

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM

Actuarial Rate Review

In Support of the May 1, 2008, Rate and Rule Changes

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Purpose of This Document

An annual review of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) underwriting experience, with accompanying Program revisions, is an integral part of maintaining the Program's goal of a fiscally sound rating and coverage structure. The purpose of this document is to share the results of the latest actuarial review of the rating structure in the context of the history and goals of the Program.

Overview

Floods have been, and continue to be, the nation's most destructive natural hazard in terms of economic loss and life-threatening events. In response to this destructive natural hazard, Congress authorized numerous expensive flood protection works and disaster relief efforts. For many years, studies indicated that the Federal Government's reliance on these expensive flood protection works and disaster relief efforts urgently needed to be complemented by a national nonstructural floodplain management approach implemented at the State and local government level. Since the inception of the NFIP in 1968, the Federal Government has required communities to adopt a nonstructural floodplain management approach as the quid pro quo for providing Federal Government backed flood insurance at reasonable rates to ease the impact of flood damage on individuals and communities.

Congress established the NFIP with the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. The NFIP provides the means by which flood insurance is made available through the cooperative efforts of the Federal Government and the private insurance industry. Subsequent studies have indicated that, although insurance does not and probably cannot respond to all the needs of disaster victims, insurance is the most efficient and equitable method of providing disaster assistance (e.g., [GAO Report PAD-80-39](#)).

The NFIP is a coordinated, three-pronged approach developed to (1) identify those areas within local communities that are most at risk of flooding, (2) reduce the impact of flooding through a combination of mitigation and floodplain management, and (3) make flood insurance available to help individuals and small businesses recover following a flood. The NFIP can provide the flexibility for flood insurance to be based on workable methods of pooling risks, minimizing costs, distributing burdens equitably among those protected by flood insurance and the general public, and structuring rates to support mitigation and floodplain management efforts.

A Brief History of the NFIP

The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 created the NFIP, which since 1979 has been part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In 2003, FEMA became part of the newly created U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within FEMA, the NFIP is administered by the Federal Insurance Administrator as part of the Mitigation Directorate.

The basic structure of the NFIP was established by the 1968 Act, and that structure continues today. The NFIP is a Federal program enabling property owners in participating communities to purchase insurance as a protection against flood losses in exchange for State and community floodplain management to reduce future flood damages. Participation in the NFIP is based on an agreement between communities and the Federal Government. Flood insurance is made available within a community when it adopts and enforces a floodplain management ordinance to reduce the flood risk to new construction.

To encourage participation in the NFIP, the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 expanded the use of premium subsidies¹ as an additional incentive to encourage widespread State, community, and property owner acceptance of Program requirements, including that Act's introduction of mandatory flood insurance purchase. For the next 7 years, the heavily subsidized premium charges remained in effect. During that period, nearly every community with a flood hazard joined the NFIP, and the insurance policy count increased dramatically, reaching 2 million by 1979. States also responded: governors appointed floodplain management coordinators to assist local communities' governments in working with the Federal Government on Program matters. These actions created the first nationwide response to address the flood peril.

In 1981, with the NFIP firmly established, FEMA initiated a multiyear series of coverage changes and large rate increases for all subsidized policies, which placed the Program on a fiscally sound basis. In establishing a fiscally sound program, which was achieved in 1986, FEMA stressed that, as opposed to the traditional insurance definition of fiscal solvency, the NFIP's intent was to generate premium at least sufficient to cover expenses and losses relative to what is called the "historical average loss year."²

The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 reinforced the objective of using insurance as the preferred mechanism for disaster assistance by expanding mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements and by prohibiting further flood disaster assistance for any property where flood insurance, after having been mandated as a condition for receiving

¹ While the 1973 Act expanded the authority to grant premium subsidies, the NFIP continued to charge full-risk premiums to all new construction in Special Flood Hazard Areas, as well as all construction outside Special Flood Hazard Areas. In this way, through its premium structure, the NFIP has always supported sound floodplain management and helped to reduce the nation's exposure to flood risk.

² This concept of targeting the average Program-wide premium levels to the "historical average loss year" is explained in more detail in the section entitled "Target Premium Level and the Historical Average Loss Year" on page 5.

disaster assistance, is not maintained. These measures were added in recognition of the fact that loan or grant programs, to the extent that they parallel the insurance mechanism, can undermine the ability of the insurance program to operate efficiently and equitably.

In June 2004, Congress passed and the President signed the Bunning-Bereuter-Blumenauer Flood Insurance Reform Act (FIRA) of 2004. Title I of the Act provides additional tools for addressing the impact of repetitive loss properties on the National Flood Insurance Fund. It introduced a pilot project through fiscal year 2009 that (1) defines severe repetitive loss properties, (2) authorizes additional funds for mitigation projects, and (3) mandates a 50% increase in premiums for property owners who decline a mitigation offer, along with an appeal process. Title I also modified the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Program by doubling the annual authorized funding level to \$40 million and directing FMA to give priority to those properties that are in the best interest of the National Flood Insurance Fund. In addition, Title I of FIRA 2004 introduced a new Individual Priority Property Program that authorizes up to \$10 million annually for FEMA to address those previously flooded properties that the State and local community do not have the capacity to manage themselves. Title I also expanded Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) coverage so that, even when there has not been a recent flood loss, it can be applied to the non-Federal cost-share requirement of FEMA-funded mitigation projects for individual buildings.

To address concerns raised in the aftermath of Hurricane Isabel, Title II of FIRA 2004 seeks to increase policyholders' knowledge of the Standard Flood Insurance Policy's provisions and of consumer rights under the NFIP.

With the NFIP's authority set to expire on September 30, 2008, Congress has been considering legislation that, in addition to extending the Program, would also provide several enhancements. If passed, these enhancements would affect both the coverages provided and FEMA's administration of the NFIP. It is too early to tell which, if any, of these enhancements will be included in a final bill.

Financial Structure of the NFIP

Premium Structure

The objective of the NFIP's premium structure is to promote the Program's financial soundness, support floodplain management, and encourage the widespread purchase of flood insurance. The premium structure of the NFIP consists of two distinct approaches, the application of which depends on whether buildings have been constructed after the issuance of a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM)³ delineating a community's flood risk, or before the issuance of the FIRM.

³ A Flood Insurance Rate Map, or FIRM, is an official map of a community on which FEMA has delineated both the Special Flood Hazard Areas and the risk premium zones that are applicable to the community. "Post-FIRM" pertains to a building for which construction or substantial improvement occurred after December 31, 1974, or on or after the effective date of an initial FIRM, whichever is later. "Pre-FIRM"

New buildings (Post-FIRM) are charged full-risk premiums that contemplate the full range of loss potential including catastrophic levels. If the building is constructed in compliance with local floodplain management ordinances (e.g., at or above the Base Flood Elevation in a Special Flood Hazard Area), the flood risk has been reduced to a level where the full-risk premiums should be reasonable. Buildings constructed below the Base Flood Elevation are also charged full-risk premiums, but these premiums can be quite high. In this way, the premium structure of the NFIP helps to reinforce wise building decisions by individuals.

Full-risk premiums are also charged to all buildings that are outside the Special Flood Hazard Area, where the flood risk is low to moderate and premiums are relatively modest.

By statute, highly discounted premiums—otherwise known as subsidized premiums—have been made available for Pre-FIRM buildings in the Special Flood Hazard Area. For many such buildings, the full-risk premiums would be extremely high. Providing certain statutory amounts of insurance at less than full-risk rates was justified as public policy for the following reasons:

- (1) Lower premiums for existing construction made it easier to convince communities to join the NFIP. It was very important in the early years of the NFIP to increase community participation so that sound floodplain management was implemented and the nation's exposure to flood would thereby be slowly but significantly reduced.
- (2) It was anticipated that very high premiums would cause great resistance to insurance purchase. However, with reasonable premiums, property owners purchasing insurance at less than full-risk rates would still be funding at least part of their recovery from flood damage. This was considered preferable to the previous arrangement of disaster relief that came solely from taxpayer funding.
- (3) In the public policy discussions leading to the authorization of the NFIP, it was determined to be undesirable to potentially force, through high flood insurance premiums, the abandonment of otherwise economically viable buildings.

The average full-risk premium for these older buildings is currently estimated to be about five times greater than the average full-risk premium for compliant buildings. Even though these older, noncompliant buildings receive highly discounted premiums (estimated to be between 35% and 40% of the full-risk premium), subsidized premiums are still significantly higher than what actuarially rated policyholders pay for buildings constructed in compliance. This means that, if the Pre-FIRM subsidized portion of the business were charged full-risk premiums, affected policyholders would have to pay, on average, about two and a half times their current premium. Such a change would cause the aggregate premium for the entire NFIP to increase on the order of 50% to 75%.

pertains to a building for which construction or substantial improvement occurred on or before December 31, 1974, or before the effective date of an initial FIRM.

It should be mentioned that not all older construction was built unwisely. Older buildings that can be documented, through an Elevation Certificate completed by a licensed surveyor, to be at or above the Base Flood Elevation, can use the less expensive actuarial premium rates. Currently, about half of the older Pre-FIRM buildings insured by the NFIP have documented their compliance with new construction standards and pay the appropriate actuarial rates.

Target Premium Level and the Historical Average Loss Year

Because the NFIP, as explained above, charges highly discounted premiums for many older buildings, it is currently impractical for the NFIP to be actuarially sound in the aggregate. The question then becomes, what should be the overall targeted premium level for the Program? That, essentially, is a question of deciding the level of discount to be provided subsidized policyholders. This became especially relevant in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when subsidized premiums were much more heavily discounted than today. Following what was mostly a period of relatively modest loss years, NFIP borrowing grew to a level far in excess of annual premium receipts. As a result, a series of appropriations was provided to pay down the borrowing. At the same time, the NFIP established the goal for subsidized policyholder premiums to be at the level where, in combination with those policyholders paying full-risk premiums, the Program would generate sufficient revenue to pay for the historical average loss year. The absence of a catastrophic loss year (prior to Hurricane Katrina in 2005) meant that the Program's historical average was less than could be expected over the long term.

With Katrina now in the loss experience, the historical average loss year is roughly equivalent to the estimated long-term average loss year. The automatic use of historical average loss year would result in the elimination of current subsidies. While the elimination of the subsidy is a long-term goal supported by FEMA, such a significant change should be explicitly supported by Congress and not simply the result of a formula.

The establishment of this target level of premium income for the Program as a whole has accommodated the combined effect of the portion of NFIP business paying less-than-full-risk premiums (a subsidy that is provided by statute) and the portion of the business paying full-risk premiums that contemplate in their rates the full range of loss potential including catastrophic levels. The distribution of business written in 2008 is anticipated to be 22% at subsidized rates⁴ and 78% at full-risk premium rates.

The historical average loss year has been a useful benchmark that has functioned as a lower bound for Program revenue and resulted in lower subsidies for Pre-FIRM policyholders. Over the years, this approach has blunted downward pressure on rates and facilitated a series of increases on subsidized classes. As a result, rates had risen to a level 25% in excess of this benchmark, as documented in the 2004 Actuarial Rate Review. At that time

⁴ This estimate of 22% is composed of 21% Pre-FIRM and 1% other categories. For a more complete discussion of the various subsidized rates categories, see the "Ratemaking" section on pages 8-12.

(pre-Katrina), FEMA had begun to investigate alternatives to the historical average loss year as a benchmark.

Beginning with last year's rate review, we have used an interim benchmark that gives a 1% weight to 2005 results (including Katrina, Rita, and Wilma). This is an attempt to reflect the events of 2005 without allowing them to overwhelm the pre-Katrina experience of the Program. We have contracted with Deloitte Consulting to advise us on a suitable benchmark that appropriately reflects Katrina and other potential large events. Deloitte will publish their findings and recommendations sometime in fiscal year 2009.

Borrowing Authority

The Program has not been capitalized and pays losses and operating expenses out of policyholder premiums. The result is that during less-than-average-loss years the Program generates surplus, while during higher loss years accumulated surplus is used to help pay the insured flood losses that exceed that year's net premium revenue. For periods when losses exceed the accumulated surplus, the NFIP has borrowing authority with the U.S. Treasury that can be drawn upon in order to pay those losses. Initially, the NFIP was granted a \$1 billion borrowing authority, but in 1996 legislation was passed (and subsequently extended) providing an increase in borrowing authority from \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion in order to provide a greater cushion against potential losses. More recently, following the catastrophic hurricanes of 2005, the borrowing authority was increased three more times, so that it now stands at \$20.775 billion. At the end of fiscal year 2007, the NFIP had borrowed \$17.535 billion. It is unlikely, given the current annual revenue of the NFIP, that the National Flood Insurance Fund will be able to meet the future interest payments on that debt. Interest on the borrowing is currently about \$700 million to \$800 million per year. FEMA's anticipated borrowing to meet future interest payments will necessitate further increases in the NFIP's borrowing authority.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Fund had been in a debt position four times since the mid-1980s. Following the Midwest Flood of 1993, the Program borrowed \$100 million, which was quickly repaid. The Program borrowed again as a result of the heavy flood losses during 1995 and 1996 that were at twice the historical average. That borrowing peaked at \$922 million during fiscal year 1998, but was completely repaid by June 2001. However, Tropical Storm Allison (June 2001)—the first \$1 billion storm in the history of the NFIP—required the Program to borrow \$650 million. That amount was repaid as of October 31, 2002. Between then and the 2004 hurricane season, the balance of the Fund grew to just over \$1.1 billion. However, that entire amount, along with \$300 million of borrowing, was used to pay for claims from Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, which occurred during August and September 2004. When Hurricane Katrina made landfall in August 2005, the Fund had outstanding borrowing of \$225 million and \$189 million of cash on hand.

NFIP Funding and Overall Program Goals

Funding of the Program from policyholder income or potentially from other sources must be addressed in the context of the long-term governmental goals for the NFIP, including

its substitution for disaster relief and its encouragement of floodplain management. Because of the highly variable nature of flood losses, the possibility of borrowing funds would be present even if all NFIP policyholders paid full-risk premiums. But, with 22% of policyholders paying significantly less than full-risk premiums, the NFIP's ability to generate surplus or to repay borrowed funds is impeded. Subsidized insurance for older construction, built to lower standards in regard to the flood risk and for which full-risk premiums could be unreasonably high, was the quid pro quo for local community adoption of ordinances controlling new construction in the floodplain. It is also a means by which owners of older construction can prefund at least part of their disaster recovery. The NFIP's standards for new construction are now saving an estimated \$1.2 billion annually in flood damage avoided. Additionally, it should be recognized that, in fiscal years 1986 through 2004, the NFIP paid out, from policyholder funding, \$12.1 billion in insurance claims, which otherwise would have greatly increased taxpayer-funded disaster relief. In evaluating the ability of the NFIP to achieve its overall Program goals, this \$12.1 billion in payments and \$1.2 billion in reduced annual losses should also be considered, along with the current debt resulting from Katrina.

The Program's financial status must be addressed in a context that is broader than the focus of this rate review. While low loss experience can provide opportunities to rebuild surplus from policyholder premiums, other measures and public policy issues must also be explored. For example, the passage of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 provides several tools for mitigating repetitive loss properties. These properties are primarily Pre-FIRM, and the premiums they are currently charged are some of the most heavily discounted relative to their full-risk premiums. Once the provisions of FIRA 2004 are implemented and the number of repetitive loss properties is reduced, one benefit will be a reduction in the NFIP's level of subsidy.

Other public policy objectives that have a bearing on the Program's financial status must be accommodated by the NFIP. It is sound public policy to maximize the number of people who have flood insurance, so as to lessen the reliance on disaster assistance. Policy growth has increased more recently as a result of increased public awareness from the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, combined with the introduction of the NFIP's "FloodSmart" marketing and advertising program in 2004. But even with this higher growth rate, the Program continues to experience a high nonrenewal or lapse rate. To increase this growth rate further, the FloodSmart campaign now focuses on retaining existing policyholders and attracting back those individuals who previously have had flood insurance, while continuing to market to new customers.

Average amounts of insurance continue to increase, which increases the potential dollar amounts borrowed. And apart from the Pre-FIRM subsidy, it is public policy to encourage the purchase of flood insurance in areas that are known to be experiencing temporary conditions of heightened flood risk, although the 30-day waiting period reduces some of the effects of this adverse selection.

Ratemaking

Generally accepted actuarial principles require at a minimum that a rating system provide protection against the economic uncertainty associated with chance occurrences by exchanging that uncertainty for a predetermined price. This price for insuring the uncertain event must:

- Protect the insurance system's financial soundness;
- Be fair, by allocating costs in proportion to risk; and
- Permit economic incentives to operate and thus encourage widespread availability of coverage.

For the purpose of setting prices, the grouping of risks with similar characteristics is a fundamental precept of a financially sound and equitable system. Because each property at risk is different, a rating system that attempts to identify and reflect in prices every risk characteristic is usually unworkable and costly. The basic features that must be present in sound risk groupings in order to meet the above criteria are that the system should:

- Reflect cost and experience differences on the basis of relevant risk characteristics;
- Be applied objectively and consistently;
- Be practical, cost-effective, and responsive to change;
- Minimize anti-selection; and
- Be acceptable to the public.

Also, in the case of flood insurance authorized under Public Law 90-448 (National Flood Insurance Act), the system of insurance and pricing must further the purposes of the Act, which include, among other things, to “(1) encourage State and local governments to make appropriate land use adjustments to constrict the development of land which is exposed to flood damage and minimize damage caused by flood losses, [and] (2) guide the development of proposed future construction, where practicable [emphasis added], away from locations which are threatened by flood hazards.” In order to give practical meaning to these objectives, the standard of a 1% annual chance of flood is now used by virtually all Federal, State, and local agencies and participating communities in the administration of floodplain management programs. The risk of experiencing a flood of this magnitude or larger is one chance in four during a typical 30-year mortgage period. In terms of flood insurance, this standard yields reasonably priced insurance protection to the property owner.

The use of a lesser standard approximating pre-1969 building practices would expose future risks to a greater than 50% chance of being flood damaged during a 30-year mortgage period and result in insurance rates three to four times those reflecting the “1% annual chance of flood” standard. It was just this consideration of unaffordable full-risk (actuarial) premium rates that prompted Congress to “grandfather” existing construction at subsidized rates.

The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 separated the flood insurance ratemaking process into two distinct categories, namely, chargeable premium (subsidized) rates and estimated-risk premium (actuarial) rates.

Subsidized Rates

Subsidized rates are countrywide rates by broad occupancy type classifications, which produce a premium income less than the expected expense and loss payments for the flood insurance policies issued on that basis. The difference between the full-risk premiums for these policyholders and the subsidized premiums they actually pay is revenue foregone by the National Flood Insurance Fund.

Pre-FIRM Subsidized Rates

FEMA has promulgated subsidized rates for use in two cases. The first case is for the Emergency Program (added to the NFIP in 1970). Subsidized rates are also used in the Regular Program on construction or substantial improvement started on or before either December 31, 1974⁵, or the effective date of the initial FIRM, whichever is later. Exhibit E details the relationship between the amount of subsidized premium to be collected and the amount of premium required to fund the historical average loss year. The Pre-FIRM properties that pay less than full-risk premium are estimated to pay between 35% and 40% of the full-risk premium needed to fund the long-term expectation for losses.

Special Post-FIRM Classes That Are Subsidized

There are three other cases where classes of business are being subsidized either statutorily or by agreement with Congressional oversight committees.

The first of these is the class of risks located in Zone A99 areas that would be subject to the 1% annual chance flood, but for which structural measures that will protect to that level are at least 50% completed. By statute, rates are charged as if full protection were in place.

A second case, added by statute in 1998, is the class of risks located in Zone AR areas. These are areas for which structural measures have been decertified as no longer providing protection to the “1% annual chance of flood” standard. If the areas meet certain criteria pertaining to a scheduled restoration of protection levels, then rates for new and existing construction are capped at the Pre-FIRM subsidized level. After careful consideration of several public policy issues, FEMA set the initial rates for AR Zones at levels equivalent to X Zone Standard rates. Such rates are substantially lower than the cap allowed by statute.

The third case is the class of risks comprised of Post-FIRM construction in the V Zones built between 1975 and 1981. These buildings were constructed to NFIP standards that accounted for stillwater flood elevations but not the associated wave heights, which were not

⁵ This additional “grandfathering” was added to the NFIP in 1973.

determinable by the engineering state-of-the-art of the time. In October 1981, the NFIP was able to make use of the latest engineering developments and began to require new construction to be built to more stringent standards and to charge rates that took into account the risks posed by the waves associated with the Base Flood⁶. Because the previously compliant construction would be subject to very high rates if held to the same new standards, discussions with Congressional oversight committee members led to the decision to “grandfather” the 1975-81 construction with less than the full-risk premium rates indicated by the latest knowledge of the risk. Those policies total only 0.2% of all NFIP policies in force.

Actuarial Rates

Actuarial rates are promulgated by FEMA for use under the Regular Program (the phase of the National Flood Insurance Program that a community may enter after the initial publication of the FIRM). The actuarial rates are applied in the rating of Post-FIRM construction and second layer limits of insurance on all construction (e.g., in the case of 1- to 4-family residences including Pre-FIRM, amounts of insurance in excess of \$35,000).

These rates are based on consideration of the risk involved and accepted actuarial principles. An overview of the actuarial rate calculations utilized in developing the indicated rates can be found in the Appendix. The formula described there follows in principle the “hydrologic method of estimating flood damage risk” first outlined in the 1966 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) report *Insurance and Other Programs for Financial Assistance to Flood Victims*. This method is still the basis for FEMA’s various Mitigation Grant programs and is used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in evaluating their projects. It is important to note that the 1966 HUD report described the hydrologic method of ratemaking as a method that “uses available data on the occurrence of floods and damage, but is considerably more sophisticated than merely averaging losses over a period of time.”

The NFIP’s use of the hydrologic model to estimate loss exposure in flood-prone areas also incorporates other relevant factors, such as the building’s location, construction, and elevation relative to expected flood levels.

There are a few risk zones (Zones B, C, D, AO, AH, X, unnumbered A, and unnumbered V) where costs to obtain the hydrologic and topographic information needed to develop flood magnitude and frequency relationships would be extremely high in relation to the floodplain management benefits. Average rates based on actuarial and engineering judgments and underwriting experience have been promulgated for these zones.

⁶ The Base Flood is the flood associated with the Base Flood Elevation (BFE). In other words, there is a 1% chance in any given year that a flood will occur that equals or exceeds the Base Flood.

Rate Levels in Light of the Extreme Variability in Annual Flood Losses

High-severity, low-frequency events such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes do not lend themselves to traditional actuarial pricing techniques. Results vary dramatically from year to year (see graphs on next page), and average results have little predictive value even when gathered over a long period of time. For example, the NFIP has paid more in flood losses from the single event of Hurricane Katrina than it has paid for all other events since its inception in 1968.

In recognition of the fact that historical flood loss experience is an improper basis for setting rates, the NFIP has always used modeling techniques to establish rate levels. This is similar to what is done by private insurers that provide coverage for other natural catastrophes. For those lines of insurance, the industry relies heavily on models of expected damage over many possible events in order to price their products.



So while the hydrologic model, as adapted by the NFIP to develop indicated rates⁷, is the only valid estimate of insured flood damage over a very long period of time, it is not useful for estimating future loss results in the short term. In fact, the estimated amount of losses in any future 1-year period is so uncertain that it can be provided for only by having available large loss reserves and replenishing those reserves by accumulating funds during good years to offset the drain on the reserve during bad years. Since the chargeable rates for so many policyholders are less than the actuarial rates by statute⁸, the ability to accumulate loss reserves during the good years is impeded.

However, the achievement of the goal of collecting sufficient premium to cover at least the historical average loss year now allows for some accumulation of reserves during years when losses are less than the historical average. In view of the catastrophic loss potential, the current statutory method of providing borrowing authority to finance the long-term loss and loss adjustment provision of the flood insurance program makes a good deal of sense. Even though the Federal Government became the sole insurer in 1978, the funding mechanism has essentially remained the same.

In light of the extreme variability in annual losses, the vast majority of loss years will vary significantly either above or below the historical average. In fact, the rare but catastrophic loss year has such a large influence on the expected long-term average loss year that it is to

⁷ The hydrologic model, as originally developed, estimated the expected annual total damage by flood. The NFIP's actuarial model adjusts that damage amount to reflect the portion of the damage covered by insurance after the application of deductibles and other factors. The NFIP actuarial model also loads operating expenses in order to arrive at indicated premium rates.

⁸ By statute, all buildings in the Special Flood Hazard Area that were constructed before December 31, 1974, or the effective date of the initial FIRM, whichever is later, are to be charged less than actuarial rates. These policies are referred to as Pre-FIRM Subsidized.



be expected that most loss years will be below the long-term average. As a result of this behavior of flood losses, it is misleading to rely on observed experience to reach conclusions about either the long-term loss year or the threshold for catastrophic loss years. Instead, FEMA uses the hydrologic model in order to estimate those amounts.

Target Level Premium Analysis

In 1981, FEMA established the goal of the NFIP becoming self-supporting for loss year levels at least equivalent to the historical average loss year. This was accomplished by 1986. In order to achieve that goal, the Program undertook a series of aggressive rate increases on the subsidized portion of the book. The end result was that subsidized policyholders were then paying premiums that were sufficient, when combined with the premium paid by actuarially priced policyholders, to provide the Program sufficient revenue to pay the losses associated with the historical average loss year.

In the years since 1986, additional rate increases have been made to bring the average Program premium to a level sufficient to pay for the historical average loss year and have additional funds available to build surplus. Prior to the four hurricanes of 2004, Program premiums were 125% of the historical average loss year. The adverse experience of the 2004 loss year decreased Program premiums to 115% of the historical average loss year. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina necessitated a change in approach. The new approach is discussed in the section Target Premium Level and the Historical Average Loss Year on pages 5-6. Using this new approach in last year's rate review, it was estimated that the rate change that was implemented on May 1, 2007, was sufficient to bring Program premiums to a level equal to 98.3% of the interim benchmark. This year, the ratio of May 1, 2008, Program premiums to the interim benchmark improves to 114.5%. The ratio improves for two reasons. First, as detailed on page 15, premiums increase an average of 7.8%. Second, the interim benchmark decreases because the 2006 loss year was lighter than the historical average.

Establishing a target other than long-term expected annual losses is required by the presence of subsidies for many policyholders. The selected interim approach, which gives a 1% weight to Hurricane Katrina, results in a more aggressive benchmark than that previously used. This is in keeping with a long-standing goal to reduce the level of subsidies provided by the Program. In recent years, only modest gains have been made toward the goal. The new benchmark will enable the pace of subsidy reduction to increase.

The target level premium allows FEMA to assess, as part of each year's rate review, how well the NFIP's self-supporting status is being maintained overall. This approach to setting rates accommodates the statutory mandate that premium charges for Pre-FIRM risks, if less than full-risk premiums, must be reasonable. It provides a mathematical basis for determining rates for Pre-FIRM risks, which in the early years of the NFIP were determined solely on a political basis, and provides an important framework for making accurate estimates of fiscal soundness. This approach recognizes that the premiums for the two major categories of business, actuarial and Pre-FIRM subsidized, are developed very differently. Actuarially rated policies are charged premiums that consider the full range of possible losses, including catastrophic levels. Thus, these premiums are targeted at the true long-term average. Written premiums for actuarial policies will generally be greater than those that would be based either on the historical average loss year or on the interim benchmark described above. This is consistent with the expectation that the long-term average annual losses will be higher than the historical experience to date because of the influence of relatively infrequent but catastrophic loss years.

Subsidized policies are defined as a category of business that does not make an adequate contribution to the loss reserve pool. These risks are charged premiums that are based on political and statutory considerations that override actuarial considerations. The probabilities of expected and/or catastrophic losses are not contemplated in the rates, which are established for Pre-FIRM construction as rate caps (limitations on chargeable rates) by occupancy type and flood risk zone. FEMA estimates that the premiums for policyholders in this category are between 35% and 40% of fully actuarial premiums.

Typically, during the rate review, it is first determined whether the actuarial rates need to be adjusted. The effects of any such adjustments on maintaining the overall target level are then projected. Adjustments to policy coverage or premiums for Pre-FIRM risks will likely be proposed to make up any overall shortfall so that, once again, the combination of actuarial and subsidized business can generate written premium at least to the level of the NFIP's self-supporting target.

The target premium level is also affected by inflation and the expected types of policies to be written, particularly in regard to those paying full-risk premiums versus those that will be subsidized.

As explained above, and throughout this paper, the issue of the proper level of subsidy for older Pre-FIRM structures has been addressed through the concept of the historical average loss year. However, there is also a companion issue of which policyholders should be eligible to receive subsidized premiums (that is, heavily discounted premiums that do not reflect the true long-term flood exposure of a structure). In determining who should receive subsidized premiums, FEMA has always worked with its Congressional oversight committees. Through the years, FEMA has made several proposals to reduce the amount of subsidy, by restricting who is eligible, introducing coverage limitations, and reducing the level of subsidy through a series of aggressive annual rate changes. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA discussed these proposals with Congressional committee staff and the Office of Management and Budget. The level of subsidy provided in the Program has been the subject of much Congressional debate, and the 1994 NFIP reform legislation directed FEMA to study the economic effects of charging actuarially based premium rates for Pre-FIRM buildings. PricewaterhouseCoopers was contracted to conduct this study, and FEMA released the results during fiscal year 2000. Several provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 seek to reduce the adverse impact of repetitive loss properties on the National Flood Insurance Fund, which, when implemented, will help reduce the average overall subsidy level. The Act doubles the authorized funding for the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Program and directs that priority for mitigation assistance shall be given to such properties that are in the best interest of the National Flood Insurance Fund.

The Role of the Non-Catastrophic Average Loss Year

Although, with this rate review, the definition of Target Level Premium is changing, "non-catastrophic average loss year" remains an important concept. It is the level around which the great preponderance of loss years will concentrate and allows for the accumulation of funds in years when losses are less than that level to help pay losses in years when they exceed that level.

Rate Review Results

Costs based on the 1978 through 2006 underwriting experience and expected NFIP activities were projected to the 2008-2009 cost levels. Exhibit E shows the premiums required by these projections, the expected average written premiums, and the relationship of the written premium to the historical indicated premiums for flood insurance coverage excluding the premiums for Increased Cost of Compliance coverage. The written premium based on all rate and rule changes through May 2008 is expected to be 114.5% of the adjusted historical average loss year (see the section Target Premium Level and the Historical Average Loss Year on pages 5-6 for a discussion of this concept).

The rate and rule changes for May 1, 2008, implementation would result in an overall premium increase of 7.8% and include the following major points:

- An overall increase to X Zone rated policies of 9.1%, which is composed of a 10.1% increase to the standard rated policies and an 8.4% increase to the Preferred Risk Policies (PRPs).
- Increases in the rates of V Zone policies ranging from 9.6% to 10.3%.
- An increase in the rates of AE Zone policies of 6.0%, with increases in the other A Zone (unnumbered A Zones, AO, AH, etc.) policies that average 8.2%.
- Various increases in the Mortgage Portfolio Protection Program (MPPP) policies.

Exhibit A, Page 1, provides, by risk zone category, the average increases in premium projected as a result of the May 2008 rate and rule recommendations.

Federal Policy Fee

The expense of flood insurance studies, floodplain management, and FEMA administrative costs is charged to policyholders through the Federal Policy Fee. Under the Residential Condominium Building Association Policy (RCBAP), the fee varies according to the number of units in the building. The Federal Policy Fee is increasing for all policyholders to support increasing the amount of mapping that is funded from Federal Policy Fee revenue. For most policyholders, the Federal Policy Fee will increase from \$30 to \$35. For PRPs, the Federal Policy Fee will increase from \$11 to \$13. For RCBAPs, the Federal Policy Fee will increase proportionately to the increase for most policyholders. On the basis of recent historical trends, the Federal Policy Fee is expected to produce about \$144 million in revenue in 2008-2009.

FEMA believes that most of the salary, study, and floodplain management costs are Federal in nature and benefit taxpayers as a whole through programs that reduce future flood losses and resultant Federal expenditures. However, Congress legislated, with the

Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, that the full funding of these expenses⁹ would be borne by flood insurance policyholders through a Federal Policy Fee. To keep this charge as low as possible, the legislation specifically states that the fee is not subject to agent commissions, company expense allowances, or State or local premium taxes. Therefore, although in this rate review the Federal Policy Fee is included in exhibits and analyses of rate level indications, for accounting and Write Your Own (WYO) company reporting purposes, the fee is not considered to be premium.

Impact of Community Rating System

Policyholders in communities that participate in the Community Rating System (CRS) are eligible for premium discounts based on the creditable activities undertaken by their communities. The impact is considered in the target premium level projections and in their comparison with expected written premium.

The success of CRS—both in terms of number of communities and policyholders and in terms of activities undertaken and losses avoided—has continued to grow. Currently, nearly two-thirds of all NFIP policyholders are in participating CRS communities, with discounts ranging from 5% to 45%.

As a result of CRS communities' improving their risk classes by adopting additional creditable activities, Special Flood Hazard Area policyholders in the participating CRS communities should receive an average premium discount of 13.9% in 2007.

Furthermore, in most cases the CRS discount is eliminated for structures where the lowest floor elevation used for rating is 1 foot or more below the Base Flood Elevation.

B, C, and X Zones Experience¹⁰

The NFIP has two types of policies in the X Zone: the Preferred Risk Policy (PRP) and the standard X Zone policy.

Preferred Risk Policies (PRPs)

PRPs are available to buildings that are outside of the Special Flood Hazard Area and have not flooded more than once. To ensure that these conditions are met, the following two underwriting requirements were implemented in 1998:

⁹ One current exception to the full funding of these expenses through the Federal Policy Fee is mapping. The Risk Analysis Division of the FEMA Mitigation Directorate is currently in the midst of a multiyear Map Modernization initiative that is being funded primarily by taxpayer funds. However, those taxpayer funds are being supplemented by Federal Policy Fee revenue. Once the Map Modernization initiative is completed, it is anticipated that the Federal Policy Fee will revert to being the primary source for funding map studies and revisions.

¹⁰ "B, C, and X Zones" is abbreviated to "X Zone" throughout this section and elsewhere in the document. As mentioned in the Appendix, since 1985 all new FIRMs have shown a reduced number of zones, with one of those being an X Zone. The X Zone encompasses areas formerly shown as Zones B or C.

- The insured property must be in the X Zone at the time of the policy inception and at each subsequent renewal; hence, no “grandfathering” is allowed.
- The insured property’s flood history must meet additional requirements regarding paid insured losses and Federal Disaster Relief payments.

Since those underwriting rules were implemented, the PRP experience has substantially improved, except for 2001, when Tropical Storm Allison stalled over Harris County, Texas. While Allison also produced flooding in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Pennsylvania, most of the PRP losses were attributable to incorrectly mapped X Zones in Houston and the surrounding area. Flood maps have since been updated to more accurately reflect the true flood hazard in those areas. PRP experience slightly worsened during 2004 and 2005 but that is to be expected from a loss year that is moderately greater than the estimated long-term average.

For May 2008, PRP rates will increase 8.4%, the same percentage as the overall Program rate. This is the first PRP rate increase since May 2003. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the need for flood insurance coverage outside of the Special Flood Hazard Area. It also demonstrated that very few people outside of the Special Flood Hazard Area, in areas ravaged by Katrina, actually purchase flood coverage. Rates were not increased between May 2003 and April 2007 to encourage more people to buy policies in these low-hazard areas. During this time, PRP policies in force increased from 790,000 as of May 1, 2003, to 1,403,000 as of April 30, 2007. The rates are increased for May 2008 to ensure their adequacy.

X Zone Standard Policies (Non-PRP Policyholders)

For standard X Zone policies, rates are adjusted so the premium level relates to the historical indicated premium level at least in the same way as for actuarially rated AE Zone policies. This has resulted in X Zone premium increases for most years that are greater than other zones. In May 2007, X Zone premiums increased 9.7%, and are increasing again in May 2008 by 10.1%.

This produces a relationship of X Zone premium to historical indicated premium of 130%, compared to a similar relationship for AE Zone policies of 105%. This relationship is similarly balanced to last year’s rate review, in which the X Zone and AE Zone premiums were 115% and 92% respectively of their historical indicated premiums. However, these relationships are out of balance compared to how the X Zone standard premium and AE Zone premium compared to their historical indicated premium in the earlier rate reviews. In the rate review supporting the May 2006 rates, the X Zone and AE Zone premiums were 125% and 120% respectively of their historical indicated premiums. The change in this relationship is due to the impact of the Hurricane Katrina loss results, which significantly increased the historical indicated premiums. FEMA actuaries will continue to evaluate the appropriate benchmark for X Zone standard premiums.

Special Flood Hazard Area Experience

The Special Flood Hazard Area is differentiated into two zone classifications, the V Zone and the A Zone.

V Zone Policies

The increased risk of flooding brought about by erosion has been an area of concern for the NFIP. The 1994 NFIP reform legislation directed a study of a series of possible policy changes to address erosion hazards within Federal programs. The Heinz Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment was contracted to perform this analysis, and the study was released in June 2000. The study results demonstrated that the risk of flooding in those areas of V Zones that are susceptible to erosion will dramatically increase (a two- to three-fold increase in the risk in various areas of the country) during the next 30 to 60 years. The NFIP's ratemaking methodology for V Zones has not directly addressed this increased flood risk brought about by erosion. FEMA is currently investigating ways to do so in the flood maps and the flood rates. The Flood Insurance Rate Maps could be refined to delineate erosion zones. However, that will depend upon funding, development of mapping standards, and political acceptance of higher premiums targeted at those subject to the increased flood risk due to erosion.

In order to at least partially address the increasing hazard of flooding as a result of ongoing erosion, the NFIP began a multiyear plan, beginning in May 2001, to increase rates for all V Zone policies. In May 2008, V Zone rates will increase about 10%. Over the last 8 years, actuarial V Zone rates have increased 78.2%. This increase is in addition to any increases due to increased amounts of insurance.

A Zone Policies

Indicated rates for AE zones have always been calculated using the hydrologic method described in the Appendix. This model contemplates the full range of loss probabilities, and combines the distribution of likely events with damageability factors provided by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. This model has been enhanced through the years to reflect advances in our understanding of hydrology and the actual experience of the NFIP. Events of all sizes are anticipated by the model, so that the impact of Katrina does not change our perception of the exposure as much as some may expect.

As a result of the indications produced by this model, we are increasing rates in the AE zones by 6.0% for May 2008.

Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) Coverage

The 1994 National Flood Insurance Reform Act mandated a new coverage to compensate policyholders when they are required to bring their insured buildings into compliance with local floodplain ordinances as a result of being substantially damaged by a flood. The Act required this new coverage to be actuarially sound, but placed a \$75 limit on what any policyholder could be charged. Pursuant to these directives, FEMA introduced

Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) coverage in 1996, which provided payment of up to \$15,000 per eligible building. That amount was subsequently increased, first to \$20,000 in 2000, and then to \$30,000 in 2003. These increases in coverage were based on analyses of the expected claim frequency under this coverage.

The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 introduced additional refinements to ICC coverage. The most significant is allowing ICC coverage to apply, even when there has not been a recent flood loss, to the non-Federal cost-share requirement of FEMA-funded mitigation projects for individual buildings. The rule-making necessary to implement these changes is still in development.

The ICC premium for PRP policyholders is increasing from \$1 to \$6.

Mortgage Portfolio Protection Program (MPPP)

The Mortgage Portfolio Protection Program (MPPP) was introduced in 1991 as an additional tool to assist the mortgage lending and servicing industries in bringing their mortgage portfolios into compliance with the flood insurance requirements of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, as amended. Since the lender or servicer issuing the MPPP policy usually does not have adequate underwriting data for the building being insured, a policy written through the MPPP requires less underwriting data. For this reason, FEMA has targeted MPPP rates at levels that will compensate us for the greater uncertainty in these risks. Effective May 1, 2003, MPPP rates were increased for the first time in several years. In a continuing effort to keep these rates in line with those charged to our non-MPPP policyholders, we are increasing MPPP rates in line with the revisions to the AE and VE Zone rates.

Exhibit D – Analysis of NFIP Projected Income and Expenses

This exhibit details the various administrative expenses as well as the losses associated with the historical non-catastrophic average loss year. It further illustrates the expected revenue shortfall due to interest expenses servicing more than \$17 billion in borrowing from the Treasury to cover losses incurred during 2004 and 2005. Were it not for this debt, the exhibit would show that premium income would be more than sufficient to meet losses and administrative expenses and would provide a small contribution to surplus.

Exhibits

The exhibits on the following pages include the information below.

- A.** Effects of Rate Revisions on Written Premium
- B.** Insurance Underwriting Experience (five exhibits, B1 through B5)
- C.** Calendar/Accident Years 1978-2006 Experience for the Larger Risk Zones
- D.** Analysis of NFIP Projected Income and Expenses, May 1, 2008 – May 1, 2009
- E.** Projected Annual Premium Requirements Based on 1978-2006 Loss Experience vs. Projected Written Premium

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM

Effects of Rate Revision on Average Annual Written Premium (plus FPF) per Policyholder*
Based on Projected Distribution of Business and Projected Amounts of Insurance

	Distribution of Business	Average Annual Premium with May 2008 Rates	Increase over Annual Premium with Current Rates
REGULAR PROGRAM - ACTUARIAL RATES			
AE	29.2%	437.47	6.0%
A	1.7%	729.09	8.2%
AO,AH	0.6%	802.67	10.7%
AOB,AHB	8.0%	308.99	7.2%
ZONES AE,A,AO,AH,AOB,AHB	39.6%	429.92	6.5%
POST-81 V,VE	0.9%	2,270.27	10.3%
B,C,X ACTUARIAL (Standard)	37.3%	394.34	9.1%
PRP	10.1%	592.72	10.1%
	27.2%	320.67	8.4%
SUB-TOTAL ACTUARIAL	77.8%	435.35	7.8%
REGULAR PROGRAM - SUBSIDIZED RATES			
PRE-FIRM SUBSIDIZED** (Pre-FIRM V, VE)	21.1%	1,009.30	7.5%
	0.8%	1,525.50	9.7%
75-81 POST V,VE	0.1%	1,168.69	9.6%
A99 POST	0.8%	744.46	10.4%
AR	0.1%	773.00	10.4%
EMERGENCY	0.0%	356.82	1.4%
SUB-TOTAL SUBSIDIZED	22.2%	998.48	7.6%
TOTAL	100.0%	560.48	7.8%

*Computations are based on counting and pricing units insured under Condo Master Policies separately.

**The category, PRE-FIRM SUBSIDIZED, includes Pre-FIRM V,VE which was broken out in order to show the premium increase for that subset of policies.

Exhibit A. Effects of Rate Revisions on Written Premium, Page 1

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
History of Rate Changes by Risk Group for the Latest 5 Years

	Distribution of Business	Percentage Rate Change Effective:				
		May-08	May-07	May-06	May-05	Apr-04
REGULAR PROGRAM - ACTUARIAL RATES						
AE ACTUARIAL	29.2%	6.0%	5.7%	2.5%	2.5%	2.8%
A ACTUARIAL	1.7%	8.2%	8.3%	5.2%	4.4%	3.0%
AO,AH ACTUARIAL	0.6%	10.7%	9.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
AOB,AHB	8.0%	7.2%	9.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ZONES AE,A,AO,AH,AOB,AHB	39.6%	6.5%	6.5%	2.2%	2.2%	2.3%
POST-81 V,VE ACTUARIAL	0.9%	10.3%	9.9%	5.7%	0.0%	7.5%
B,C,X ACTUARIAL (Standard)	37.3%	9.1%	3.7%	2.6%	2.7%	0.0%
(PRP)	10.1%	10.1%	9.7%	5.6%	6.2%	0.0%
	27.2%	8.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SUB-TOTAL ACTUARIAL	77.8%	7.8%	5.4%	2.6%	2.3%	1.6% 0.1%*
REGULAR PROGRAM - SUBSIDIZED RATES						
PRE-FIRM SUBSIDIZED (Pre-FIRM V, VE)	21.1%	7.5%	6.8%	6.2%	0.1%	5.1%
	0.8%	9.7%	9.4%	8.8%	0.0%	5.6%
75-81 POST V,VE	0.1%	9.6%	9.4%	9.1%	0.0%	7.7%
A99 PRE + POST	0.8%	10.4%	10.3%	6.4%	5.8%	0.0%
AR	0.1%	10.4%	10.4%	6.9%	6.2%	0.0%
EMERGENCY	0.0%	1.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
SUB-TOTAL SUBSIDIZED	22.2%	7.6%	7.0%	6.2%	0.3%	4.9%
TOTAL	100.0%	7.8%	6.0%	4.1%	1.4%	3.0% 2.2%*

* Although not shown as a separate category on this exhibit, a new Non-Residential Preferred Risk Policy (PRP) was introduced in May 2004 that allows current Standard X Zone policyholders who qualify to realize significant premium decreases (up to 34%) on renewal. This reduces the overall rate change for 2004 to 2.2% and reduces the subtotal for actuarially rated policies to 0.1%.

EXHIBIT B1
Page 1

FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
UNDERWRITING EXPERIENCE BY CALENDAR/ACCIDENT YEAR

Year	Earned Exposures (Millions)	Average Amount of Insurance per Policy	Earned Premium (\$ Millions)	Loss & Allocated Loss Adjustment Expenses (\$ Millions)	Average Premium	Average Operating Expense incl. Agts Comm.	Average Loss & ALAE Cost per Policy	Interest on 2005 Borrowings	Underwriting Profit/ (Deficit) per Policy
2006	5.14	\$184,891	\$2,252.8	\$629.6	\$438.36	\$136.61	\$122.51	\$101.87	\$77.37
2005	4.66	\$170,683	\$1,967.6	\$17,765.0	\$422.46	\$263.15	\$3,814.38	\$1.12	(\$3,656.19)
2004	4.50	\$155,816	\$1,811.8	\$2,237.4	\$402.81	\$153.62	\$497.43		(\$248.23)
2003	4.42	\$147,617	\$1,697.5	\$794.2	\$384.06	\$141.83	\$179.69		\$62.54
2002	4.37	\$140,771	\$1,611.4	\$448.3	\$368.94	\$132.76	\$102.65		\$133.53
2001	4.29	\$132,928	\$1,511.5	\$1,322.7	\$352.62	\$133.50	\$308.58		(\$89.46)
2000	4.25	\$126,322	\$1,416.4	\$262.7	\$333.33	\$124.35	\$61.83		\$147.15
1999	4.17	\$119,569	\$1,319.4	\$790.1	\$316.39	\$120.91	\$189.45		\$6.02
1998	4.09	\$115,639	\$1,224.8	\$921.9	\$299.74	\$110.47	\$225.62		(\$36.35)
1997	3.80	\$108,397	\$1,041.3	\$540.9	\$274.31	\$99.49	\$142.48		\$32.34
1996	3.52	\$102,309	\$904.9	\$858.3	\$256.73	\$97.76	\$243.51		(\$84.54)
1995	3.20	\$99,023	\$819.4	\$1,332.3	\$256.14	\$100.48	\$416.43		(\$260.77)
1994	2.85	\$96,712	\$734.6	\$423.5	\$258.20	\$93.32	\$148.85		\$16.04
1993	2.67	\$94,301	\$667.9	\$678.4	\$250.45	\$92.64	\$254.39		(\$96.58)
1992	2.54	\$90,400	\$626.9	\$734.6	\$246.90	\$91.83	\$289.34		(\$134.26)

Exhibit B1. Key Underwriting Components by Year, 1978-2006, Page 1

FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
UNDERWRITING EXPERIENCE BY CALENDAR/ACCIDENT YEAR

EXHIBIT B1
Page 2

Year	Earned Exposures (Millions)	Average Amount of Insurance per Policy	Earned Premium (\$ Millions)	Loss & Allocated Loss Adjustment Expenses (\$ Millions)	Average Premium	Average Operating Expense incl. Agts Comm.	Average Loss & ALAE Cost per Policy	Interest on 2005 Borrowings	Underwriting Profit/ (Deficit) per Policy
1991	2.47	\$87,527	\$602.2	\$367.9	\$243.48	\$84.65	\$148.76		\$10.08
1990	2.33	\$85,005	\$570.4	\$174.2	\$244.40	\$82.40	\$74.63		\$87.37
1989	2.17	\$83,044	\$531.3	\$677.6	\$244.59	\$87.40	\$311.96		(\$154.77)
1988	2.10	\$80,350	\$491.3	\$53.5	\$234.44	\$73.56	\$25.55		\$135.33
1987	2.07	\$76,700	\$462.1	\$110.2	\$222.74	\$70.14	\$53.09		\$99.50
1986	2.03	\$71,110	\$403.4	\$131.5	\$198.25	\$63.53	\$64.60		\$70.12
1985	1.92	\$66,888	\$364.8	\$382.4	\$189.95	\$55.49	\$199.08		(\$64.63)
1984	1.92	\$61,862	\$334.9	\$265.8	\$174.68	\$48.10	\$138.67		(\$12.08)
1983	1.92	\$58,105	\$313.0	\$460.8	\$163.24	\$42.07	\$240.31		(\$119.15)
1982	1.89	\$55,168	\$247.7	\$209.4	\$130.90	\$38.76	\$110.68		(\$18.55)
1981	1.97	\$50,883	\$181.0	\$134.9	\$92.00	\$31.60	\$68.57		(\$8.17)
1980	1.95	\$45,101	\$149.2	\$244.0	\$76.38	\$29.51	\$124.92		(\$78.05)
1979	1.62	\$37,650	\$125.5	\$505.8	\$77.26	\$23.80	\$311.40		(\$257.94)
1978	1.06	\$33,150	\$81.8	\$155.6	\$77.20	\$26.85	\$146.87		(\$96.52)

Exhibit B1 (cont'd). Key Underwriting Components by Year, 1978-2006, Page 2

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1) Average Amount of Insurance per Policy	\$108,397	\$115,639	\$119,569	\$126,322	\$132,928
2) Earned Premium (A)	\$1,041,260,695	\$1,224,760,631	\$1,319,441,660	\$1,416,380,461	\$1,511,487,080
3) Losses Incurred (B)	\$518,383,437	\$872,960,993	\$750,154,116	\$248,606,546	\$1,269,703,277
4) Allocated Loss Adjustment Expenses (ALAE)	\$22,467,703	\$48,943,656	\$39,927,613	\$14,120,047	\$53,009,929
5) Loss & ALAE Ratio	0.519	0.753	0.599	0.185	0.875
6A) Insurance Agent Commission--Direct	\$14,472,665	\$15,328,404	\$14,988,564	\$14,409,800	\$14,378,966
6B) Agent Commission Allowance--WYO	\$141,716,439	\$168,385,690	\$182,927,685	\$198,047,270	\$212,344,096
7A) General Expense--Direct & Bureau	\$39,331,000	\$46,326,000	\$74,198,000	\$75,472,000	\$59,575,000
7B) Interest Payments on 2005 Borrowings					
7C) Operating Allowance (includes ULAE) --WYO (C)	\$182,146,314	\$221,343,946	\$232,135,338	\$240,463,054	\$285,952,789
8) Earned Exposure (D)	3,795,920	4,086,074	4,170,322	4,249,238	4,286,469
9) Average Premium	\$274.31	\$299.74	\$316.39	\$333.33	\$352.62
10) Average Operating Costs Other than Agent Commission & Loss Adjustment Expense	\$58.35	\$65.51	\$73.46	\$74.35	\$80.61
11) Average Insurance Agents' Commission	\$41.15	\$44.96	\$47.46	\$50.00	\$52.89
12) Average Loss & Loss Adjuster Cost per Policy (E)	\$142.48	\$225.62	\$189.45	\$61.83	\$308.58
13) Operating Profit/(Deficit) per Policy	\$32.34	(\$36.35)	\$6.02	\$147.15	(\$89.46)

(A) Does not include Federal Policy Fee, nor are the expenses covered by that fee reflected in this exhibit. Also, Group Flood and MPPP premium is excluded.

(B) Includes an allowance for open claims. In addition, Group Flood and MPPP losses are excluded.

(C) Operating Allowance for 2005 is higher than in other years because ULAE, which is included in all years, is a fixed percent (3.3%) of reported losses, which were extraordinary in 2005.

(D) This exhibit counts exposures by policy and by each unit covered by a Residential Condominium Building Association Policy (RCBAP).

(E) Average Loss & Loss Adjuster Cost per Policy does not include ULAE, which is included in line 7C.

Exhibit B2. Detailed Underwriting Experience by Year for the Latest 10 Years, Page 1

FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
UNDERWRITING EXPERIENCE BY CALENDAR/ACCIDENT YEAR

EXHIBIT B2
PAGE 2

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
1) Average Amount of Insurance per Policy	\$140,771	\$147,617	\$155,816	\$170,683	\$184,891
2) Earned Premium (A)	\$1,611,438,106	\$1,697,509,226	\$1,811,799,962	\$1,967,567,898	\$2,252,790,788
3) Losses Incurred (B)	\$425,223,334	\$753,712,700	\$2,144,539,242	\$17,264,799,898	\$601,273,557
4) Allocated Loss Adjustment Expenses (ALAE)	\$23,108,582	\$40,486,953	\$92,827,955	\$500,168,145	\$28,319,988
5) Loss & ALAE Ratio	0.278	0.468	1.235	9.029	0.279
6A) Insurance Agent Commission--Direct	\$14,101,186	\$13,648,484	\$13,397,898	\$13,358,493	\$13,421,367
6B) Agent Commission Allowance--WYO	\$227,614,530	\$240,977,900	\$258,372,096	\$281,776,692	\$324,497,251
7A) General Expense--Direct & Bureau	\$46,954,000	\$60,912,000	\$45,900,000	\$54,800,000	\$60,000,000
7B) Interest Payments on 2005 Borrowings				\$5,232,218	\$523,535,548
7C) Operating Allowance (includes ULAE) --WYO (C)	\$291,191,768	\$311,336,853	\$373,289,167	\$875,628,207	\$304,133,255
8) Earned Exposure (D)	4,367,746	4,419,861	4,497,861	4,657,365	5,139,121
9) Average Premium	\$368.94	\$384.06	\$402.81	\$422.46	\$438.36
10) Average Operating Costs Other than Agent Commission & Loss Adjustment Expense	\$77.42	\$84.22	\$93.20	\$200.90	\$172.73
11) Average Insurance Agents' Commission	\$55.34	\$57.61	\$60.42	\$63.37	\$65.75
12) Average Loss & Loss Adjuster Cost per Policy (E)	\$102.65	\$179.69	\$497.43	\$3,814.38	\$122.51
13) Operating Profit/(Deficit) per Policy	\$133.53	\$62.54	(\$248.23)	(\$3,656.19)	\$77.37
=== =====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====

- (A) Does not include Federal Policy Fee, nor are the expenses covered by that fee reflected in this exhibit. Also, Group Flood and MPPP premium is excluded.
- (B) Includes an allowance for open claims. In addition, Group Flood and MPPP losses are excluded.
- (C) Operating Allowance for 2005 is higher than in other years because ULAE, which is included in all years, is a fixed percent (3.3%) of reported losses, which were extraordinary in 2005.
- (D) This exhibit counts exposures by policy and by each unit covered by a Residential Condominium Building Association Policy (RCBAP).
- (E) Average Loss & Loss Adjuster Cost per Policy does not include ULAE, which is included in line 7C.

Exhibit B2 (cont'd.). Detailed Underwriting Experience by Year for the Latest 10 Years, Page 2

FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
LOSS AND EXPENSE EXHIBIT

EXHIBIT B3

1986 to Present (excluding 2005) represents period of reduced subsidies, excluding high-impact year of 2005 (Katrina, Rita, Wilma)

	1969-1977	1978-1985	1986-2006 (ex-2005)	2005	1986-2006	1969-2006
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
FINANCIAL DATA						
1) Earned Exposure	2,933,939	14,252,026	66,972,333	4,657,365	71,629,699	88,815,664
2) Earned Premium	208,191,752	\$1,797,881,733	20,701,365,595	\$1,967,567,898	22,668,933,493	24,675,006,978
3) Losses Incurred	290,363,185	\$2,249,157,887	12,948,122,329	\$17,264,799,898	30,212,922,227	32,752,443,299
4) Allocated Loss Adjustment Expense	22,146,853	\$109,638,797	541,603,268	\$500,168,145	1,041,771,413	1,173,557,063
5) Insurance Agent Commission	44,817,526	\$283,074,261	\$3,118,563,332	\$295,135,185	3,413,698,517	3,741,590,304
6) Direct & Bureau General Expense and WYO Operating Allowance	75,071,236	\$256,639,638	\$4,360,698,393	\$930,428,207	5,291,126,599	5,622,837,474
7) Interest Charge on 2005 Borrowings*				\$528,767,766	528,767,766	528,767,766
ANALYSIS OF COSTS						
8) Average Premium per Policy	\$70.96	\$126.15	\$309.10	\$422.46	\$316.47	\$277.82
9) Average Loss & Allocated Loss Adjuster Cost per Exposure Unit	\$106.52	\$165.51	\$201.42	\$3,814.38	\$436.34	\$381.98
10) Average Insurance Agents Commission	\$15.28	\$19.86	\$46.56	\$63.37	\$47.66	\$42.13
11) Average Operating Costs Other Than Agt. Commission & Alloc. Loss Adj. Expense	\$25.59	\$18.01	\$65.11	\$86.24	\$73.87	\$63.31
12) Interest Payments on 2005 Borrowing				\$113.53	\$7.38	\$5.95
13) Operating Profit/(Deficit) per Policy	(\$76.42)	(\$77.23)	(\$4.00)	(\$3,655.06)	(\$248.77)	(\$215.55)
14) Loss Adjuster Expense as a Percentage of Loss	7.6%	4.9%	4.2%	2.9%	3.4%	3.6%
15) Agent Commission as a Percentage of Premium	21.5%	15.7%	15.1%	15.0%	15.1%	15.2%

* All interest on 2005 borrowings are attributed to the 2005 year regardless of when the interest payments are actually paid (\$529M interest includes \$5M paid in calendar year 2005 and \$524M paid in calendar year 2006).

Exhibit B3. Detailed Underwriting Experience Aggregated by Experience Period

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
ACTUARIAL INFORMATION SYSTEMLOSS AND EXPENSE EXPERIENCE
Accident Period 1978-2006

	VE,V1-V30 Post-FIRM Post 10/81	Unnumbered A Zone Post-FIRM	AE,A1-A30 Post-FIRM & Pre-FIRM Actuarial	B,C,X Standard	B,C,X PRP	AO & AH Post-FIRM	AOB & AHB	Actuarial Totals
1) Earned Exposures	442,585	1,477,357	22,140,397	16,452,403	8,381,752	407,145	4,686,025	53,987,664
2) Average Earned Premium	\$1,054.78	\$338.09	\$226.45	\$222.83	\$230.83	\$407.93	\$185.77	\$233.71
3) Number of Paid Losses	7,225	9,351	195,004	179,987	83,587	1,969	18,748	495,871
4) Average Loss Payment	\$34,889.05	\$18,862.29	\$51,854.14	\$22,090.90	\$41,066.96	\$45,900.47	\$26,719.55	\$37,389.31
5) Loss Ratio	0.54	0.35	2.02	1.08	1.77	0.54	0.58	1.47
6) Loss Frequency per 100 Policy Contracts	2.5	0.7	1.2	1.3	1.0	0.5	0.5	1.1
7) Average Loss Cost per Policy Holder	\$569.55	\$119.39	\$456.71	\$241.67	\$409.54	\$221.98	\$106.90	\$343.42
8) Other Expenses (Average per Policyholder)								
a) Servicing Facility/WYO Operating Allowance	\$139.28	\$68.62	\$57.61	\$57.26	\$70.69	\$75.51	\$53.60	\$60.29
b) Agent Commission	\$158.22	\$50.71	\$33.97	\$33.43	\$34.62	\$61.19	\$27.87	\$35.06
c) Loss Adjuster	\$23.24	\$5.31	\$14.34	\$8.80	\$14.20	\$7.22	\$4.31	\$11.53
d) Int. on 2005 Borrowing ¹	\$6.02	\$0.69	\$11.27	\$2.35	\$8.74	\$5.03	\$2.01	\$6.97
e) Total	\$326.76	\$125.34	\$117.19	\$101.83	\$128.26	\$148.94	\$87.79	\$113.85
9) Operating Surplus/(Deficit) ² per Policyholder on Paid Basis	\$158.48	\$93.36	(\$347.45)	(\$120.67)	(\$306.97)	\$37.01	(\$8.92)	(\$223.56)
10) Total Operating Surplus/(Deficit)	\$70,141,250	\$137,923,715	(\$7,692,570,205)	(\$1,985,269,867)	(\$2,572,950,228)	\$15,068,317	(\$41,798,175)	(\$12,069,455,194)

¹ Interest on 2005 borrowings has been allocated based on the Total Operating Deficit for the year 2005 alone.² The operating surplus is the policyholder contribution in periods of relatively better loss experience towards reserves used to fund high loss years.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
ACTUARIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

LOSS AND EXPENSE EXPERIENCE
Accident Period 1978-2006

	VE,V1-V30							
	Pre-FIRM	Post-FIRM Pre 10/81	A Zone Pre-FIRM	AE,A1-A30 Pre-FIRM	AO & AH Pre-FIRM	Emergency Program	Subsidized Totals	Program Totals
1) Earned Exposures	1,350,854	254,103	4,573,792	17,956,584	1,415,697	3,206,701	28,757,730	85,820,714
2) Average Earned Premium	\$484.90	\$406.43	\$354.41	\$428.01	\$429.06	\$112.48	\$383.66	\$284.81
3) Number of Paid Losses	30,968	4,164	82,839	412,198	8,428	104,890	643,487	1,174,122
4) Average Loss Payment	\$22,805.56	\$29,698.80	\$15,198.30	\$24,398.60	\$24,462.22	\$5,653.72	\$20,117.21	\$27,221.80
5) Loss Ratio	1.08	1.20	0.78	1.31	0.34	1.64	1.17	1.31
6) Loss Frequency per 100 Policy Contracts	2.7	2.5	1.8	2.5	0.6	3.3	2.4	1.6
7) Average Loss Cost per Policy Holder	\$522.81	\$486.68	\$275.27	\$560.08	\$145.63	\$184.93	\$450.15	\$372.42
8) Other Expenses (Average per Policyholder)								
a) Servicing Facility/WYO Operating Allowance	\$83.09	\$75.36	\$70.23	\$77.49	\$77.59	\$46.38	\$73.11	\$64.60
b) Agent Commission	\$72.74	\$60.96	\$53.16	\$64.20	\$64.36	\$16.87	\$57.55	\$42.72
c) Loss Adjuster	\$18.96	\$17.13	\$11.56	\$20.51	\$5.73	\$10.46	\$17.14	\$13.21
d) Int. on 2005 Borrowing ¹	\$4.65	\$3.02	\$0.43	\$7.56	\$2.17	\$0.00	\$5.14	\$6.16
e) Total	\$179.43	\$156.47	\$135.39	\$169.76	\$149.85	\$73.71	\$152.94	\$126.70
9) Operating Surplus/(Deficit) ² per Policyholder on Paid Basis	(\$217.34)	(\$236.72)	(\$56.24)	(\$301.82)	\$133.58	(\$146.16)	(\$219.43)	(\$214.31)
10) Total Operating Surplus/(Deficit)	(\$293,597,727)	(\$60,151,806)	(\$257,217,867)	(\$5,419,733,041)	\$189,104,774	(\$468,690,091)	(\$6,310,285,759)	(\$18,392,236,653)

¹ Interest on 2005 borrowings has been allocated based on the Total Operating Deficit for the year 2005 alone.

² The operating surplus is the policyholder contribution in periods of relatively better loss experience towards reserves used to fund high loss years.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
ACTUARIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

LOSS AND EXPENSE EXPERIENCE
Accident Period 1986-2006

	VE,V1-V30 Post-FIRM Post 10/81	Unnumbered A Zone Post-FIRM	AE,A1-A30 Post-FIRM & Pre-FIRM Actuarial	B,C,X Standard	B,C,X PRP	AO & AH Post-FIRM	AOB & AHB	Actuarial Totals
1) Earned Exposures	435,300	1,318,554	20,554,413	12,340,787	8,381,752	400,919	4,647,587	48,079,312
2) Average Earned Premium	\$1,061.08	\$355.13	\$236.22	\$263.02	\$230.83	\$410.75	\$186.34	\$249.52
3) Number of Paid Losses	7,012	8,411	182,164	119,933	83,587	1,955	18,674	421,736
4) Average Loss Payment	\$35,721.19	\$20,025.64	\$54,888.01	\$29,354.18	\$41,066.96	\$46,150.38	\$26,767.61	\$42,587.81
5) Loss Ratio	0.54	0.36	2.06	1.08	1.77	0.55	0.58	1.50
6) Loss Frequency per 100 Policy Contracts	2.5	0.7	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.5	0.5	1.1
7) Average Loss Cost per Policy Holder	\$575.41	\$127.74	\$486.45	\$285.28	\$409.54	\$225.04	\$107.55	\$373.57
8) Other Expenses (Average per Policyholder)								
a) Servicing Facility/WYO								
Operating Allowance	\$151.92	\$77.19	\$64.60	\$67.44	\$70.69	\$83.08	\$59.32	\$67.17
b) Agent Commission	\$159.16	\$53.27	\$35.43	\$39.45	\$34.62	\$61.61	\$27.95	\$37.43
c) Loss Adjuster	\$23.41	\$5.64	\$15.21	\$9.99	\$14.20	\$7.31	\$4.34	\$12.39
d) Int. on 2005 Borrowing ¹	\$6.12	\$0.78	\$12.14	\$3.13	\$8.74	\$5.11	\$2.03	\$7.83
e) Total	\$340.61	\$136.88	\$127.38	\$120.01	\$128.26	\$157.11	\$93.65	\$124.82
9) Operating Surplus/(Deficit) ² per Policyholder on Paid Basis	\$145.06	\$90.51	(\$377.61)	(\$142.27)	(\$306.97)	\$28.59	(\$14.85)	(\$248.87)
10) Total Operating Surplus/(Deficit)	\$63,144,262	\$119,344,318	(\$7,761,558,885)	(\$1,755,764,265)	(\$2,572,950,228)	\$11,464,035	(\$69,037,835)	(\$11,965,358,598)

¹ Interest on 2005 borrowings has been allocated based on the Total Operating Deficit for the year 2005 alone.

² The operating surplus is the policyholder contribution in periods of relatively better loss experience towards reserves used to fund high loss years.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
ACTUARIAL INFORMATION SYSTEM

LOSS AND EXPENSE EXPERIENCE
Accident Period 1986-2006

	VE,V1-V30							
	Pre-FIRM	Post-FIRM Pre 10/81	A Zone Pre-FIRM	AE,A1-A30 Pre-FIRM	AO & AH Pre-FIRM	Emergency Program	Subsidized Totals	Program Totals
1) Earned Exposures	956,460	201,186	3,719,144	14,980,899	1,305,446	205,212	21,368,347	71,570,277
2) Average Earned Premium	\$601.25	\$445.84	\$400.22	\$481.81	\$451.48	\$209.97	\$468.16	\$316.40
3) Number of Paid Losses	21,734	3,122	62,432	322,233	7,542	4,152	421,215	858,468
4) Average Loss Payment	\$28,795.88	\$36,375.00	\$17,375.84	\$29,016.25	\$26,442.36	\$10,301.71	\$27,103.54	\$34,611.54
5) Loss Ratio	1.09	1.27	0.73	1.30	0.34	0.99	1.14	1.31
6) Loss Frequency per 100 Policy Contracts	3.0	2.8	1.7	2.4	0.6	2.1	2.1	1.4
7) Average Loss Cost per Policy Holder	\$654.34	\$564.47	\$291.68	\$624.13	\$152.77	\$208.43	\$534.27	\$415.16
8) Other Expenses (Average per Policyholder)								
a) Servicing Facility/WYO Operating Allowance	\$103.24	\$86.79	\$81.96	\$90.60	\$87.39	\$61.83	\$89.15	\$73.87
b) Agent Commission	\$90.19	\$66.88	\$60.03	\$72.27	\$67.72	\$31.50	\$70.22	\$47.46
c) Loss Adjuster	\$22.92	\$19.18	\$12.17	\$22.47	\$5.96	\$8.57	\$19.52	\$14.31
d) Int. on 2005 Borrowing ¹	\$6.56	\$3.82	\$0.53	\$9.06	\$2.36	\$0.06	\$6.92	\$7.39
e) Total	\$222.91	\$176.66	\$154.70	\$194.40	\$163.43	\$101.95	\$185.82	\$143.03
9) Operating Surplus/(Deficit) ² per Policyholder on Paid Basis	(\$276.00)	(\$295.29)	(\$46.16)	(\$336.72)	\$135.28	(\$100.41)	(\$251.93)	(\$241.78)
10) Total Operating Surplus/(Deficit)	(\$263,984,882)	(\$59,409,019)	(\$171,674,357)	(\$5,044,343,500)	\$176,603,015	(\$20,605,042)	(\$5,383,413,785)	(\$17,304,549,154)

¹ Interest on 2005 borrowings has been allocated based on the Total Operating Deficit for the year 2005 alone.

² The operating surplus is the policyholder contribution in periods of relatively better loss experience towards reserves used to fund high loss years.

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
Analysis of Pure Premium per Policyholder
 Based on Claims and Policy Data for Accident Years 1978-2006
 Consolidated Data (excluding ICC)

EXHIBIT C


Program Type / Zone	(1) Earned Exposure (\$M)	(2) Earned Premium (\$M)	(3) Losses Paid (\$M)	(4) Allocated Loss Adjustment Expense (\$M)	(5) Loss & Loss Adj Exp Inc'd on 5/1/2009 Cost Level (\$M)	(6) Number of Paid Losses	(7) Pure Premium on 5/1/2009 Cost Level
Post-FIRM -- Subject to Actuarial Rate Schedules							
AE, A01-A30							
+ Elevated	10.49	1,961.3	3,619.6	114.2	4,389.6	71,161	418.41
0 Elevated	3.16	1,049.3	2,247.2	64.9	2,650.6	30,956	838.81
- Elevated	0.84	459.4	402.0	15.7	509.4	12,335	604.40
Subtotal	14.49	3,469.9	6,268.8	194.7	7,549.5	114,452	520.88
A	1.48	495.5	176.6	7.9	253.2	9,364	171.33
AO and AH	0.41	164.6	90.4	2.9	108.9	1,969	267.57
AOB and AHB	3.36	645.3	294.0	12.8	376.5	13,122	112.02
Post-'81 VE, V01-V30							
+ Elevated	0.31	265.3	189.6	7.2	245.4	5,564	780.03
0 Elevated	0.05	66.6	21.4	1.0	28.4	588	619.13
- Elevated	0.08	130.6	41.0	2.1	51.6	1,064	636.78
Subtotal	0.44	462.5	252.0	10.3	325.5	7,216	737.01
B, C, X							
Standard	4.68	1,241.0	1,125.2	37.8	1,529.6	30,088	326.73
Preferred Risk (PRP)	4.24	1,008.7	1,424.0	46.7	1,694.9	28,029	400.20
Subtotal	8.92	2,249.7	2,549.2	84.6	3,224.4	58,117	361.62
ALL ZONES COMBINED	29.19	7,525.4	9,641.2	313.6	11,854.5	204,749	406.16
Pre-FIRM -- Electing Actuarial Rate Schedules							
AOB and AHB	1.33	210.9	207.0	7.4	257.5	5,626	194.33
AE, A01-A30							
+ Elevated	5.88	949.3	2,264.8	74.1	2,814.6	51,771	478.31
0 Elevated	1.76	546.7	1,578.2	48.7	1,900.9	28,781	1,078.83
Subtotal	7.65	1,496.0	3,843.0	122.7	4,715.5	80,552	616.69
B, C, X							
Standard	11.77	2,409.2	2,850.9	107.0	4,502.2	149,899	382.48
Preferred Risk (PRP)	4.15	894.8	2,008.7	72.3	2,445.9	55,558	589.84
Subtotal	15.92	3,304.0	4,859.6	179.3	6,948.1	205,457	436.50
ALL ZONES COMBINED	24.89	5,010.9	8,909.5	309.4	11,921.1	291,635	478.97
Post-FIRM -- Electing Subsidized Rate Schedules							
A99	0.32	101.1	38.1	1.1	45.1	806	141.06
Pre-'81 VE, V01-V30							
+ Elevated	0.18	63.5	83.8	3.0	132.2	3,162	729.63
0 Elevated	0.05	15.7	21.7	0.7	29.7	442	624.49
- Elevated	0.02	22.7	18.0	0.7	25.3	540	1,050.50
Subtotal	0.25	101.9	123.5	4.3	187.2	4,144	740.44
ALL ZONES COMBINED	0.60	213.1	162.1	5.5	233.2	4,990	391.68
Pre-FIRM -- Electing Subsidized Rate Schedules							
A	5.70	1,741.0	1,450.9	61.4	2,478.8	104,418	434.52
AE, A01-A30	17.96	7,248.1	10,057.1	368.3	14,273.9	412,198	794.91
All Other A Zones	2.64	924.99	346.82	12.86	451.46	0.01	170.78
V, VE	1.35	639.5	706.2	25.6	1,105.0	30,968	817.99
Other (Pre- & Post-FIRM)	0.34	93.6	99.7	3.8	184.0	7,355	533.92
ALL ZONES COMBINED	28.00	10,647.1	12,660.7	472.0	18,493.3	568,138	660.46
TOTAL	82.67	23,396.6	31,373.6	1,100.6	42,502.0	1,069,512	514.11
Emergency	3.21	361.2	593.7	33.5	1,636.9	104,912	509.91
Group Flood Ins Policy (GFIP)	0.27	30.8	69.2	3.2	87.1	7,214	317.09
Mortgage Portfolio (MPPP)	0.06	48.3	11.5	0.5	14.6	509	230.65
GRAND TOTAL	86.22	23,836.9	32,048.0	1,137.8	44,240.6	1,182,147	513.12

Note: Pure premium reflects full weight for AY 2005 and Katrina. Our analysis suggests 2005 should be accorded perhaps 1% weight, to reflect the relative likelihood of such an event. See Rate Review for further discussion.

Exhibit C. Calendar/Accident Years 1978-2006 Experience for the Larger Risk Zones

EXHIBIT D

Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Flood Insurance Program
Analysis of NFIP Projected Income and Expenses
May 1, 2008 – May 1, 2009
(\$ Billions)



The chart above shows the prospective expenses and losses associated with the average premium resulting from the May 1, 2008, rate changes. These items fall into four categories, described below. The percentages sum to 111.3%; that total includes the \$343.4 million by which expenses are expected to exceed income during the year ending May 1, 2009.

¹**Debt Obligations (24.4%)** consists of annual interest expense of about \$748 million. The NFIP had about \$17.5 billion in outstanding Treasury borrowing at the end of fiscal year 2007.

²**Loss and Loss Adjustment Expense (50.9%)** includes \$1.45 billion for annual losses, which represents the current estimated historical average loss year as explained on pages 5-6. This also includes \$112 million for compensation to adjusters and to handle claims office overhead.

³**WYO Allowance (28.7%)** consists of three components. Premium tax (2.3%) and agents' commissions (14.3%) are pass-through costs incurred by the WYO (Write Your Own) companies. The remaining amount (12.1%) is retained by the WYO companies to cover their expenses.

⁴**Other Operating Expenses (7.3%)** consists of the Federal Policy Fee (4.7%), which covers salaries, mapping, mitigation grants, etc., and fixed expenses (2.6%). Fixed expenses covers such items as contractor costs and the NFIP's FloodSmart marketing and advertising program.

Exhibit D. Analysis of NFIP Projected Income and Expenses, May 1, 2008 – May 1, 2009

NFIP Actuarial Rate Review
Supporting May 1, 2008, Rate Changes

EXHIBIT E

Average Annual Premium Required per Policyholder
for Historical Average Loss Year (w/o ICC)
vs.
Projected Premium Written with May 2008 Rates

Based on 2008/2009 Cost Levels

	Distribution of Business	Average Annual Premium Indicated by Historical Average Loss Levels and Projected Expenses	Projected Average Annual Written Premium* with May 2008 Rates (excluding ICC)	Projected Premium Expressed as Percentage of Historical Indicated Premium**
REGULAR PROGRAM - ACTUARIAL RATES				
AE ACTUARIAL	29.2%	411.43	433.48	105.4%
A ACTUARIAL	1.7%	316.38	723.10	228.6%
AO,AH ACTUARIAL	0.6%	272.75	797.67	292.4%
AOB,AHB	8.0%	241.95	304.64	125.9%
ZONES AE,A,AO,AH,AOB,AHB	39.6%	370.79	425.74	114.8%
POST-81 V,VE ACTUARIAL	0.9%	846.45	2,255.73	266.5%
B,C,X ACTUARIAL	37.3%	398.52	388.99	97.6%
(Standard)	10.1%	454.63	589.11	129.6%
PRP	27.2%	377.68	314.67	83.3%
SUB-TOTAL ACTUARIAL	77.8%	389.89	430.48	110.4%
REGULAR PROGRAM - SUBSIDIZED RATES				
PRE-FIRM SUBSIDIZED***	21.1%	796.39	948.60	119.1%
(Pre-FIRM V, VE)	0.8%	866.52	1,478.33	170.6%
75-81 POST V,VE	0.1%	916.20	1152.89	125.8%
A99 PRE + POST	0.8%	232.41	739.23	318.1%
AR	0.1%	174.98	767.76	438.8%
EMERGENCY	0.0%	820.99	356.82	43.5%
SUB-TOTAL SUBSIDIZED	22.2%	773.56	940.47	121.6%
TOTAL	100.0%	475.14	543.80	114.5%

*All computations are based on counting and pricing condominium units insured under Condo Master Policies separately. Projected Annual Written Premium includes \$35 Federal Policy Fee (\$13 for PRP's) for individual policies, and prorates the schedule of charges for CMP's to the units covered. Historical Indicated Premium includes the equivalent of \$29.73 Federal Policy Fee on all non-PRP policy/units and a \$13.00 Federal Policy Fee on PRP's.

** Based on 1978 - 2006 experience. with an assumption that the events of 2005 (including Katrina, Rita and Wilma) represent a 1% occurrence. Experience for that year is weighted at 1%, with all prior years weighted at 99%.

***The category PRE-FIRM SUBSIDIZED includes Pre-FIRM V, VE which was broken out to show that subset of policies.

**Exhibit E. Projected Annual Premium Requirements Based on 1978-2006 Loss Experience vs.
Projected Written Premium**

APPENDIX

Actuarial Rate Formula

Actuarial Rate Formula

Actuarial rates are applied in the rating of Post-FIRM construction and additional layer limits of insurance on all construction. This Appendix provides an overview of the actuarial rate formula that is utilized in developing these rates.

The actuarial rates are based on consideration of the risk involved and accepted actuarial principles. The actuarial rate formula may be expressed as follows:

$$RATE = \left[\sum_{i=Min}^{Max} (PELV_i \times DELV_i) \right] \times \frac{LADJ \times DED \times UINS}{EXLOSS}$$

Where: *Min* = minimum elevation relative to lowest floor at which flood damage occurs.

Max = elevation relative to lowest floor at which flood damage approaches a maximum.

The variable *PELV* is the probability of a particular water surface elevation relative to the 100-year Base Flood Elevation (BFE). For example, in Zone A10, the probability of water's rising to or above an elevation 1 foot less than the 100-year flood elevation is 1.6%, and 1 foot or more above the 100-year flood elevation is 0.6%, whereas the probability of water's rising to or above BFE is 1%. There are many risk zones, and they are based on information gathered and calculations made by engineers and hydrologists. Various Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and private engineering firms are performing detailed risk zone and elevation studies of all major flood-prone areas. The flood risk zones are determined from these detailed studies and *PELV* values are assigned to these zones. The results of these studies are published on a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) showing zones and, where appropriate, BFEs.

The assignment of *PELV* values must be accomplished in such a way as to keep the rating of policies as simple as possible and still distinguish expected average cost differences among the rate zones. There are 30 numbered A Zones for which different sets of *PELV* values may be assigned. However, there are three main technical reasons for combining risk zones for rating purposes¹¹:

- Lowest Floor Elevations are measured to the nearest foot.
- Due to the difficulty in estimating the extremely rare flood, the base frequency curves are truncated at about the 350- to 500-year event.
- The BFEs are approximations based on the best available data about the major sources of flood.

¹¹ Some of the factors that increase flood hazard (e.g., local urban drainage problems and urbanization of other parts of the watershed) are virtually impossible to quantify if the Flood Insurance Study process is to remain cost effective.

As a practical approach, in 1982 five risk zone combinations were established reflecting 1.0 foot elevations, and a minimum elevation difference of 1.5 feet between the maximum flood level and the BFE was established for the risk zones that had the lowest flood hazard factors. Considering the relative variance in flood levels that can occur because of conditions that affect a particular building site during an actual flood, even more averaging for insurance rating is reasonable for buildings constructed with a Lowest Floor Elevation of -1.0 foot or above, relative to the BFE (the elevation of a flood with an exceedance probability of 1%). In 1983, the transition to a single rate schedule was approved. This approach has provided the NFIP with the means for simplifying FIRMs.

Since 1985, all new FIRMs have shown at most ten zones. These are A, AE, V, VE, AH, AO, AR, A99, X, and D. Zone AE includes all zones formerly designated as A1-A30, and Zone VE includes all those formerly designated as V1-V30. Zone X encompasses areas formerly shown as Zones B or C.

To assure consideration of the maximum flood level that might damage a building located in a Special Flood Hazard Area (even though elevated to the BFE or higher) and to recognize a minimum price associated with the risk transfer, the use of a minimum insurance rate has been continued. This is virtually mandated when adverse selection and the uncertainty of risk elevation are factors as important as they are in flood insurance. The minimum rate is \$.16 per \$100 of basic limits building coverage.

The need to establish minimum values also can be found in the manner that the Flood Insurance Study process treats hydrologic uncertainties. The accepted methods used in the studies tend to underestimate the calculated flood frequencies when there is little or no recorded flood data. Generally, recorded data relating to flooding events exceeding the 100-year event are sparse. The number of years of recorded flood data rarely exceeds a 30-year period. Even in those instances where longer records exist, changes in floodplain characteristics partly invalidate the usefulness of the data. It is generally accepted that the uncertainties involved in calculating the 500-year flood level are significant. Statistical analysis of these calculations has been published in the American Society of Engineers *Proceedings*. It has been projected that complete reliance on the traditional flood frequency tables in the calculation of insurance rates would produce only about one-half the insurance premium required to meet the insured risk.

The variable *DELV* is the ratio of the flood damage to the value of the insurable property and is obtained from depth percent damage tables. These tables are subject to experience checks by FEMA from a review of actual flood insurance claim files. The *DELV* values are calculated by weighting the actual insurance claims experience and the previously established depth percent damage values. The weighting is accomplished by using standard actuarial techniques (credibility).

The variable *LADJ* is the loss adjustment expense factor expressed as a percentage of losses (claim payments to policyholders). This provides funds for the payment of loss adjusters' fees and special claims investigation costs that are required to determine the appropriate insurance value of the flood damage and the amount due the policyholder under the terms

and conditions of the flood insurance policy. The value of *LADJ* is currently projected to be 4.12% under the adjuster fee schedule that was implemented during 2004.

The variable *DED* is the deductible offset. This variable is required to reflect the insurance policy condition that the first \$500 of damage does not qualify for an indemnification payment. The factor *DED* is based on size of claim data produced from insurance claim files.

The variable *UINS* is the under-insurance factor and is included in the formula because flood insurance policyholders do not always insure to value. This requires that the impact of the *DELV* values in the formula be adjusted to account for the difference between property values and the amount of insurance purchased within basic and additional coverage limits for each category of risk. The value of *UINS* is determined by a review of insurance claims data.

The variable *EXLOSS* is the expected loss ratio and serves to load the actuarial rates for insurance agents' commissions and other acquisition expenses incurred in the selling of flood insurance policies and a small contingency loading. The contingency loading is 10% in non-velocity zones and 20% in velocity zones.

