entrances.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

Does security screening cover all public and private areas?
Are public and private activities separated?
Are public toilets, service spaces, or access to stairs or elevators located in any non-secure
areas, including the queuing area before screening at the public entrance

Retail activities should be prohibited in non-secured areas. However, the Public Building Cooperative Use Act
of 1976 encourages retail and mixed uses to create open and inviting buildings. Consider separating entryways,
controlling access, hardening shared partitions, and special security operational countermeasures.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

Is access control provided through main entrance points for employees and visitors?
(lobby receptionist, sign-in, staff escorts, issue of visitor badges, checking forms of personal identification, electronic
access control systems

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Is access to private and public space or restricted area space clearly defined through the
design of the space, signage, use of electronic security devices, etc.

Finishes and signage should be designed for visual simplicity.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
2.

Is access to elevators distinguished as to those that are designated only for employees and
visitors

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

2.1

Do public and employee entrances include space for possible future installation of access
control and screening equipment

These include walk-through metal detectors and x-ray devices, identification check, electronic access card,
search stations, and turnstiles.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.1

Do foyers have reinforced concrete walls and offset interior and exterior doors from each
other

Consider for exterior entrances to the building or to access critical areas within the building if explosive blast
hazard must be mitigated.
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853
2.1

Do doors and walls along the line of security screening meet requirements of UL752 "Standard
for Safety: Bullet-Resisting Equipment"

If the postulated threat in designing entrance access control includes rifles, pistols, or shotguns, then the screening area
should have bullet-resistance to protect security personnel and uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if present, should also be
bullet-resistant.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.1

Do circulation routes have unobstructed views of people approaching controlled access points

This applies to building entrances and to critical areas within the building.
References: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide and DoD UFC 4-010-01
2.1

Is roof access limited to authorized personnel by means of locking mechanisms

References: GSA PBS-P100 and CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139
2.1

Are critical assets (people, activities, building systems and components) located close to any
main entrance, vehicle circulation, parking, maintenance area, loading dock, or interior
parking?
Are the critical building systems and components hardened

Critical building components include: Emergency generator including fuel systems, day tank, fire sprinkler, and
water supply; Normal fuel storage; Main switchgear; Telephone distribution and main switchgear; Fire pumps;
Building control centers; Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) systems controlling critical functions; Main
refrigeration and ventilation systems if critical to building operation; Elevator machinery and controls; Shafts
for stairs, elevators, and utilities; Critical distribution feeders for emergency power. Evacuation and rescue
require emergency systems to remain operational during a disaster and they should be located away from
potential attack locations. Primary and backup systems should be separated to reduce the risk of both being
impacted by a single incident if collocated. Utility systems should be located at least 50 feet from loading
docks, front entrances, and parking areas.
One way to harden critical building systems and components is to enclose them within hardened walls, floors,
and ceilings. Do not place them near high-risk areas where they can receive collateral damage.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.1

Are high-value or critical assets located as far into the interior of the building as possible and
separated from the public areas of the building

Critical assets, such as people and activities, are more vulnerable to hazards when on an exterior building wall
or adjacent to uncontrolled public areas inside the building.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.1

Is high visitor activity away from critical assets

High-risk activities should also be separated from low-risk activities. Also, visitor activities should be
separated from daily activities.
Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide
2.1

Are critical assets located in spaces that are occupied 24 hours per day?
Are assets located in areas where they are visible to more than one person

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

2.1

Are loading docks and receiving and shipping areas separated in any direction from utility
rooms, utility mains, and service entrances, including electrical, telephone/data, fire
detection/alarm systems, fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains, etc.

Loading docks should be designed to keep vehicles from driving into or parking under the building. If loading
docks are in close proximity to critical equipment, consider hardening the equipment and service against
explosive blast. Consider a 50-foot separation distance in all directions.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.20
Are mailrooms located away from building main entrances, areas containing critical services,
utilities, distribution systems, and important assets?
Is the mailroom located near the loading dock?

The mailroom should be located at the perimeter of the building with an outside wall or window designed for
pressure relief.
By separating the mailroom and the loading dock, the collateral damage of an incident at one has less impact
upon the other. However, this may be the preferred mailroom location.
Off-site screening stations or a separate delivery processing building on site may be cost-effective, particularly
if several buildings may share one mailroom. A separate delivery processing building reduces risk and
simplifies protection measures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.21
Does the mailroom have adequate space available for equipment to examine incoming
packages and for an explosive disposal container

Screening of all deliveries to the building, including U.S. mail, commercial package delivery services, delivery
of office supplies, etc.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
2.2

Are areas of refuge identified, with special consideration given to egress

Areas of refuge can be safe havens, shelters, or protected spaces for use during specified hazards.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

2.23
Are stairwells required for emergency egress located as remotely as possible from high-risk
areas where blast events might occur?
Are stairways maintained with positive pressure or are there other smoke control systems

Consider designing stairs so that they discharge into areas other than lobbies, parking, or loading docks.
Maintaining positive pressure from a clean source of air (may require special filtering) aids in egress by keeping
smoke, heat, toxic fumes, etc,. out of the stairway. Pressurize exit stairways in accordance with the National
Model Building Code.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139

2.2

Are enclosures for emergency egress hardened to limit the extent of debris that might
otherwise impede safe passage and reduce the flow of evacuees?

Egress pathways should be hardened and discharge into safe areas.
Reference: FEMA 386-7
2.2

Do interior barriers differentiate level of security within a building

Reference: USAF Installation Force Protection Guide

2.2

Are emergency systems located away from high-risk areas

The intent is to keep the emergency systems out of harm's way, such that one incident does not take out all
capability - both the regular systems and their backups.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

2.2

Is interior glazing near high-risk areas minimized?
Is interior glazing in other areas shatter-resistant

Interior glazing should be minimized where a threat exists and should be avoided in enclosures of critical
functions next to high-risk areas.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

2.2

Are ceiling and lighting systems designed to remain in place during hazard events?

When an explosive blast shatters a window, the blast wave enters the interior space, putting structural and non-
structural building components under loads not considered in standard building codes. It has been shown that
connection criteria for these systems in high seismic activity areas resulted in much less falling debris that
could injure building occupants.
Mount all overhead utilities and other fixtures weighing 14 kilograms (31 pounds) or more to minimize the
likelihood that they will fall and injure building occupants. Design all equipment mountings to resist forces of
0.5 times the equipment weight in any direction and 1.5 times the equipment weight in the downward direction.
This standard does not preclude the need to design equipment mountings for forces required by other criteria,
such as seismic standards.
Reference: DoD UCF 4-101-0

3 Structural Systems

What type of construction?
What type of concrete and reinforcing steel?
What type of steel?
What type of foundation?

The type of construction provides an indication of the robustness to abnormal loading and load reversals. A
reinforced concrete moment-resisting frame provides greater ductility and redundancy than a flat-slab or flat-
plate construction. The ductility of steel frame with metal deck depends on the connection details and pre-
tensioned or post-tensioned construction provides little capacity for abnormal loading patterns and load
reversals. The resistance of load-bearing wall structures varies to a great extent, depending on whether the walls
are reinforced or un-reinforced. A rapid screening process developed by FEMA for assessing structural hazards
identifies the following types of construction with a structural score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A higher score
indicates a greater capacity to sustain load reversals.
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 to 8.5
Steel moment-resisting frames - 3.5 to 4.5
Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0
Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 6.5
Steel frames with cast-in-place concrete shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5
Steel frames with unreinforced masonry infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0
Concrete moment-resisting frames - 2.0 to 4.0
Concrete shear wall buildings - 3.0 to 4.0
Concrete frames with unreinforced masonry infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0
Tilt-up buildings - 2.0 to 3.5
Precast concrete frame buildings - 1.5 to 2.5
Reinforced masonry - 3.0 to 4.0
Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 2.5
References: FEMA 154 and Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
3.2
Do the reinforced concrete structures contain symmetric steel reinforcement (positive and
negative faces) in all floor slabs, roof slabs, walls, beams, and girders that may be subjected to
rebound, uplift, and suction pressures?
Do the lap splices fully develop the capacity of the reinforcement?
Are lap splices and other discontinuities staggered?
Do the connections possess ductile details?
Is special shear reinforcement, including ties and stirrups, available to allow large post-elastic behavior?

Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.3
Are the steel frame connections moment connections?
Is the column spacing minimized so that reasonably sized members will resist the design loads
and increase the redundancy of the system?
What are the floor-to-floor heights?

A practical upper level for column spacing is generally 30 feet. Unless there is an overriding architectural
requirement, a practical limit for floor-to-floor heights is generally less than or equal to 16 feet.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
3.4
Are critical elements vulnerable to failure?
The priority for upgrades should be based on the relative importance of structural or non-structural elements that
are essential to mitigating the extent of collapse and minimizing injury and damage.
Primary Structural Elements provide the essential parts of the building's resistance to catastrophic blast loads
and progressive collapse. These include columns, girders, roof beams, and the main lateral resistance system.
Secondary Structural Elements consist of all other load-bearing members, such as floor beams, slabs, etc.
Primary Non-Structural Elements consist of elements (including their attachments) that are essential for life
safety systems or elements that can cause substantial injury if failure occurs, including ceilings or heavy
suspended mechanical units.
Secondary Non-Structural Elements consist of all elements not covered in primary non-structural elements, such
as partitions, furniture, and light fixtures.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.5
Will the structure suffer an unacceptable level of damage resulting from the postulated threat
(blast loading or weapon impact)?

The extent of damage to the structure and exterior wall systems from the bomb threat may be related to a
protection level. The following is for new buildings:
Level of Protection Below Antiterrorism Standards - Severe damage. Frame collapse/massive
destruction. Little left standing. Doors and windows fail and result in lethal hazards. Majority of personnel
suffer fatalities.
Very Low Level Protection - Heavy damage. Onset of structural collapse. Major deformation of primary
and secondary structural members, but progressive collapse is unlikely. Collapse of non-structural elements.
Glazing will break and is likely to be propelled into the building, resulting in serious glazing fragment injuries,
but fragments will be reduced. Doors may be propelled into rooms, presenting serious hazards. Majority of
personnel suffer serious injuries. There are likely to be a limited number (10 percent to 25 percent) of fatalities.
Low Level of Protection - Moderate damage, unrepairable. Major deformation of non-structural elements
and secondary structural members and minor deformation of primary structural members, but progressive
collapse is unlikely. Glazing will break, but fall within 1 meter of the wall or otherwise not present a
significant fragment hazard. Doors may fail, but they will rebound out of their frames, presenting minimal
hazards. Majority of personnel suffer significant injuries. There may be a few (<10 percent) fatalities.
Medium Level Protection - Minor damage, repairable. Minor deformations of non-structural elements and
secondary structural members and no permanent deformation in primary structural members. Glazing will break,
but will remain in the window frame. Doors will stay in frames, but will not be reusable. Some minor injuries,
but fatalities are unlikely.
High Level Protection - Minimal damage, repairable. No permanent deformation of primary and
secondary structural members or non-structural elements. Glazing will not break. Doors will be reusable. Only
superficial injuries are likely.
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

3.6
Is the structure vulnerable to progressive collapse?
Is the building capable of sustaining the removal of a column for one floor above grade at the
building perimeter without progressive collapse?
In the event of an internal explosion in an uncontrolled public ground floor area, does the
design prevent progressive collapse due to the loss of one primary column?
Do architectural or structural features provide a minimum 6-inch stand-off to the internal
columns (primary vertical load carrying members)?
Are the columns in the unscreened internal spaces designed for an unbraced length equal to two floors,
or three floors where there are two levels of parking?
Design to mitigate progressive collapse is an independent analysis to determine a system's ability to resist
structural collapse upon the loss of a major structural element or the system's ability to resist the loss of a major
structural element. Design to mitigate progressive collapse may be based on the methods outlined in ASCE 7-98
(now 7-02). Designers may apply static and/or dynamic methods of analysis to meet this requirement and ultimate
load capacities may be assumed in the analyses. Combine structural upgrades for retrofits to existing buildings,
such as seismic and progressive collapse, into a single project due to the economic synergies and other cross
benefits. Existing facilities may be retrofitted to withstand the design level threat or to accept the loss of a
column for one floor above grade at the building perimeter without progressive collapse. Note that collapse of
floors or roof must not be permitted.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.7
Are there adequate redundant load paths in the structure?

Special consideration should be given to materials that have inherent ductility and that are better able to
respond to load reversals, such as cast in place reinforced concrete, reinforced masonry, and steel construction.
Careful detailing is required for material such as pre-stressed concrete, pre-cast concrete, and masonry to
adequately respond to the design loads. Primary vertical load carrying members should be protected where
parking is inside a facility and the building superstructure is supported by the parking structure.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.8
Are there transfer girders supported by columns within unscreened public spaces or at the
exterior of the building?

Transfer girders allow discontinuities in columns between the roof and foundation. This design has inherent
difficulty in transferring load to redundant paths upon loss of a column or the girder. Transfer beams and girders
that, if lost, may cause progressive collapse are highly discouraged.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.9
What is the grouting and reinforcement of masonry (brick and/or concrete masonry unit
(CMU)) exterior walls?

Avoid unreinforced masonry exterior walls. Reinforcement can run the range of light to heavy, depending upon
the stand-off distance available and postulated design threat.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 recommends fully grouted and reinforced CMU construction where CMU is selected.
Reference: DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings states "Unreinforced masonry walls are
prohibited for the exterior walls of new buildings. A minimum of 0.05 percent vertical reinforcement with a
maximum spacing of 1200 mm (48 in) will be provided. For existing buildings, implement mitigating measures
to provide an equivalent level of protection." [This is light reinforcement and based upon the recommended
stand-off distance for the situation.]

3.10
Will the loading dock design limit damage to adjacent areas and vent explosive force to the
exterior of the building?
Design the floor of the loading dock for blast resistance if the area below is occupied or contains critical utilities.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

3.11
Are mailrooms, where packages are received and opened for inspection, and unscreened
retail spaces designed to mitigate the effects of a blast on primary vertical or lateral bracing
members

Where mailrooms and unscreened retail spaces are located in occupied areas or adjacent to critical utilities,
walls, ceilings, and floors, they should be blast- and fragment- resistant.
Methods to facilitate the venting of explosive forces and gases from the interior spaces to the outside of the
structure may include blow-out panels and window system designs that provide protection from blast pressure
applied to the outside, but that readily fail and vent if exposed to blast pressure on the inside.
Reference: GSA PBS-P10

4 Building Envelope

4.1

What is the designed or estimated protection level of the exterior walls against the postulated
explosive threat?

The performance of the fa�ade varies to a great extent on the materials. Different construction includes brick or
stone with block backup, steel stud walls, precast panels, or curtain wall with glass, stone, or metal panel
elements.
Shear walls that are essential to the lateral and vertical load bearing system and that also function as exterior
walls should be considered primary structures and should resist the actual blast loads predicted from the threats
specified. Where exterior walls are not designed for the full design loads, special consideration should be given
to construction types that reduce the potential for injury.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.2
Is there less than a 40 percent fenestration opening per structural bay?
Is the window system design on the exterior fa�ade balanced to mitigate the hazardous effects
of flying glazing following an explosive event? (glazing, frames, anchorage to supporting walls,
etc.)
Do the glazing systems with a 1�2-inch (3�4-inch is better) bite contain an application of
structural silicone?
Is the glazing laminated or is it protected with an anti-shatter (fragment retention) film?
If an anti-shatter film is used, is it a minimum of a 7-mil thick film, or specially manufactured
4-mil thick film?

The performance of the glass will similarly depend on the materials. Glazing may be single pane or double
pane, monolithic or laminated, annealed, heat strengthened or fully tempered.
The percent fenestration is a balance between protection level, cost, the architectural look of the building
within its surroundings, and building codes. One goal is to keep fenestration to below 40 percent of the
building envelope vertical surface area, but the process must balance differing requirements. A blast engineer
may prefer no windows; an architect may favor window curtain walls; building codes require so much
fenestration per square footage of floor area; fire codes require a prescribed window opening area if the window is
a designated escape route; and the building owner has cost concerns.
Ideally, an owner would want 100 percent of the glazed area to provide the design protection level against the
postulated explosive threat (design basis threat- weapon size at the expected stand-off distance). However,
economics and geometry may allow 80 percent to 90 percent due to the statistical differences in the
manufacturing process for glass or the angle of incidence of the blast wave upon upper story windows (4th floor
and higher).
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.3
Do the walls, anchorage, and window framing fully develop the capacity of the glazing material
selected?
Are the walls capable of withstanding the dynamic reactions from the windows?
Will the anchorage remain attached to the walls of the building during an explosive event
without failure?
Is the fa�ade connected to backup block or to the structural frame?
Are non-bearing masonry walls reinforced?

Government produced and sponsored computer programs coupled with test data and recognized dynamic
structural analysis techniques may be used to determine whether the glazing either survives the specified threats
or the post damage performance of the glazing protects the occupants. A breakage probability no higher than
750 breaks per 1,000 may be used when calculating loads to frames and anchorage.
The intent is to ensure the building envelope provides relatively equal protection against the postulated
explosive threat for the walls and window systems for the safety of the occupants, especially in rooms with
exterior walls.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.4
Does the building contain ballistic glazing?
Does the ballistic glazing meet the requirements of UL 752 Bullet-Resistant Glazing?
Does the building contain security-glazing?
Does the security-glazing meet the requirements of ASTM F1233 or UL 972, Burglary
Resistant Glazing Material?
Do the window assemblies containing forced entry resistant glazing (excluding the glazing)
meet the requirements of ASTM F 588?

Glass-clad polycarbonate or laminated polycarbonate are two types of acceptable glazing material.
If windows are upgraded to bullet-resistant, burglar-resistant, or forced entry-resistant, ensure that doors,
ceilings, and floors, as applicable, can resist the same for the areas of concern.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

4.5
Do non-window openings, such as mechanical vents and exposed plenums, provide the same
level of protection required for the exterior wall

In-filling of blast over-pressures must be considered through non-window openings such that structural
members and all mechanical system mountings and attachments should resist these interior fill pressures.
These non-window openings should also be as secure as the rest of the building envelope against forced entry.
Reference: GSA PBS-P10

5 Utility Systems

What is the source of domestic water? (utility, municipal, wells, lake, river, storage tank)
Is there a secure alternate drinking water supply?

Domestic water is critical for continued building operation. Although bottled water can satisfy requirements for
drinking water and minimal sanitation, domestic water meets many other needs - flushing toilets, building
heating and cooling system operation, cooling of emergency generators, humidification, etc.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.2
Are there multiple entry points for the water supply?

If the building or site has only one source of water entering at one location, the entry point should be secure.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.3
Is the incoming water supply in a secure location?

Ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the water supply and its components.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.4
Does the building or site have storage capacity for domestic water?
How many gallons of storage capacity are available and how long will it allow operations to
continue?

Operational facilities will require reliance on adequate domestic water supply. Storage capacity can meet short-
term needs and use water trucks to replenish for extended outages.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities.

5.5
What is the source of water for the fire suppression system? (local utility company lines,
storage tanks with utility company backup, lake, or river)
Are there alternate water supplies for fire suppression?

The fire suppression system water may be supplied from the domestic water or it may have a separate source,
separate storage, or nonpotable alternate sources.
For a site with multiple buildings, the concern is that the supply should be adequate to fight the worst case
situation according to the fire codes. Recent major construction may change that requirement.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.6
Is the fire suppression system adequate, code-compliant, and protected (secure location)?

Standpipes, water supply control valves, and other system components should be secure or supervised.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

5.7
Do the sprinkler/standpipe interior controls (risers) have fire- and blast-resistant separation?
Are the sprinkler and standpipe connections adequate and redundant?
Are there fire hydrant and water supply connections near the sprinkler/standpipe
connections?
The incoming fire protection water line should be encased, buried, or located 50 feet from high-risk areas. The
interior mains should be looped and sectionalized.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.8
Are there redundant fire water pumps (e.g., one electric, one diesel)?
Are the pumps located apart from each other?

Collocating fire water pumps puts them at risk for a single incident to disable the fire suppression system.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

5.9
Are sewer systems accessible?
Are they protected or secured?

Sanitary and stormwater sewers should be protected from unauthorized access. The main concerns are backup or
flooding into the building, causing a health risk, shorting out electrical equipment, and loss of building use.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.10
What fuel supplies do the building rely upon for critical operation?
Typically, natural gas, propane, or fuel oil are required for continued operation.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.11
How much fuel is stored on the site or at the building and how long can this quantity support
critical operations?
How is it stored?
How is it secured?

Fuel storage protection is essential for continued operation.
Main fuel storage should be located away from loading docks, entrances, and parking. Access should be
restricted and protected (e.g., locks on caps and seals).
References: GSA PBS-P100 and Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.12
Where is the fuel supply obtained?
How is it delivered?

The supply of fuel is dependent on the reliability of the supplier.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.12
Are there alternate sources of fuel?
Can alternate fuels be used?

Critical functions may be served by alternate methods if normal fuel supply is interrupted.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.14
What is the normal source of electrical service for the site or building?

Utilities are the general source unless co-generation or a private energy provider is available.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.15
Is there a redundant electrical service source?
Can the site or buildings be fed from more than one utility substation?
The utility may have only one source of power from a single substation. There may be only single feeders from
the main substation.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.16
How many service entry points does the site or building have for electricity?

Electrical supply at one location creates a vulnerable situation unless an alternate source is available.
Ensure disconnecting requirements according to NFPA 70 (National Fire Protection Association, National
Electric Code) are met for multiple service entrances.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.17
Is the incoming electric service to the building secure?

Typically, the service entrance is a locked room, inaccessible to the public.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.18
What provisions for emergency power exist? What systems receive emergency power and
have capacity requirements been tested?

Is the emergency power collocated with the commercial electric service?
Is there an exterior connection for emergency power?

Besides installed generators to supply emergency power, portable generators or rental generators available
under emergency contract can be quickly connected to a building with an exterior quick disconnect already
installed.
Testing under actual loading and operational conditions ensures the critical systems requiring emergency power
receive it with a high assurance of reliability.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

5.19
By what means do the main telephone and data communications interface the site or building?
Typically, communication ducts or other conduits are available. Overhead service is more identifiable and
vulnerable.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.20
Are there multiple or redundant locations for the telephone and communications service?

Secure locations of communications wiring entry to the site or building are required.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
5.21
Does the fire alarm system require communication with external sources?
By what method is the alarm signal sent to the responding agency: telephone, radio, etc.?
Is there an intermediary alarm monitoring center?
Typically, the local fire department responds to an alarm that sounds at the station or is transmitted over phone
lines by an auto dialer.
An intermediary control center for fire, security, and/or building system alarms may receive the initial
notification at an on-site or off-site location. This center may then determine the necessary response and
inform the responding agency.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

5.22
Are utility lifelines aboveground, underground, or direct buried?

Utility lifelines (water, power, communications, etc.) can be protected by concealing, burying, or encasing.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-

6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR)

6.1
Where are the air intakes and exhaust louvers for the building? (low, high, or midpoint of the
building structure)
Are the intakes and exhausts accessible to the public?

Air intakes should be located on the roof or as high as possible. Otherwise secure within CPTED-compliant
fencing or enclosure. The fencing or enclosure should have a sloped roof to prevent the throwing of anything
into the enclosure near the intakes.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states that air intakes should be on the fourth floor or higher and, on buildings with
three floors or less, they should be on the roof or as high as practical. Locating intakes high on a wall is
preferred over a roof location.
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 states that, for all new inhabited buildings covered by this document, all air
intakes should be located at least 3 meters (10 feet) above the ground.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 states: "An extension height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will place the intake out
of reach of individuals without some assistance. Also, the entrance to the intake should be covered with a sloped
metal mesh to reduce the threat of objects being tossed into the intake. A minimum slope of 45� is generally
adequate. Extension height should be increased where existing platforms or building features (i.e., loading
docks, retaining walls) might provide access to the outdoor air intakes".
Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: Exhausts are also a concer n during an outdoor release, especially if exhaust fans
are not in continuous operation, due to wind effects and chimney effects (air movement due to differential
temperature).

6.2
Is roof access limited to authorized personnel by means of locking mechanisms?
Is access to mechanical areas similarly controlled?

Roofs are like entrances to the building and are like mechanical rooms when HVAC is installed. Adjacent
structures or landscaping should not allow access to the roof.
References: GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 51959

6.3
Are there multiple air intake locations?

Single air intakes may feed several air handling units. Indicate if the air intakes are localized or separated.
Installing low-leakage dampers is one way to provide the system separation when necessary.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

6.4
What are the types of air filtration? Include the efficiency and number of filter modules for each of the
main air handling systems?
Is there any collective protection for chemical, biological, and radiological contamination
designed into the building?

MERV - Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value
HEPA - High Efficiency Particulate Air
Activated charcoal for gases
Ultraviolet C for biologicals
Consider mix of approaches for optimum protection and cost-effectiveness.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.5
Is there space for larger filter assemblies on critical air handling systems?

Air handling units serving critical functions during continued operation may be retrofitted to provide enhanced
protection during emergencies. However, upgraded filtration may have negative effects upon the overall air
handling system operation, such as increased pressure drop.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.6
Are there �provisions for air monitors or sensors for chemical or biological agents?

Duct mounted sensors are usuallly found in limited cases in laboratory areas. Sensors generally have a limited
spectrum of high reliability and are costly. Many different technologies are undergoing research to provide
capability.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

6.7
By what method are air intakes and exhausts closed when not operational?

Motorized (low-leakage, fast-acting) dampers are the preferred method for closure with fail-safe to the closed
position so as to support in-place sheltering.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.8
How are air handling systems zoned?
What areas and functions do each of the primary air handling systems serve?
Understanding the critical areas of the building that must continue functioning focuses security and hazard
mitigation measures.
Applying HVAC zones that isolate lobbies, mailrooms, loading docks, and other entry and storage areas from
the rest of the building HVAC zones and maintaining negative pressure within these areas will contain CBR
releases. Identify common return systems that service more than one zone, effectively making a large single
zone.
Conversely, emergency egress routes should receive positive pressurization to ensure contamination does not
hinder egress. Consider filtering of the pressurization air.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.9
Are there large central air handling units or are there multiple units serving separate zones?

Independent units can continue to operate if damage occurs to limited areas of the building.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

6.10
Are there any redundancies in the air handling system?
Can critical areas be served from other units if a major system is disabled?

Redundancy reduces the security measures required compared to a non-redundant situation.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

6.11
Is the air supply to critical areas compartmentalized?
Similarly, are the critical areas or the building as a whole, considered tight with little or no
leakage?
During chemical, biological, and radiological situations, the intent is to either keep the contamination
localized in the critical area or prevent its entry into other critical, non-critical, or public areas. Systems can be
cross-connected through building openings (doorways, ceilings, partial wall), ductwork leakage, or pressure
differences in air handling system. In standard practice, there is almost always some air carried between
ventilation zones by pressure imbalances, due to elevator piston action, chimney effect, and wind effects.
Smoke testing of the air supply to critical areas may be necessary.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.12
Are supply, return, and exhaust air systems for critical areas secure?
Are all supply and return ducts completely connected to their grilles and registers and
secure?
Is the return air not ducted?

The air systems to critical areas should be inaccessible to the public, especially if the ductwork runs through the
public areas of the building. It is also more secure to have a ducted air handling system versus sharing hallways
and plenums above drop ceilings for return air. Non-ducted systems provide greater opportunity for introducing
contaminants.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.13
What is the method of temperature and humidity control?
Is it localized or centralized?
Central systems can range from monitoring only to full control. Local control may be available to override
central operation.
Of greatest concern are systems needed before, during, and after an incident that may be unavailable due to
temperature and humidity exceeding operational limits (e.g., main telephone switch room).
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
6.14
Where are the building automation control centers and cabinets located?
Are they in secure areas?
How is the control wiring routed?

Access to any component of the building automation and control system could compromise the functioning of
the system, increasing vulnerability to a hazard or precluding their proper operation during a hazard incident.
The HVAC and exhaust system controls should be in a secure area that allows rapid shutdown or other activation
based upon location and type of attack.
References: FEMA 386-7, DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1 and LBNL Pub 51959

6.15
Does the control of air handling systems support plans for sheltering in place or other
protective approach?

The micro-meteorological effects of buildings and terrain can alter travel and duration of chemical agents and
hazardous material releases. Shielding in the form of sheltering in place can protect people and property from
harmful effects.
To support in-place sheltering, the air handling systems require the ability for authorized personnel to rapidly
turn off all systems. However, if the system is properly filtered, then keeping the system operating will provide
protection as long as the air handling system does not distribute an internal release to other portions of the
building.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139
6.16
Are there any smoke evacuation systems installed?
Does it have purge capability?

For an internal blast, a smoke removal system may be essential, particularly in large, open spaces. The
equipment should be located away from high-risk areas, the system controls and wiring should be protected, and
it should be connected to emergency power. This exhaust capability can be built into areas with significant risk
on internal events, such as lobbies, loading docks, and mailrooms. Consider filtering of the exhaust to capture
CBR contaminants.
References: GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 51959
6.17
Where is roof-mounted equipment located on the roof? (near perimeter, at center of roof)

Roof-mounted equipment should be kept away from the building perimeter.
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853
6.18
Are fire dampers installed at all fire barriers?
Are all dampers functional and seal well when closed?

All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor air, return air, bypass) must be functional for proper protection within the
building during an incident.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139
6.19
Do fire walls and fire doors maintain their integrity?
The tightness of the building (both exterior, by weatherization to seal cracks around doors and windows, and
internal, by zone ducting, fire walls, fire stops, and fire doors) provides energy conservation benefits and
functional benefits during a CBR incident.
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959
6.20
Do elevators have recall capability and elevator emergency message capability?

Although a life-safety code and fire response requirement, the control of elevators also has benefit during a CBR
incident. The elevators generate a piston effect, causing pressure differentials in the elevator shaft and
associated floors that can force contamination to flow up or down.
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959
6.21
Is access to building information restricted?

Information on building operations, schematics, procedures, plans, and specifications should be strictly
controlled and available only to authorized personnel.
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959
6.22
Does the HVAC maintenance staff have the proper training, procedures, and preventive maintenance
schedule to ensure CBR equipment is functional?

Functional equipment must interface with operational procedures in an emergency plan to ensure the equipment
is properly operated to provide the protection desired.
The HVAC system can be operated in different ways, depending upon an external or internal release and where in
the building an internal release occurs. Thus maintenance and security staff must have the training to properly
operate the HVAC system under different circumstances, even if the procedure is to turn off all air movement
equipment.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and LBNL Pub 5195

7 Plumbing and Gas System

What is the method of water distribution?

Central shaft locations for piping are more vulnerable than multiple riser locations.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.2
What is the method of gas distribution? (heating, cooking, medical, process

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.3
Is there redundancy to the main piping distribution?
Looping of piping and use of section valves provide redundancies in the event sections of the system are
damaged.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.4
What is the method of heating domestic water?
What fuel(s) is used?

Single source of hot water with one fuel source is more vulnerable than multiple sources and multiple fuel types.
Domestic hot water availability is an operational concern for many building occupancies.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.5
Where are gas storage tanks located? (heating, cooking, medical, process)
How are they piped to the distribution system? (above or below ground)

The concern is that the tanks and piping could be vulnerable to a moving vehicle or a bomb blast either directly
or by collateral damage due to proximity to a higher-risk area.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

7.6
Are there reserve supplies of critical gases?

Localized gas cylinders could be available in the event of damage to the central tank system.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilitie

8 Electrical Systems
8.1
Are there any transformers or switchgears located outside the building or accessible from the
building exterior?
Are they vulnerable to public access?
Are they secured?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.2
What is the extent of the external building lighting in utility and service areas and at normal
entryways used by the building occupants?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.3
How are the electrical rooms secured and where are they located relative to other higher-risk
areas, starting with the main electrical distribution room at the service entrance?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.4
Are critical electrical systems collocated with other building systems?
Are critical electrical systems located in areas outside of secured electrical areas?
Is security system wiring located separately from electrical and other service systems?

Collocation concerns include rooms, ceilings, raceways, conduits, panels, and risers.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.5
How are electrical distribution panels serving branch circuits secured or are they in secure
locations?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

8.6
Does emergency backup power exist for all areas within the building or for critical areas only?
How is the emergency power distributed?
Is the emergency power system independent from the normal electrical service, particularly
in critical areas?

There should be no single critical node that allows both the normal electrical service and the emergency backup
power to be affected by a single incident. Automatic transfer switches and interconnecting switchgear are the
initial concerns.
Emergency and normal electrical equipment should be installed separately, at different locations, and as far apart
as possible.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

8.7
How is the primary electrical system wiring distributed?
Is it collocated with other major utilities?
Is there redundancy of distribution to critical areas?

Central utility shafts may be subject to damage, especially if there is only one for the building.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilitie

9 Fire Alarm System

9.1
Is the building fire alarm system centralized or localized?

How are alarms made known, both locally and centrally?

Are critical documents and control systems located in a secure yet accessible location

Fire alarm systems must first warn building occupants to evacuate for life safety. Then they must inform the
responding agency to dispatch fire equipment and personnel.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.2
Where are the fire alarm panels located?
Do they allow access to unauthorized personnel?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.3
Is the fire alarm system standalone or integrated with other functions such as security and
environmental or building management systems?
What is the interface?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

9.4
Do key fire alarm system components have fire- and blast-resistant separation?

This is especially necessary for the fire command center or fire alarm control center. The concern is to similarly
protect critical components as described in Items 2.19, 5.7, and 10.3.

9.5
Is there redundant off-premises fire alarm reporting?

Fire alarms can ring at a fire station, at an intermediary alarm monitoring center, or autodial someone else. See
Items 5.21 and 10.5

10 Communications and IT Systems

10.1
Where is the main telephone distribution room and where is it in relation to higher-risk areas?
Is the main telephone distribution room secure?

One can expect to find voice, data, signal, and alarm systems to be routed through the main telephone
distribution room.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

10.2
Does the telephone system have an uninterruptible power supply (UPS)?
What is its type, power rating, and operational duration under load, and location? (battery, on-line,
filtered)

Many telephone systems are now computerized and need a UPS to ensure reliability during power fluctuations.
The UPS is also needed to await any emergency power coming on line or allow orderly shutdown.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.3
Where are communication systems wiring closets located? (voice, data, signal, alarm)
Are they collocated with other utilities?
Are they in secure areas?
Concern is to have separation distance from other utilities and higher-risk areas to avoid collateral damage.
Security approaches on the closets include door alarms, closed circuit television, swipe cards, or other logging
notifications to ensure only authorized personnel have access to these closets.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

10.4
How is the communications system wiring distributed? (secure chases and risers, accessible
public areas)

The intent is to prevent tampering with the systems.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.5
Are there redundant communications systems available?

Critical areas should be supplied with multiple or redundant means of communications. Power outage phones
can provide redundancy as they connect directly to the local commercial telephone switch off site and not
through the building telephone switch in the main telephone distribution room.
A base radio communication system with antenna can be installed in stairwells, and portable sets distributed to
floors.
References: GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7

10.6
Where are the main distribution facility, data centers, routers, firewalls, and servers located
and are they secure?
Where are the secondary and/or intermediate distribution facilities and are they secure?

Concern is collateral damage from manmade hazards and redundancy of critical functions.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.7
What type and where are the Wide Area Network (WAN) connections?
Critical facilities should have two Minimum-Points-of-Presence( MPOPs) where the telephone company's
outside cable terminates inside the building. It is functionally a service entrance connection that demarcates
where the telephone company's property stops and the building owner's property begins. The MPOPs should
not be collocated and they should connect to different telephone company central offices so that the loss of one
cable or central office does not reduce capability.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.8
What are the type, power rating, and location of the uninterruptible power supply? (battery,
on-line, filtered)
Are the UPS also connected to emergency power?

Consider that UPS should be found at all computerized points from the main distribution facility to individual
data closets and at critical personal computers/terminals.
Critical LAN sections should also be on backup power.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.9
What type of Local Area Network (LAN) cabling and physical topology is used? (Category (Cat)
5, Gigabit Ethernet, Ethernet, Token Ring)

The physical topology of a network is the way in which the cables and computers are connected to each other.
The main types of physical topologies are:
Bus (single radial where any damage on the bus affects the whole system, but especially all portions
downstream)
Star (several computes are connected to a hub and many hubs can be in the network - the hubs can be critical
nodes, but the other hubs continue to function if one fails)
Ring (a bus with a continuous connection - least used, but can tolerate some damage because if the ring fails at a
single point it can be rerouted much like a looped electric or water system)
The configuration and the availability of surplus cable or spare capacity on individual cables can reduce
vulnerability to hazard incidents.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
10.10
For installed radio/wireless systems, what are their types and where are they located?(radio
frequency (RF), high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), medium wave (MW))

Depending upon the function of the wireless system, it could be susceptible to accidental or intended jamming
or collateral damage.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

10.11
Do the Information Technology (IT - computer) systems meet requirements of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability?
Ensure access to terminals and equipment for authorized personnel only and ensure system up-time to meet
operational needs.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

10.12
Where is the disaster recovery/mirroring site?

A site with suitable equipment that allows continuation of operations or that mirrors (operates in parallel to)
the existing operation is beneficial if equipment is lost during a natural or manmade disaster. The need is based
upon the criticality of the operation and how quickly replacement equipment can be put in place and operated.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
10.13
Where is the backup tape/file storage site and what is the type of safe environment?(safe, vault,
underground)
Is there redundant refrigeration in the site?
If equipment is lost, data are most likely lost, too. Backups are needed to continue operations at the disaster
recovery site or when equipment can be delivered and installed.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
10.14
Are there any satellite communications (SATCOM) links?(location, power, UPS, emergency
power, spare capacity/capability)

SATCOM links can serve as redundant communications for voice and data if configured to support required
capability after a hazard incident.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
10.15
Is there a mass notification system that reaches all building occupants? (public address, pager,
cell phone, computer override, etc.)
Will one or more of these systems be operational under hazard conditions? (UPS, emergency
power)

Depending upon building size, a mass notification system will provide warning and alert information, along
with actions to take before and after an incident if there is redundancy and power.
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01

10.16
Do control centers and their designated alternate locations have equivalent or reduced
capability for voice, data, mass notification, etc.?(emergency operations, security, fire alarms,
building automation)
Do the alternate locations also have access to backup systems, including emergency power?

Reference: GSA PBS-P10

11 Equipment Operations and Maintenanc

11.

Are there composite drawings indicating location and capacities of major systems and are they
current? (electrical, mechanical, and fire protection; and date of last update)
Do updated operations and maintenance (O&M) manuals exist?
Within critical infrastructure protection at the building level, the current configuration and capacity of all
critical systems must be understood to ensure they meet emergency needs. Manuals must also be current to
ensure operations and maintenance keeps these systems properly functioning. The system must function during
an emergency unless directly affected by the hazard incident.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.2
Have critical air systems been rebalanced?
If so, when and how often?
Although the system may function, it must be tested periodically to ensure it is performing as designed.
Balancing is also critical after initial construction to set equipment to proper performance per the design.
Rebalancing may only occur during renovation.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

11.3
Is air pressurization monitored regularly?
Some areas require positive or negative pressure to function properly. Pressurization is critical in a hazardous
environment or emergency situation.
Measuring pressure drop across filters is an indication when filters should be changed, but also may indicate
that low pressures are developing downstream and could result in loss of expected protection.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

11.4
Does the building have a policy or procedure for periodic recommissioning of major
Mechanical/Electrical/Plumbing (M/E/P) systems?

Recommissioning involves testing and balancing of systems to ascertain their capability to perform as
described.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.5
Is there an adequate O&M program, including training of facilities management staff?

If O&M of critical systems is done with in-house personnel, management must know what needs to be done and
the workforce must have the necessary training to ensure systems reliability.
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139

11.6
What maintenance and service agreements exist for M/E/P systems?
When an in-house facility maintenance work force does not exist or does not have the capability to perform the
work, maintenance and service contracts are the alternative to ensure critical systems will work under all
conditions. The facility management staff requires the same knowledge to oversee these contracts as if the work
was being done by in-house personnel.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

11.7
Are backup power systems periodically tested under load?

Loading should be at or above maximum connected load to ensure available capacity and automatic sensors
should be tested at least once per year.
Periodically (once a year as a minimum) check the duration of capacity of backup systems by running them for
the expected emergency duration or estimating operational duration through fuel consumption, water
consumption, or voltage loss.
Reference: FEMA 386-7

11.8
Is stairway and exit sign lighting operational?

The maintenance program for stairway and exit sign lighting (all egress lighting) should ensure functioning
under normal and emergency power conditions.
Expect building codes to be updated as emergency egress lighting is moved from upper walls and over doorways
to floor level as heat and smoke drive occupants to crawl along the floor to get out of the building. Signs and
lights mounted high have limited or no benefit when obscured.
Reference: FEMA 386-

12 Security System

Perimeter System

12.

Are black/white or color CCTV (closed circuit television) cameras used?
Are they monitored and recorded 24 hours/7 days a week? By whom?
Are they analog or digital by design?
What are the number of fixed, wireless, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras used?
Who are the manufacturers of the CCTV cameras?
What is the age of the CCTV cameras in use?
Security technology is frequently considered to complement or supplement security personnel forces and to
provide a wider area of coverage. Typically, these physical security elements provide the first line of defense in
deterring, detecting, and responding to threats and reducing vulnerabilities. They must be viewed as an integral
component of the overall security program. Their design, engineering, installation, operation, and
management must be able to meet daily security challenges from a cost-effective and efficiency perspective.
During and after an incident, the system, or its backups, should be functional per the planned design.
Consider color CCTV cameras to view and record activity at the perimeter of the building, particularly at
primary entrances and exits. A mix of monochrome cameras should be considered for areas that lack adequate
illumination for color cameras.
Reference: GSA PBS P-100

12.2
Are the cameras programmed to respond automatically to perimeter building alarm events?
Do they have built-in video motion capabilities?

The efficiency of monitoring multiple screens decreases as the number of screens increases. Tying the alarm
system or motion sensors to a CCTV camera and a monitoring screen improves the man-machine interface by
drawing attention to a specific screen and its associated camera. Adjustment may be required after installation
due to initial false alarms, usually caused by wind or small animals.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.3
What type of camera housings are used and are they environmental in design to protect against
exposure to heat and cold weather elements?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.4
Are panic/duress alarm buttons or sensors used, where are they located, and are they
hardwired or portable?

Call buttons should be provided at key public contact areas and as needed in offices of managers and directors, in
garages and parking lots, and other high-risk locations by assessment.
Reference: GSA PBS P-100

12.5
Are intercom call boxes used in parking areas or along the building perimeter?

See Item 12.4.
12.6
What is the transmission media used to transmit camera video signals: fiber, wire line,
telephone wire, coaxial, wireless?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.7
Who monitors the CCTV system?

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
12.8
What is the quality of video images both during the day and hours of darkness?
Are infrared camera illuminators used?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.9
Are the perimeter cameras supported by an uninterruptible power supply, battery, or building
emergency power?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.10
What type of exterior Intrusion Detection System (IDS) sensors are used? (electromagnetic; fiber
optic; active infrared; bistatic microwave; seismic; photoelectric; ground; fence; glass break
(vibration/shock); single, double, and roll-up door magnetic contacts or switches)
Consider balanced magnetic contact switch sets for all exterior doors, including overhead/roll-up doors, and
review roof intrusion detection.
Consider glass break sensors for windows up to scalable heights.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
12.11
Is a global positioning system (GPS) used to monitor vehicles and asset movements?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

Interior Security

12.12
Are black/white or color CCTV cameras used?
Are they monitored and recorded 24 hours/7 days a week? By whom?
Are they analog or digital by design?
What are the number of fixed, wireless, and pan-tilt-zoom cameras used?
Who are the manufacturers of the CCTV cameras?
What is the age of the CCTV cameras in use?

See Item 12.1.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.13
Are the cameras programmed to respond automatically to interior building alarm events?
Do they have built-in video motion capabilities?

The efficiency of monitoring multiple screens decreases as the number of screens increases. Tying the alarm
system or motion sensors to a CCTV camera and a monitoring screen improves the man-machine interface by
drawing attention to a specific screen and its associated camera.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.14
What type of camera housings are used and are they designed to protect against exposure or
tampering?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.15
Do the camera lenses used have the proper specifications, especially distance viewing and
clarity?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.16
What is the transmission media used to transmit camera video signals: fiber, wire line,
telephone wire, coaxial, wireless?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.17
Are the interior camera video images of good visual and recording quality?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.18
Are the interior cameras supported by an uninterruptible power supply source, battery, or
building emergency power?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.19
What are the first costs and maintenance costs associated with the interior cameras?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.20
What type of security access control system is used?
Are the devices used for physical security also used (integrated) with security computer
networks (e.g., in place of or in combination with user ID and system passwords)?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.21
What type of access control transmission media is used to transmit access control system signals
(same as defined for CCTV cameras)?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.22
What is the backup power supply source for the access control systems? (battery, uninterruptible
power supply)

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.23
What access control system equipment is used?

How old are the systems and what are the related first and maintenance service costs?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.24
Are panic/duress alarm sensors used?
Where are they located?
Are they hardwired or portable?

See Item 12.24.
12.26
Are magnetometers (metal detectors) and x-ray equipment used?
At what locations within the building?

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

12.27
What type of interior IDS sensors are used: electromagnetic; fiber optic; active infrared-motion
detector; photoelectric; glass break (vibration/shock); single, double, and roll-up door magnetic
contacts or switches?

Consider magnetic reed switches for interior doors and openings.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
12.28
Are mechanical, electrical, gas, power supply, radiological material storage, voice/data
telecommunication system nodes, security system panels, elevator and critical system panels, and other
sensitive rooms continuously locked, under electronic security, CCTV camera, and intrusion alarm
systems surveillance?

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
12.29
What types of locking hardware are used throughout the building?
Are manual and electromagnetic cipher, keypad, pushbutton, panic bar, door strikes, and
related hardware and software used?

As a minimum, electric utility closets, mechanical rooms, and telephone closets should be secured.
The mailroom should also be secured, allowing only authorized personnel into the area where mail is screened
and sorted. Separate the public access area from the screening area for the postulated mailroom threats.
All security locking arrangements on doors used for egress must comply with NFPA 101, Life Safety Code.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100

12.30
Are any potentially hazardous chemicals, combustible, or toxic materials stored on site in non-
secure and non-monitored areas?

The storage, use, and handling locations should also be kept away from other activities.
The concern is that an intruder need not bring the material into the building if it is already there and accessible.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.31
What security controls are in place to handle the processing of mail and protect against
potential biological, explosive, or other threatening exposures?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.32
Is there a designated security control room and console in place to monitor security, fire
alarm, and other building systems?
Is there a backup control center designated and equipped?
Is there off-site 24-hour monitoring of intrusion detection systems?
Monitoring can be done at an off-site facility, at an on-site monitoring center during normal duty hours, or at a
24-hour on-site monitoring center.
Reference: GSA PBS-P100
12.33
Is the security console and control room adequate in size and does it provide room for
expansion?
Does it have adequate environment controls (e.g., a/c, lighting, heating, air circulation, backup
power)?
Is it ergonomically designed?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.34
Is the location of the security room in a secure area with limited, controlled, and restricted
access controls in place?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.35
What are the means by which facility and security personnel can communicate with one
another (e.g., portable radio, pager, cell phone, personal data assistants (PDAs))?
What problems have been experienced with these and other electronic security systems?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.36
Is there a computerized security incident reporting system used to prepare reports and track
security incident trends and patterns?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.37
Does the current security force have access to a computerized guard tour system?

This system allows for the systematic performance of guard patrols with validation indicators built in. The
system notes stations/locations checked or missed, dates and times of such patrols, and who conducted them on
what shifts. Management reports can be produced for recordkeeping and manpower analysis purposes.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.38
Are vaults or safes in the building?
Where are they located?
Basic structural design requires an understanding of where heavy concentrations of floor loading may occur so as
to strengthen the floor and structural framing to handle this downward load. Security design also needs this
information to analyze how this concentrated load affects upward and downward loadings under blast conditions
and its impact upon progressive collapse. Location is important because safes can be moved by blast so that
they should be located away from people and away from exterior windows.
Vaults, on the other hand, require construction above the building requirements with thick masonry walls and
steel reinforcement. A vault can provide protection in many instances due to its robust construction.
Safes and vaults may also require security sensors and equipment, depending upon the level of protection and
defensive layers needed.
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-85
Security System Documents
12.39
Have security system as-built drawings been generated and are they ready for review?

Drawings are critical to the consideration and operation of security technologies, including its overall design
and engineering processes. These historical reference documents outline system specifications and layout
security devices used, as well as their application, location, and connectivity. They are a critical resource tool
for troubleshooting system problems, and replacing and adding other security system hardware and software
products. Such documents are an integral component to new and retrofit construction projects.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.40
Have security system design and drawing standards been developed?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.41
Are security equipment selection criteria defined?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.42
What contingency plans have been developed or are in place to deal with security control
center redundancy and backup operations?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.43
Have security system construction specification documents been prepared and standardized?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.44
Do all security system documents include current as-built drawings?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.45
Have qualifications been determined for security consultants, system designers/engineers,
installation vendors, and contractors?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

12.46
Are security systems decentralized, centralized, or integrated?
Do they operate over an existing IT network or are they a standalone method of operation?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.47
What security systems manuals are available?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
12.48
What maintenance or service agreements exist for security systems?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilitie

13 Security Master Pla

13.

Does a written security plan exist for this site or building?
When was the initial security plan written and last revised?
Who is responsible for preparing and reviewing the security plan?
The development and implementation of a security master plan provides a roadmap that outlines the strategic
direction and vision, operational, managerial, and technological mission, goals, and objectives of the
organization's security program.
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
13.2
Has the security plan been communicated and disseminated to key management personnel and
departments?

The security plan should be part of the building design so that the construction or renovation of the structure
integrates with the security procedures to be used during daily operations.
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.3
Has the security plan been benchmarked or compared against related organizations and
operational entities?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.4
Has the security plan ever been tested and evaluated from a benefit/cost and operational
efficiency and effectiveness perspective?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.5
Does the security plan define mission, vision, and short- and long- term security program goals
and objectives?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.6
Are threats/hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks adequately defined and security
countermeasures addressed and prioritized relevant to their criticality and probability of
occurrence?

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1
13.7
Has a security implementation schedule been established to address recommended security
solutions?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.8
Have security operating and capital budgets been addressed, approved, and established to
support the plan?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.9
What regulatory or industry guidelines/standards were followed in the preparation of the
security plan?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.10
Does the security plan address existing security conditions from an administrative, operational,
managerial, and technical security systems perspective?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.11
Does the security plan address the protection of people, property, assets, and information?
Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities
13.12
Does the security plan address the following major components: access control, surveillance,
response, building hardening, and protection against CBR and cyber-network attacks?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.13
Has the level of risk been identified and communicated in the security plan through the
performance of a physical security assessment?

Reference: Physical Security Assessment for the Department of Veterans Affairs Facilities

13.14
When was the last security assessment performed?
Who performed the security risk assessment?

Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

13.15
Are the following areas of security analysis addressed in the security master plan?
Asset Analysis: Does the security plan identify and prioritize the assets to be protected in accordance
to their location, control, current value, and replacement value?
Threat Analysis: Does the security plan address potential threats; causes of potential harm in the
form of death, injury, destruction, disclosure, interruption of operations, or denial of services?(possible
criminal acts [documented and review of police/security incident reports] associated with forced
entry, bombs, ballistic assault, biochemical and related terrorist tactics, attacks against utility
systems infrastructure and buildings)
Vulnerability Analysis: Does the security plan address other areas associated with the site or
building and its operations that can be taken advantage of to carry out a threat?(architectural design
and construction of new and existing buildings, technological support systems [e.g., heating, air
conditioning, power, lighting and security systems, etc.] and operational procedures, policies, and
controls)
Risk Analysis: Does the security plan address the findings from the asset, threat/hazard, and
vulnerability analyses in order to develop, recommend, and consider implementation of appropriate
security countermeasures?
This process is the input to the building design and what mitigation measures will be included in the facility
project to reduce risk and increase safety of the building and people.
Reference: USA TM 5-853, Security Engineerin

*Sources:
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (CDC/NIOSH)Publication No. 2002-139, Guidance for Protecting Building
Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks, May 2002
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)FEMA 154, Rapid Visual Screening of
Buildings for Seismic Hazards: A Handbook, 1988 (also, Applied Technology Council (ATC-
21) by same name)
FEMA 386-7, Integrating Human-Caused Hazards Into Mitigation Planning, September 2002
SLG 101, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, Chapter 6, Attachment G,
Terrorism, April 2001
General Services Administration (GSA)PBS - P100, Facilities Standards for Public
Buildings Service, November 2002
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL)LBNL PUB-51959, Protecting Buildings
from a Biological or Chemical Attack: Actions to Take Before or During a Release, January
10, 2003
U.S. Air Force (USAF)Installation Force Protection Guide, 1997
U.S. Army (USA)Technical Manuals (TM) 5-853-1/-2/-3/-4, Security Engineering, May 12,
1994
U.S. Department of Commerce, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (DOC
CIAO)Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1, October 1998
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), UFC 4-010-01, DoD
Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, July 31, 2002
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)National Criminal Justice (NCJ) NCJ181200, Fiscal Year
1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, Assessment and Strategy
Development Tool Kit, May 15, 2000
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)Physical Security Assessment for the Department
of Veterans Affairs Facilities, Recommendations of the National Institute of Building Sciences
Task Group to the Department of Veterans Affairs, 6 September 2002